Historical constructions of postcolonial citizenship and subjectivity: the case of the Lozi peoples of southern central Africa

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Abstract

This study examines notions of citizenship and subjectivity experienced by the Lozi peoples of Barotseland in the Upper Zambezi Valley region of Sub-Saharan Africa. Through the colonial and postcolonial eras the region has endured physical remoteness as well as political and economic isolation leading to incorporation on unfavourable terms in the new state of Zambia and economic underdevelopment. This contrasts sharply with pre-colonial political and economic dynamics in which the Lozi were the controlling political and economic power of the region. In the postcolonial era, a sense of alienation, disillusionment and subjugation to a postcolonial state that is perceived to have acted in a predatory manner on Barotseland has impacted on the ability of Lozis to feel a sense of loyalty to that state. Instead, in daily life and heritage, Lozis turn to their strong, communitarian culture and a socially constructed past comprising power, glory and wealth to provide notions of identity.

The intrusion of externally originating influences such as the invasion, in the 1830s, of peoples known as the Makololo led by a Sotho clan who left behind their language and much of their political organization, and the British who were ‘invited’ to protect Barotseland from threats originating within and without the kingdom, have accentuated the individualistic self-view of the Lozis and the way others view the Lozis. Meanwhile, it is argued that the intrusion of capitalist dynamics likely to take place over the next 50 years is likely to blur the rigid edges of Lozi particularism and allow for a more associationist sense of identity to come about. Citizenship, subjectivity and identity are shown to be more mobile than previously imagined, with strength of feeling being dependent on a sense of economic and social well-being.
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Abbreviations used in the text

AMEC - African Methodist Episcopal Church
ANC – African National Congress
AU – African Union
BSAC – British South Africa Company
BNG - Barotse Native Government
BNP – Barotse National Police
BOSS – Bureau of state Security
BPF - Barotse Patriotic Front
BNS – Barotse national School
BRE – Barotse Royal Establishment
CANU – Caprivi African National Union
CAP - Caprivi Alliance Party
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
CMML - Christian Missions to Many Lands
DC – District Commissioner
DRC – Democratic Republic of the Congo
DTA - Democratic Türnhalle Alliance
EU – European Union
FF – Freedom fighter
FOREBA – Forum for the Restoration of Barotseland
IFI – International Financial Institution
INESOR – Institute for Economic and Social Research
LMS – London Missionary Society
MMD – Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
MPLA - Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NAZ – National Archives of Zambia

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

NR – Northern Rhodesia

OAU – Organisation of African Unity

PEMS – Paris Evangelical Missionary Society

PIDE - International Police for the Defence of the State

RLI – Rhodes-Livingstone Institute

RSA – Republic of South Africa

SADF – South African Defence Force

SDA – Church of the Seventh Day Adventists

SWAPO – South West African Peoples Organisation

UCZ – United Church of Zambia

UDI – Unilateral Declaration of Independence

UNHCR – United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNIP – United National Independence Party

UNITA - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

Wenela – Witwatersrand Native Labour Association

ZANLA – Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army

ZIPRA – Zimbabwe People’s Liberation Army

ZNDF - Zambian National Defence Force
Preface

This dissertation is the product of an intermittent six-year relationship with the Upper Zambezi Valley and its peoples. It was a relationship that started quite by accident in 1998 whilst working on ethnicity and nationalism in Namibia with a journalistic query on Caprivi, the north-eastern panhandle of that country, which quickly led the writer up the Zambezi valley into the homeland of the Lozi peoples, now located in Western Zambia. Originally, it had been intended to investigate the roots of secessionist tendencies in Caprivi but, once having arrived in that region and realising the import of historical influences from the Lozi kingdom of Barotseland, it quickly became imperative to first study the roots of notions of citizenship and subjectivity in the heart of the old Lozi empire, perhaps as a prelude to later concentrating on sub-regions like Caprivi.

One of the defining characteristics of Lozi identity is a passionate sense of self, an awareness of specialness that is experienced within the Lozi diaspora and amongst those outside who interact with Lozis. This, of course, does not make the Lozi case study in any way unique as similar passions can be observed elsewhere around Africa where there have been strong centralised political communities. There is, however, a certain uniqueness to the Lozi case and this is bound up with the dramatic physical setting of the Lozi homeland, Bulozi, and the physical extremes experienced annually in that environment. It is also associated with a sense of isolation brought about by both the physical exigencies of the region and by what Lozis perceive as the politico-economic exigencies of a postcolonial state that has been both parasitic, predatory and antagonistic to Barotseland and its peoples.

While the work appears at the outset to be historically focussed, the end-product is most emphatically about the present. The objective is to provide an anthropological and socio-cultural gaze on the present state of Loziness that is constituted with and imbued by a past that lives and breathes within the consciousness of every Lozi, young and old. Thus the study adopts a very interdisciplinary approach to the subject issue. Meanwhile, although the work is quite particularistic in the choice of case-study, it is intended to broaden the field in future research to investigate possible similar tendencies elsewhere in Africa. It is seriously hoped that the explanations and findings of this work may be of value to
government and development personnel both in Zambia and elsewhere as well as the subject of academic debate.

The nature of the investigation has been a considerable amount of secondary literature review in the early period followed by a three-stage field research programme carried out over six months in 2001, three months in 2002 and a further month in 2004. Archival research took place in the UK, South Africa, Botswana and Zambia and a mass of information derived from those investigations. Yet this archival data is not heavily reflected in the end-product where references to archival research may seem rather thin. This reflects the changing nature of the study which responded very much to the intense interest in the work displayed wherever field research was conducted in Barotseland itself and amongst Lozis elsewhere. Thus, there is perhaps a noticeable prejudice to empirical evidence collected from interviews buttressed by archival and literature evidence where pertinent.

Field research thus formed an important component of the investigation for the study. To this end, the assistance of first two, then three research assistants was an invaluable aid, particularly in terms of language, translation and continuity while the writer was unable to be on-site so to speak. During most of the interviews, at least two research staff were present so that the results could be compared in case one interpreted a set of responses in a certain way. Thus, evenings during field research were often spent arguing out the nuances of responses from interviewees, a stimulating and fulfilling aspect of the work which was aimed at distilling true feelings and accurate responses as well as avoiding the danger of taking information volunteered at face value. Whilst Lozis are particularly proud to use and display a knowledge of English, it is a fact that the language is not widely used in Barotseland itself, so the Silozi vernacular was the usual medium of communication which the writer learnt the rudiments of but due to lack of interaction with native speakers, has yet to become fluent in, hence the need for efficient and effective translation and interpretation.

In purely mechanical terms, it was not possible to traverse all of the Barotseland region. Use was made of the inadequate few roads that exist with a borrowed Land Rover, watery expanses were crossed with canoes while, at other times, simple trekking on foot was the only way of accessing communities that, on
the one hand, were sought out for knowledge and, on the other sought out the research team to give evidence. The historical investigation rapidly gained ground and developed a life of its own outside of the confines of the requirements of this work. This project is now known as the ‘Living history of the Lozis project’, supported by the Barotse Royal Establishment, which aims to provide interpretations of the Lozi past to be located at the various royal centres around the old Kingdom where traditional authority is still the most potent power among local people. There is also a side project which involves ways of exacting value from the region’s heritage for the benefit of local people. Finally, a further project is in train, in the UK, to build a document and book archive to be located at the Nayuma Museum for the benefit of future Lozi scholars and local people just interested in the region and its people as well as for researchers from elsewhere who currently have to travel in many different directions, often at great cost, in order to do in archival research. The logic employed here is that the main benefactor of research into a people’s history and heritage should surely be that people themselves.

In terms of strengths and weaknesses of the work, one might point to the high participation level of local people at all levels of what is a class and gender based society. The extended timeframe also helped in that it was possible to go back and check information and responses several times before drawing final conclusions. The writer found that the field research portion of the investigation was assisted by being British (the relevance of which will be gained in the main text), male and of a certain ‘mature’ age! These factors were adjudged locally to qualify the writer, as an outsider, to be spoken to confidentially in what has long been a closed social environment to foreigners. The essential weakness felt by the writer is in the awkward telescoping of such a vast historical period from which specific phases were drawn arbitrarily to illustrate the import of a particular dynamic to current notions of citizenship and subjectivity. There is so much more that could have been added if space had allowed although the final arguments would probably have remained the same. Perhaps the mass of data left behind after this investigation will spawn opportunities for further academic research and output.
1 Introduction

Citizenship and subjectivity, as aspects of identity, are issues of varied interpretation both in academic circles and amongst institutions of government in modern states. This is especially so in the light of the supposed blurring of the borders of the nation-state and diluted notions of sovereignty. Particularly in the developing world, or more accurately, in the developed world’s perception of the developing world, there is concern and frustration over the apparent failure of people to sufficiently absorb or recognise specific notions of identity such as citizenship and subjectivity in the context of the post-colonial state. This, it is said, impinges on the legitimacy of that institution, set up by the ex-colonial powers to mirror their own aspirations for the emerging new political entities. Instead, many in the developing world see themselves primarily as citizens of other entities existent either prior to European colonialism or as a result of colonialism.

There is palpable frustration that the nation-state project, itself an agenda of the liberal democratic political regime, central to the operation of the capitalist world economy, has not resulted in the appearance of a patriotic citizenry demonstrating loyalty and obligation to post-independence national governments. This frustration derives from the premise that the efficient functioning of the world economy is dependent on a world system of so-called ‘nation-states’ freely interacting in an imaginary multi-national politico-economic arena which Taylor refers to as the inter-state system.¹ That a large majority of these ‘nation-states’ are the artificial creation of a few pre-existing European states with a particular hybridised history of political and economic development tends to get lost in the search for a kind of global uniformity conducive to the interests of the core states of the world economy.

Meanwhile, many developing world governments are not, either within their own borders or outside, generally respected as institutional icons providing law and order and setting parameters for moral and political behaviour. Nor, concomitantly, are they perceived to be promoting and coordinating economic and social development or the interests and aspirations of the ‘nation-state’ and its subjects. Herbst explains this phenomenon in the context of incomplete state formation, a

project left unfinished by colonialism, leaving post-independence African states vulnerable to 'state failure', where governments are unable to effectively control their territories.²

Citizenship and subjectivity, while associated with state formation and consolidation must, by relation to the very concept of the state, be closely related to other aspects of identity, particularly nationalism (because a state is composed of a conglomerate of nations or, more rarely, a single nation), the transition from tradition to modernity, ethnicity, tribalism and race. The latter three are often conflated or studied as one phenomenon and treated as more important in Africa which is often perceived as stuck in the transition from tradition to modernity. In the developed world, by comparison, the transition is rather from modernity to post-modernity where the individual or ‘self’ attains much more importance as an actor or political agent.

It has been suggested by some writers that notions of identity are ‘more contingent, fragile, incomplete and thus more amenable to reconstruction than was previously thought possible’.³ This seems to generalise in that it implies that identity is intrinsically vulnerable to change which, it is argued here, is not necessarily the case. Others, such as Geertz,⁴ Van den Bergh,⁵ and Grosby,⁶ assert that there are certain vertical aspects of identity, sometimes referred to as ‘primordial ethnicity’, that are largely immutable, such as personal origin, language of birth, parentage and race, a collection of cultural givens, while there are other, more mutable or transferable elements, classed as horizontal or instrumental such as those related to wealth creation and consumption. This assertion assumes an unchanging and accurate self-perception in terms of primordialism.

In reality, not only do individuals experience confusion over the nature of their ‘primordial’ origins such as in the case of children of mixed race or mixed nationality parents, they are also likely to alter what is, in any case, a largely

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imagined origin. An example is the case of some white South Africans who grew up during the last two decades of the apartheid era believing, as they were taught, that they were white Europeans and are now, in the post-apartheid twenty-first century, attempting to re-invent themselves as ‘Africans’ and members of the ‘rainbow nation’ by virtue of their place of birth and in order to don a new sense of collective citizenship, subjectivity and acceptability. Even issues such as race and colour can be obfuscated and subject to interpretation when people attempt to describe their identity. Examples are the ‘white’ and ‘black’ Moors of Mauritania and the insistence of many African Zanzibaris on calling themselves ‘Arabs’. In both of these latter examples, perceived colour and race have potential impacts on a person’s status and prospects, thus conflating and blurring the boundaries of what Lake and Rothchild consider to be exclusively primordialist and instrumental components of ethnicity.7

It would, meanwhile, be fair to propose that there are aspects of identity associated with birth, blood, race, ethnicity, class, language and personal or group pasts that, while subject to interpretation, social reconstruction and the agendas of translators, historians and editors, do prove more permanent than those elements concerned with wealth or accumulation. Yet it would also be fair to suggest that such aspects take on more importance in the somewhat dynamic overall sense of identity when other, more mobile, associative layers are peeled away or where they have never been prominent. This is particularly the case with members of groups that, today, feel excluded from power and decision-making yet were part of strong centralised polities in the pre-colonial past whose status and power were preserved or even elevated as part of colonial ‘indirect rule’, and who perceive themselves to be worse off in terms of wealth and power in the post-independence era than they were in the pre-colonial and/or colonial era. These groups tend to feel little empathy with the post-colonial states in which they now subsist and which are perceived to provide few if any benefits of membership. This work focuses on one example of this phenomenon, the Lozi peoples of central southern Africa.

Meanwhile, groups and individuals may vary the criteria by which to determine membership according to the ruling social, political or economic climate. Thus, people who see themselves as ostensibly Yoruba or Hausa before they

emigrate or take up residence elsewhere, take on more prominent notions of ‘Nigerianess’, blackness or Africanity when outside of the African continent on account of the need to seek wider group membership in arenas of xenophobic and other political or socio-cultural discrimination. Alternatively, for a Lozi in Europe, to articulate oneself as Lozi would have no meaning to the target audience who would know of no such people or ethnicity, but would be aware of Zambia and Africa which provide convenient ‘pigeonholes’ in which to locate for acceptance. At all times, people aspire to membership of some kind of political or cultural community, the tendency in the developed world in the contemporary era being more to a plural, associative identity with multiple ephemeral layers than to a more simplistic and less mutable primordialist one. This is surely due to the fact that the human species is a sociable one, where emotional stability, personal success and status are accredited by and dependant on the appraisal and evaluation of other group members. As Mbiti puts it ‘I am because we are, and because we are, I am’.8

Eligibility for membership is premised on acceptance by or within a group which is surely central to all notions of citizenship and subjectivity in that the individual cannot consider the latter two notions in the absence of acceptance and membership except where membership cannot be denied, as in the case of certain aspects of so-called primordial ethnicity. Thus, for a group member living outside of the confines of an imagined homeland but within the borders of a post-colonial state that offers neither the benefits nor even the offer of membership, there is an understandable recourse to the introverted ‘ethnicity of the group’. There is also a perceived need to display that mode of membership to the dominant host community so that one can at least be defined, if not respected, as belonging to some political or cultural entity. Thus, the polarities of total mutability of identity and the supposed unchangeability of primordialist ethnicity are too absolutist.

Citizenship, then, is intimately linked to other aspects of identity such as ethnicity, tribe, race and gender. What is surely needed here is a clear understanding of what is meant by ‘citizenship’ lest it become as vague and multifariously understood as a term like ‘development’. Once having defined the term it needs to be asked what people consider relevant in terms of their citizenship,

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why they choose to be considered as citizens of a political community such as a state and why an entity such as a state would want people to become its subjects. A third issue is whether citizenship can only be understood in terms of states or whether there are concepts of citizenship applicable to other forms of membership such as faith or other socially constructed entities such as culture and tradition. If so, how important and relevant are these other modes of citizenship? A fourth issue, directly affecting the subject matter of this work is the idea that citizenship is thought of in different ways in different parts of the world, the biggest gulf in perception surely being between the developed core countries of the world economy and those parts most recently emerged from European-style colonialism such as most of Sub-Saharan Africa. All of these conceptual issues are analysed and discussed in more detail in Chapter Eight of this study.

In the case of Zambian Lozis, there appear to be few motivations or incentives for wrapping themselves in the social construct of ‘Zambianess’, while there is a tendency to invest in a passionate sense of ‘Loziness’. Concomitantly, other groups in Zambia tend to suspect the Lozi as people who perceive themselves as somehow different and superior to everyone else and who must be prevented from gaining access to power as this would only result in the drain of resources to the Lozi homeland, the old Protectorate of Barotseland, now Western Province, Zambia.

The way that Lozis in the contemporary era identify themselves first and foremost as Lozis and subjects of the Litunga (King) of Barotseland or at least of the Kingship as an institution and are identified and defined by others as Lozis has explanations rooted in the present state of economic and political development and, peculiar to this work, specific social historical processes that have led to that condition. The same arguments will be used to explain the differing ways in which Lozis in those portions of the old Lozi Kingdom that now lie in Namibia and Angola define their sense of identity both individually and vis-à-vis their counterparts in Zambia.

The fact that the Western Province of Zambia has been, for most of the post-independence era, the least economically developed region of the country and that, in its former manifestation of Barotseland, it was once the breadbasket of its region
and home to a powerful centralised state system is highly relevant here. Virtually all Lozis feel that their region has suffered negative development since the advent of independence in 1965. More ambiguous, however, is the attitude towards the colonial period. While it might be obvious to the casual outside observer that the ex-colonial power, Britain, seriously underdeveloped Barotseland during the 75 odd years of colonial rule, the curiously warm attitude towards Britain and British rule deliberately overlooks the negatives aspects of this period in Lozi history.

Of course, this dynamic is not exclusive to Zambia or to sub-Saharan Africa as a whole but it is more pronounced in Africa where independence from European colonialism, which divided communities so arbitrarily, arrived comparatively recently and where economic marginalisation has been more pronounced. The latter is conceptualised in the enhanced ability to see and interpret how other peoples live in different parts of the world due to the compression of time and space resulting from advances in communications technology and globalisation of the media. It is also closely connected to the material poverty of most African post-colonial states that have low institutional capacity, diminished ability to impose visible sovereignty and insufficient rights, benefits and material resources to distribute amongst the various groups or nations that make up the new state.

People look outside the confines of their own existence at other parts of the world through the medium of television and perceive the apparent superior levels of development elsewhere. When they compare that to what they see in their own lands and decide that they are disadvantaged, the recipient of most of the blame tends to be the post-colonial state. This state aspires to be a nation-state on the lines of its European and American counterparts but can offer little in the way of a national ‘history’ with which to connect the disparate components of its constituency and create a citizenry. Rather the history of the post-colonial state is the often-unconnected histories of separate peoples who now compose the population of the state and which that state often refuses to recognise or give legitimacy to due to the perceived threat that such histories might pose. Such is the importance of history to the business of nation building which the post-colonial state is engaged in, that in the absence of a single history, it relies on the history of the struggle for independence of a state that was, in any case, largely illusory, a creation of the colonial era.
Those who were once part of strong centralised polities that dominated others and who do not perceive any benefit from the post-colonial state have little incentive to imagine their histories as part of some larger national history. Meanwhile, those who were members of weaker groups that were not part of or aligned to a strong centralised polity have little choice but to accept the history offered by the post-colonial state and are thus more open to the purchase of citizenship. Thus, in the case of Zambia, following the so-called ‘Bembaisation’ of government in the post-independence years, Bembas are able to imbue themselves with a layer of ‘Zambianess’ whilst retaining their own strong sense of Bemba group membership, due to their control of the levers of power. Others such as the Lunda, Lovale, Kaonde and Nyanje who were either involuntarily subordinated by more powerful groups without being subsumed and those who simply have no sense of a defined imagined homeland to aspire to control of, still retain a sense of group membership; but it is not so defined, thus they become citizens and subjects of the moribund and uncharitable post-colonial state by default. A common theme to this line of thinking is that there must be some sense of a glorious past to which to turn in creating a sense of national history and, even more potently, a sense of dispossession by some external force that can be identified and villified in the contemporary era.

One of the problems in making these comparisons and in linking the way that people live in other places, particularly the West, where respect for the power and beneficence of the state is of a higher if declining order, is that members of groups such as the Lozi are able very easily to conceive of the apparent failure of state institutions that they have been obliged, due to the legacy of formal colonialism, to offer allegiance to. In other ways, due to colonialism as a globalising ideology, African peoples were led to associate material wealth, the possession of money, conspicuous consumption and private property as being conducive with a good lifestyle and, not unsurprisingly, now seek to identify, partly, with notions of citizenship and subjectivities that assist with these aspirations. Thus the failure of the post-colonial state to ‘come up with the goods’ in this respect leaves peoples who have been part of strong centralised polities, such as the Lozi in this case-study, to focus very strongly on a sense of shared identity that articulates their uniqueness and specialness in the absence of those other, more associative layers of identity.
that they would otherwise aspire to. Yet where members of the group now form the nucleus of power in the post-colonial state such as the Ovambo in Namibia, the Wolof in Senegal and, perhaps, the Bemba in Zambia, these more historical aspects of identity are not so pronounced. And where the state apparatus at least contrives to be more inclusive, such as in Ghana, members of previously strong centralised polities, such as Dagomba and Asante, find it easier to add a layer of Ghanaian identity to their notions of citizenship and subjectivity.

This study aims to analyse and explain the contemporary construction of notions of citizenship and subjectivity amongst the Lozi peoples of the Western Province of Zambia, known locally by its pre-independence appellation, Barotseland. The objective is to explain why it is so hard for African peoples who existed within their own nations to take on notions of citizenship in the postcolonial state, in this case after 40 years of its existence. The central mode of investigation employed is an examination of local interpretations of specific temporal zones of the Lozi past. This is not to say that there are not other equally relevant dynamics to investigate but, it is argued here, it is primarily through perceptions of Lozi history, whether individually held, or by a group or community, that notions of Lozi identity, citizenship and subjectivity come to life.

In addition, when the word history is used here, it is not just the history of one group of people, in this case, the Lozi, that is relevant in interpreting contemporary notions of identity; it is also the history of all those components that have had an input to or interaction with the Lozi peoples over time. This includes, most particularly, the physical environment that has evolved in reaction to both physical and human inputs. The environmental history of the Upper Zambezi Valley over the last five hundred years, as with most major river basins, has been dramatic.

Also to be considered is the history of other peoples, some of whom may have interacted directly with the subject group. In this case one might think of the Makololo, Matabele, Mambari slave traders, European missionaries and the British as examples. Yet one should also consider the histories, interactions and culture of other, external groups whose machinations have indirectly impacted on the Lozi world. In this context, we might consider the Cold War, the globalising impact of American culture as seen through the medium of television in the towns and villages
connected to an electricity supply, and the internecine civil conflict in neighbouring Angola that has continued unabated from 1961 to the present day together with the refugee camps and aid agency activity that these have spawned.

That this particular collection of peoples, for that is what the Lozi really are, is chosen for study is premised largely on the passionate sense of membership and belonging displayed by all Lozis whether or not they are resident in their homeland, the region roughly bounded by the watershed of the Upper Zambezi in central southern Africa. ‘Loziness’ quintessentially orbits the central components of kingship, land, language and belief in order of precedence. Admittedly, the Lozi are not likely to be unique in their choice of parameters for self-identification and membership and similar case-studies are sought for comparison throughout this work.

Most studies of the region and peoples of the Upper Zambezi valley are likely to utilise the headings of uniqueness, remoteness and isolation under which to discuss a particular theme. Mulford, for instance in the opening sentence of his chapter on Barotseland states, ‘Barotseland’s most distinctive feature has always been its isolation from the rest of Northern Rhodesia.’ Yet what other writers from various disciplines describe as isolation, is in point of fact the centre of the Lozi cosmos, particularly the Bulozi floodplain and the way of life associated with the land together with the political, economic and social structures that have grown up in the region throughout Lozi history.

A central feature of the Lozi case-study in the context of African identity is that the Lozi sense of identification is strongly imbued by the concept of land and Kingship. That these two components of identity are welded together is explained by the notion of caretakership of the Lozi homeland, the flat floodplain of the Upper Zambezi known today as Bulozi, on behalf of the Lozi nation by the Kingship which, in turn, is the fulcrum of Lozi citizenship, a membership which is bought into in varying degrees depending on the strength or dilution of one’s ‘Loziness’. In Bulozi, land and cattle were technically owned by the King, which was parcelled up and handed out to family and dignitaries who distinguished themselves in service to the Lozi nation. The occupants of the Kingship are known as ‘Litunga’, which literally

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means earth or owner of the earth. The logic for this unusual mode of identification is explained by the primary source of wealth creation, the earth, in particular, the agriculturally productive nature of the Bulozi floodplain, also variously known as Ngula and Liondo.

By harnessing the productive capacity of a unique environment, free of pestilential infestations such as the tsetse fly, in which the river annually floods a large flat plain leaving behind nutrient-rich silts, Lozi ancestors learnt the art of cultivation, harvested rich fish resources and grazed livestock to such a degree that settlement could become permanentised and large food surpluses often produced. These could be traded with less settled peoples on the plain margins and surrounding forest areas who, in turn, provided the Lozis with foods not cultivable in the plain, metal goods and timber, required for the construction of canoes, barges and for fuelwood in what is mostly a treeless plain.10

This surplus-creating ability was to fuel expansion of the homebase as the Lozis expanded their realm, first through breakaway princes and their followers seeking to create their own powerbases elsewhere and later by the re-conquering of these satellite princedoms by Lozi kings leading to absorption into an enlarged homogenous Lozi kingdom. The dates of this early expansion, probably during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, are unclear due to lack of written records and, as McCaskie points out, ‘Historical periodicity, as is well understood, is a notoriously slippery business’.11 Eventually, the wealth of the kingdom allowed the exploits of these latter consolidating kings to extend to venturing beyond Bulozi to bring neighbouring peoples under the sway of Lozi influence by military conquest.

The route of this expansion was usually southwards, directed by the transport artery of the River Zambezi and its tributaries, which is how the Lozi kings arrived at what is now known as Caprivi. Here they were able to subordinate the peoples living in that region, before at least one moved beyond the Victoria Falls into present-day western Zimbabwe and then back along a tributary known variously as the Chobe, Linyanti, Mashi or Cuando. This river originates in the central highlands of Angola

10 The exceptions being planted mangos and palms, he former for shade and fruit and the latter as a mark of a royal village.
and flows through what were the western extremities of pre-colonial Lozi influence before turning east and forming part of the southern boundary of Caprivi as well as the southern limits of Lozi influence before joining the Zambezi a little upstream of the Victoria Falls. In this process, many peoples fell under the tutelage of Lozi overlordship, some being prepared to offer more allegiance than others, for instance where Lozi rule was perceived as protection from more threatening interlopers.

The main purpose of these expeditionary forays, which were consolidated by the posting of Lozi governors or overseers known as 'Lindumeleti’, was the garnering of regular tribute and, just as importantly, the sourcing of labour, either in the form of slaves or seasonal migratory labour to quench the thirst of a very labour-intensive mode of economic production in Bulozi. As production expanded in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and as the variable climate of the highland regions from which the annual flood originated produced occasional years of either over-inundation which washed all the crops away or drought resulting in failure of the flood, in both cases leading to scarcity of food, so the requirements of labour and tribute from outside of Bulozi increased.

Thus the more benign assimilation of peoples within the plain into the Lozi system of production and into the heterogeneous centralised Lozi nation gave way at the periphery to a more autocratic and perhaps despotic regime of control from afar. This was a form of local colonialism, articulated by regularly imposed obligations of tribute and labour and supplemented by irregular raiding for slaves and cattle, particularly in times of exigency in Bulozi. Chapter Two examines the period from original settlement in what is now considered the Lozi homeland and the creation of a centralised polity up to the invasion of the Upper Zambezi Valley by other African peoples from the south in the nineteenth century. In particular, the chapter seeks clues from this period into the make-up of Lozi identity and notions of pre-colonial citizenship and subjectivity that are relevant to the contemporary era.

In the late 1820s, the actual date is unclear, an invading force under the leadership of a very astute and charismatic leader known locally as Sibitwane arrived at the Zambezi having migrated in a series of steps from their home area close to Basutoland. These were the Makololo (originally part of the the Bafokeng) who were said to have been displaced from their homeland as part of the chain of events
known as the Mfecane and Lifaqane or Difaqane. This group raided and plundered their way west and north, arriving at the Zambezi ford of Kazungula from where Sibitwane determined to plunder the Batoka on the highlands north of the river. Later on, the Makololos’ own enemy, the Matabele, followed them up onto the Batoka plateau. This, added to the unfriendly reception of the Mashukumbe (or Ila) who neighboured the Batoka to the north, caused Sibitwane to take his people west to the Bulozi floodplain where, he had been told, vast herds of cattle and rich pasturage existed. Here the Makololo met and defeated Lozi forces seriously weakened by a succession dispute following the death of the popular and long-reigning Litunga Mulambwa.

Sibitwane made his capital at Naliele in the Bulozi plain but moved it later to Linyanti (now Sangwali) in Caprivi. Subsequently, his son Sekeletu chose to retain Caprivi as the Makololo headquarters, albeit for different reasons. After the death of Sekeletu, a succession battle ensued during which the latter’s uncle, Mbololo, took power only to be overthrown in 1864 when the Lozi are said to have risen up, rebelling against unreasonable treatment and taking advantage of weakening Makololo ability to exert power to reassert specifically Lozi influence. Thus began the second Lozi Kingdom at a time referred to as the ‘Restoration’. This work investigates the accuracy of this supposed transition.

Today, non-Lozi Caprivians seem to be largely unaware of the significance of Makololo rule, the association between Sibitwane and local people and the centrality of power focussed on Caprivi in the latter part of Makololo rule. The Mayeyi, on the other hand, whose villages Sibituane and Sekeletu’s old capitals and burial grounds now lie in, are aware of the Makololo heritage and the myths and legends surrounding the Makololo but complain that no interest is taken in this heritage by others in Caprivi or elsewhere in Namibia making an interest in conserving the memories hard to maintain. In Barotseland, by contrast, where pre-colonial history is considered of much greater value, considerable awareness and interest in the Makololo interregnum is displayed.

It was also during the Makololo interregnum that the first British interloper arrived in the lands of the Lozi. This was the intrepid David Livingstone, who, while interacting primarily with the leadership of the Makololo with whom he struck up a
cordial relationship. Livingstone’s stays in Barotseland were short and few in number but they transcended his supposed role as a missionary and left an indelible mark on the Lozi consciousness and pioneered the sense of warmth that exists to this day in the minds particularly of the Lozi royal classes. Livingstone was the first of a number of ‘Englishmen’ (Livingstone was actually Scottish) who developed an incestuous kind of relationship with Barotseland and its peoples and who are remembered in contemporary articulations of the Lozi consciousness.

The import of the Makololo era and the visits of Livingstone for this work is the legacy of layers of identity imbued into the Lozi psyche, not least the language now spoken by the Lozi, which is largely derived from the Sesotho spoken by the Makololo. Many Lozi historians from the time of the so-called overthrow of Makololo rule attempt to downplay the impact of the Makololo interregnum but this work will argue that much in the way of organisational and external linkaging as well as character traits from that era were, absorbed, retained and continue to impact notions of Lozi identity today. Chapter Three then, looks at the impact and legacy of the Makololo interregnum on the peoples of Barotseland and how, during this period, the Lozi Kingdom’s considerable geopolitical and economic significance in the sub-region was enhanced. It also analyses the way that Caprivi became rooted in the collective Lozi psyche as a pivotal, if segmented, southern component in the Lozi political and economic system.

After the restoration of Lozi rule over the old Lozi Kingdom and some peripheral areas gained during the Makololo era, the new administration, initially based in different parts of Bulozi, moved south again, finishing up at Sesheke on the Zambezi immediately opposite Caprivi. Here the new Lozi King, Sipopa (original name Lutangu), continued the Makololo policy of trading with Portuguese and Mambari slave merchants as well as developing new trading links with the south, in particular, with an English trader by the name of Westbeech who was able to offer good prices for ivory which previously had not been considered of much value by the Lozi or Makololo until advised differently by David Livingstone. Sipopa was not, however, popular with the Lozi aristocracy based in Bulozi, especially for moving the capital village back to the south. Yet the move was entirely explainable in the context of Sipopa’s personal history and experience, much of which had been gained at the court of the Makololo kings where he had been groomed for a senior role.
Sipopa, like Sekeletu before him, continually feared conspiracy plots designed to overthrow him and fell under the influence of Mbunda diviners and witchdoctors who confirmed all his worst suspicions. This resulted in the harassment and death of so many of Sipopa’s aides and senior officials as well as perceived competitors for power and their families from other regions of the kingdom, that Sipopa himself was eventually killed after being chased from Sesheke in 1876.

His successor Mwanawina II, who lasted less than two years, also failed to unite the disparate portions of the kingdom and when a new young King, Lubosi (later to be called Lewanika – ‘the uniter’) was brought to the royal drums in 1878, it was with great trepidation and fear that the new young monarch, who was to reign until his natural death in 1916, took over the reins of power, almost like a poisoned chalice. Lubosi or Lewanika as he will now be referred to, was deposed for a short period in 1884-5 and soon became convinced, with the help of early missionaries and other African leaders, that he would need the help of outside power sources if he was to succeed in his aims of uniting the Kingdom, holding on to power (and his life) and developing the Lozi nation. First of all, Lewanika would need educated interlocutors and for this he took the advice of Westbeech, the trader whom his uncle, Sipopa, had previously trusted and to whom Lubosi also now turned.

After his overthrow and subsequent return to power, Lewanika accepted François Coillard of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (PEMS) into the Kingdom. Although Coillard was a Frenchman, he was also an anglophile and recommended by Westbeech. The relationship that developed between Lewanika and Coillard led to the creation of a layer of spirituality, the legacy of which is still evident in Barotseland and is also relevant to contemporary modes of identification of Lozi people. Coillard also became useful to Lewanika in other ways, not least of which was the aforementioned problem of how to stay alive and in power in the face of internal competition as well as protecting the Kingdom and Lozi nation from attack from externally based groups, both African and European. Lewanika also looked to Coillard to provide education and act as a provider of information about what was going on in the outside world, which Barotseland was physically isolated from. Coillard became, in effect, an intermediary between British colonialism, which was to last in Barotseland until Zambian independence in 1965, and African power and authority or to use another analogy, between a certain phase of modernity and a
form of tradition. For the missionaries, the enticement of British colonialism was also a survival strategy for their own spiritual enterprise as will be explained later.

This temporal phase also marked the expansion of Lozi influence to its maximum extent. It saw the consolidation of power over peoples subdued by the Makololo to the east of Barotseland and those to the north and north west such as the Lunda-Luvale, who, without the help of the British-commanded Barotse Native Police and British diplomatic pressure on other European powers, would most probably have broken away from what was a tenuous subordination to Lozi power. Pivotal to this period is the way in which the turn to the south for political and economic force gained momentum, a theme relevant to the whole study and to the difficulties experienced in contemporary times in relating to the post-colonial Government of Zambia to the east of Barotseland. Chapter Four studies the period from the ‘restoration’ to the establishment of colonial rule, which during its early years was actually rule by officials employed by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) of Cecil Rhodes albeit with the mediation of the British High Commissioner to South Africa in Cape Town.

Chapter Five studies the curious warmth that exists between the Lozi national consciousness and ‘Britishness’ as well as the way that Britain underdeveloped Barotseland both politically and economically. Included in the latter are the excision of Caprivi in 1890 and the westernmost portions of Lozi influence in 1905 to Germany and Portugal respectively. The loss of Caprivi, the gardens and grazing ground of southern Barotseland as well as a source of labour for the productive capacity of the central Bulozi floodplain, in particular, seriously degraded the ability to subsist economically in this region. It also led to increasing migration of the active male labour force to South Africa and to a lesser extent Southern Rhodesia, in order to earn money to pay new taxes imposed by British authority and legitimised by the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE), which derived a percentage of the revenue. This migration was encouraged by the BSAC and later the colonial authorities both of which came to the conclusion that Barotseland’s best contribution to the Empire, in the absence of mineral wealth and distance from the coast, was migrant labour.

In order to enhance this process, the British also managed to excise considerable power from the Kingship and insisted on the abandonment of slave
labour and a reduction in the judicial capacity of the Royal Establishment. Meanwhile, realising the beneficent effect of continuing traditional rule over a country considered unsuitable for white settlement, Britain bolstered and protected the Barotse Royal Establishment, which ended up spending a reducing income mainly on itself instead of the people, thereby creating a lame duck administration and for Barotseland, the appearance of a living museum. These developments did not, however, impact negatively on the way that Britain was perceived amongst Lozis and this is also very relevant to the way that Lozis, particularly the older generation who lived through the freedom struggle years and the exigencies of the Kaunda era, perceive themselves today.

After the somewhat disreputable termination of British rule in Barotseland, which included incorporation in Northern Rhodesia, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the Republic of Zambia, none of which are covered in detail here, the era of the Zambian First Republic commenced in earnest under its First President, Kenneth Kaunda. For much of this time, Barotseland became enmeshed in the freedom struggle of other countries, predominantly Namibia and Angola but also, to a lesser extent, Zimbabwe. This freedom struggle, with which Kaunda associated both his political career and the political economy of Zambia, impacted heavily on Barotseland, which suffered helicopter attacks by the Portuguese and the setting up of base camps for SWAPO Freedom Fighters (FFs) from Namibia which were subsequently attacked by South African forces. Local people were terrorised by both the FFs and South African forces and largely blamed Kaunda for visiting these horrors upon them unasked.

In addition to this, the vibrant aspects of the Barotse economy and virtually all remaining powers of the Lozi Kingship were systematically diverted to central government in Lusaka to the consternation of the Lozi people, even those who had supported independence and amalgamation with other parts of former Northern Rhodesia. Measures such as the termination of labour recruitment for apartheid South Africa without the replacement of employment and earning opportunities for those now made redundant were bitterly resented as was the use of Lozi ministers to promulgate such measures.
By 1969, Kaunda had overseen the abandonment of the Barotseland Agreement of 1964, which effectively protected many of the rights, privileges and remaining judicial responsibilities of the King of Barotseland and this is still resented by Barotse activists at the start of the twenty-first century. It appeared to complete the jigsaw of dismantlement of Barotse independence and political and economic power, put in place during the pre-colonial era and degraded during the colonial era, although the architects of that underdevelopment are not generally held responsible. The story of the years from 1965 to the eclipse of Kaunda’s rule at the Zambian elections of 1990 have rarely been told or reported. This is largely due to the climate of fear imposed during the Kaunda era, from which many of the older generation are only now emerging. The impact of this era on Lozi respect for the post-colonial government has, however, been substantial and the younger generation of today tend to recall the stories told to them by their parents and this colours their perception of the state to varying degrees depending on the strength of feeling of the parents who, in Lozi culture, hold considerable sway over the thoughts and opinions of their offspring.

This is amply reflected at the time of Kuomboka, the annual ceremony commemorating the migration from the flooded plain to drier land of the population of Bulozi, when Zambian soldiers and police, who in Western Province are rarely Lozi, are actively prevented from getting close to the King or his entourage. Kuomboka is a showcase, the biggest cultural festival in Zambia, used by the state tourist board in its advertising of the country. For Lozis, who see Kuomboka and the events that surround the ceremony as their own festival, Kuomboka is rather an opportunity for a reaffirmation of Loziness, an event that all Lozis must attend at least once in their lives, an opportunity to pay homage to the Kingship and a time to remember the glory of the old Lozi Kingdom and the warm glow of former power and wealth. It is at these times that the socially constructed history of the old Lozi empire is brought out, polished and displayed as if to say, ‘Don’t look at us as poor Zambians, with the lowest levels of living in country, see us as proud Lozis, with a glorious and unique history of power and wealth, the dominant people in the region.’ Chapter Six deals with the Kaunda era and its ramifications for contemporary notions of citizenship and subjectivity amongst Lozi people.
Chapter Seven does not deal with a specific time period but examines the very specific and, in many ways, unique articulation of Lozi culture, in particular, Lozi codes of behaviour and comportment, Lozi spirituality and use of belief systems over time and the use of heritage, most particularly the Kuomboka ceremony. Aspects of Lozi culture such as language, greetings and belief are used to mark Lozi territory, both in a physical and metaphysical sense. Other Zambians always remark on the unusually strong sense of culture that Lozis display compared to other groups, sometimes a source of admiration, sometimes of jealousy and resentment. No study of Lozi identity would be complete without a discussion of this most important component.

The penultimate chapter collates the evidence from the five temporal eras examined and seeks to formulate an explanation for contemporary notions of citizenship and subjectivity experienced by Lozi people both within and outside of the Lozi homeland. In so doing, the importance of a powerful history in a situation where the present seems to offer so little is seen to achieve disproportionate importance. The inappropriateness of citizenship theory to date is also visited and the case made for a revision of the theoretical premise upon which notions of citizenship and subjectivity in the developing or post-colonial world are thought of. In so doing it is argued that the vibrancy of specific components of community history plays a much more enhanced role than would be the case in developed world countries at the core of the world economy. This is particularly the case because a socially constructed history can so easily be moulded by selectivity and re-interpretation to fit the requirements of group identity.

Finally, the conclusion summarises the main findings of the work and attempts to take a look into the future. It suggests that the strong communitarian and cultural aspects of Lozi citizenship are likely to be diluted in the next few decades as the outside world impinges increasingly on the Lozi homeland which has been isolated by colonial and post colonial regimes alike. Nevertheless it is also suggested that, in allowing the old Lozi homeland to be opened up to outside influences, the conditionalities of geopolitics in the sub-region and differential development levels may also lead Lozis to discover a sense of Zambianess where, previously, this proved difficult.
The genesis of the ‘original’ Lozi peoples is a matter for conjecture. Over the last 140 years or so, they have preferred to be known by the name given to them by the invading Makololo but before that were known as Luyi (loosely translated as ‘foreigner’), Aluyi or Luyana. For most Lozis, but particularly the ruling class, it has been and continues to be important to locate their roots in the original Lozi homeland, Bulozi, the flat floodplain of the Upper Zambezi River and to assert that their ancestors always lived there. The plain was known in the time before the invasion of the Makololo in the 1830s as ‘Ngulu’ and ‘Lyondo’, which also mean ‘sweet potato’ and ‘weapons’ respectively in Siluyana, the language spoken by the Luyi, now found only in court circles. For ease of reading, in this chapter, the early Lozi will be referred to as Luyi and the floodplain by the name it is known now, Bulozi.

The history of the Luyi before the coming of the Makololo is told through the medium of story-telling and via the records set down by European missionaries and other visitors close to the turn of the twentieth century. These were dictated and censored by Lozi monarchs such as the great Litunga Lewanika and those close to the court who have an interest in purveying a certain construction of the past. Virtually all Lozis are aware to some degree of the early myths and legends concerning the infancy of the Lozi nation while parents and village story tellers delight in recounting the deeds of some of the figures from this period, not least as the era is bound up in magic and fantastic deeds. And whilst the history of the Luyi is bound up in myths and magic, this in no way diminishes its importance or relevance to the Lozi national consciousness today. The meanings embodied in the stories that are narrated here impinge directly on the way that Lozis identify themselves in the world today and link the past to contemporary notions of citizenship and subjectivity. A knowledge and understanding of this history is, therefore, implicit to an understanding of Lozi identity over time and space.

There is a certain logic to the Lozi claim of originality in Bulozi. Lozi historians, certainly since the restoration of Lozi hegemony in the Upper Zambezi Valley following the overthrow of the Makololo Sotho regime in 1864, have used the

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1 Interviews with Inengu Muyunda Ananyatele, Limulunga 12 to 30-07-2001.
earliest memories handed down in oral testimony through the generations to establish the Lozi nation, in particular the Kingship, the Bulozi homeland, political community and culture in time and space. This chapter provides some narrative and interpretation of the early period of Lozi history that bestows a deep sense of pride of place in the universe as well as core components of Lozi identity which in turn help to negotiate notions of citizenship and subjectivity experienced today. Central to the myths and legends that articulate this era are the Lozi creation myths which will be examined from oral texts in use today. Various characteristic virtues and a sense of good and bad behaviour are also established during this time. Key among these are intelligent strategies employed to deal with the exigencies of the time, some of which exist to the present day, heroic deeds, valorous behaviour, kindness and good sense or pragmatism which in Lozi culture is perhaps one of the most prized virtues.

By locating their origin and claiming both primogeniture and preponderance in Bulozi, the Lozi effectively eliminate the possibility of any other group claiming that land as their ‘national’ homeland. Langworthy suggests also that this helps to maintain a hierarchical distinction between the original Luyi and the various sub-groups, between 25 and 35 in total that have been absorbed since earliest known times. Yet whilst many Lozis try to insist that their ancestors have always lived in Bulozi, there have been one or two attempts to locate their beginnings with the Rozwi or, those that Coillard called the Banyai south east of present-day Barotseland.

The most commonly offered explanation for their origin, however, is a stepped migration from the north, specifically from the Lunda-Luba empires of the Katanga region of present-day Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Gibbons, the English major, sent out to map the full extent of the influence of the Lozi King, Lewanika, at the end of the nineteenth century, was told that the ‘Aälui’, as he refers to them, prior to arriving in northern Bulozi, ‘dwelt two hundred miles to the northeast on the middle Kabompo’ and that the people found there around 1900 were

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remnants of the original Luyi people who had moved from the Katanga region. Oliver and Atmore describe how certain groups migrated south and west from that region after the Luba hunter Chibinda Ilunga moved into the territory controlled by the Lunda, married Lueji, the granddaughter of a minor Lunda Chief and later became the Mwata Yamvo. It seems that Kinguri and Chinyama, brothers of Lueji, were not satisfied with the alien leadership of Chibinda and left to form new areas of influence elsewhere. According to Oliver and Atmore, Chinyama is credited as having gone to the Zambezi valley.

Hall locates this migration, albeit under a different leader, at around 1700 and suggests that the journey may have taken as much as twenty years. Yet, elsewhere, the Luyi are also said to have arrived in Bulozi around the mid-1600s, which would be prior to the rise of the first Mwata Yamvo from which the ancestors of the Lozi are often said to come, casting doubt on the accuracy of the above story. Langworthy and Mainga agree that the early migrants were probably a relatively small group, maybe a large clan or group of families. The names of early Luyi leaders that have been passed down are liable to have been titles and, as such, not likely to have referred to individuals but were probably ascribed to groups. Of further relevance is the suggestion that wherever these offshoots settled, they would set up a ‘scale model of the parent kingdom’ presumably adopting similar rituals and customs. If this were the case then it would help in establishing the suspected links between the Lozi and the Lunda-Luba empires as will be seen later. Such links appear ever more likely in the light of identical place names and cultural practices. Hall points to the use of Imuba and Namayula as place names in both Lunda and Lozi lands as well as the wearing of necklaces of white stones and of feathers in the headdresses of rulers of both groups.

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10 Oliver and Atmore, op. cit., p. 183.
It would still seem unlikely that the Luyi arrived directly from the Lunda Empire as the evidence afforded to Gibbons above testifies. An offshoot such as that of Chinyama would probably have initially located in the region immediately to the south of Katanga, currently occupied by the Lovale, Bulozi lying even further to the south. The Lovale of today have customs and habits more closely aligned to the Lunda than to the Lozi. Langworthy even goes so far as to suggest that the political systems of the Luyi and the Lunda were so different that this would rule out the origin of the Luyi being the Lunda Empire. Mainga’s conclusion is that there was a Luba migration to Bulozi that then became overlain by Lunda rule.12 Nevertheless, the Luyi most probably originated from a region to the north of the Zambezi-Congo watershed as an offshoot of another political entity which could have been either the Luba or Lunda spheres of influence. Meanwhile, their political structure had evolved somewhat by the time of the first recorded Luyi tradition. They probably entered the Upper Zambezi valley in the early part of the seventeenth century under the leadership of a female chieftain, possibly the semi-mythical Mwambwa who appears in Lozi history as the founder of the nation.

The early Luyi lived in clusters in Bulozi, the plain of the Upper Zambezi Valley. It is quite likely that the plain was not thickly populated when they arrived, particularly if this was before the seventeenth century, as before this time the plain itself may well have been flooded for most of the year and probably resembled a giant swamp. Certainly, there are few references to the plain prior to the seventeenth century and early Portuguese explorers made efforts to circumnavigate the area when attempting to cross the African continent from west to east and vice versa.13 Kayongo promotes the suggestion first made by Livingstone and later by the late twentieth century geographers Grove and Goudie that Bulozi, like the great depressions of the Kalahari, was actually a giant lake. These lakes, it is suggested, started drying up for a large part of the year as a result of climate change resulting from overgrazing and deforestation in southern Africa in the first half of the second millennium.14

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12 Mainga, op. cit., p. 21.
14 Ibid.
In interpreting oral history, it appears that the Upper Zambezi floodplain was a difficult physical and human environment in which to settle when the Luyi first arrived although Hall claims that the conditions they found were ideal for a settled and highly organised life.\footnote{Hall, op. cit. p.21.} Unquestionably, it provided attractions not found on the surrounding higher ground. The floodplain was treeless which meant that livestock, particularly of the bovine variety, could be reared without fear of the dreaded tsetse fly so prevalent in the rest of the sub-continent. Meanwhile, the annual inundation of the Zambezi waters meant that a fertile layer of silt was deposited over the underlying Kalahari sand providing fertile and nutrient-rich soil in which crops of a wide variety of fruit and vegetables could be grown. On the surrounding higher ground, by contrast, the Kalahari sand is exposed at the surface while the predominant vegetation consists of Mopane woodland. Little nutritious vegetation exists for livestock and up to the 1980s the range of the tsetse fly extended virtually to the floodplain edge. In these woodlands however, iron ore had previously been found and smelted and there is evidence of pottery production from as early as the sixth century.\footnote{A. Roberts, A History of Zambia (Heineman, London, 1976), pp. 39-41} It is not clear who were the people who inhabited the forested regions surrounding the floodplain but the San (Kwengo or Twa) were almost certainly one of the groups present.

Given that Bulozi would have been a very much wetter environment than it is today, having most probably been a semi-permanent lake, it seems likely that there was minimal habitation before the Luyi and other similar groups who the Luyi gradually overcame, went to live there. Although not supporting this theory, Mainga points out that no Stone Age sites or remains of Iron Age settlements have been found in the plain although both have been excavated in other, higher areas of present-day Barotseland,\footnote{Mainga, op. cit., pp. 8-9.} a factor confirmed by Fagan.\footnote{B. M. Fagan, A Short History of Zambia (From the Earliest Times until A.D. 1900), (Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1966), pp. 58 and 82.} This does not preclude the possibility, however, as any evidence would be subject to removal or degradation by the annual flood. What is clear, however, is that the exigencies of the environment for the early Luyi in Bulozi, particularly the annual inundation of the plain by the waters of the Zambezi followed by drought and severe heat, together with other human factors caused the Luyi to make adaptations to their political structure and this, as will be seen, included a change of gender in their leadership.
As described above, on arrival in Bulozi, the early Luyi lived in small clusters but are generally believed to have collected around the area between the Zambezi and present-day Kalabo (see map in Appendix 1c). The present-day village of Libonda is said to have been the first capital and it was here that the first Luyi rulers lived and where the earliest Lozi oral history and creation myths begin.

The language spoken by the ancestors of the current Lozi peoples was Siluyana, the language of the Luyi people, which is very rarely heard today as it is spoken by only a very few who are associated with royal ceremony or duties. Siluyana was claimed by Jacottet at the end of the nineteenth century to be close to the language spoken by the Herero and the Ovimbundu, which, Mainga suggests, points to an Angolan link for the early Luyi. However, given that all the Bantu groups gradually migrated over the second millennium into central, south-east and south-west Africa, the linguistic similarities are not surprising and do not detract from the Lunda-Luba theory. It is said that only three people today are able to recite a good proportion of the traditional Siluyana praise sayings and poems. Even these individuals, two of whom were interviewed during the course of field research for this work, admitted to having only weak conversational skills in the language which became eclipsed in the mid-nineteenth century by the language brought by the Makololo, a Sesotho tongue known originally as Sikololo and later as Silozi. All of the Luyi names in the creation myths and early history that follow are Siluyana names unless stated to the contrary.

**Creation myths**

According to some Lozi myths and legends, the Lozi God, Nyambe (literally ‘no speaking’ or ‘one who does not speak’), was living in the Libonda area with his wife, Nasilele (‘one associated with long things’), and mother, Ngula (various meanings including mother and ‘pregnant’), both of whom he had made. Nyambe made the forests, the river (Lyambai or Zambezi), the plain (Ngula now Bulozi) and all the

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animals and plants. Included amongst the animals was Kamunu (‘human being’) who quickly distinguished himself from other animals, for example by learning from and copying Nyambe in carving a canoe and forging iron. And, whilst impressed by Kamunu’s intelligence, Nyambe became increasingly tired and disappointed by the behaviour of Kamunu to the other worldly things that he, Nyambe, had created. In particular, Nyambe disliked the constant copying of virtually everything he did. Thus, Kamunu went hunting and killed animals for food with a spear he had forged and Nyambe would scold him. Every time Kamunu killed an animal, it seemed that some other misfortune would befall him such as his cooking pot breaking, his dog dying and so on. One day Kamunu killed an elephant, whereupon his own child died only to be seen later on at the home of Nyambe where Kamunu continually went in order to report his misfortune and ask for forgiveness, medicine and help.

Exasperated, Nyambe moved several times to try and escape the pestilential Kamunu until finally, in desperation, he crossed the Lyambai (Zambezi), presumably from the west where the early Luyana settled, arriving first on an island. Yet Kamunu found his way to the island and regularly brought Nyambe animals and fish, presumably as tribute or for food as the story goes that Nyambe accepted these but refused to eat them as ‘they were his children’. Later, Nyambe fled to a mountain but even there, Kamunu found him. Finally, Nyambe crossed the river again and met with the animals, telling them they must be afraid of Kamunu before ascending to Litooma (heaven) on a spider’s web. The eyes of the spider were put out on the advice of Nalungwana (a wagtail) so that it could not direct Kamunu who was bound to try and follow. Kamunu was left alone to live and die in the earthly world after being refused medicine by Nyambe to prevent disease, destruction and death. Lisimba asserts that death became a divine punishment for Kamunu’s disobedient behaviour. For man to achieve the right reach the nirvana of heaven it may be

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23 Jalla, 1921, op. cit., II.
24 Ibid.
25 Jalla (1921), op. cit., p.2.
26 Ibid and interviews with Wakuũuma Wakuũuma, local historian and Headmaster of Libonda Basic School, Libonda, 16-08-2001. Jalla claims Litooma was the place that Nyambe fled to before ascending to heaven while Wakuũuma and most other Lozis say that Litooma is the name of Nyambe’s place in heaven.
27 Jalla (1921), op. cit., p. 3.
28 Lisimba, op. cit., p. 132.
necessary to be returned to earth several times in various forms (human, animal or bird).

Another version of events, ruling in Libonda village today says that Nyambe and Nasilele had a daughter, whom they named Mwambwa. Indeed, Nyambe is said elsewhere to have created for himself many wives (this story certainly exemplifies and legitimises polygyny) and had children by all of them. Later on, Nyambe is said to have fallen in love with and had relations with Mwambwa whose name means ‘one who is being talked about’. This caused a quarrel to ensue between Nyambe and Nasilele during which the enraged Nasilele beat her daughter. Nyambe is said to have been so upset by this behaviour that he called his servant, Sasisho and announced his ‘return’ to heaven. Sasisho wondered how they would ascend but Nyambe asked a spider to spin its web so that he and his servant could climb to heaven leaving Nasilele, who died a few weeks later, to languish behind on earth.

Yet another version claims that Nyambe was the first person known and that all Luyis originate from Nyambe, whose village was Litoma-ndi-wa-Nyambe (heaven, the home of Nyambe). Here, Mwambwa is said to have been the first wife of Nyambe and the first female chief, the origin of Mwambwa being unclear here. The Barotse royalty are said to originate from Mwambwa as do all the Luyi. Mwambwa was given the title Njemakati meaning ‘A woman from whom the Kingdom originates’. In this version she is also credited with giving birth to nine other children including a daughter named Mbuyu.

Finally, Muuka says that all Luyi believed in the existence of one great God, Nyambe ‘who was conceived of as the creator, the merciful, the almighty and the giver of all things. He was, by nature, without flesh and bones’. Muuka claims that prayers were said to him in the mornings and evenings and offerings made of seeds, hoes, spears and cattle. Here we can again see what Muuka refers to as ‘spread-

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29 This version was recounted by Wakuľuma (see note 26) and corresponds to that told by local historians such as Maliwa Liyaali (65), Nayaka village, 19-08-2001.
30 Jalla (1921), op. cit., p.3.
31 No explanation was offered at any interview, or is evident anywhere in existing literature for Nyambe’s arrival from heaven.
eaglism’ by which the creation of the universe is correlated with the origins of the Barotse Kingship which claims divine paternity from the time that Nyambe was on earth, what Muuka refers to as ‘the behaviour of a splinter group bent on asserting its own autonomy and separate identity’ thus ‘we can easily appreciate this functional link’.33

Shortly after Nyambe’s ascent to heaven, Mwambwa gave birth to a daughter who was called Mbuyu or Mbuywamwambwa (literally ‘Mbuyu of Mwambwa’) despite having had no male friends suggesting that the child may have been Nyambe’s. The relationship between Nyambe and Mwambwa involved here might have been brother-sister, which would denote correlation again with Lunda customs where incest between royal males and their queen-sisters was a common enough habit.34 Then again, maybe the term brother, sister or daughter is not meant literally. Mwambwa had two villages – Sifuti in Nyala (Kalabo) district and Sangaulu (where Mwambwa eventually died), located in the fork between the Zambezi and Kabompo rivers, which is where, it is claimed, Mwambwa eventually died.35 Some say that it was Mwambwa that brought the Luyi to settle in Bulozi, the first settlement being at Sifuti and the second at Imuba erected on a large termite mound that the Luyi built up.36 From these two villages, the Luyi spread into the plain although Mwambwa and her child remained at Sifuti.

Mwambwa, a popular leader,37 ruled the Luyi peoples as queen until she died (and was buried at Sangaulu) when Mbuywamwambwa took over the chiefship. This succession is common to all versions of Lozi history recounted for this work demonstrating that the earliest rulers of the Luyi peoples were, in fact, female. Discounting for a moment, the tradition relating to Nyambe, it is Mwambwa, then, who is credited with leading the Luyi when they first came to Bulozi.38 Yet Mwambwa did not, it seems, rule dictatorially but utilised the services of Chief Councillors or Indunas otherwise known as Makwambuyu, referred to later by Mainga as ‘full-blooded Lozi aristocrats’. One of these, Yutoya, was clearly closest to her, being referred to variously as her Natamoyo (a title that almost certainly did not

33 Ibid.
34 Oliver and Atmore, op. cit., p. 182.
35 Interview with Buxton Simasiku (Induna Amulimukwa), Mwandi, 01-09-2001
38 Interview with local historian, Inengu Muyunda Ananyatele, Limulunga 12 to 30-07-2001.
exist at that time),\textsuperscript{39} and alternatively as a brother to her daughter, Mbuywamwambwa and it is from Yutoya that one version of the name of the plain is derived, ‘Ngula ta Yutoya’.\textsuperscript{40} Mwambwa, it is suggested, also used the services of one of her sons, Sokanalinganga, quite extensively in ruling over the Luyi domain.\textsuperscript{41} It was during a discussion with the Makwambuyu that a decision was taken to broaden the area occupied by the Luyi in order to extend their agriculture and grow groundnuts, cowpeas and sorghum.\textsuperscript{42}

Simulyangumba, whose family is still in existence, was chosen to lead a group of people east to Luena and, once there, they settled in Njonjola in what is now the land of the Nkoya peoples who are stated elsewhere to have been under the domination of the Lozi and who were ruled over by Chief Kahare,\textsuperscript{43} who Mainga says also claim common ancestry with the Lozi and Lovale rulers.\textsuperscript{44} The name of the Luena village they settled at became known as Kooya, later corrupted to Koya or Nkoya.\textsuperscript{45} This confirms Van Binsbergen’s deduction that the name Nkoya never referred to a people. At interview, the current Induna Amulimukwa asserted that at this time there were no people named Nkoya, instead there were just people known as Baulima meaning cultivators.\textsuperscript{46}

When his mother died, Sokanalinanga (referred to in Mainga’s text as Sihokanalinanga of the Nkoya),\textsuperscript{47} took his mother’s drum, variously known as Mutango, Matongo and Munduko and went with it to Mwito. The drum was beaten by Yutoya and kept in Mwito until the time when Mbuyu took over as Chieftainess.\textsuperscript{48} Since it was a royal drum, Sokanalinanga did not allow anyone else access to it and it was eventually taken from him by force on behalf of Mbuyu by a royal prince by the name of Isimwaa who was charged with the installation of Mbuyu. He took the drum to Yeta, a brother to Mbuyu and future King, who became the new ‘Natamoyo’ for Mbuyu (and gained responsibility for beating the drum). Sokanalinanga then

\textsuperscript{39} The title Natamoyo, normally occupied by a royal prince, is explained more fully in Chapter Seven.
\textsuperscript{40} Interview with Inengu Muyunda Ananyatele, Limulunga 12 to 30-07-2001.
\textsuperscript{41} Interview with Buxton Simasiku (Induna Amulimukwa), Mwandi, 01-09-2001
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Mainga, op. cit., p. 19.
\textsuperscript{45} Interview with Buxton Simasiku (Induna Amulimukwa), Mwandi, 31-08-2001
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{47} Mainga, op. cit., p. 28.
\textsuperscript{48} Interview with Buxton Simasiku (Induna Amulimukwa), Mwandi, 31-08-2001
moved from Mwito further east to the Kaonde area extending the Luyi field of influence still further from the Bulozi floodplain.

**Early political development**

As stated earlier, when Mwambwa died, her daughter, Mbuywamwambwa took over the queenship and despite declaring abstinence from sexual relations proceeded to give birth to as many as eleven children. It is always said that the identity of the father of Mbuywamwambwa’s children is either not known or is a closely guarded Lozi secret, most likely the former. The numbers of children ascribed to both Mwambwa and Mbuywamwambwa vary according to the version of history being told. Different oral traditions ascribe different numbers of children to Mwambwa and Mbuywamwambwa and in some versions there is also a tradition that Mbuywamwambwa gave birth to human children with soft horns of human tissue and calves alternately. This should perhaps be understood in the context of the position of cattle as revered symbols of wealth and status in Barotse culture.\(^{49}\)

It is said that during Mbuywamwambwa’s reign, the Luyi peoples felt that they needed a leader who would rescue them from the waters of the annual flood that each year drowned the crops and wrecked homesteads (rainfall in the catchment area of the Zambezi as well as in Bulozi itself would have been much higher than today) and that this should be a male. In addition, it was felt that a male leader would be likely to be a better hunter and a more able traveller.\(^{50}\) The latter requirements suggest that hunting contributed a significant amount to food and clothing at this time, that cultivation was not so advanced and that significant damage was being incurred as a result of the flood. Later, when referring to the annual migration to the plain margins now known as the Kuomboka, it was said that ‘a woman could never have come up with the idea of Kuomboka’.\(^{51}\)

It is said that the Luyi clan gathered to discuss a successor to Mbuywamwambwa and that Nambula (‘born during the rainy season’), a servant of Mbuywamwambwa overheard and reported the discussion to the queen.

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\(^{50}\) Induna Nawa Matakala, Limulunga, 13-07-2001.

\(^{51}\) Ibid.
Mbuywamwambwa was upset and disappointed with her subjects but, as she loved her people and did not want to disappoint them, she decided to announce that she was tired of ruling and wished that the people should elect a new leader. Overall, it seems that Mbuywamwambwa was respected even if it was not felt that a woman was the best choice as leader. Alternatively, Lozi historians are not prepared to have criticism levelled at one of the founders of the Lozi Kingdom. Siluyana praise sayings describe Mbuywamwambwa as:

A daughter to Mwambwa
She was a woman who bore men and cattle
Through her we have a cousinship with Lundas
She was the mother of the Kingship, related to Nyambe

Alternatively:

Mbuyu, daughter of Mwambwa is a woman who gave birth to a cow and to a human and is a uniter of the Lundas and the Luyis through the birthright of the Mwambwa clan.

According to the latter version then, Mbuywamwambwa is greatly honoured in Lozi culture as a dignified leader, a ‘uniter’ of the Lundas and Luyis. This then serves to confirm the earlier theory that the first Luyis were not Lundas. The aspect of dignity, especially in carriage and comportment, becomes a feature of Luyi and later, Lozi royalty by which they are able, universally, to be distinguished from commoners. It is also suggested by the same correspondent that many essential aspects of contemporary Lozi culture originated during the reign of Mbuywamwambwa including, as the above praise sayings suggest, cattle rearing. Indeed, when the Lozis give praise to their longhorn cattle that figure so highly in Bulolo in terms of wealth and prestige, they often use the Luyana term Ngombe a Mbuyu meaning the cattle of Mbuyu. Some mention of the physical appearance of the Luyi royals is also relevant here. Mbuywamwambwa is remembered as being black, having big ears and being tall and slim. Significantly, these are still commonly

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52 Interview with Inengu Muyunda Ananyatele, Limulunga 12 to 30-07-2001.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
held perceptions amongst Lozis of how a true Lozi should appear and certainly many do possess these features today. The reference to big ears in this context probably refers to the ability of the queen to hear of whatever happens throughout the land, thus there must have developed during this period some system of communications incorporating a reporting structure.

The rearing of cattle is claimed to have begun in this era and undoubtedly this would have added greatly to the productive capacity of the Luyi and encouraged their wish to remain in the plain. Maybe cattle were already in the plain when the Luyi arrived and they simply learnt to obtain dairy products, meat and skins from them. Like many pre-modern forms of production and wealth accumulation, cattle soon took on mystical and ritual symbolism and that is seen in the story of Mbuywamwambwa giving birth to human children and calves alternatively.

Some organisational structure seems also to originate in this era. The assumption made here is that the bands of Luyi who first arrived in the plain were not very well organised except in terms of their leader. They were most probably roving clans or associated families. Once settled in the plain however, a degree of organisational structure appears with the appointment of councillors and the use of information gathering with which to plan ahead in terms of gathering new skills and defence. Drums are also defined as symbols of power from the earliest times. Care is taken to give these drums names, a common practice in Lozi history, and throughout central and southern Africa. The ability to remain in the plain, meanwhile, would be tested by new threats as other groups arrived and from internal competition within the newly coalescing clan.

**Inauguration of the Kingship**

In Mbuywamwambwa’s place, the Luyi ‘elected’ Muyunda Mwanasilundu, commonly known as Mboo, a nickname given to him by the councillors who are always described in tradition as Indunas. Mbuywamwambwa, meanwhile, lived on into the reign of the second male ruler, her eldest son, Inyambo. Mboo, it seems, was chosen for his skills, both in leadership and as a renowned hunter, being in the habit of going out and bringing meat for the palace and the Indunas. He was the second eldest of his mother’s children, chosen over his eldest brother, Inyambo. The Indunas had come to respect him (the Lozis tend to use the verb ‘love’ in this
respect). To the people he was friendly, respectful and courageous and as a result was ‘loved’ by all. To some, Mboo was the son of Nyambe. To most others, however, he was the second son of Mbuyamwambwa. A great deal of significance is attached to Mboo. His nickname means shyness or embarrassment, this being ascribed to his overdue birth, for overstaying in his mother’s womb. The name Mwanasilundu means ‘a huge mass when born’. According to some Lozi historians, Mboo knew that he was someone who had to be loyal to the Luyi people out of respect to his mother whom he had inconvenienced by his late birth. A different version at Libonda, meanwhile, says that Mboo’s full name described his bravery and wisdom. After being elected leader (he is referred to as the first Lozi King), Mboo moved first to Libonda, which he made his capital (although Jalla claims that he built first at Ikuyu), and then to Ikatulamwa, situated on the banks of the Zambezi (also known as Kambai – meaning face of the Chief), a village that disappeared (but was rebuilt elsewhere) as the course of the river migrated.

Mboo soon set about subduing other groups in the Kalabo area who presumably were competing for supremacy at this time, specifically, according to Jalla, the Mishulundu, Namale, Imulangu, Upangoma, Liuwa, Muenyi and Mambowe. Evidence of all these names can be found in the Kalabo district where the Luyi first came to stay. The parent group of the Luyi now became known as Mbowe or Mambowe. In much of the tradition on Mboo, mention is also made of the ‘Andonyi’, an enemy that came from the west that proved a formidable foe. The notion of enemies and bad witchcraft emanating from the west was to become a recurring theme during this era. As in so many of the Lozi myths, this threat to the well-being of the Luyi could only be overcome with the help of magic, usually supplied by a ‘doctor’ from the ‘south’ meaning the southern portion of Bulozi.

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57 Interview with Buxton Simasiku (Induna Amulimukwa), Mwandi, 01-09-2001
58 Interview with Wakuñuma Wakuñuma, Headmaster of Libonda Basic School, 14 to 16-08-2001
59 A.D. Jalla History, Traditions and Legends of the Barotse Nation, translated copy of original Sicololo manuscript located in document archive of the Institute of Economic and Social Research (INESOR [old Rhodes-Livingstone Institute]), Lusaka, dated 1909, p. 1
60 Ibid.
61 The original Ikatulamwa was washed away but another village of the same name now also stands on the banks of the Zambezi to the west of the original.
62 Jalla, History, Traditions and Legends..., p. 5.
Jalla’s account speaks of the way that Yeta, who was apparently a son of Mwambwa, and had obviously been given the responsibility of guarding fords across the ‘river’ (Zambezi), was withdrawn. Maybe Yeta had not served the purpose with which he had been entrusted although no direct criticism is made and Yeta was to become the third Lozi King. The ‘doctor’ in this case instructed that a young girl had to be fetched who had to pound the doctor’s medicine in a mortar and pointing the pestle in the direction of the Andonyi, cursed them, comparing them to a variety of trees which were known to die (this is very interesting as virtually no trees were to be found in this part of the plain), presumably of old age. The Andonyi, with whom the Luyi must have clearly been in some sort of attritive conflict, now started to be seized by fever and this rendered them powerless permitting the Luyi to kill them in large numbers. \(^{64}\) Thus the Andonyi were repulsed from the Luyi homeland although they retreated only as far as the western boundary of the flood plain, where the Lukona forest begins from where they continued to harass all those who passed through. \(^{65}\) It is suggested here that the Andonyi might well have been the Mbunda who were to share much of Luyi/Lozi history in the ensuing years, indeed, right up to the present day. Meanwhile all peoples from the west were termed Wiko or Mawiko, a term (sometimes used deprecatingly) in use up to the present day as far east as Kaonde.

Mboo appears as a particularly inspired leader, one correspondent saying he had qualities that a mere mortal commoner could not have. \(^{66}\) An example is a seat he had made from reeds and Makenge roots called Lubona, which was peculiar in that it was so designed that when Mboo sat on it his feet could not touch the ground but would need to be rested on some sort of support. \(^{67}\) Another is the creation of the Nalikwanda. One of the prime reasons for making the change from a female to a male ruler, it is said, was to deal with the threat from the annual inundation which killed most of the Luyi livestock and drowned people and villages alike. \(^{68}\) Mboo came up with the idea of a boat or rather a barge with which to transport people and valuables to higher ground. The first barge, called Njonjola, was constructed of local reeds called Mefalingi, which were sewn together using Makenge roots and fibres. It was, it is said, constructed in parts, the sides finally being attached to the base.

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\(^{65}\) Mainga, *Bulozi under the Luyana Kings…*, p. 25.
\(^{66}\) Interview with Inengu Muyunda Ananyatele, Limulunga 12 to 30-07-2001.
\(^{67}\) Ibid.
\(^{68}\) Interview with Induna Nawa Matakala, Limulunga, 13-07-2001.
Clearly, this sort of craft was not very sturdy or long-lasting and soon the need for wood was realised. The sort of wood that was desired was that from which planks could be made and three sorts were chosen as suitable, *Mulombe*, *Muzauli* and *Munyonga*. The latter was chosen specifically for the base due to its low density, providing good floatation properties. Quite where the technology or idea of using planks came from is a mystery. Clearly, as there were virtually no trees in Bulozi, it seems unlikely that this method would have developed locally. The reed and fibre boat would have been an indigenous product using materials available locally. The question is intriguing and no answer is readily available.

Three carvers were sought by Mboo for the *Njonjola* which was constructed at a village called Liaylo at the place of a man called Akabeti. Spears (*mbinji*) were sought from people living in the forest east of the plain (where iron working had been known for centuries past) and these were used to make holes in the planks using fire and through these holes were passed *Makenge* fibres (roots), which were used to join the planks together. Locally available bitumen-like glue called *Lingongwe* (made from the bark of certain trees) was then used to seal the holes. Paddling sticks were made under the supervision of Mukulwembowe, the Chief Rainmaker at Nakato village. These early barges were decorated with vertical dull scarlet and creamy white stripes using dried clay and chalkstone or dried *Makenge* root for the creamy colour. The object was to create shades of light and dullness, which were to resemble the designs on the altars used to worship the Luyi God, Nyambe. Later, the stripes changed in colour to black and white and were said to resemble a zebra’s stripes but this was not the original purpose. Thus the early Njonjola was decorated to look like a giant altar.

Finally, the chief carver, Induna Nambayo would be called to supervise all the carvings and to launch the barge for testing. The barge Njonjola became known also as *Linene* meaning ‘a wide thing’ and later as *Nalikwanda*, the name by which it is known today. This latter name means ‘for the people’ meaning that it was for the use of all those who could paddle and who lived in vulnerably low areas when the flood, known as *mezi a lungwangwa* (water that consumes everything) rose too high. The purpose was to transport people to higher ground for safety. Later, the Nalikwanda was for the sole use of the King who led a train of barges and canoes in the procession known as *Kuomboka*, which heralded the move to higher ground of
much of the Lozi nation between early March and April depending on the height of the waters. In the pre-Makololo era this migration did not take place to any particular or regular location, it could be to any higher ground that was deemed safe. Later, when the use of the plain margins was included, families had regular flood-time homes where they took their cattle, and Kings would also choose their own Kuomboka destination. It was only during the time of Yeta III in the twentieth century that a set destination was ordained. More discussion of Kuomboka takes place in Chapter Seven, the purpose here being to locate this very potent symbol of Lozi culture and identity in the reign of the first Lozi male monarch, Mboo.

Meanwhile Mboo had other, more human difficulties to deal with, specifically competition with siblings who, although it is not admitted in Lozi tradition, probably challenged for the leadership of the Luyi resulting in unsuccessful contenders moving out. Most accounts of the time of Mboo describe a process of handing out new areas of influence to brothers and sisters. Thus Mwanambinje moved to Nayaka, the next village south of Libonda, although this was later given to Mboo’s sister, Njikana. Mbuywamwambwa, had, by this time, moved to Mukono.69 Meanwhile Inyambo was given Sikuli, Mwanawina was given Sikongo and Yeta was given Mwandi (not to be confused with the Mwandi on the Zambezi opposite Caprivi which became the royal capital in the far south of the Kingdom),70 Mbikusita (‘a zebra that kicks’) went to rule in Mukola, Namakau (‘a digging tool or hoe’) was given Salondo or Kwandu and Mange was given Nakanda, a forest area.71 This indicates a substantial broadening out of Luyi influence in the region. Not everyone appears to have been satisfied with Mboo’s retention of the Kingship, however, and tradition tells of two individuals who challenged their ascribed position in relation to Mboo and later moved on to found their own princedoms and extend Luyi influence still further.

One of these was Mboo’s younger brother, Mwanambinje (often spelt Mwanambinye), whose name means ‘child who moves with spears’. The two

69 Interview with Her Highness the Mboanjikana Kandundu, Libonda Royal Palace, 17-08-2001.
70 Indeed place names from the early period of the Luyi crop up in several locations across Barotseland which can prove confusing fro the newcomer.
71 Interviews with Her Highness the Mboanjikana Kandundu, Libonda Royal Palace, 17-08-2001, Inengu Muyunda Ananyatele, Limulunga 12 to 30-07-2001, Wakuñuma Wakuñuma, Headmaster of Libonda Basic School, 14 to 16-08-2001 (who places this allocation at the time of Mbuywamwambwa’s abdication and the election of Mboo), Buxton Simasiku (Induna Amulimukwa), Mwandi, 30-08-2001 and Mainga, Bulozi under the Luyana Kings, op. cit., p. 25. All these accounts differ slightly as to who went where as would be expected.
brothers, it is said, regularly sparred with each other. Examples of the competitions indulged in were shooting arrows across the Zambezi and pitting their fighting bulls against one another. In many of these bouts, Mwanambinje would be the victor causing considerable resentment and jealousy on the part of Mboo so that eventually Mwanambinje left (or was expelled) to seek 'new pastures'. Mwanambinje (who was endowed with great powers of magic) is credited with having been the first Luyi/Lozi leader to subdue peoples south of Bulolo including the Mbukushu on the right bank of the Zambezi in what became Caprivi, who were apparently fracturing under the stress of succession disputes. It is from these succession disputes that the Subia are said by the Lozi to have emerged.

A similar dynamic occurred with another brother, Mange, who made for the eastern plain margin and wooded higher lands beyond that. The ability to relocate and elude compliance with existing authority, thereby avoiding internal conflict, came about due to sparse populations and the availability of land not already claimed as a homeland by other groups or where the existing status quo was easily overturned as in the case of regions inhabited by the Khoi-San. Both of the above protagonists set out with a band of followers, some of whom were appointed councillors in a political structure replicating the one left behind, which could then be planted in the areas in which they settled. This may be seen as one explanation for the rise in Barotseland of a number of royal centres with similar political structures. Eventually, as will be seen, the Luyi clan and its King became more and more powerful, overrunning and reclaiming these other centres of influence and posting consuls who governed through institutional capacity identical to the central authority of the King. For those left behind it is said, Mboo distributed various administrative duties. By this method, commoners were brought into the sphere of government through appointments in matters of spiritual, military and judicial importance including the traditional Kuta or council. This may also have been a strategy to discourage further competitive lust.

By locating the political organisation of the present as primordial and timeless, Lozi historians and contemporary structures of power are able to create the impression of irreducibility and inviolability. Indeed, the Lozi system of governance has fascinated, confused, frustrated and constrained attempts to change the system both from within and without. Failed attempts at modification by the British South
Africa Company (BSAC), the British colonial administrative system and its intermediaries such as the academic Max Gluckman, and the post-colonial governments of Kenneth Kaunda and Frederick Chiluba are all testament to the enduring quality of Lozi governance infused though it became in the mid-nineteenth century with Makololo influence. This, it is argued here, is due to the way that Lozi Governance and the umbilical cord to the Kingship are pivotal to Lozi identity and citizenship. Thus an attack on a Litunga, even an unpopular one, or the Barotse Royal Establishment is interpreted as an attack on the Lozi nation and usually results in a closing of ranks behind the Kingship which is the active as well as symbolic manifestation of 'Loziness'.

The story concerning the end of Mboo’s rule whilst Mbuywamwambwa was still alive is not without significance. According to local legend, a period of darkness suddenly descended upon Bulozi and as much as a week passed without sight of the sun, an unheard of occurrence in that region even today. People and animals rose and slept but this had no impact on the continual darkness that befell the country. This worried the people and, according to the custom of the day, when a mystery occurred that could not be explained, a diviner was called and consulted for an explanation. The diviner discovered that the ancestral spirits were annoyed because the Luyis had appointed Mboo to the Kingship when, in fact, it should have gone to his elder brother, Inyambo, an unworthy decision. Following this discovery, Mboo apparently politely resigns from the monarchy in the same manner as his mother before him and is replaced by Inyambo. Undoubtedly this is a benign interpretation put on competition between early Luyi leaders probably during the reign of Lewanika at the turn of the twentieth century that were then dictated to gullible missionary writers such as Jalla who produced what was to become the ‘authorised’ history of the Lozis, still in use today.72

It is a matter of conjecture as to what the period of darkness referred to could have been. Maybe a week of heavy continuous storms or perhaps a solar eclipse (clearly not lasting a week) are responsible, but it is relevant that the natural environment is again used as a participant and as a backdrop to events that are core to Lozi history and to Lozi consciousness. In addition, the notion that the Kingship

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72 A. Jalla, Litaba za Sicaba sa Malozi.
could be passed down to the eldest son is interesting here in that this was not a custom that was followed in later Lozi history. Thus perhaps these two factors are convenient ways of explaining how the performance of one of the founding monarchs of the Lozi Kingship, so central to Lozi identity, may have fallen below expectations, resulting perhaps in some kind of putsch. The idea that Mboo, like Mbuywamwambwa before him, would have politely resigned from office is somewhat implausible to say the least, but entirely in keeping with the way in which the Luyi/Lozi Kingship is intended to be perceived from the viewpoint and interests of the Second Lozi Kingdom.

Certainly Mboo is remembered today with considerable fondness. His praise sayings promote admiration:

*Mboo mwana silundu*
*Silundu lwanga manji*
*Silundu sa makumba*
*Ana ku kumanga litunga naya*
*Nayo litunga naye, na ku kumanga*
*Naye, u Muyunda wa Ikatulamwa*
*A kuyunda mbu telela*

*Mboo the bright one*
*Who accommodates all the people in his heart*
*Is likened to a bunch of fibres tied together*
*The people loved him and he loved them too*
*Muyunda of Ikatulamwa, a village that once visited*
*Will not be willingly departed from*
*Because of his (Mboo’s) hospitality*

This praise saying and others like it imply a bond or bargain between the Lozi people and their King. He would rule over them with care and provide protection and succour whilst the people (his supporters) would also protect their King from overthrow. As already implied, little open criticism of a King/Litunga is permissible in Lozi culture. If there was fault, then criticism would be directed at an advisor or the
Ngambela (Prime Minister) who would probably be punished in place of the King. Also, the Lozi nation protects the Kingship even if a less than unanimously popular King occupies it.

Another aspect of Kingship and of the indigenous Lozi belief system is the added relevance and importance that attaches to Kings after their death, from when their influence increases. Departed Kings are regularly consulted at their closely guarded cenotaphs for advice and approval (this aspect of tradition is explored in more detail in Chapter Seven). Thus the cenotaph of Mboo, reified along with Mbuywamwambwa as founding parents of the Lozi order and system of governance, must be visited by all Litungas upon their accession to the Kingship. Upon their death of Mboo, the first King of the Luyis was buried in his capital, Ikatulamwa, in a specially designed courtyard known as Limbwata. The following morning, however, the courtyard built around his grave and a mound of earth put on the grave, had disappeared. A trail was found leading out of the village and leading to nearby Imwambo village. In that place the courtyard fence was found together with the earth mound. At some point in time after this event (when is not clear), the old village of Ikatulamwa was washed away as the Zambezi modified its course and the surviving inhabitants all moved to a new village given the same name. After the discovery of the transferred grave and the subsequent washing away of the original Ikatulamwa, the Luyis concluded that the spirit of Mboo had not wanted to be buried in Ikatulamwa and that this was a portent of events to come, a message from the spirit to the people that had been ignored. From that time onwards, each King designated his eventual burial place, which is always at a different location from his capital. It also marks the inauguration of what Mainga refers to as the ‘royal graves and ancestor cult’, discussed in detail in Chapter Seven. Suffice it to say here that the legend concerning Mboo’s transfer of his own gravesite for posterity is indication of the belief that, on departure from the world of mortals, a Litunga, far from losing control, actually gains in power and influence over the mortal world.

Twelve Litungas are said to have reigned over the Luyi in the period between the abdication of Mbuywamwambwa and the arrival of the Makololo (a chronological

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73 This version of events was provided by Inengu Muyunda Ananyatele, Limulunga 12 to 30-07-2001 and a similar one is recounted by Coillard, On the Threshold… p. 595.
list of Lozi monarchs is given in Appendix 2). Of these, ten displayed qualities that
define the ideals of the Lozi consciousness and two, Yeta Canute and Mwananyanda,
of whom little is written, demonstrate qualities of which the Lozi consciousness
strongly disapproves. Mboo, of whom this chapter has already spoken was renowned
for his inventiveness, his hunting prowess, his pragmatism and his magical powers in
dealing with intruders. His brothers Mwanambinje and Mange were also both
renowned for their magical powers, while Mwanambinje, whilst only a prince, is
renowned for founding the southern Kingdom and for pacifying other peoples as far
south as the Chobe/Linyanti/Mashi/Kwando. Mboo’s successor, Inyambo was
remembered as a great hunter while Yeta ya Musa (Yeta the kind one) was known
for his gentleness, kindness and care for people as well as for the flora and fauna.
These first three kings are associated intimately with the foundation of the nation as
they were all of one generation, Mboo and Inyambo both being sons of
Mbuyuwamwambwa while Yeta is spoken of generally as their uncle (a brother to
Mbuywamwambwa), a brother to the latter.

After Yeta passed away a new generation of Kings took over led by Ngalama
the son of another of Mboo’s brothers, Ingalamwa who had not risen to Litungaship.
Ngalama was a warrior king known for his fierceness and determination. The
kingdom expanded under this Litunga who set about eliminating the fledgling
princeoms set up by Mwanambinje and Mange and consolidating these southern
and western extensions to the original Bulozi homeland. The conquest of
Mwanambinje is a story of magic and heroism with Mwanambinje thwarting
Ngalama’s armies by magic until, finally tired by the continuing onslaughts, choosing
to sink into the earth with his people at his capital Imatonga, on the southern plain
near to Senanga rather than be captured by Ngalama. This led to the acquisition by
the Luyi kingship of the Maoma drums which Mwanambinje had captured from the
Mbukushu and which were to become a symbol of Lozi power.75 His cenotaph is still
upkept and visited by Litungas today. The symbolism of the site is expressed today
by the existence of palm trees that are said to have grown from the poles to which
Mwanambinji’s cattle were tied so long ago.

75 Mwanambinje had attempted to share these with Ngalama who became his son-in-law through
marriage to the former’s daughter, Notulu. However, it is said that Ngalama could not be satisfied with
only one of these symbolically powerful drums, closely associated with the ability to bring rain which
Mbukushu chiefs were believed to be endowed with since earliest known times and so turned on his
father-in-law.
The stories of Ngalama’s conquest of Mange, by contrast, teaches present-day Lozis the quality of loyalty for it is said that Mange’s people failed to rally to his cause when Ngalama’s forces came to deal with Mange who ran into a lake to escape his pursuers. Instead Mange’s followers ran away and the descendants through all generations to this day are known as the Makwanga (failures) for their weakness when their chief was under pressure. Even today people living in the area in which Mange is said to have perished suffer the reputation gained from this event which may have taken place 250-300 years ago. All Litungas from this time to the present day are descended from Ngalama who by all accounts did not make any plans for succession having any known sons killed at birth.

This did not stop at least two sons from being spirited away, however, and when Ngalama died, one of these, Yeta Nalute, was appointed Litunga but he turned out to be very unpopular due to his penchant for eating human flesh. This is interpreted as a habit picked up while in exile with the Mbunda to the west (Wiko), where all bad things were said to emanate from. As a non-swimmer, it is said he was drowned after being enticed onto a canoe believing he was going hunting. The canoe was deliberately sunk, it being a cardinal sin to spill the blood of a Litunga. Yeta Nalute was followed by another of Ngalama’s sons, Ngombala, who was an empire builder like his father. He had to deal with insurrection on the part of the Subia in the south, originally subdued by his great uncle, Mwanambinje, but took this further by extending the lands under Luyi influence beyond the Victoria Falls and up to Hwange in present-day Zimbabwe. Returning from the Falls, Ngombala then sailed up the Kwando, subduing peoples such as the Yeyi, and Mbukushu, posting sentinels on the way and finally making allegiances with the Mbunda in present day south-eastern Angola, offering them hospitality in Bulozi should they ever need it before re-entering the Bulozi plain from the west.

Next came Yubya who was loved so much that, when he was taken ill, he was locked in a little house with no door so that the angel of death could not take him away. Alas, that Litunga died as others had before which taught the Luyi that God was all powerful and omnipresent. Yubya is also known for dictating that Indunas who obtained tribute could keep a small portion for themselves, probably a pragmatic decision at the time. Mwanawina was known for his good looks.

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76 Interviews with Chief Sikwa and his people, Nambinje, 21-07-2001.
Mwananyanda was another bad king who had large numbers of his people killed but invented the famous Liwale dance for women.

The great Litunga Mulambwa is revered by in Lozi history, not least by the Mbunda who dwell in Barotseland alongside the Lozi. It was Mulambwa who welcomed two branches of the Mbunda to move to the kingdom after they left their homeland beyond the Kwando River to the west, honouring the offer first made by Ngombala. A section of the Mbunda peoples, sometimes known as the ‘Old Mbunda’ have lived in Bulozi ever since and their two chiefs, Kandala and Cieniele, hold high office in the Lealui Kuta paying regular homage to the Litunga although, while there are Mbunda Indunas, there are few opportunities for Mbunda progression in the traditional establishment. Mulambwa was also known as a law-maker, including the rather weird law that a thief should not be prosecuted but rather given land or title to encourage him not to repeat the offence. Meanwhile Mulambwa stands out along with Mboo and later Lewanika as a landmark Litunga who reigned for maybe 50 years, an unparalleled period during that epoch. Finally Silumelume and Mubakwanu, both sons of Mulambwa are remembered only for their foolishness in fighting over the succession of their father which led to the ease of invasion of the Makololo in the late 1820s.

These paragraphs then, contain a distillation of hundreds of stories handed down over the generations and distorted in the various parts of the old Lozi kingdom. Yet there are clearly grains of truth in each, not least as the same stories crop up so many times in different areas albeit with different nuances. Each Litunga as well as the errant princes Mwanambinje and Mange is remembered for something vital. Only two have negative connotations and these like Sipopa who followed later, who also became unpopular, were rewarded by having their cenotaphs chosen for them in remote places where people did not live. The memories of these Litungas and princes serve to tell the Lozi of today of the evils of cannibalism, ill-temper and cruelty. All other Litungas of the period are remembered for good characteristics such as intelligence, kindness, hospitality, beauty, bravery, hunting prowess and pragmatism as well as for magical powers and comportment that encourage Lozis today to revere their heritage and also to continue to respect institutions such as the Kingship. The supremacy of the original Malozi among the family of groups that
make up the nation also comes through the ages although of course no such thing as a pureblood Lozi exists.

**Summary and conclusion**

In conclusion to this chapter, the history of the period between the arrival in Bulozi of the first Luyis and the end of the first Lozi kingdom after the death of Litunga Mulambwa, handed down in orally transmitted stories, purveys many founding components of Lozi state formation, custom, ritual and cosmology. Meanwhile, many of the cultural values appertaining to the nation today, which are described in more detail in Chapter Seven, are rooted in the Luyi era. On reflection, apart from the short shrift given to the two bad kings Yeta Nalute and Mwananyanda, it appears that the history handed down has been carefully crafted so as not to embarrass or in any way lead to perceptions of internal conflict in early Luyi political formation, with the exception of the reconquering of the fiefdoms of erring princes who sought to dilute the power of the Luyi kingship. This is an enduring theme regardless of the factual variation between various versions and is testament to the Lozi sense of propriety and protection that is afforded to the institution of Kingship in all corners of the realm. Also, this is a history that serves the additional purpose of rooting the Lozi people and the Lozi state, with its political structure very similar to the one found today, in timeless perpetuity in Bulozi. It also links the Lozi kingship directly to the God, Nyambe, the founder of life on earth. Van Wimsbergen found very similar stories among the creation myths of the Nkoya, who are claimed in Lozi myths and legends to have come under Luyi domination soon after the founding of the Luyi dynasty in Bulozi.77

Analysis and interpretation provides clear indications that the early Luyi arrivals were limited in numbers, probably a large family clan that settled initially in a comparatively small area of northern Bulozi and found conditions attractive but exacting. The physical environment was nothing like that obtained elsewhere and difficulties were clearly experienced in maintaining subsistence in the floodplain until the introduction of cattle rearing and extended cultivation outside of the initial settled area. The vagaries of the climate and the annual flood that varies in height and extent from one year to the next were also major factors. Conflict with other

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77 Van Binsbergen, op. cit, pp. 359-364.
intruders on the plain was another feature that occupies early Lozi history as does the use of magic to overcome these threats. It seems likely that population levels and density were considerably less than is the case today. Internal conflict amongst the contenders for power in the ruling family is concealed by way of attaching blame to poor decision-making on the part of commoners electing their leader, causing offence to the spirits of ancestors and to God. Added to this was the need to expand the limits of influence of the Luyi people as an answer to insufficiencies in locally produced food supplies and that obtained in the form of tribute. Conflicts are solved with the help of magic and superhuman effort. The Lozi God, Nyambe, is shown to be the first and founding person in Buluзи and thus provides legitimation for all future Lozi domination of the floodplain and surrounding area.

More recent contributions to Lozi history accept that other people may have been present in the region but that they were largely confined to the margins of the floodplain. Scientific analysis suggests that there might be some logic and correctness to this as the floodplain may well have been a virtually uninhabitable watery expanse prior to the time when the Luyis and other similar groups arrived from the Lunda or Luba Empires to the north. Other peoples may have attempted to gain access to the region where the Luyis settled but were repelled. Finally here, the history of this era is shown to be a founding component of the 'national history of the Lozis', and forms a significant fund of Lozi heritage that can be bought into by Lozis when constructing their identity and sense of belonging to something. Particularly since the overthrow of the Makololo invaders in 1864, Lozis have been able to accept citizenship and provide subjectivity of the metaphysical entity that is the Lozi nation and take possession of the limited and simultaneously inclusive and exclusive membership it offers.

The relevance of environmental change and adaptation is paramount in this segment of Lozi history. One can only imagine the reaction of the early Luyis to the vista that greeted them on arrival in the plain. The flatness of the plain, the extremes of weather found there, the exigencies of the annual flood, the power of the River Zambezi and of the animals that lurked therein have only been hinted at in this chapter. But the imprint of the environment exists in everything that was created whether in physical form as with the creation of the first Nalikwanda and grass-built huts or more subjectively as in the creation myths surrounding Nyambe.
and the ability of the Luyi queen Mbuywamwambwa to bear calves as well as humans. The imprint of the physical environment that has been handed down is as potent and vivid as it is to any newcomer to Bulozi today and forms an irreducible layer of identity for Lozis once acceptance of their primogeniture in Bulozi has taken place. Even the name that Lozis give to their King in Siluyana, Litunga, meaning earth or holder of the earth, is directly connected to the environment. The King is seen to hold the land on behalf of the people. The physical environment will continue to be a recurring theme throughout this work.

In the contemporary era, Lozi parents still talk to their children of the early ancestors so virtually everybody has a rudimentary knowledge of the myths and stories pertaining to the early period. In terms of citizenship and subjectivity, the constructed history of the early period is very important in giving root to the nation and the Lozi consciousness with all its defining characteristics. The link to the present is provided by the cenotaphs of departed Kings maintained and guarded by the Limbote (gravekeepers, singular - Nombote) through whom messages and requests for advice are passed to and from departed Litungas who are more powerful than the living which is why their graves have been visited and honoured by all Litungas, Ngambelas and other Lozi notables throughout recorded Lozi time.

This earliest period of Luyi history is relevant then in describing the way that one group of ancestors of the present-day Lozi arrived and dealt with the exigencies of the time. Mwambwa and Mbuywamwambwa, assuming that these were separate people, clearly had Lunda connections, Mwambwa almost certainly being pure Lunda. On arriving in Bulozi, there must have been pluses and minuses to be weighed up in making the decision to remain. On the positive side, here was a land that was not yet thickly populated, that responded to cultivation, a skill that the Lunda brought with them and probably existed amongst any Luba remnants living in the plain at this time. Yet, in the beginning, this clearly did not cater sufficiently for the needs of the Luyi thus the need to send out a party to colonise other parts of Bulozi.
3 Makololo interregnum and the legacy of David Livingstone

From the 1820s to the 1860s, the name Makololo inspired a combination of fear, horror, respect and reverence amongst the peoples of the Kalahari and Central to Upper Zambezi Valley. Many Lozi people today, particularly historians and chiefs wear a rarely articulated but omnipresent psychological Makololo badge of identity, almost in the way of a medal. This is in spite of the fact that, according to all historical narratives, the Makololo, under their charismatic leader, Sibituane,¹ invaded the Lozi kingdom, occupying it and imposing their will for over thirty years before being spectacularly overthrown by a force of Lozis from exile in Lukwakwa district to the northeast of Bulozi in 1864.

While conventional Lozi history speaks of invasion, temporary dominance and overthrow, there are few accounts of suffering or oppression endured under the Makololo yolk except perhaps amongst the Mayeyi in Caprivi. Furthermore, it is of great significance that the language imported by the Makololo, infused with many words and idioms of the Siluyana language of the Luyi, remained and became embedded after the “overthrow”. Much of the organisational structure and customs of the Makololo also became permanentised after the restoration despite the stated intention of the later Litunga Lewanika to re-impose an autochthonous Lozi stamp on political organisation and traditional customs in Barotseland. Long-term political and cultural domination may result in a community adopting an alien language and culture by default as happened to the coloured communities of South Africa under the yolk of Afrikaner apartheid domination. Makololo rule, however, only lasted between 25 and 40 years, hardly long enough to become deeply engrained with the local population. Therefore, alternative explanations must be sought. The dichotomy between the concept of overthrow and rejectionism and the retention of an alien language and culture is clear to see but the obvious inconsistency embodied in this has not been properly tackled in the literature to date. The significance of this apparently contradictory dynamic is, nevertheless, very

relevant to an adequate explanation and understanding of contemporary notions of Lozi citizenship and subjectivity. This chapter aims to explore the issue more fully.

From the same era, or more specifically from 1850-1860, the Scottish explorer and missionary, David Livingstone is fondly remembered by Lozis today as a beneficent influence on the Lozi nation despite the fact that this influence was really directed at the Makololo leadership and that he actually made only comparatively short visits to Barotseland around a hundred and fifty years ago. The legacy of warmth and positive feeling attributed to Livingstone is bound up with the construction of the contemporary Lozi nation, its cosmos, the signs and symbols of its culture and the face it seeks to portray to the outside world. And yet, Livingstone directed most of his energy whilst in Barotseland to the Makololo, the masters of the day and mediators of his progress, not to mention benefactor, victualler and securer and guarantor without whose help, Livingstone’s star in Africa and Britain would not have shone so brightly. As Debenham points out, ‘His visits being at a time when the Barotse people proper were under temporary subjugation to the Makololo, he did not pick them out as the well-defined people they were before and since....’ But Livingstone’s commentary, his records, detailed observations, analysis and musings are absolutely essential to an understanding of the contradictory dynamics of the Makololo legacy.

Livingstone tried to deal with the Makololo and Lozi (the Borotsi, later Barotse, as he called them) throughout as separate peoples, an aspect of the European colonial attempt to rationalise African peoples by tribalising them. Yet Livingstone realised that the Makololo comprised more than one people as will be seen and he was honest enough to admit that even in the midst of the Makololo interregnum when he was there, the boundaries between the two often became blurred and therein lies the key to understanding the aforementioned inconsistency. Without acknowledging the contribution of Livingstone, it is argued here, a true understanding of Lozi identity today could not be achieved.

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**Arrival of Makololo influence**

According to all historical narratives to date, Barotseland, or rather the Luyi state or nation, was invaded sometime between 1820 and 1840 by a branch of Basotho peoples that the Luyi originally referred to as the Akubu, later known as the Makololo, and was occupied by them until they were overthrown in 1864. This overthrow was apparently accompanied by great bloodshed with virtually every Makololo male being slain and the women only saved due to their attractiveness to Lozi men and young children for their usefulness in labour. This supposedly seminal event marks what is often referred to as the ‘restoration’ and the beginning of the second Lozi Kingdom.

The story of the Makololo, a composite horde brought together by the assimilation of groups conquered by the astute and charismatic Sibituane began around 1820 among the Bafokeng, a section of a Sotho group called the Patsa. Sibituane and his people migrated in stages from an area close to modern-day Lesotho as part of the dispersals referred to as the ‘Difaqane’ in south-eastern Africa, across the High Veldt, then west and north through present-day Botswana. Germond says it was the attention of the Amandebele (Matabele) of Mzilikaze that persuaded Sibituane of the need to move his people north: ‘It was at this time... the dreaded Mosilikatse (another version of the name Mzilikaze) who forced Sebetuane to go towards the lake (Ngami).’ This stepped migration was articulated largely by war and the usurpation by the Makololo of existing authority. The name Makololo only arose during the long migration north. One version has it that the name came about after Sibituane took a wife named Setlutlu of the Makollo people, a sub-section of the Batlokoa, who he had previously awarded to Lechae, one of his young commanders but who he was particularly enamoured with himself. It was this same wife who bore Sibituane’s son Sekeletu who was later destined to succeed his father as Chief of the Makololo people and it was this same woman who Livingstone met at Naliele where Sibituane originally made his capital in Barotseland. From here, mostly referred to as Masekeletu, she was observed to have

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3 Information supplied by local Lozi historian Inengu Anayatele during interview 14-10-2002.
4 Smith, op. cit., p. 50.
much influence over the commanders that Sibituane left in place in Bulozi when he moved his capital south to Linyanti. The Makololo name crops up in another form elsewhere in Botswana. Chirenje refers to the first wife of the Bakwain chief Sebele who went by the appellation Machololelo, so the name seems to have a Tswana connection.\(^7\)

Sibituane was renowned for his military capabilities and his leadership qualities. The very fact of so many victories for Sibituane over peoples who would have strongly resisted the transit of strangers through their lands suggests remarkable abilities. Sibituane’s forces must have been considerable as the polities he challenged were known for their resilience and supported substantial populations. The Bamangwaketse, for instance, had never before been defeated in battle. Ellenberger attempts to explain this phenomenon, observing that ‘other tribes contributed their quota, for he (Sibituane) defeated all the tribes he came across, without, however, seeking to take their country, but capturing their cattle, partly for food and partly to encourage their followers.’\(^8\) He also had a strategy of assimilating compliant, young, aspiring leaders from conquered peoples into the Kololo ranks. He was, reportedly, an inclusive leader, his strategies including the taking of wives and the making of appointments from the most outstanding among the vanquished groups under his jurisdiction, particularly the most promising young men who were trained and groomed for leadership.\(^9\) Livingstone described ‘Kwenane, one of Sebetwane’s indunas, apparently of Lozi stock...’\(^10\) This led to considerable respect for Sibituane and the Makololo system of rule.\(^11\) As the missionary Adolph Jalla who wrote his history of the Barotse nation almost completely from the information passed to him by Lewanika and his senior Indunas who were present during Makololo rule, observed:

\begin{quote}
Sibitwanie himself was very kind to everybody, even to the poor people. Strangers were always hospitably received by him. Nevertheless he always expected and received the respect due to such a powerful chief as he was.
\end{quote}

\(^8\) Ellenberger, p. 308.
\(^11\) Ibid.
When strangers are (sic) returned to their homes, they would say of him: ‘He has a heart! He is wise!’ As a result, the Barotse, the Batoka and all the other tribes continued to surrender to him. All were received and some were even given positions of importance.12

This contrasted with the unadulterated terror inspired by the Matabele, a popular name given by the Shona to the amaNdebele or amaKumalo, an Nguni-speaking group organised as a military state under their warrior chief, Mzilikaze. Such terror, it is suggested by Dickson, was partly due to the bloodthirsty devastation wreaked by the Matabele warriors upon whose undivided loyalty, allegiance and obedience their chief could rely.13 The Matabele, however, did not assimilate other groups as did the Makololo. During the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the Matabele terrorised virtually all other groups in central southern Africa between the High Veldt and the Kafue, having also migrated north from South Africa under pressure from both Boers and the amaZulu of Shaka from whom Mzilikazi had broken away.14 The respect that arose between the Makololo and their new Lozi subjects undoubtedly contributed to their joint ability to withstand the onslaught of Matabele impis sent by Mzilikazi, an enemy that Sibituane had had to contend with throughout the trek from Lesotho and who settled in present-day western Zimbabwe, the northern part of which was said to have been previously plundered by the Lozi Litunga, Ngombala.15 This respect was largely premised on Makololo military skills and the specialist productive skills of the various peoples who made up the Lozi nation.

The direction of Makololo infiltration of the Lozi sphere of influence was from the south, where most major threats as well as opportunities were later perceived by the Lozi to originate. The original Luyi treated the south with great negativity even though it was from the west that their early enemies came (the Andonyi or Wiko). The Zambezi flows from north to south through Barotseland, bifurcating the Lozi kingdom and, states Lisimba,

15 Mainga, Bulozi under the Luyana Kings, 70.
According to Lozi belief, the southward flow of the Zambezi symbolises the natural movement of everything in the world. All good things are supposed to originate from the north whereas the south...is reminiscent of a disposal facility.\textsuperscript{16}

Thus, until the arrival of European missionaries and traders from the south from the middle of the nineteenth century, there was a positive psychic flow from north to south. The river flowed from the north, clean and clear, and acted as a disposal facility, depositing Lozi waste somewhere to the south. From the north, the original Lozi groups are thought to have migrated and from the south, as previously from the west, enemies of the Lozi originated. In addition, prior to the arrival of the Makololo, the chiefs of the south of Bulozi (Lwambi) often competed with the north (Namuso) for dominance and the Chiefs scattered around the periphery of the kingdom often exercised great autonomy and proved difficult to control.\textsuperscript{17} The invasion of the Lozi kingdom by the Makololo also began in the south although actual occupation was enacted from the east. The Matabele also threatened from south of the Zambezi and, from the arrival of the Makololo, both they and the Lozi looked primarily to the south for threats to the kingdom. However, the Makololo also came from the south and it is the contention of this study that as the boundaries between Makololo and Lozi became somewhat blurred as the nineteenth century wore on, the previous antipathy for anything from the south changed. Livingstone also appeared from the south as did later traders who became crucial to the trade in ivory for the Lozi as well as missionaries following in the footsteps of Livingstone who were to have such an impact on cultural life. Thus, it might be said that the positive gravitational pull of the south for the Lozi in the twentieth century, which came to haunt Kenneth Kaunda in the 1960s, originated with the arrival of the Makololo in the 1820s.

\textsuperscript{16} Lisimba, \textit{Lozi Names in Language and Culture}... p. 146.

\textsuperscript{17} Sesheke, meaning white sand, is situated on the Zambian side of the Zambezi where the river forms the border between Namibia (Caprivi) and Zambia (Barotseland). It has referred to a number of places over the years. Livingstone gave the name to the Zambezi when he first saw the river. A settlement called Sesheke first came to prominence under the Makololo. The location of the royal village and palace changed at least once during the course of the second Lozi kingdom and was renamed Mwandi, a popular Luyana place-name. Today’s Sesheke is located approximately 50km west of Mwandi and a short distance from the Zambezi due to the drying up of a lagoon which previously connected the town to the main river.
Sibituane first arrived at the borders of the Lozi kingdom after defeating Moremi of the Tawana on the banks of the Linyanti River where the latter had fled with his people. Here Sibituane remained for two years before his Tawana captives absconded and Sibituane roamed north east to the tip of Impalira Island near Kazungula, the traditional crossing point of the Zambezi. This helps to explain his otherwise surprising choice of Linyanti around 1849-1850 to set up a final capital after moving from Naliele to await Livingstone. It was an area he already knew and might expect visitors to arrive at from the south as he had done. After arriving at this eastern extremity of present-day Caprivi, Sibituane did not follow the Zambezi west and north but instead moved directly north on to the healthier highlands of the Batoka, where he pacified and incorporated large bodies into his regiments, 18 and to the lands of the much less easily pacified Ila (Mashukulumbwe) whose forces were only defeated after a battle lasting three days and nights. 19 Shortly after settling at Kapoli near Kalomo, Sibituane was also attacked by impis of Mzilikaze and on hearing of the lush plains of Bulozi where large herds of healthy cattle grazed (the Batoka variety being somewhat smaller in stature) turned west to and entered the Bulozi floodplain close to Namushakende, where he met and fought the forces of Mubukawanu, a son of Mulambwa, who had hurriedly mobilised Lozi forces to meet him.

These forces were, according to many reports, a ragtag bunch of ‘southerners’ exhausted after their recent successful struggle with the forces of the ‘north’ under another son of Mulambwa, Silumelume, over domination of the whole of Barotseland. Because of the bad feelings that still existed between north and south, the leadership of the ‘north’ had refused to help out Mubukwanu in the Lozi hour of need. It had been a classic north-south struggle that left the nation weakened just at the time of the arrival of the fitter and more battle-hardened Makololo led by a wise military strategist. In truth it was no contest and after a few battles the Lozi forces were completely routed although total subjugation of Barotseland took around five years to complete. Sibituane made his first capital at Naliele in the Bulozi floodplain but moved south again to Linyanti (present-day Sangwali) in Caprivi where he met Livingstone and Oswell in 1851.

18 Rangeley, op. cit., pp. 61-62.
From here in the elbow of the River Linyanti, which was for much of the year a swamp, protection was afforded in the form of an environmental buffer zone in the event of attack from the south, in particular from the Matabele. This same environment also became the ‘Achilles Heel’ of the Makololo who, like the Europeans to follow, suffered greatly from multifarious afflictions and fevers associated with the swampland around the river and standing water left behind after the retreat of the annual flood from which prodigious swarms of insects invaded the surrounding land.

Livingstone and Sibituane appear to have got on famously. The former’s travelling companion, Oswell, was also present as Sibituane regaled the two with his life story. It is from Livingstone and Oswell that a large proportion of the life and progress of Sibituane and the Makololo are learnt. Unfortunately for Livingstone and, arguably, the Makololo and Lozi nations, Sibituane died soon after meeting Livingstone. In his *Missionary Travels* Livingstone ascribed Sibituane’s death to sickness brought on by inflammation of the lungs resulting from an old war wound but another story that Livingstone omitted is that Sibituane’s sudden sickness followed a fall from a horse called Scarab that Livingstone had brought north with his expedition. This horse had reminded Sibituane of his younger years on the veldt and he had insisted on riding it at Linyanti taking ever tighter turns until he came off and landed badly. Maybe this excited the chest injury Livingstone had referred to. Livingstone did not treat the Makololo chief because, he says, of possible accusations of having caused the death, but Livingstone was devastated at the loss of an African chief, whose honesty, strength of purpose, flexibility, and pragmatism he admired greatly. Livingstone as missionary had quickly perceived that with Sibituane, there existed an opportunity to set up a mission station in a land that he had heard was fertile and productive and where the ‘heathen’ could be converted into Christians with the aid of a wise and strong chief who would co-operate.

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21 The horse ‘Scarab’ was looked after during Livingstone’s long absences and was used by the explorer nine years later after he returned to meet Sibituane’s son and successor, Sekeletu, in August 1860, riding it from Sesheke to Livingstone’s caravan at Linyanti (in this case at present-day Malengalenga) where all Livingstone’s belongings had been kept intact from intrusion throughout his absence, and back to Sesheke again (see D. and C. Livingstone, *Narrative of an Expedition to the Zambezi and its Tributaries* (John Murray, London, 1865)).
Although of a completely alien culture, Livingstone surely saw in Sibituane and the reverence and respect with which he was perceived amongst all the peoples he had conquered or made treaties of peace and co-operation with, a little of what Livingstone aspired to for himself. As the latter opined:

_He was decidedly the best specimen of a native chief I have ever met. I never felt so much grieved by the loss of a black man before; and it was impossible not to follow him in thought into the world of which he had just heard before he was called away, and to realise somewhat of the feelings of those who pray for the dead._22

And in a letter to his family in Scotland:

_I never felt so sorry for the death of a black man before. He became quite frank with us, and placed confidence in our good intentions at once. I still feel sorry..._23

The eulogies were not confined to Livingstone. 30 years later, the French missionary Coillard’s carpenter Waddell was to note what his Lozi apprentices told him – that ‘Sibituane was a wise ruler as well as a warrior. The land prospered under his sway!’24 To Luyi people too, there was a sense of admiration for this warrior who also possessed great leadership skills, an admiration that has been passed down to the present day: ‘Sibituane...was one of the greatest Africans who has ever lived. ...I can say that Sibituane, by receiving Livingstone, gave Christianity to his people... The Lozis should honour... the name of Sibituanee (sic)’.25

Sibituane appeared ready to give the sort of welcome to Livingstone that Lewanika, to a lesser extent, was prepared to give to the anglophile French missionary

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22 Livingstone, _Missionary Travels_..., p. 90.
25 William Simapuka, Standard VI pupil of Nampianga village Kalomo district, quoted from essay published by Livingstone Mail, 20th October 1941 as part of a literature competition, copies held in Livingstone Museum, examined October 30, 2002.
Coillard 35 years later. Why should this have been so? Clearly Sibituane was acutely aware of the presence of an expanding white European influence on the continent, that this influence fell into differing camps and that its inexorable spread presented both threats and opportunities that would need to be confronted by an African leader. Firstly, the Boers who Sibituane had had a painful and hostile encounter with, assisted by the Griquas, were extending the Trek-Boer frontier at the expense of various peoples in present-day Botswana. This destructive (as far as Africans were concerned) influence seemed determined to plunder Africa’s land for itself and gave no quarter for the indigenous population except as its slaves. Livingstone also, had had a number of unfriendly encounters with the Boers between 1846 and 1850. Livingstone, in turn, was perceived as a sympathiser with African interests and causes and, therefore, like his British counterparts at the Cape, hostile to the mongrel tribe, part white and, up to the end of the nineteenth century, part coloured, known collectively as Boers or Afrikaners. The year after his meeting with Sibituane, Livingstone was to suffer losses at the hands of the Boers when his station and belongings at Kolobeng were sacked.

Secondly, there were the Portuguese from the west coast and their Ovimbundu and mixed race proxies loosely referred to as ‘Mambari’, representatives of whom were certainly thought to have been visiting the Lovale people, north of the Lozi kingdom from the time of Mulambwa while the latter is said to have rejected the advances of the traffickers in people. When Livingstone and Oswell visited Sesheke ‘Morantsiane (name given to a Sesheke chief to the present day), the principal person... shewed us also three English guns which they had procured from the Bajoko... who are either bastard or true Portuguese (here Oswell must have been referring to the Mambari)... they gave about thirty captives for them’. Given the physical difficulties of accessing Bulozi and the surrounding areas due to higher floods and wetness up to the middle of the nineteenth century, it is conceivable that the Portuguese deliberately circumvented Barotseland to the north to avoid what must have seemed like formidable physical barriers. The term Mambari, meanwhile, was used to refer to all African and mixed race

27 Ibid. pp. 143-146.
29 Oswell, op. cit., p. 252
traders from the west. As their main interest was in the recruitment of slaves by any means, they inspired a mixture of fear and suspicion in southern central Africa. The Portuguese at the coast were generally the eventual purchasers of this human commodity, and this affected the way they were perceived. Thus their value to the Makololo was confined to the trading of largely English-made clothes, and, most particularly, guns, in exchange for young male slaves after previously having had no success with the Lozi king Mulambwa who had appreciated the value of labour for Barotseland’s system of economic production rather more greatly than the Makololo.

Finally there were the likes of Livingstone and Robert Moffat, pioneers of English influence in central southern Africa, who had developed something of a reputation for their spiritual and magical prowess (this included medical and technological skills) and their knowledge of the world, some of which they seemed prepared to introduce to the African peoples with whom they stayed. For African chiefs, the knowledge, predictions and advice that certain Europeans could offer about the outside world enabled some, such as Livingstone, to achieve the status of master diviners or seers. This led to some competition for their attention amongst different groups in southern central Africa and the apparent reluctance of many chiefs to allow missionaries to pass through when it was plain that they were planning to invest their knowledge and skills with other peoples who the former were often in competition with.

As already indicated, Sibituane was, like Livingstone, a pragmatist. When Livingstone arrived at Linyanti, he estimated Sibituane to be about 45 years of age although he was almost certainly older. The fact that the latter was prepared to go to great lengths to assist Livingstone’s passage to Caprivi, including the sending of messages of goodwill and pleas for assistance to chiefs in Livingstone’s path, suggests an urgent need felt by Sibituane. He regaled Livingstone and Oswell on the first night after their arrival with what appears to have been his full life story and made it clear that he wished to settle with his people in the Upper Zambezi Valley and surrounding area (his warriors having already indicated a lack of interest in removing from

30 Robert Moffat who developed the mission station at Kuruman and befriended and ministered to Mzilikaze, Chief of the Matabele. Both Moffat and Livingstone were Scottish but even today, Livingstone is referred to in Barotseland as being of ‘English’ origin.
31 Livingstone, Missionary Travels…, p. 84.
Barotseland). He was also tired of war and fighting and, according to Livingstone, viewed this early intercourse with the himself and Oswell as a precursor to obtaining 'sleep' (peace), partly by the acquisition of firearms, which had been used to such deadly effect against the Makololo by the Griquas and Boers. Meanwhile, the Makololo's only threat came from the Matabele chief Mzilikaze, with whom Livingstone's father-in-law, Moffat was on very good terms having made a favourable impact during his first visit to Matabeleland in 1829-30.

Had Sibituane lived, it is likely that the relationship of mutual admiration and trust enjoyed by Moffat and Mzilikaze would have been repeated between Livingstone and Sibituane, the one difference being that the restless Livingstone would inevitably still have moved on in pursuance of fame and career. It is often suggested that the help later afforded to Livingstone by Sibituane’s son, Sekeletu, and the lack of assistance afforded to the Helmore-Price expedition described below, was due to the notion that Livingstone's familial relationship to the Matabele chief would prevent further attacks on the Makololo by that group. It seems reasonable to suggest that this notion was first propagated by Sibituane who must have passed on the strategy to his closest confidants including Sekeletu, who by all accounts lacked the foresight of his father. In the English missionaries, Sibituane surely saw, in addition to the aforementioned magical and spiritual talents and skills, the opportunity to secure the peace for himself and his people to settle and develop other means of wealth-creation to raiding and pillaging. Thus in Moffat and later in Livingstone, the seeds of British influence and the strangely enduring affectation of 'Britishness', still recognisable in the Lozi national consciousness today, was born.

With the death of its creator, the empire of Sibituane started to unfold. At his untimely and unanticipated departure for the afterlife, Sibituane’s daughter

33 Known to Livingstone and other early European travellers as Moselikatze.
34 Attested to by Dickson, op. cit., pp. 96-97.
Debenham, op. cit, p. 177
Mamochisane was appointed successor in accordance with her father’s wishes. Clearly Sibituane had felt that the interests and future well-being of his cosmopolitan empire would be better served by a woman at this juncture and not by any of his sons or other male relatives, a perception that turned out to be a wise one. Alternatively, it could also have been that he had no sons of pure Sotho blood. It was Mamochisane, whose permission was sought and received from her home in the heart of Bulozi, who allowed Livingstone and Oswell to continue their travel and explorations in Caprivi and Barotseland. However, both were soon to leave and by the time of Livingstone’s return in May 1853, Mamochisane had stepped down in favour of her half-brother and son of Setlutlu of the Makololo, Sekeletu. Setlutlu, who is mostly referred to by Livingstone in Missionary Travels as MaSekeletu exerted much influence from Naliele over other male contenders for the chiefship of the Makololo such as Mbololo and was still living when Arnot went to stay in 1882. This trend of powerful women exerting influence was very much in keeping with Luyi and later Lozi tradition. Mamochisane, meanwhile, had stepped down in favour of her unwilling half-brother Sekeletu, according to Livingstone due to the unacceptable conditions of the job imposed on her including the frequent taking and changing of husbands in order for none to get ideas beyond his station.

Sekeletu, who Livingstone estimated at only eighteen years of age on his visit in 1853, was an unwilling aspirant to the chiefship of the Makololo for the very good reason that there were older, more determined competitors, particularly his half-brother Mpepe and uncle, Mbololo. These two already exerted considerable influence in Barotseland proper where they had command over the extensive productive capacity of Bulozi. Indeed, Livingstone claims to have prevented an attempt on Sekeletu’s life by Mpepe which subsequently led to the death of the latter, an event that Livingstone only faintly protested at. Sekeletu would only permit Livingstone to travel to Bulozi in his company, even after the death of Mpepe and, seeing that this was Sekeletu’s first journey there after his appointment, it seems fair to suggest he was still very much afraid of being attacked and killed; Livingstone’s presence affording some degree of protection.

38 Livingstone, Missionary Travels..., p. 178.
It is suggested elsewhere that Sekeletu’s reasons for remaining close to the unhealthy marshes and swamps of Linyanti, was primarily a preventative measure in the event of further attack by the Matabele impis of Mzilikaze. Yet, should the Matabele have wanted to continue their incursions, they would have been more likely to have gained access by crossing to Impalira Island from what is now Kasane in Botswana and travelling south west through Caprivi on drier well worn paths or by crossing the Zambezi at Kazungula like most travellers and attacking Caprivi-Sesheke from there before going on to Bulozi.

This study contends rather that a large part of the explanation for Sekeletu’s reluctance to leave the apparently unhealthy living environment at Linyanti was the ongoing dangers and threats perceived to exist to Sekeletu’s authority amongst contenders and their followers based in Bulozi. The bloody struggles between Sekeletu’s confidant and close associate Mamili and his uncle Mbololo that ensued after Sekeletu’s death in 1863 gives credence to these fears. Nonetheless, Sekeletu retained power for twelve years and it was only really due to ill-health (he is thought to have died from leprosy) that the power he inherited indirectly from his father really waned. Livingstone noted on his final visit in late 1860, that the Lozi princes, including Sepopa, Sebeso, Litia and the latter’s son, Lubosi, had left the Makololo headquarters for the north once Sekeletu’s powers had become enfeebled. This was a portent of events to follow. It seems likely that Livingstone would have realised the implications for the remaining dynasty of Sibituane of the demise of Sekeletu and his frustration at the failure of the latter to move to the healthier highlands was all too apparent.

**The Helmore-Price débâcle**

During the reign of Sekeletu, an event occurred of the utmost import to the way in which both the Makololo and indeed Livingstone were to be perceived by the outside world up to the present day. This was the catastrophe which befell the Helmore-Price
expedition appointed by the London Missionary Society (LMS) to follow in Livingstone’s footsteps and set up a mission station amongst the Makololo that became the subject of legend long after the its demise. Caused by the enthusiasm aroused by Livingstone’s reception in London on his return there at the end of 1856 and partly on account of his urging, the LMS decided to approve two new missions, one to the Matabele, prompted by Livingstone’s father-in-law, Robert Moffat, and one to the Makololo, without waiting for an expected report from the more experienced Moffat on the prospects for success of such a mission. Holoway Helmore, who had long experience of missionary work at Lekhatlong, was appointed in 1858 to lead the expedition, assisted by Roger Price and John Mackenzie. Somehow, whether from Livingstone’s prompting it is not clear, the impression had been created that Livingstone would assist the expedition by meeting it at Linyanti and would use his good offices to get the new mission off to a good start with the Makololo. Livingstone, meanwhile, resigned from the LMS at the end of July 1857, and, according to Kilby, had distanced himself from the Society’s new project, finding no time in his full schedule of writing and speech-making to offer assistance or advice.

Livingstone left England in March 1858 for Quelimane to take up a new position as British consul there and conduct a new expedition up the Zambezi, partly to return some Makololo carriers sent to assist him to the east coast by Sekeletu in 1855 and partly to discover new avenues for trade, commerce and Christianity. The Helmores and Prices arrived at Cape Town in August 1858 to commence the long trek to the Zambezi stopping off at Moffat’s mission station at Kuruman along the way. Against advice, Helmore decided to take his wife and two of their children. Price followed suit while Mackenzie decided to remain behind in Kuruman until his own wife had given birth. The journey, in summer, to the Zambezi from Kuruman was to prove extremely exhausting

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43 Seaver, op. cit., p. 310.

44 Ibid. p. 296.

45 Kilby, op. cit., p. 74.
with the party suffering from severe dehydration and loss of animals as they crossed very arid parts of the Kalahari Desert. Indeed they were very lucky to arrive alive on February 13th 1860 at the banks of the Linyanti River where they were apparently ignored for some days by the Makololo on the other side. Eventually Sekeletu sent across for them and their wagons were dismantled and ferried across two branches of the Linyanti River for onward transport to Sekeletu’s capital at present-day Malengalenga.

Here the Helmore-Price party commenced to become very sick and tried unsuccessfully to persuade Sekeletu to allow them to move to healthier ground nearer the Victoria Falls. Communications were not helped by two major factors. Unlike Livingstone, no European in the party, with the exception of Helmore, could speak a word of the Sesotho language. Even worse, neither Livingstone nor his wife Mary were amongst the party. As Price himself recorded, “The King and his people were very much enraged at his (Livingstone’s) non-arrival.”47 Livingstone had parted from Sekeletu last in November 1855 provisioned, staffed and loaded with ivory to use as currency by the latter for an expedition to the east coast. Livingstone’s retinue consisted of 114 men who he left at Quelimane, 100 km. north of the mouth of the Zambezi while he went home to fame and some fortune in England. Thus, Livingstone had been away from Linyanti for some four years and three months when Helmore and Price arrived. Since his departure, several white men had visited Caprivi and Barotseland and none had any information to impart on Livingstone’s whereabouts.48 Sekeletu’s patience may have been wearing a little thin. Meanwhile, Sekeletu’s position of influence over the rest of Barotseland north of Sesheke remained precarious not least as a result of his increasing incapacitation due to sickness. In the journal she kept before her death, Isabella Price also records that the Makololo in Caprivi did absolutely no work but employed what she refers to as the Makalaka to serve them. These, it seems, unlike in the rest of Barotseland, were held in servitude. Makalala was a derogatory term applied to all conquered peoples but in this case it must have referred to the Mayeyi who were an apparently unassertive people living in the area prior to the arrival of either the Lozi or

46 Smith, Great Lion…, p. 116.
47 Quoted by Slater, op. cit., p. 162.
48 Slater, op. cit., p.143.
49 Ibid. p.141.
Makololo and often treated in a subordinate way by other groups such as the Tawana. It would appear that Sekeletu and the remaining pure-bred Makololo in Caprivi were becoming unpopular in a way that would never have occurred during the reign of his father, Sibituane.

Soon, members of Helmore’s party started dying. First to succumb was Price’s Bechuana leader, then Helmore’s son followed by the Prices’ baby, another of Helmore’s children, a girl, a Tswana teacher they had taken along, then the Helmores themselves. Eight in all died before Price took the decision to leave for the south as soon as possible in order to save himself, his wife and the remaining two Helmore children. Sekeletu, Price claims, was less than helpful and demanded most of the remaining supplies brought by the party. What was not handed over was taken in the night. Thus Price finally escaped with the remainder of the party, one wagon and little else other than the clothes they wore. Isabella Price expired on the trek south while Roger Price and the remaining Helmore children were saved by the hospitality of Lechulatebe who ensured that the third leader of the party, Mackenzie, who was now heading north to join the others, was brought to Price and the two returned to Kuruman with a horrified Roger Moffat who had also ventured north on a rescue mission after hearing reports of the disaster.

The whole project had been a disaster and recriminations soon started flying. Unsurprisingly most of the blame was heaped on the shoulders of the Makololo chief, Sekeletu, particularly by Price. Livingstone comes in for considerable criticism from all quarters for having encouraged the expedition in the first place and failing to be on hand to smooth relations with the Makololo, but most criticism levelled at Livingstone is for the callous and off-hand way in which he dismissed the rumours of poisoning and appeared to exonerate the Makololo, particularly his benefactor, Sekeletu, appearing to believe everything the latter told him. Helmore is criticised for having insisted on taking families into desert and fever areas in the hot summer without any idea of the way this would slow down progress and put everyone’s lives at risk. Moffat was

50 Smith, Great Lion..., p. 119
51 Kilby, op. cit., pp. 178-190, Seaver, op. cit., p. 377
52 Northcott, C. op. cit., p. 297.
blamed for not raising the doubts that he harboured about the readiness of the Makololo for a new missionary expedition and, as an experienced trekker himself, not having insisted that the party included a wagon purely for the carriage of food and water.\textsuperscript{53} Price, it seems, disliked Sekeletu and made it obvious.\textsuperscript{54} He also showed poor judgement when dealing with local people, even admitting to having pulled a pistol at one time in his anger. The Makololo accused him of much more to Livingstone. The impact of the disaster, however, was to soil the reputation of the Makololo. It is an event that is still talked about in Caprivi; most older people in the region have heard of the event, particularly in the region of Malengalenga and Sangwali.

Rather more significant for the purposes of this work is what happened when Livingstone finally reached Sesheke where Sekeletu had moved to in Helmore’s old wagon from which he rarely emerged in August 1860. Livingstone, it is said, remonstrated most strongly with Sekeletu for his poor treatment of the Helmore-Price expedition (not something he admitted to in public),\textsuperscript{55} and told the chief that he would be punished by God for the mistreatment of His servants. Meanwhile Livingstone and Kirk, his travelling companion of the day, tended to Sekeletu’s leprosy (although both doubted the accuracy of this diagnosis of Sekeletu’s ailment),\textsuperscript{56} which appeared to improve while they were there. However, once Livingstone had departed again, the condition deteriorated and Sekeletu died in 1863. From that point onwards, Livingstone achieved mythical status amongst the Lozi and indeed other groups as a truly powerful deity who could intercede with his God to bring down punishment on those he considered to have done wrong. In this case the story goes that Sekeletu offended the God of the white Englishman and Livingstone himself was able to call up the wrath of that God which is why Sekeletu died and the Makololo are no more. As Waddell recorded in the 1880s, Livingstone’s reported forecast of divine punishment was:

\textit{…a prophecy speedily fulfilled. On the death of Sekeletu... quarrels ensued and the Makololo were massacred to a man. Christians among the Bechuanas and}

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid. pp. 296-297.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid. p. 305.
\textsuperscript{55} Jalla, \textit{History: Traditions and Legends...}, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{56} Seaver, op. cit., p. 371.
Bamangwatos put the question "Where are now the powerful Makololo? Has not God avenged the death of his servants?"\(^{57}\)

Price also used the term ‘divine punishment’ to describe what he referred to as the destruction of the Makololo and he went on to minister in Botswana for a further 40 years.\(^{58}\) Even today, this power attributed to Livingstone is still talked about.\(^{59}\) Of course it is a useful way to try to reinforce the idea of ‘overthrow’ of the Makololo as a power holding the Lozi nation in check which Lozi royals and historians have employed to great effect with Europeans who wrote on Lozi history over the years. Meanwhile, it also sanctified the memory of Livingstone in Lozi mythology.

As to the truth of what led to disaster, the poisoning theory was really set in train by local people, the Mayeyi, who told Price that Sekeletu had poisoned the beer and ox and later told Chapman the same thing.\(^{60}\) Price promoted this theory volubly in Cape Town insisting at the time that they had all been poisoned by Sekeletu, the latter having sent adulterated beer and an ox to them,\(^{61}\) a theory confirmed by a bushman returning from the area in a conversation with Mackenzie.\(^{62}\) He would not accept the alternative and rather more obvious explanation that, having arrived dehydrated and physically exhausted in the middle of a fever-ridden area, that it was fever that had picked them off so mercilessly, although he is said to have changed his mind in later years.\(^{63}\) But there are four factors worth mentioning here; one, that the concept of natural death was unknown in these parts at the time, therefore magic, bewitching, poisoning or some other dark art were often employed to explain otherwise unexplainable deaths, a factor referred to by Slater.\(^{64}\) Secondly, Sekeletu was reportedly as baffled as everyone else by the way these white Europeans appeared on his doorstep and almost immediately commenced dying, not at all what he had been expecting of

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\(^{57}\) MacConnachie, op. cit., p. 61.
\(^{58}\) Smith, *Great Lion…*, p. 135.
\(^{59}\) Conversations recorded in meetings of Indunas held to discuss history of Lozi for this work in the Cashandi of the Litunga la Mboela Makwibi in Muoyo, 12 August 2001, recalled the way that Livingstone had demonstrated the power of the Christian God in punishing the Makololo.
\(^{62}\) Smith, *Great Lion…*, p. 111.
\(^{63}\) Ibid. p. 416.
\(^{64}\) Slater, op. cit., p. 165
missionaries after the remarkable Livingstone and his proven magical skills. So concerned for the health of the ladies was he that he sent nursemaids to assist both Anne Helmore and Isabella Price. Thirdly, while Sekeletu was undoubtedly disappointed with the failure of Livingstone to appear, it seems unlikely that, knowing how closely connected the Helmore-Price expedition was to Livingstone and that they were expecting to meet the great man at Linyanti any time, he would have deliberately set about wrecking his own reputation in this way. After all, Sekeletu would have been unlikely to damage the good offices he enjoyed with the one man he perceived as being capable of securing his safety. A counter-theory to this is that many Mambari were in the vicinity at the time who desirous of an elimination of missionary and therefore, anti-slaving influence advised the impressionable Sekeletu against a warm reception of the party. Finally, the whole party were in a very weak state on arrival at Linyanti, and immediately exposed to the mosquitoes of the swamps.

Slater and Rangeley say the Makololo themselves were suffering badly from fever at the time, that even Sekeletu was down with the sickness, and that it had been a particularly bad year for harvests and there was a serious shortage of food and other supplies. Price, in his address to a Congregational Church audience in Cape Town claimed the opposite and objected strongly to Livingstone’s allegations that Helmore and particularly he, Price, had behaved poorly to Sekeletu and the Makololo and that Price had simply not liked the chief, therefore, his interpretation of events was somewhat coloured by this. Whatever the truth, it was an event that, henceforward, had a strong bearing on the way the Makololo were viewed externally, that Livingstone and the later white missionaries would be perceived internally and indeed, that the British would be perceived generally in the future.

We Mayeyi know well of the [sic] Helmore-Price. We keep their memory here. They were treated badly by Sekeletu and the Makololo. We too, were treated badly by Sekeletu who was a bad chief who killed many of our people in a

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65 Ibid. p. 144.  
66 Ibid. p. 138 and Rangeley, op. cit., p. 63-64.  
67 Price also noted that, on arrival the party were told that Sekeletu was away hunting but that they suspected he was in his wagon all the time. Probably he was sick and this had prevented him from seeing the party on its arrival.
terrible way and sold our children to the Mambari. We were his slaves. White people should not blame us but come and settle amongst us and bring development that has been given to other tribes. We have suffered all these years because of what happened to Monare’s (Livingstone’s) people. Even now, foreigners from Namibia treat us as their slaves.68

Clearly there are other undercurrents flowing through the above statement but interpretations of the events of 1860 still seem to be impacting on the way local people, in Caprivi at least, identify their predicament in the world today.

The ‘overthrow’

Virtually all writers up to the present day have attempted to impose a cut-off point at which the Makololo were overthrown by the Lozi and during which, all the Makololo men were slain and the women, greatly admired amongst the Lozi for their light skins and plump figures, distributed amongst Lozi men for wives.69 The way that some of these accounts have been written are breathtaking in their naivety. Gibbons, for example, says that, ‘The fateful night arrived, and when the sun rose, with the exception of one small band, every Makololo man, throughout the length and breadth of the land, lay stiff and cold,’ 70 suggesting that an order to kill the Makololo could have been passed throughout the entirety of Barotseland and Caprivi in one night. And, while killings almost certainly took place due to the number of times an account crops up, the logic for this apparent ethnic cleansing is not so clear-cut.71

As previously stated, on the death of Sibituane in 1851, his daughter Mamochisane was appointed Chief according to her father’s wishes but she quickly

68 Conversation recorded during meeting in Malengalenga Kuta, Caprivi, 07-09-2001.
70 Gibbons, op. cit., p. 150.
71 Although it was certainly the case for a group of pure Makololo who fled south to the Bamangwato, see T.M. Morgan, Eleven Years in Central South Africa (John Snow, London, 1872), p. 355.
handed over power to her brother Sekeletu. After the death of Sibituane, the whole nature of Makololo rule was to change. Sekeletu confined himself with a group of diehard pure-bred Sotho supporters to Caprivi and Sesheke districts, a far less productive region than Bulozi, hence the well-being of the Makololo suffered considerably due to poverty and disease although raiding did continue to a lesser extent than under Sibituane. Rangeley asserts that the Makololo, despite being fever-stricken, still managed to retain the obedience of the Batoka, Lozi, Subia, Banyai and Ila (Mashukulumbwe) among others. But this is too general a statement. Different factions among the Makololo, with the assistance of others, retained dominance over other groups and it is unlikely that the old core in Caprivi had much dominance over the north of Bulozi during the latter half of Sekeletu’s reign. It is significant that the Makololo first raided the Ila but the Lozi continued to do so under the rule of both Sipopa and Lubosi-Lewanika.

The Nkoya historian Shimunika describes separate attacks on the Nkoya peoples, east of Bulozi by armies of Sekeletu and Mbololo, both described as ‘Mwene (chief) of the Kololo’. Meanwhile, then, other remnants of the old Sotho dynasty of Sibituane were preparing to vie for control of power. As Sekeletu and the Caprivi-Sesheke Makololo weakened, so the strain on the original local population (Subia, Yeyi) increased. This would also be when the Lozi princes left the area for the north and a reunion with the Lukwakwa faction of Lozi exiles. They were not the only ones to leave. Rangeley notes that other notable Makololo, sent to Livingstone at Shupanga, lower down the Zambezi, to collect medicines for the treatment of Sekeletu, refused to return and stayed with another band of Makololo who devolved from the group of bearers who had assisted Livingstone in 1855-6. Thus, on the one hand the scene was set for internal strife involving the Sibituane’s descendents and, on the other, for the so-called ‘overthrow’ of the Makololo.

73 Rangeley, op. cit., p. 64.
75 Ibid. p. 76.
Thomas Baines, who was exploring south of the Chobe at the time heard in March 1862 that Sekeletu ‘is now suffering from a leprosy which is causing his extremities to rot away and must shortly bring him to a painful and miserable end’. Yet these reports must have been exaggerated because the Makololo chief only died in August 1863, probably of leprosy or eczema for which Livingstone and Kirk had, with some effect, treated him. On the death of Sekeletu ‘many of his people have dispersed, and the rest have received a message from Moselekatse (Mzilikaze), desiring them to put their kraals in order, for the country is his and he is coming to it’. In the absence of a leader with the stature of Sibituane, one can but imagine the chaos and panic in Sesheke that would have followed the arrival of such a message from the Matabele King who was feared by all peoples in the region. After bitter fighting, Sekeletu was succeeded in turn by two of his uncles; first Mamile, who was thought by many to have bewitched Sekeletu; and then Mbololo, a brother to Sibituane who had been jealous when the chiefship was handed, by Mamochisane, to his nephew, Sekeletu. Mbololo became very unpopular due to his reputation for cruelty and was overthrown by a force consisting of Lozi loyalists, led by one Njekwa, from the north in August 1864. This, according to conventional historiography, marks the end of the Makololo period, the ‘Restoration’ of the Lozi monarchy and the start of the ‘Second Kingdom’ as the Lozi prince Sipopa, a son of Mubukwanu and grandson of Mulambwa, was invited by Njekwa, who was not of royal blood, to take over the Kingship.

It is also when the aforementioned massacre of all the Makololo men is supposed to have occurred. However, it is known that the Makololo had intermarried extensively with that section of the Lozi population who had remained in the valley as well as with the mixed population of peoples from around the region that they brought with them to Bulozi. It is also known that two of the Lozi kings who followed what has been termed the “Makololo interregnum”, Sipopa and his young cousin, Lubosi (pronounced ‘Luboshi’ and later to become known as Lewanika ‘the uniter’), spent most of their formative years in the courts of Sibituane and Sekeletu and were both admired and respected until

78 Baines, op. cit., p. 449
the infighting that took place at the end of Sekeletu’s reign when they escaped to the north. Lubosi also developed a strong friendship with Litali, a son of Sekeletu and, as already stated, is thought to have been present at the meetings of Livingstone with Sekeletu; the Lozi prince, Sipopa, almost certainly having been there.

During the time of the ‘overthrow’, many Makololo escaped, some moving south to the hoped-for sanctuary of Lecholatebe of the Tawana, who, having old scores to settle with the Makololo of Sekeletu, promptly had them killed. Others went south east to Matabeleland where they were, perhaps unexpectedly, given sanctuary, while a third contingent fled eastward along the Zambezi to the lands of the Tonga where they were received and later met by Morgan in the late 1860s. The point here is that these Sotho Makololo were easy to identify physically being ‘...of that dark-yellow or coffee-and-milk colour, of which the Makololo are so proud, because it distinguishes them considerably from the black tribes on the rivers.’ As for as the rest of the Makololo, of many mixed groups assimilated by Sibituane, who had, it is contended here, largely merged into the host populations of Barotseland, it is unlikely that their menfolk were all killed. Jalla, who, as previously explained, gleaned all his history from Lozi royal and elite respondents, describes the tensions that arose between those Lozi who had acquiesced to Makololo rule (and wanted to replace Mbololo with Litali, the aforementioned son of Sekeletu and childhood friend of Lubosi-Lewanika) and those who had not (principally from Lukwakwa and Nyengo). He also reports that it was a Makololo who was sent north to inform Sipopa of the successful overthrow of Mbololo. Lozi society had assimilated most of the Makololo and the customs and language they brought with them. Indeed some Lozi contenders for power later accused Sipopa of retaining the customs of the Makololo. Yet it was Sipopa and his faction who prevailed. Thus, the

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80 Ibid. p. 41.
81 Sipopa (also known as Lutangu) was a son of the former Lozi King, Mubukwanu, ruler of the south of Bulolo, based at Nalolo whose fight with his brother Silumelume, ruler of the north, for overall control of the Lozi kingdom after the death of their father, Mulambwa, led to the weakness that allowed the Makololo to subsume the Luyi kingdom so easily.
83 Livingstone, Missionary Travels…, p. 179.
84 Jalla, op. cit., p. 35.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
dichotomy of rejectionist overthrow and the retention of language and customs become less inconsistent and more explainable.

The centrality of Caprivi and Sesheke to Makololo rule

What is clear from this period is that Caprivi and Sesheke districts, previously conquered and subordinated by the Luyi prince Mwanambinje and King Ngombala, became the pivot of decision making of the Makololo polity. Livingstone narrates that the population of Linyanti during his visit in 1853 was some 6-7,000, a figure inconceivable today when even the odd thousand comprising the entire population of a group of villages in the area find it hard to subsist. Clearly, an enormous amount of tribute must have flowed in, particularly from Bulozi, to support the population during the heyday of Makololo rule supplemented by the proceeds of raids. In effect, all of Barotseland was ruled from this region for a good many years under the Makololo and was again later, in the latter years of the Lozi King Sipopa’s rule. Eric Flint illuminates also how, under the Makololo, Linyanti and Sesheke became the hub of trade, particularly in ivory, between Barotseland and traders from the west and east coasts of Africa as well as from the south. It was also primarily in Caprivi that the Lozi (actually a name given to the Luyi peoples by the Makololo) drew most Makololo blood. A telling extract from Holub, sojourn ing at the court of Sipopa in 1874, just ten years after the ‘overthrow’, recounts the version ruling at the Lozi court at that time in Sesheke:

The discords that sprung up amongst the people during his reign (Sekeletu’s) opened the way for the vanquished Marutse (Lozi) tribe to resume arms against them (the Makololo), and that with such success that after several battles the Makololos residing between the Chobe and the Zambesi, already decimated by disease, were reduced to two men and some boys, while their male population south of the Chobe, who had numbered more than 2000, were in like manner brought down to a mere handful.

87 Livingstone, Missionary Travels..., p. 178
89 Holub, Seven Years in South Africa, 143.
Despite the demise of the Makololo, Caprivi-Sesheke was never to lose its strategic and economic importance to Lozi rulers even when it had been excised from the main kingdom by colonial machinations in 1890. Gluckman observed:

*Only after the Kololo invasion did they (the Lozi Kings) maintain a full administrative staff of Lozi at Sesheke... The Lozi had no need to administer tightly their provinces, it was warlike incursions and the coming of Whites from the south which caused them to continue the Kololo administration at Sesheke.*

Today, Lozi historians and indeed most Lozi people in Zambia are acutely aware of their Makololo connections and equally of the fact that the Kingdom was ruled from Caprivi and later Sesheke. In 2002, it was even claimed by certain members of the Barotse Royal Establishment based at Mwandi (old Sesheke) that the royal centre there was second in importance only to the present capitals Lealui/Limulunga and that it was convention for the resident prince there to succeed to the Litungaship, an issue that caused some discomfort in the royal capital. The claim was probably mischievous but the point was being made that serious authority had rested in the far south. Oddly, in Caprivi today, the seat of power of the Makololo, few local historians are able to provide accounts of the Makololo and what reminders there are such as burial sites are not tended as they surely would be if they were in Zambia. This, it is argued later, is partly because of differing European colonialisms and differing levels of development but it is also due to the enduring bitter feelings held by local people at their mistreatment while under the Makololo yoke, a mistreatment not shared to the same extent in Bulozi to the north.

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91 This arose while the writer was conducting field research Aug–Nov 2002 when the Resident Prince at Mwandi was celebrating 25 years of Chiefship there. According to Lozi tradition, Nalolo/Muoyo, as capital of the southern kingdom is second in importance after Lealui/Limulunga, followed by Libonda, which was the first recognised capital of the Luyi. Both of these centres have, however, since the late nineteenth century, been ruled by women reducing their potential to challenge authority at the capital. Some further disharmony between Mwandi and Lealui occurred at this time resulting in the swift reimposition of authority from the capital demonstrating that old frictions across the north-south cleavage can be quick to resurface.
The legacy of Makololo rule

So what does the story of the Makololo interregnum provide in terms of understanding notions of Lozi citizenship and subjectivity today? First of all, we know that Lozis recall being invaded by the Makololo but this, they say, was the nation’s own fault seeing as it was split and riven by faction-fighting along the lines of the old north-south divide. A situation of weakness occurred, as is so often the case, in the aftermath of the death of a strong and charismatic leader as Mulambwa must have been to have reigned for fifty odd years. Thus it was easy for Sibituane and his horde to invade Barotseland at this time. The Lozi nation split into three as mentioned above. Two portions, Nyengo and Lukwakwa, left the Barotse geopolitical stage whilst the third stayed on and ‘worked with’ the administration of Sibituane. It would appear that many Lozis did not find Makololo suzerainty insufferable as there are no recorded rebellions or uprisings. This is not to say that Sibituane did not find it necessary to harass and attack the Lukwakwa faction, the more outspoken of the two groups which left Buluza after the arrival of the Makololo. And indeed it was from Lukwakwa that the overthrow of the Makololo took place. Nyengo, it seems, sat on the sidelines a little and, significantly, was not perceived as a threat by Sibituane or Sekeletu and did not share in power after the ‘overthrow.’

Asked to explain the apparent passivity with which Lozis accepted Makololo rule, the more defensive local historians will say that the domination and control of the Makololo regime was too severe to be challenged. The more sanguine admit that, on the whole, life during Makololo rule, under Sibituane at least, whilst authoritarian, was orderly and peaceful, something it certainly had not been prior to the arrival of the Makololo. It also appears likely that Lozi and Makololo worked together to repulse the Matabele threat. Plus, it is quite clear that, when Makololo rule became intolerable in the aftermath of the death of Sekeletu, Lozis quickly mobilised under the leadership of royal princes who had spent time in the Makololo courts although the overthrow was said to have been driven by the Lukwakwa faction but this time supported from within Buluza. True, the purebred Makololo men were said to have been weakened by the environment of Barotseland, but presumably, had a Sotho leader of the calibre and strength of personality of Sibituane emerged after the death of Sekeletu, it seems unlikely that such a violent overthrow would have taken place. Significantly, the leader of the revolution,
Sipopa, or Lutangu as he was earlier known, had been a Lozi prince in the Makololo court in Caprivi. Only during the sickness of Sekeletu, probably in 1859, had he left for Lukwakwa.

The way in which Lozi nationalist historians interpret the Makololo interregnum is indicative of the need to preserve certain elements that form a common theme throughout this work. Most are quite happy to admit that the kingdom was in turmoil and chaos after the death of Mulambwa. The civil wars that took place left the kingdom weak and vulnerable. Therefore it was not difficult for the Makololo chief Sibituane to overcome them. Then, while some found it impossible to stay under domination and left for Nyengo and Lukwakwa, others, it is alleged, allowed the Makololo to rule while this was in Lozi interests. Then, when things became untenable, the Makololo were overthrown. The important aspect here is the notion of being in control or when not in control, this being seen as a temporary aberration, a deviation from the norm that is quickly put right at an appropriate time.

Where this study is at variance with the accepted histories provided by Europeans and Lozi historians alike is the implied cut-off between Makololo rule and the restoration of the Lozi kingdom together with implicit Lozi values and customs. As implied earlier, the Makololo had ceased to consist of a single group long before their arrival in Barotseland. They were, in effect, a mongrel horde, much as a result of the aforementioned deliberate policy of assimilation undertaken by Sibituane. Livingstone stated clearly that

\textit{the Makololo were composed of a great number of other tribes... The nucleus of the whole were Basuto, who came with Sebituane from a comparatively cold and hilly region in the south. When he conquered various tribes of the Bechuanas, such as Bakwains, Bangwaketze, Bamangwato, Batauana etc, he incorporated the young of these tribes into his own stock. Great mortality by fever having taken place in the original stock, he wisely adopted the same plan of absorption}
on a large scale with the Makalaka (Lozi and other groups resident in Caprivi and other parts of Barotseland).  

Nettleton, in his study of the Tawana also describes how,

*While the Makololo held the Batawana in subjection there was intermarriage between the two races and today (1926) there are members of the Batawana who bear the tribal marks of the Basuto and some of them have a great deal of Basuto or Sekololo blood in their veins. They are regarded with some sort of suspicion by the pure Batawana and are sometimes called "Baloi" ("foreigner").*

The original light-skinned Bafokeng were in the minority and dying out fast by the mid-1850s. We know that several Lozi princes were captured by Sibituane, yet these do not appear to have been held against their will:

*So we found him with even the sons of the chiefs of the Barotse closely attached to his person; and they say to this day, if anything else but natural death had assailed their father, every one of them would have laid down his life in his defence. One reason for their strong affection was their emancipation by the decree of Sebituane, "all are children of the chief".*

Mubukwanu, who fought and was defeated by Sibituane on a number of occasions, turns up in Smith’s narrative, receiving the submission of the amaZulu chief, Nxabe, who had been attempting to defeat Sibituane. If true, this suggests a degree of co-operation that existed after the imposition of undisputed Makololo rule amongst those Lozi who did not go into exile at Lukwakwa and Nyengo even among vanquished

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93 G.E. Nettleton, ‘History of the Batawana tribe up to 1926: Ngamiland District’, pp. 8-9, National Archives and Records of Botswana, Gaborone, paper originally prepared for the Colonial Office by Nettleton while he was Resident Magistrate at Maun, 17th April 1926, later revised as part of ‘History of the Ngamiland Tribes up to 1926’, published in *Bantu Studies*, 8 (1934).

94 Livingstone, *Missionary Travels…*, op. cit., p. 197

leaders.\textsuperscript{96} We also know from Livingstone that Imasiku, chief among the Lukwakwa exiles, expressed a desire for peace and alliance with the Makololo,\textsuperscript{97} although his main interest in Livingstone was probably the latter’s potential value as a mediator both between his Lukwakwa faction and that of his brother Imbwa at the Nyengo as well as with the Makololo leadership to the south. On the death of Sekeletu, who as all seem to suggest, did not have the leadership qualities of his father, yet still commanded enough respect to remain in power for twelve years, an unhappy interlude of strife and infighting took place between the remaining purely Makololo contenders for power. This resulted in the temporary rise to power of first, Mamili, and then Mbololo amidst considerable bloodshed. Meanwhile, the Lozi princes Litia, Sebeso and Sipopa had taken their leave of Sekeletu during the latter’s sickness when a general incapacity seemed to take hold of the Makololo leadership in the south with Sekeletu moving to Sesheke where Livingstone found him in 1860 suffering from either leprosy or a severe form of eczema. Here was a golden opportunity to wrest power from the remaining Sotho minority.

The Lozi prince Sipopa (Lutangu) was brought to power in 1864 after forces from the Lukwakwa faction under the leadership of Njekwa stormed the Makololo strongholds in the south and presumably had put to death the remaining pure Makololo who could have in any way threatened the establishment of the new order. Sipopa was invited to take the Kingship after victory was obtained. This is when the infamous slaying of almost all the Makololo men took place. But how would it have been possible to weed out who was Makololo and who was not? Even when the Makololo arrived in Barotseland they appeared as considerably more than just Basuto peoples as already demonstrated. By 1864, there would have been precious few of purely Sotho blood. The Makololo had been producing children with Lozi women since the 1830s. The aforementioned Lozi princes had been brought up in the Makololo courts at Linyanti and Sesheke where Bonds of friendship had been formed. Certainly the children of previous chiefs were killed but this was standard practice amongst the Makololo at least and what we

\textsuperscript{96} Sibitwane is reported to have captured children of at least three Lozi princes (sons of Mulambwa) but spared all of their lives probably partly in response to Mubukwanu having previously captured a wife of Sibitwane and not putting her to death and partly as a strategy to obtain the allegiance and cooperation of the vanquished Lozi.

\textsuperscript{97} Livingstone, \textit{Missionary Travels…}, op. cit., p. 277.
see after the restoration is a continuance of many of the customs and practices inherited from the Makololo including the use of the Makololo language which had been impregnated by much Siluyana vocabulary and idioms. Thus, apart from a very few old guard Basotho, the Makololo, as the very mixed bag of peoples that they were on arrival in Barotseland, had effectively merged with the rump of the Lozi who had remained behind in the aftermath of their defeats by Sibituane. This can be the only reasonable explanation of the continuing use of Sikololo, later to be known as Silozi, one of the defining legacies of Makololo rule.

It is very pertinent that it was Sipopa, the Lozi prince who had been on such good terms with the Makololo hierarchy who was brought to the Kingship and not one of his peers who had endured exile in Nyengo or Lukwakwa. Sipopa took Sibituane’s daughter and chosen successor, Mamochisane, to wife after the restoration battle, interpreted by Kilby as a symbol of new Lozi dominancy. Perhaps, but Mamochisane was widely respected throughout Barotseland and Sipopa could well have simply been following a tradition that Sibituane and Sekeletu had followed whereby, when a chief had died, the wife or wives of the deceased were inherited and cared for by the new chief. In addition to this, Holub noted in 1876 that Sipopa’s favourite wife was the Makololo Lunga and that his daughter had married a surviving Makololo man by the name of Manengo giving the lie to the assertion that all Makololo men had been killed. Later on, Sipopa’s nephew, Lubosi, who was to take the Lozi kingdom on into the twentieth century, and his twin sister Matauka who was to rule the southern kingdom from Nalolo for some 40-50 years were other survivors who spent many years in the Makololo courts.

As previously stated, this work contends that the Makololo, varied people that they had become, had in the course of two generations, already largely merged with the host Lozi population, itself very varied due to considerable absorption of peoples over the preceding two centuries. With so much intermarriage, who could tell which young male was a Makololo and how this would have been defined? Certainly, the confusion

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99 Kilby, op. cit., p.246.
100 Holub, ‘Seven Years in South Africa…Vol. II’, op. cit., p. 221 and 228.
proved too much for European writers such as Gibbons at the turn of the century who remarked that Chief Mamili of the southern portion of Caprivi, an Induna who had carried Livingstone’s message of greeting to Sibituane had told him that only one Makololo had accompanied Livingstone to the Mozambique coast in 1855-6. As previously indicated, Livingstone had said clearly there were 115. This was Gibbons confusing the original Sotho Makololo with the hordes of other groups assimilated by Sibituane into the Makololo and largely now going by the name of their people’s conqueror and new patron. More likely the males killed were the remnants of the pure-bred Sotho stock and any other men and their families who threatened the security of the new order which did indeed consist of a return to the Luyi dynasty existent at the death of the great King Mulambwa prior to the arrival of Sibituane.

The Lozi absorbed and learnt much of Makololo culture and political organisation and vice versa. That said, some aspects were never adopted, such as circumcision and matrilineal descent. Apart from the remaining dominant Sotho Makololo rump, the two communities appear to have lived in Bulolo largely in peace and harmony. So much of Makololo organisation and culture continued and exhibited itself in the Lozi nation of the twentieth century that it must be true to say that from Caprivi north to the junction of the Zambezi with the Kabompo, Makololo and Lozi became as one. Missionary Coillard, who had worked in Basutoland prior to moving to Barotseland, observed in 1878 that ‘the Barotse are true Basuto’. Of course, the two exiled remnants of the Lozi nation continued to exist as separate Luyi entities but, as already stated, it is significant that after the restoration in 1864, it was Lozi princes who had been groomed in the Makololo court of Sibituane and Sekeletu who took power and not those in Nyengo or Lukwakwa.

The aforementioned unspoken aura and respect that exists in Lozi circles today has been omnipresent since the days of the overthrow. The French missionary Coillard, who had read much of Livingstone’s work, cast some light on the issue when he noted with some surprise in 1878 that:

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102 Coillard, On the Threshold..., op. cit., p. 59.
All their (Lozi) chiefs have been the servants or slaves of Sebetoane and Sekeletu. It is from these Makololo potentates, of whom they always speak with affection and the highest respect, that they received their education, and formed their ideal of the dignity, manners and power of a sovereign. The warrior tribe of Barotsi, once subdued, had become the most devoted of all to the interests of the Makololo; and if Mpololo (Mbololo) the cousin and successor of Sekeletu had not shown himself so capriciously cruel, they would never have thought of revolting.103

Again in 1885 Coillard noted that:

The respect and esteem that the Barotse still have for their old masters is something extraordinary. A chief would not consider himself a chief, if he had not a Makololo for his first wife; and when you visit him, he never fails to introduce her to you. This explains how the Sesuto language has kept its pre-eminence in the country.104

Coillard found that this enthusiasm extended to a desire amongst Lozi chiefs to receive and host the Basuto evangelists that he had brought with him from Basutoland.105 Even today, older Lozi in particular are always fascinated and enthusiastic to see photographs containing images of the first Basuto evangelist, Aaron. It is also worth noting that this writer found several men in Barotseland and Caprivi who claim or were perceived by others to be 'Makololo' today. Whilst the accuracy of their claimed ethnic lineage may be open to some scrutiny, it is significant if not ironic that people living in the midst of a previously conquered nation should choose or allow themselves to be perceived as members of the former unless there was an ambience attached to that nomenclature.

103 Ibid.
104 Ibid. p. 177.
105 Unlike the Matabele of Mzilikaze in whose domain Coillard had previously tried to set up missionary enterprise, who viewed the Basotho evangelists with outright hostility, an aspect that denied Coillard any hope of working amongst the ‘Banyai’, a people dominated by the Matabele. Because of this, Coillard was expelled, and was fortunate to escape without loss of life amongst his party.
The legacy of Livingstone

The legacy of David Livingstone’s interaction with the Makololo, the Lozi and the Upper Zambezi Valley is harder to define although equally tangible. Livingstone is remembered as the bringer of Christianity and a crusader against the evils of the slave trade associated with the Portuguese and their agents, the Mambari (whom were often referred to as Portuguese) from Angola. When Lozi historians speak about Livingstone, there is an ambience of goodness in the stories they tell of him. He became known variously as ‘Nyaka’ (doctor) and ‘Munali’ by which name he is largely remembered today. This word is a Luyana word meaning ‘golden cob of maize’, some say to signify the fact that he was, in so many respects like the Luyi themselves, though his theory does not take account of the fact that maize had not been consumed by the Lozi until the arrival of the Makololo. Meanwhile Munali became a name used as place names and for school etc. around Zambia. There is also the very clear reference to his Englishness, a badge of identity which Livingstone himself traded on. Indeed he seems to have played down the very nature of his native Scottishness and desired his children to be brought up without even a Scottish accent. Yet Livingstone displayed much of the austere upbringing of his native land, the Clyde region of post-industrial revolution Scotland.

Livingstone was a remarkable man who created such a deep and lasting impression that his footprints amongst the Lozi are largely in the realm of myths as are those of famous kings, chiefs and warriors of the past. He was a scientist with a thirst for new knowledge, interested in botany, zoology, ornithology and anthropology quite apart from his profession as a doctor of medicine. Debenham describes Livingstone as an intense lover of nature: ‘Even while a slave to his ambition he was laying all nature under tribute, finding everything he saw of absorbing interest.’ He was also an accomplished geographer capable of taking measurements with rudimentary equipment such as the width and depth of the Victoria Falls with amazing accuracy. He was an excellent recorder and notetaker leaving behind an unequalled and most valuable collection of observations of the Makololo, Lozi and others. A useful demonstration of

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106 Information supplied by local Lozi historian Inengu Ananyatele, see previous reference.
108 Ibid. p. 16.
this is the note Livingstone made in a letter to his family during his first sojourn to Barotseland in 1851 of a conversation in which he was told of:

...boats of considerable size might sail on it [the Zambezi], for Seunturu [Mulambwa] (the chief whom Sebitoane expelled) built a boat of planks sewn together and roofed in with white cloth, which required 20 men to paddle it...  

Here, Livingstone was clearly being told about the Nalikwanda, the Lozi state barge traditionally constructed under the direction of succeeding Litungas since the earliest kings. It was used to transport the king during the time of Kuomboka when Lozi people left the Bulozi floodplain for the margins while the annual inundation brought by the Zambezi (which Livingstone observed would make the installation of a permanent mission station in the plain impossible) was at its height. That Livingstone picked up and recorded this information is testament to his ability to hold conversations with local people that elicited valuable data. It also shows that he was able to converse freely with the Lozi while under Makololo domination. Meanwhile, it provides today the earliest recorded confirmation of a ceremony thought to date back to the time of the first Lozi king Mboo.

Still, like many explorers and missionaries of his time, Livingstone was a driven man with a giant sized ego, austere in many ways and not given to personal excess; yet he was prepared to sacrifice the stability of his family and family life on the altar of his ambition. With other Europeans and whites in general he was impatient, intemperate, unforgiving and often ill at ease unless they were his audience or promoters. This was the case most particularly on Livingstone’s own stage, Africa, where he was never happier than when he was on the road, cut off from the stifling rigidity and constraints of mid-nineteenth century European society. With his own employers, the directors of the London Missionary Society (LMS) who endured numerous intemperate tirades, Livingstone outraged and sometimes overplayed his hand to the point where relations became very strained.  

109 Contained in a letter to the Livingstone family written and sent from the banks of the ‘Zouga’ River, October 1851 in Schapera (ed.) op. cit., p. 149.
With Africans by contrast, Livingstone appeared more relaxed, easy-going and cheerful, displaying an otherwise undeveloped sense of humour while showing a surprising flexibility with regard to practices that often offended his Christian missionary principles. Livingstone appeared to feel more at home with Africans than with his own kind. For sure there was definite chemistry between himself and Sibituane, whose passing Livingstone appeared to mourn so greatly.\textsuperscript{111} There was also genuine affection for Sekeletu although Livingstone was the first to point out that the son possessed neither his father’s charisma nor wisdom.\textsuperscript{112} Livingstone appears to have respected strength and survival skills, and despised weakness in any quarter. As far as the Makololo were concerned, Livingstone’s impression of them seemed rather contradictory. Sometimes, when speaking with the missionary gaze of his day he would refer to the difficulty he had in living with ‘heathenis m, consisting of dancing, roaring, singing, jesting, anecdotes, grumbling, quarrelling and murdering of these children of nature,’\textsuperscript{113} and to their depravity.\textsuperscript{114} At other times, and presumably for a different audience he would note the Makololos’ honesty,\textsuperscript{115} generosity (to him),\textsuperscript{116} hospitality, and their being ‘by far the most intelligent and enterprising of the tribes he had met.\textsuperscript{117}

In 1859, the explorer and adventurer, Andersson, whilst at the Okavango near Libebe, was told that ‘a party of white men... the previous year... attacked the Ovaquangari nation (most likely the Tawana) and carried off much cattle, besides making captives of men women and children’. The aggressors, however, were not white men but the Makololo under Sekeletu. The outraged Andersson later accused Livingstone of naivety:

\ldots this tribe (the Makololo) have two faces for Dr Livingstone. There is no doubt he possesses great influence over them, a fact... proved by the very handsome manner in which they have treated and assisted him; and when that admirable

\textsuperscript{111} Livingstone, \textit{Missionary Travels}, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid. p. 179.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid. p. 226.
\textsuperscript{114} Seaver, p. 192.
\textsuperscript{115} Livingstone, \textit{Missionary Travels}, p. 308.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid. p. 493.
\textsuperscript{117} Seaver, op. cit., p. 373.
man is on the spot... everything goes smoothly, but, I suspect... the old Swedish saw:- when the cat is away, the rats dance on the table – is at once verified.\textsuperscript{118}

Andersson muses that missionaries generally suffer from a blindness brought on by their calling and the drive to see only what they want to see in people to satisfy their spiritual cravings and the aspirations of their promoters, and clearly includes Livingstone in this category. Whilst he may have been right about Livingstone’s apparent blindness to the excesses of the Makololo in his reporting this would not have been due to naivety. Livingstone was really very astute and interpreted well the disposition of the African peoples he interacted with. Rather he chose to overlook the excesses of the Makololo because they were his benefactors and helpers.

In quieter reflection, Livingstone calls the Makololo ‘just a strange mixture of good and evil – as men are everywhere else,’\textsuperscript{119} and would admit that ‘it would not be difficult to make these people appear excessively good or uncommonly bad’.\textsuperscript{120} In terms of his overall relationship with Africans, Livingstone was a pragmatist, keenly aware that Africans, particularly African leaders, were vital instruments in the quest to achieve his ambitions and that an inflexible attitude to these people would effectively stymie his chances of becoming successful or famous. So often Livingstone appears ambiguous in his attitude to African peoples, on the one part impatient, opinionated and arrogant and on the other, particularly where the evils of the slave trade were concerned, paternal and protective; he could also be respectful and even caring. This ambiguity perhaps reflects a component of Livingstone’s true character, driving towards the apparently unattainable and prepared to gloss over or omit negative aspects of his own behaviour and those who supported him while unhesitatingly condemning those who he felt to be a risk to his life mission or the world’s perception of himself.

Africans generally treated him as they would a chief, a powerful doctor of medicine yes, but rather in the sense of a wizard, a magician, capable of what were to them, superhuman feats. For the Makololo and therefore for the restored Lozi kingdom

\textsuperscript{118} C.J. Andersson, The Okavango River: A Narrative of Travel, Exploration and Adventure (Hurst and Blackett, London, 1861), pp. 194-195.
\textsuperscript{119} Gluckman, ‘As men are everywhere else’ op. cit., p. 461.
\textsuperscript{120} Livingstone, Missionary Travels, op. cit., p. 510.
as well, Livingstone set the standard by which all whites would be judged. According to Gluckman, Livingstone became a key figure in Makololo foreign policy.\textsuperscript{121} This seems fair but it is the contention here that he was also seen as having the potential to bring enrichment and development to the Makololo after he was able to prove the value of ivory at Luanda with Makololo witnesses. He became a mythological icon represented as a bringer of good to the nation and destroyer of evil. Prins picks up on this theme, remarking on how Livingstone was later explained in terms of magic and chiefship.\textsuperscript{122} The missionary F.S. Arnot, another Scotsman who was the first real missionary to the Lozi from 1882-4 and had admired Livingstone as a child (having met and played with Livingstone’s own children), found the remembrance of Livingstone fresh in the memory of most who had been near to him, ‘Although... more than 20 years since he was last seen there, yet the remembrance of him, his ways, his words, his physique, is as fresh as yesterday... Many of the older men had whole sermons of his off by heart.’\textsuperscript{123} So great was the reverence and the immediate comparisons made between himself and his illustrious predecessor that Arnot found the burden almost onerous, ‘I being of the same nation, and no doubt having a national likeness to him, was called by the same name, Monare. This I at first resented... ’\textsuperscript{124} Coillard also ruefully observed in 1878 that

\textit{If some travellers have engraved their names on the rocks and tree trunks, he has engraved his in the very hearts of the heathen population of Central Africa. Wherever Livingstone has passed, the name Moruti (missionary) is a passport and a recommendation. Must I confess that I have been humiliated not a little to see myself fitted with a doctor’s cap by these gentlemen of Sesheke? Whether I will or not, I am Nyaka (doctor), Livingstone’s successor. Thus it is that the first missionary that comes by is invested with the boots of this giant.}\textsuperscript{125}

Thus it can well be imagined that part of Livingstone’s affection for the Makololo was the awe in which he was held and the way he was looked up to practically everywhere he went, even if this tended to make him into a bit of a megalomaniac.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid. p. 459.
\textsuperscript{122} Prins, op. cit., p. 192.
\textsuperscript{123} E. Baker, \textit{The Life and Explorations of Frederick Stanley Arnot...}, pp. 100-101.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Coillard, \textit{On the Threshold...} op. cit., p. 60. As already stated, Coillard, was not the first missionary among the Lozi, that honour belonging to Frderick Arnot.
Yet like most driven people, Livingstone's time and patience for others lasted only as long as they were of use to him. Thus, once his raison d'être had moved to discovery of the source of the Nile and other missions not connected with Barotseland, Livingstone quickly lost interest in the Makololo as he had previously lost interest in the Bakwena at Kolobeng after the Boers wrecked his station there and the changing physical environment made missionary work there unsustainable. Gluckman goes further and accuses Livingstone of committing a breach of faith with the Makololo and that his own knowledge of this was responsible for his continuing crusades into previously unexplored and unhealthy areas that led to his own self-destruction. This may be going too far as Livingstone had clearly moved on by the time of his foray to Lake Bangweolu and what he perceived to be the possible regions of the source of the Nile. Nevertheless, the flawed nature of Livingstone's manic ambition also caused him to overlook or distort other European interaction with Barotseland during the Makololo interregnum although, admittedly, the extent of this was limited mainly to traders. It is known that the Hungarian Laszlo Magyar, visited Linyanti in October 1852 and June 1853 in the hope of meeting Livingstone who, to the astonishment of Magyar, refused to see him despite the positive description of the Hungarian given to him by Sekeletu. Listowel conjectures on the possibility that Livingstone did not like the fact that Magyar had 'gone native by marrying a local lady and having children with her, a practice which Livingstone, like many missionaries, claimed to abhor. More likely, however is the alternative explanation that Livingstone wanted to be seen as the first European to travel from the Zambezi to the Atlantic coast and without the aid or advice of anyone.

Similarly Livingstone referred to the Portuguese trader and explorer Silva Porto who reached Linyanti and Barotseland in 1853 meeting and offering advice to Livingstone who chose to refer only to Mambari slave traders. This considerably insulted Porto who had travelled from the east to west coasts of central southern Africa half a decade before Livingstone, and was a long established personality in Angola, although

127 Gluckman, 'As men are everywhere', op. cit., p. 460.
128 The story of Laszlo Magyar, his abortive attempts to meet Livingstone and speculation as to the likely explanation for this unfriendly behaviour are provided in J. Listowel, The Other Livingstone (Julian Friedmann Publishers, Lewes, 1974) pp. 129-131.
offence seems to have been taken more at the suggestion that he was being categorised as an African than at the accusations of slave trading. Listowel details other Portuguese visitors to Barotseland who were variously misrepresented by Livingstone as slave traders and Mambari, the general term for Africans and people of mixed blood from the Bihé area of Angola. Nevertheless, the impact of these other visitors on the Makololo was minimal in comparison to that of the charismatic Livingstone. The legacy of Livingstone can perhaps be judged most objectively through its lasting impact.

Thus it becomes pertinent to finally review what impacts the Makololo interregnum had on Lozi identity. These can be interpreted in the sense of a set of signs and symbols, badges that can be added to the aura of Lozi history as a mediating force in defining Lozi citizenship and subjectivity today. To be associated with the Makololo is to be associated with power and glory. To speak Silozi is to speak a unique language in the sub-region, associated with the south, South Africa, and the Sotho horde of Sibituane. It is a component of that which distinguishes the Lozi today from other groups in Zambia. The link with the south, in this case with the Sotho, is another aspect of the legacy. Post-independence leaders such as President Kenneth Kaunda portrayed Barotseland’s links with South Africa purely in terms of links with apartheid and white hegemony but there is much more to Barotseland and the Lozi nation’s links to the south than this.

When discussing the possible future dissemination of this work, the present Litunga and his Ngambela expressed a deep interest in the links between the Lozi and Sotho peoples and the desire that the fruits of this and other works concerning the history of the Lozi are communicated to the peoples and leadership of present-day Lesotho. Also stated was the desire to see further research on the origins of the Makololo carried out and communicated to the BRE. The Litunga, Lubosi II, was at pains to point out the historical ties between Barotseland and Lesotho. What this demonstrates is the fact that the Makololo connection is still held dear to heart by Kingship and elite in Barotseland and that the relationship between the Lozi and South

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129 Ibid. pp. 126-128.
Africa is far more deep-seated and Africa-centric than critics in the post-independence era have suggested.

Finally, this chapter has sought to demonstrate that, far from being destroyed, the influence of the Makololo and, implicitly, Livingstone, lived on into the second Lozi Kingdom both in person and in culture and organisation. Any doubt about that must surely be dispelled by the telling revelation by Lubosi-Lewanika in 1895 to Major Gibbons, sent by London to make a map of Barotseland, that he remembered ‘Monare’ (Livingstone) from when he was a small boy and that after Gibbons had made it clear he was of the same ilk, ‘all his suspicious little insinuations vanished, and he showed absolute confidence in me.’131 The Luyi dynasty returned in 1864, and even if it was Makololo-trained kings that followed the ‘overthrow’, many perceived positive aspects of Makololo rule were retained as were most of the lands that extended the frontiers of Barotse influence (although, significantly, not that south of the Chobe). It is also contended here that Barotseland’s particular interaction and relationship with European colonialism and enduring affection for Britain was originally set in train during the Makololo era. Previous writers have ascribed Lewanika’s turn to the British for ‘protection’ to the influence of Khama of the Bamangwato,132 Coillard,133 and even to the trader Westbeech who is described in more detail in the next chapter.134 Certainly, all of these had an impact but the trail really starts with the incredible rapport that grew between Sibituane and Livingstone, two strong and remarkable men of different worlds, who saw in each other the realisation of their own particular dreams and aspirations and left behind a joint legacy of influence still found among the Lozi today.

This chaptercatalogues the somewhat chaotic transition from the latter years of Sotho rule characterised by a rather confused sense of identity in the Upper Zambezi Valley to a renewed sense of Loziness, albeit very different from the one experienced before the coming of the Makololo. This transition period was influenced by the Makololo interregnum and increased pressure from the south east (the Matabele) as well as new external threats exerted by white Europeans. It was a period of political and socio-economic chaos and uncertainty which drew to a close with the granting of British protection in 1890 after which, it is argued, the second Lozi Kingdom really took flight. After this uncertain period and during the last decade of the nineteenth century, partly due to support from British power, Loziness permeated the consciousness of more people than all previous versions culminating around 1900 when Lozi influence was at its greatest in the sub-region.

Exiting Sotho rule, the Aluyi had absorbed many thousands of people of different origins, cultures and social organisation. Most were now speaking a new language, Sikololo (later to become known as Silozi) a derivative of the Sesotho brought by the Makololo, infused with Siluyana vocabulary and nuances and this included a new name for the resultant people, the Lozi or Rotsi (the L and R being interchangeable). The new leaders, though clearly Lozi, being descended from Mulambwa, had been groomed in the Makololo court, introduced to trading with slavers from Angola (the Mambari) and Zanzibar (the Arabs), and had temporarily abandoned the idea of Bulozi as the heart of empire.

The legacy of Makololo influence in Barotseland during the infancy and consolidation of the second Lozi kingdom permeated the Kingship itself. Sipopa was criticised by competing power sources in Bulozi for having been too closely aligned to the Makololo.¹ As was pointed out in the last chapter, Sipopa had taken Mamochisane, the daughter of Sibituane to wife while his favourite wife was said to be another

Makololo woman called Lunga. Meanwhile, one of his daughters had married a man called Manengo who was presumably a Sotho as Holub describes him as ‘...one of the few Makololos who had survived the general massacre’. In addition to this, Sipopa made appointments from people who were at least partially if not wholly Makololo such as Simataa Kabende who was given the title of Mamili (caretaker) and made guardian of the southern portals of the kingdom, based at Linyanti in present-day Caprivi. It is from this Mamili, who had settled at Lianyi, a hill village to the north of Senanga, that the currently exiled chief of the Fwe, Chief Boniface Bebi Mamili, and the leader of the 1999 Caprivi secessionists, Mishake Muyongo, who are cousins, are directly descended. Contrary to the position of previous writers, then, it is argued here that, far from there being a cut-off between Makololo and Lozi rule as a ‘restoration’ of some pre-existing authority, what emerged in the Upper Zambezi Valley after 1864 was a hybrid socio-political community, heavily infused with Luyi and Makololo influence, presided over by kings and elites descended from the earlier Luyi dynasty. Meanwhile, due to the vastness of the territory and diversity of the peoples absorbed under the influence of the new Lozi administration, any sense of normative Lozi socio-political system was absent until the late 1880s by when Lewanika had realised that he would need outside assistance to impose such systems.

The course of Lozi history then, became much infused by people from outside the region from the coming of the Makololo around 1830 onwards. There were two flows of these outsiders to the Upper Zambezi Valley, from the west and from the south, with occasional forays by Arabs from the east. Yet it was the influence of English speakers from the south who were to have the greatest influence, both on the Lozi political economy and on Lozi society at large although this was not clear during the transition between First and Second Lozi Kingdoms when the influence of the Portuguese was still pervasive. The thrust of this new influence was largely articulated

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2 Holub, *Seven Years in South Africa*..., op. cit., ii, p. 221.
3 Ibid. p. 222.
5 Lianyi is one of several hills on the eastern ridge of the Bulolo floodplain said to have been magically raised by the Lozi prince Mwanambinje, brother of Mboo from which he could keep watch over his cattle swimming down the Zambezi as he moved south after the differences between the brothers became irreconcilable.
by specific individuals who are remembered and reified in Lozi mythology and Lozi identity discourse in the contemporary era. The individuals who will be considered here are the trader and adventurer George Westbeech and the two missionaries Frederick Arnot and Francois Coillard. To differing extents, these and other anglophile characters became entranced and seduced by Lozi society and culture and most particularly, by their relationship with Lozi Kings and the ruling Barotse elites. These early pioneers, missionaries and traders, assisted by Khama, chief of the Bamangwato, continued to exert a certain ‘British’ influence which persisted throughout the colonial and postcolonial period in Barotseland. There were, of course, many more Englishmen who became entranced by Lozi society and culture, particularly in the colonial service, and later on the academic Loziphile, Max Gluckman, but these three, following the example of Livingstone, had more impact than most in this transitory period, and who, in a way, prepared the ground for others to follow.

**George Cobb Westbeech**

Much of the information available today on George Westbeech and his life in Barotseland is gleaned from the remnants of his personal memoirs (which are only available for the last four years of his life), and the copious notes and literary work of the Czech adventurer and naturalist, Emil Holub. Westbeech spent most of the last 17 years of his life based at Panadamatenga on the wagon route south from Kazungula, hunting and trading throughout Barotseland and Caprivi. Holub stayed at Seseke and Pandamatenga in the 1870s and early 1880s and faithfully recorded life in the last capital of Sipopa and his own adventures to the Mashkumbwe, which ended in near catastrophe. Holub never made it to Bulozi, though not for the want of trying, and although he came to the region from the south, under the auspices of Anglophone influence, he cannot be considered as an agent of influence from the south quite simply because he is not remembered in Lozi folklore today. This may be due to the fact that he never learnt to speak much Sicololo and due to his apparently naïve and gauche approach to his relationships with African elites and commoners alike, yet the records he left provide a rare and invaluable insight into the life and culture of the post-Makololo

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period, certainly as far as the south is concerned. Interestingly, Holub referred constantly to the political community of this time as the ‘Marutse-Mambunda Kingdom’ reflecting his perception of the considerable influence and infusion of Mbunda culture and practices, the Mbunda having arrived in Barotseland from the Kwando-Kwito region to the west in the time of Mulumbwa.

Westbeech’s relationship with Barotseland and Lozi royalty commenced in the era of the restoration, specifically with Sipopa who assumed the Kingship after having been nominated by Njekwa, the leader of the overthrow of the Sotho, who in turn became Sipopa’s Ngambela after the latter came to power. Westbeech arrived, like the Paris missionaries who were to follow in his wake, from South Africa VIA the Matabele in present-day Western Zimbabwe. He was not the first British trader to access Barotseland from the south after the departure of Livingstone but he was the first to be welcomed formally and, in his dealings, was to have the most lasting impact. In the two decades or so between Livingstone’s first confirmed encounter with Sibituane and Westbeech’s arrival at the confluence of the Chobe and Zambezi around 1871, several traders and adventurers made it to the Upper Zambezi and the courts of the Makololo and Sipopa. Many of these came from the west. These were the Mambari traders, largely Ovimbundu and mixed race, often trading as middlemen for the Portuguese at the coast (occasional pure Portuguese such as Silva Porto and Serpa Pinto came to Barotseland personally). Others were British and Dutch adventurer-traders who came from the south but, were generally not well received. Tabler suggests that this was due to fear and suspicion in Barotseland that the Matabele could somehow take advantage of any access given to traders from the south. Maybe it was also because the prices of the Mambari for trade goods were, initially at least, considerably lower than those of traders from the south due to reduced overheads related to distance from the coast and the absence of bureaucratic barriers on the route from the west coast. Perhaps it was also due to the inability of white traders from the south to instil much confidence in the Makololo-Lozi

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8 Holub’s primary works relating to the region from the period include A Cultural Survey of the Lozi-Mbunda Kingdom in South Central Africa [translated by L. Holy] (Royal Imperial Geographical Society, Vienna, 1879), Seven Years in South Africa: Travels, Researches, and Hunting Adventures, between the Diamond-Fields and the Zambesi, 1872-79 [translated by E.E. Frewer], Two Volumes (Sampson Low, London, 1881), Von der Capstadt ins Land der Maschukulumbe Reisen im Südlichen Afrika in den Jahren 1883-7 (Alfred Hölder, Vienna, 1890).

chiefs they came across. This, in turn, may have been due to a heightened sense of racial arrogance on the part of white traders originating from the Cape.

George Westbeech, however, succeeded where others had failed and achieved considerable influence in Barotseland, particularly with the Lozi Kings, Sipopa and Lewanika. In Barotseland he was known as ‘Joros’ or ‘Georos Umutunta’ meaning ‘Great George’, Georos being as close as Lozis could get to pronouncing the name George.\(^\text{10}\) His influence, like that of Livingstone, was also instrumental in the ability of later interlocutors of British influence to gain a foothold in Barotseland. That influence was premised on Westbeech’s preparedness to locate and base himself in the region, to learn local languages and to act as an “honest broker” between locally competing forces. Perhaps the goods brought by the English from the south were also of better quality than those originating with the Portuguese, particularly where guns were concerned. In essence, Westbeech built up relationships of trust, respect and friendship with local chiefs and Kings, particularly the Matabele, the latter being equally valuable to the Lozi elites as trade. In addition, Westbeech was judged to be a fair man, who traded fairly and did not ask for slaves.

This is not to say that slaves were not traded in the aftermath of Makololo rule, it is clear from Holub’s accounts that they were. Yet the legacy of slaves being more valued in local productivity persisted from pre-Makololo days and it is clear that there was a feeling that trading a commodity like ivory, which quickly came to assume enormous value in the Lozi economy, for the luxury wares of the approaching European world economy was a more prudent and preferable mode of commerce. Westbeech was to be the standard bearer of this preferred mode of commerce. He was also a man of gregarious tastes, whose character and reputation spread far and wide. He is recorded as enjoying the company of local mistresses up and down the Zambezi between Sesheke and Lealui and also of the ‘demon drink’, both of which appalled European missionaries who, with the exception of Frederick Arnot, some of whom, like the Frenchman, Coillard, said as little about Westbeech in their records as possible, despite his dependence on

\(^{10}\) R. Sampson, *The man with a Toothbrush in his Hat…*, p. 32. The present writer found that the name Westbeech is hardly known amongst Lozi historians today whereas the nomenclature ‘Joros’ immediately receives recognition amongst elders at royal centres in Lealui and Mwandi (Sesheke).
him for access to Barotseland. Yet he was seen as a humane and friendly man by both black and white, who would help virtually anyone in need, despite any reservations he might hold about them. The nature of Westbeech’s success is worthy of some analysis.

Westbeech was born into the lower middle classes of England in 1844, and by the age of eight, had lost his mother, father, and only brother (there were no other children) as well as his grandfather who he had become attached to. Brought up by his widowed grandmother, Westbeech, who was a healthy child and known to have undertaken elementary education, soon developed a wanderlust and, possibly influenced by the exploits of Livingstone, left England for Natal in 1862 at the age of seventeen, never to return. Few details exist of the means or motivations that Westbeech relied upon to promote his travels but it seems that shortly after landing in Natal, he moved on north to Matabeleland where he arrived in 1863 and met Mzilikaze and his son Lobengula, to whom Westbeech was to become a trusted confidant. From the age of 19 to his death at 44 years of age, Westbeech rarely left the region, trading and hunting mainly for ivory, in business with his partner, George Arthur Philips. Philips was known locally as ‘Elephant Philips’ due to his size and propensity for hearty behaviour and roaring laughter; to local people he was known as ‘Vela Impi’ or ‘behold an army!’ Philips, like Westbeech, was a ‘larger than life’ character who inspired respect among those he came across and could not be satisfied with life in European society. While partners however, Philips and Westbeech, with their strong personalities, were unable to stomach one another’s company for very long. Thus, after hunting and trading in Matabeleland with Philips for almost a decade, Westbeech was to move on to the region north of the Zambezi, because he had heard that elephants were more numerous there and because of competitive pressure from the south in the form of other European hunters and traders.

In 1871, during Sipopa’s reign, Westbeech arrived at the confluence of the Chobe and Zambezi Rivers where, it seems, Sipopa, with many of his followers, came to meet him. Westbeech succeeded in endearing himself to the Lozi having also,

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11 Sampson, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
12 Ibid. p. 18.
remarkably, achieved the same with their enemies, the Matabele. Here, Westbeech, like Livingstone and like Moffat in Kuruman and Matabeleland became conceived of as a powerful agency, a member of a scarce and valued band of people, capable of mediation with other power sources, African and European. When he arrived at the Zambezi, Westbeech, like Livingstone and Moffat before him, and unlike other European interlopers who unsuccessfully attempted to trade with Barotseland during the same period, spoke the local languages (quickly learning Sesotho, Sindebele and Setswana), and had already proved capable of winning the confidence of other strong peoples in the region. In other words, his value travelled before him and his usefulness as an intermediary as well as in trade soon became apparent.

However, for reasons that are not altogether clear, when Westbeech first arrived, Sipopa simply wanted him to stay, regardless of his trading abilities; this being perhaps due to Westbeech’s good offices with Mzilikaze and Lobengula of the Matabele. One reason could be that Westbeech was known to have good relations with the Matabele chiefs and might therefore be relied on to forestall possible Matabele raiding intentions. For Westbeech, the attraction was originally undoubtedly ivory and the potential to become rich but he quickly became accustomed to life among the Lozi and was reputed, as mentioned previously, to have innumerable Lozi mistresses dotted around Barotseland, something that outraged the Boer woman whom he married in 1875, a short-lived union that fell apart in acrimony in 1878. By this time, however, Westbeech was reported by the adventurer and hunter F.C. Selous to be ‘...no longer a white man, but had become to all intents and purposes an African’. Westbeech was to become the main purchaser as well as hunter of Lozi ivory, much in the manner that Livingstone had dreamt of and recommended to the Makololo. Such was the devastating cull of elephants north of the Zambezi during Westbeech’s time there that, by the time of his death in 1888, the trade in ivory in this region had already become unprofitable due to scarcity and the remoteness of remaining elephants. This aspect of Livingstone’s legacy

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14 Ibid. p. 17.
16 …and which, according to Sampson, The Man with a toothbrush in his Hat…, op. cit., p. 69, she was to complain about for forty years afterwards!
17 Quoted in Sampson, The Man with a toothbrush in his Hat…, op. cit., p. 69.
has been overlooked to date. Presumably, Livingstone never foresaw the destruction of the local fauna as a result of his advice.

By the end of the 1870s, Westbeech was spending longer and longer periods in the Zambezi Valley without going south, like Livingstone before him, clearly finding this preferable to life amongst his peers in South Africa. Also like Livingstone and unlike most Europeans, he had been able to withstand the ravages of fever and had settled at Pandamatenga, thirty-seven miles south of Kazungula on the Zambezi in present-day Botswana, which he made his base.\textsuperscript{18} Significantly, Pandamatenga was then considered by Schultz and Hammar as being in ‘the Barotse country’,\textsuperscript{19} although Sampson says it was in a kind of ‘no man’s land’ at the periphery of both Lozi and Matabele influence.\textsuperscript{20} Westbeech created such an impression in the region that, on a visit to his base camp in 1884, Schulz and Hammar referred to: ‘George Westbeech, who is a chief here, established by both the Barotzi and the Matabele...’.\textsuperscript{21} The visitors were amazed that, at a moment’s notice, Westbeech could summon and receive ninety bearers to assist them with their passage from a chief located one hundred and sixty miles away.\textsuperscript{22} In fact, Westbeech behaved like, and was treated as an Induna or local chief, and was often called upon to adjudicate in local disputes, his advice and decisions being much respected, not least as he was known to have the ear of successive Litungas.

The time that Westbeech spent with Sipopa in 1871 then, was the beginning of an intimate and mutually remunerative relationship between the two, which was subsequently continued by Lubosi-Lewanika after his accession to the kingship, a relationship that was only really brought to a close by the increasing scarcity of ivory and Westbeech’s declining health. Put simply, Sipopa and Lewanika appeared to like Westbeech and certainly trusted him, and, from the Czech explorer Holub’s account, came to rely on their English friend for information and trade.\textsuperscript{23} Lewanika also set great

\textsuperscript{18} L. Holy in introduction to L. Holy (ed.) \textit{Emil Holub’s Travels North of the Zambezi 1885-6}, (Manchester University Press, Manchester for the University of Zambia) a translation by C. Johns of part of the second volume of E. Holub \textit{Von der Capstadt ins Land der Maschukulumbe…} op.cit.
\textsuperscript{19} Clay, op. cit., p.16.
\textsuperscript{20} Sampson, op. cit., p. 19.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Holub, \textit{Seven Years in South Africa… II}, op. cit., pp. 284-285.
store by Westbeech’s advice while not trusting him to the same degree over the Kingdom’s declining ivory resources. Coillard’s niece, Christine Mackintosh, in 1907, paid Westbeech an interesting tribute by saying ‘the name of Westbeech must never be forgotten as one of those who first inspired the Barotsi with confidence in white men and in the English.’

**Reunification and consolidation**

Sipopa moved continuously during his reign, but in 1874 settled at Sesheke on the opposite bank of the Zambezi to Caprivi. In Jalla’s ‘History and legends of the Barotse nation’ it is said that at this time Sipopa was accused of having ‘no ideas above hunting, selling ivory and amusing himself, the care of the country being a secondary consideration with him’. Several suggestions have been made as to why Sipopa finally moved to Sesheke, but it is clear that he felt safer there and as far as hunting was concerned, Caprivi would have been the location for much of that as, unlike in Bulozi, large quantities of game were still located there and, of course, his friend Westbeech with whom he was trading ivory, had based himself not too far away across the Zambezi. It was also clear that Sipopa was becoming less and less popular with his subjects, particularly in the heart of the kingdom, Bulozi, which impacted on his ability to gather wealth as Holub noted, ‘As a consequence of Sepopo’s oppression, many of the natives have withdrawn from the kingdom, generally going south, and the difficulty of collecting tribute anywhere has greatly increased’. This added to the King’s dependence on trade with Europeans and the half-caste Mambari. Additionally, Sipopa’s mother was Subia and he himself would have been more familiar with the southern people having spent most of his formative years in the Caprivi region under Makololo tutelage.

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27 Holub estimated that less than a quarter of the subject tribes were actually paying any tribute to Sipopa. See Holub, *Seven Years in South Africa*, p. 146.
28 Part Portuguese, part Ovimbundu traders infamous for promoting the slave trade from central southern Africa to the Portuguese on the coast of Angola who had been used to trading with the Makololo, particularly when their leadership was based in Caprivi.
Nevertheless, despite earlier popularity gained at the overthrow of Mbololo, Sipopa became a ruthless and autocratic ruler, renowned for his cruelty and repeated use of Mbunda diviners to accuse and have put to death anybody who stood in the way of access to an admired woman or articles of value desired by the King. Meanwhile Sipopa developed a paranoia based on the idea that conspiracies were always being hatched to overthrow him,\textsuperscript{29} and this paranoia, fed by Sipopa’s belief in and fear of witchcraft, led to the persecution and death of many in the new Lozi hierarchy including his loyal Ngambela Njekwa who had been instrumental in bringing Sipopa to power. Such behaviour resulted in Sipopa’s own overthrow in 1876 by a small force led by his new Ngambela, Mataa, and the seventeen year-old Mwanawina, another grandson of Mulambwa and first cousin of Sipopa, was installed to the Lozi kingship between August and November of the same year. Sipopa died while fleeing injured from Sesheke, shot by one of his own bodyguards who, as no Lozi may spill the blood of a Litunga, claimed it had been an accident.\textsuperscript{30} Sipopa expired, it is said, while on his way to try and reach safety with his old friend Westbeech who on hearing of Sipopa’s travails set out from Pandamatenga to meet him only to find a party of Indunas doing obeisance to the dead King on the south bank of the Zambezi near to Kazungula.\textsuperscript{31}

Sipopa is given very brief coverage in all but Holub’s accounts, yet his period of rule was critical in the transition period from rule by the Sotho chiefs and the fully restored Lozi Kingdom under Lewanika. Sipopa ruled for some twelve years, no mean achievement in the region at this time and led many raids both east and west, imposing new Lozi influence and even capturing Mambari prisoners as well as the more usual Batoka and Mashukulumbwe (Ba-Ila). That said, his influence over Bulozi and the north of the kingdom was clearly constrained in the latter half of his reign. He had clearly absorbed a considerable degree of Makololo culture and this was accepted in the regional royal capital of the south of Bulozi, which he consolidated by placing first his sister Kandundu and later his daughter Kaiko as chieftainesses at Nalolo but resented further north, where the influence of Lukwakwa was still strong and where his cousin Imbwa had moved to be chief in 1864. He clearly felt more comfortable with the people

\textsuperscript{29} Tabler, op. cit., p. 8 and E. Holub, \textit{Seven Years in South Africa... II}, pp. 284-285.
\textsuperscript{30} Jalla, \textit{History, Traditions and Legends...}, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
of the far south (Sesheke district and Caprivi), where Makololo influence had permeated most and among the Subia to whom he was related. Like Sekeletu, he felt uncomfortable and threatened in Bulozi and desired to be in the south for reasons of personal safety as well as for the other aforementioned factors.

Sipopa also placed a great deal of faith in the Englishman Westbeech who came to be widely respected throughout Barotseland, Botswana and Matabeleland. For a time at least, there was something in the way that Sipopa looked upon Westbeech which is reminiscent of the way that Sibituane and Sekeletu looked upon Livingstone although it is clear that Westbeech brought no spiritual message with him. Thus Westbeech’s influence extended outside of royal circles; he was not merely a friend and confidant of the king, he was a respected chief on his own account and this is proved by the way this respect was handed down to succeeding Lozi kings until Westbeech’s death in 1888. As will be seen, Westbeech’s penchant for promoting Anglophone influences that would also promote development in Barotseland were to have far-reaching impacts on the political future of the region although the name of Westbeech is remembered today more on a local basis in the south and in Lealui rather than generally across the Kingdom.

It was not to be long before the new young King Mwanawina who, despite attempting to base himself in the north, and sending out a successful expedition to subdue the Makololo Siluka (or Siroque) who was believed to be fomenting an invasion from the west, was also overthrown, escaping first to the Mashi (Kwando), then to Sesheke and finally to the Batoka highlands. In the competitive confusion that followed, Lubosi was hauled onto the Maoma drums and installed in 1878. The difficulties that the young Mwanawina, like Sipopa, had faced, were a reincarnation of the psychosomatic schism between Namuso (the North) and Lwambi (the South) a division set in train as early as the time when Mwanambinje departed from the original Luyi fold at Libonda, later to be re-conquered by his son-in-law, Ngalama. This schism resurrected itself again during Makololo times after the all-conquering Sibituane had died and power was competed over between Sekeletu in the south and first Mpepe, then

32 Mainga, Bulozi under the Luyana Kings..., footnote, p. 96.
33 Ibid. p. 118.
Mbololo in Bulozi. It was really about which power base should rule over all of Barotseland. Bulozi, Caprivi and Sesheke districts were both relatively densely populated but were geographically different and physical communication between the two was difficult and time consuming at best. Mwanawina had also apparently upset many royals by unwisely appointing his mother’s southern Subia relations to positions of authority and then found himself relying almost solely on support from southerners, particularly the Subia, for his power base. Either way, Mwanawina survived. Bradshaw later observed that ‘Masubias…headed by Wana-Wena…being assisted by a tribe from the north-east called the Ma-kupi-kupi…succeeded in burning down Sesheke….’

Interestingly, Bradshaw, previously a ship’s doctor interested in natural history who managed Pandamatenga for Westbeech for six years, appeared to confuse the Lozi with the Subia who he described as ‘very black in colour of skin; physically they are well developed about the chest and arms, due to rowing...’. Most other travellers described the Subia as being lighter-skinned like the Makololo, which they generally are to this day. Ironically, European travellers in the nineteenth century were generally more impressed by the tall, slim, deep black original Lozi or Luyi who they found more attractive than the lighter skinned races to the south while the Lozi themselves admired only the lightest of their compatriots. Clearly, at this time, as the example of Bradshaw shows, there must have been some considerable confusion as to who was who, tribally, a further indication of the ethnic amalgamation that had taken place over the previous century or so.

As the story of Mwanawina and the coming to power of Lubosi demonstrate, the true locus of conflict was between northern and southern protagonists for power in Barotseland. From the death of Sibituane to the return of Lewanika to power in 1885, there existed two sets of parallel interest groups in the country, with the south having a slight edge. After this time, Lubosi who later became known as Lewanika, made it his business to unite the bifurcated kingdom and brooked no intrigue or opposition to this.

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34 Ibid. - Mwanawina’s father, Sibeso, like so many Lozi royals, before and since, having married a Subia woman.
36 Tabler, op. cit., p. 6.
37 Ibid. p. 212.
Meanwhile, certain groups such as the Mayeyi and Subia in the south and the Lovale in the north suffered fluctuating fortunes throughout the entire period. Bradshaw says that in May 1879, a party of ‘Masubias’ was ‘flying (fleeing) up the Chobe River, intending to settle at Mababe, in Khamà’s country, the chief of the Bamangwato’. Selous, meanwhile, writes that in June 1879, ‘we came to some Masubia towns (these people are refugees fleeing from the tyranny of the Barutse, and are at present living under Khame’s protection).’38 This continued subjugation of the Subia and other groups in the far south and Caprivi, who had sought their independence after the overthrow of Sotho rule, can be understood in the context of a claim made by the Subia historian Shamukuni that, sometime before the invasion of the Makololo, the Subia had set up a new zone of influence between the Chobe in the south and Sioma in the north, which Shamukuni refers to as ‘Itenge’.

Note should be made here that, unlike other groups where succession depended on either patrilineal or matrilineal succession, Lozi Kings are nominated and elected, accession is not a hereditary right. Any royal prince descended in the male line from the first Lozi monarch, Queen Mbuywamwambwa, the daughter of the semi-mythical Mwambwa, might be nominated but it is the Indunas who make the decision as to who shall reign and it is they who install the King and expect to be repaid with positions of status and wealth.40 This is very similar to the system of succession in the Ganda Kingship described by Twaddle.41 During the era in question, it was really a case of which competing faction could have their nominated royal prince hoisted on to the royal

40 Interviews with Inengu Muyunda Ananyatele, Limulunga, 12 to 30-07-2001, Induna Nawa Matakala, Limulunga, 13-07-2001, Wakuľuma Wakuľuma, Headmaster of Libonda Basic School, Libonda, 16-08-2001 and Buxton Simasiku (Induna Amulimukwa), Mwandi, 01-09-2001. After the death of the much-revered Mulambwa, all Kings were descended from that monarch and, since 1916, from King Lewanika.
maoma drums that took power. So it was, in 1878, that Lubosi came to be Litunga of the Lozi kingdom, a wise young prince who had grown up and lived, first with the exiled Lozi of Nyengo in the Mashi region of the south west, then in the courts of the Makololo and Lozi kings before him. Lubosi claimed to have witnessed the contacts between Sekeletu and Livingstone; he also knew and respected Westbeech and now found himself at the helm of a nation hitherto riven by splits and intrigues, where few of his recent predecessors had died a natural death. Lubosi was also to be deposed six years later in 1884, but only for a brief period after which, he adopted the name of Lewanika, the ‘uniter’ (by which name he will be known henceforth), and confirmed Lealui, originally founded by Sipopa and called Namuso (meaning north), in the heart of the floodplain, as his dry season permanent capital.

Lubosi had not been a part of the northern contingent during the Makololo interregnum. On the contrary, he had spent his early childhood with the western Lozi contingent in exile and in the court of the Makololo king Sekeletu where he came with his father Litia after some conflictual relations had developed in the west. Here he developed a close friendship with Litali, Sekeletu’s son, who was of the same age-grade, an important factor in Makololo organisation. Only when Sekeletu’s uncle, Mbololo, came to power and Lewanika’s father Litia was murdered as the two were escaping northwards does a connection with the north become evident. And, if any confirmation were needed of his southern connections, at the time of Sipopa’s death in 1876, Lewanika was to be found escaping with his uncle, albeit in a separate boat, having been a respected nephew of the former king.

The logic of Lewanika’s later success must lie in the ability that he displayed in bringing the two power sources together. In this he was helped by the appointment of his sister, Matauka, to the regency at Nalolo (Lwambi), whose loyal support was later to be instrumental in keeping Lewanika in power. In appointing Matauka, Lewanika followed a trend set in train originally by the early Luyi King, Ngombala, and continued by Sipopa and Mwanawina, of appointing a female relative to the capital of the southern Kingdom at Nalolo, which could not then be a threat to the north as the Litungaship had

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at all times to be occupied by a male. Today, a similar system operates although, in practice, a royal princess appointed by a previous Litunga is unlikely to be expelled from Nalolo or Libonda by an incoming administration as would have happened prior to the installation of Lewanika.

**The arrival of European spirituality**

The story of George Westbeech’s sway interaction with the leadership of the Lozi kingdom in transition has already been alluded to. His influence and advice were to have far-reaching implications in the evolving political economy of the kingdom that came to be known as Barotseland. Westbeech was also responsible for the appearance and early mediation of European spirituality in the region. This took the form, firstly, of access for the French (though Anglophile) missionary François Coillard of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (PEMS) to talk to Lewanika, secondly of permission for a lone missionary of the Plymouth Brethren called Arnot to sojourn at Lealui, thirdly for the refusal of permission for Belgian and Dutch Jesuits to launch a mission to Barotseland, and finally, for the return and subsequent establishment of Coillard and his followers, including Sotho catechists, in Barotseland after the restoration of Lewanika in 1885.

Notions of European spirituality were first introduced by David Livingstone on his two principal sojourns to Barotseland in 1851 and 1853 and, although he did not remain in the region or establish a mission, his spiritual capacity, which was conceived of largely as magical and messianic, laid the way for others to follow. However, it was not to be an easy road as the abortive attempt by the Helmore-Price expedition of 1861 was to prove. It was to be another twenty years before any further success was to be achieved at penetrating what was to European missionary societies, a remote and isolated, therefore costly region to exploit. Furthermore, due to the remoteness of Barotseland from the coast or from suitable transport arteries, it would take very fit, determined and devoted missionaries, who would be unlikely to obtain much support from their metropolitan bases in terms of resources for a venture to Barotseland to make the effort, not least due to the outlay involved, lack of reliable information and

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43 Described and analysed in Chapter 3, pp. 59-65.
paucity of obvious returns. And so it was that the missionaries that made it to Barotseland and stayed there were of a particularly hardy and eccentric breed whose interaction with Lozi politics and society was to have far-reaching impacts for the future. This is not to say that missionaries to Barotseland in the late nineteenth century succeeded in making great inroads to spiritual conversion of the population; in this endeavour they were largely unsuccessful although Coillard is warmly remembered today by devotees of churches derived from those first established by the PEMS. Their impact was rather felt in other areas such as politics and education. Lewanika, in particular, looked upon missionaries as a tool to assist in mediation with external powers and the procurement of assistance in stabilising and permanentising his own administration in Barotseland. In this he did not always enjoy the support of his some sections among the Lozi elite. Once this had been achieved, relationships often became strained as the different agendas of the missionaries and the Lozi elites came into conflict with one another.

Coillard first attempted to enter the Lozi kingdom with Westbeech’s support in 1878. He came via Leshoma and Sesheke soon after Lewanika had been appointed to the kingship in that year and as it was still so soon in Lewanika’s reign, was told to return later when the latter had become more settled, his position consolidated and his capital built. Coillard, who had previously worked at the Paris Evangelical Society mission in Basutoland, had had no luck in attempting to evangelise in Mashonaland, having been rejected by Lobengula for having Sotho evangelists and staff, a traditional enemy of the Matabele who dominated all of Zimbabwe at that time, and had heard from Khama of the Bamangwato of a Sotho-speaking nation to the north of the Zambezi. Westbeech saw in Coillard an ‘English’ influence, despite the obvious ‘Frenchness’ of the missionary. As Sampson notes ‘...a Frenchman, but who was at the same time an Anglophile’. Coillard was married to and accompanied by a doughty Scotswoman who Westbeech admired. The very act of bringing a white wife to live amongst the Lozi was a cause for some fascination and respect in itself. Most importantly, Coillard spoke the Sotho language, a prerequisite for gaining any influence

44 Coillard, *On the Threshold...*, pp. 64-65
in Barotseland at the time. He also brought with him Sotho-speaking catechists from Basutoland, which appealed to Lozi romance with Makololo culture.

However, it was to be six years before Coillard returned to knock again on the door of Barotseland at Kazungula having failed to raise adequate funds in France and finally only realising sufficient new philanthropic resources in Britain. In 1881, a visit was made by three Jesuit priests, Depelchin, Berghegge and De Vijlder who at first received a friendly reception from Lewanika and an invitation to settle permanently at Lealui. Yet when Berghegge and De Wijlder returned two years later with exactly that purpose in mind, Lewanika’s heart had turned against them and their party left disappointed. Westbeech claimed responsibility for this, having given his word to Coillard, and apparently deciding that the Jesuits were an inappropriate spiritual influence.

Meanwhile, in 1882, Westbeech was again responsible for the appearance in Barotseland of the first settled missionary, Frederick S. Arnot, a Plymouth Brethren missionary of the Christian Missions to Many Lands (CMML), who as a child had been a friend of Livingstone’s children. Arnot was to spend two years at Lealui during which he earned the respect of Lewanika and both elite and commoners among the Lozis who he came across there. To Lozis, Arnot, who was just 23 when he arrived, was an unusual visitor, for he sought no personal gain and, for the first year lived in a succession of huts provided for him in very squalid conditions where his health deteriorated rapidly. Arnot learnt the Sikololo language, a good strategy and necessary as there was nobody to translate for him except when Westbeech came to visit. After giving away virtually all his worldly possessions, and thus was no longer perceived as an opportunity, Arnot was treated with respect and generosity. He talked to local people and taught (although, on the strict instructions of Lewanika, not about God). Yet Arnot is also remembered for the pragmatic way in which he avoided openly condemning any of the cultural practices that were alien to him or his faith. Rather Arnot simply told people of what he thought and left it to others to believe him or otherwise. This, perhaps unsurprisingly, did not lead to any conversions but to a good deal of curiosity. There were also those who remembered Livingstone, including Sekeletu’s mother and a sister of Sibituane who were still alive at

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46 Tabler, op. cit., p. 90.
47 Rea, op.cit., p. 8.
the time of Arnot’s sojourn in Bulozi,\textsuperscript{48} plus another old Makololo woman named Mamwia, who happened to be a wife of Lewanika’s loyal and wise Ngambela, Selumbu, and who had worked for the Helmores and Prices while they were at Linyanti. This lady was able to remember some of the bible stories that Arnot recited.\textsuperscript{49} Arnot credits her with having saved him from starvation on more than one occasion.\textsuperscript{50} Soon Lewanika was confiding in the young Arnot who estimated that they were about the same age,\textsuperscript{51} and discussing his fears and reservations about being King in such a volatile political environment.

As previously stated, Westbeech took the credit for preventing the Jesuits, who clearly invested a great deal in their potential missionary venture to Barotseland, from gaining a foothold there, but in so doing created the impression that the young Lewanika either could not think for himself or was not being advised from within. In fact, Lewanika’s judgement was based on at least three other factors: the arrival and satisfaction gained from the relationship with Frederick Arnot; the advice of some of Lewanika’s closest and older allies (what the later missionary Coillard was to refer to as the ‘Conservative Heathen Party’) who were deeply suspicious of all whites without specific connections to Nyaka (Livingstone), Westbeech being the obvious exception; and his own disappointment at what appeared to be scrooge-like behaviour on the part of the Jesuits when it came to gifts, behaviour which would have been interpreted as lack of respect to the hegemonic status of the kingship in Barotseland. Meanwhile, despite his lack of assistance to them in their endeavours, Westbeech hosted the Jesuits at Pandamatenga allowing them to farm there while they made their unsuccessful entreaties to Lewanika although the relationship was at times somewhat acrimonious by all accounts, until they finally gave up and moved south.\textsuperscript{52} Further confirmation of Westbeech’s unique status in Barotseland can be gleaned from Mackintosh, Coillard’s niece who heard from her father when describing this period that ‘The missionaries were

\textsuperscript{48} E. Baker, \textit{The Life and Explorations of Frederick Stanley Arnot} (Seeley Service and Co., London, 1921), p. 100.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid. p. 81.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid. p. 82.
\textsuperscript{51} Lewanika was, in fact, about 40 years old at this time.
\textsuperscript{52} Rea, op. cit., p. 21.
plundered at every turn. Even the traders (always excepting Westbeech) were
demoralised by the state of affairs'.53

Meanwhile, Arnot, while clearly not a literary man, recorded many observations
that are relevant to the way that the Lozi consciousness was unfolding in the latter part
of the nineteenth century. He repeats an observation made frequently by Holub,
particularly in the south of Barotseland, in Batokaland (Tongaland) and in Caprivi, that
virtually everyone was a slave. Only ‘Malozi’ were not slaves and even some of these
seemed to be in some sort of bondage. Of course, as Holub points out, there were many
degrees of this slavery, and some so-called slaves seemed to be very well off people in
their own right. Yet this lowly status related also to the way that non-Lozi were thought
of. It is also clear from Arnot’s observations that his value to Lewanika and the Lozi elite
was not assessed in terms of his religious instruction or spiritual value. Indeed any
attempts to teach bible stories or promote such Christian ideals as equality of all before
God were immediately denounced by King and councillors alike.54 A certain amount of
inquisitiveness was expressed from time to time by Lewanika in this direction but only
on a personal one-to-one-basis and on condition that nothing was repeated in public.
Instead, Arnot was valued for his knowledge and teaching abilities although here again,
education was to be limited to children of royalty.

Another, more potent example of Arnot’s value to Lewanika was as an advisor
when Lobengula of the Matabele sent an envoy to Lewanika with gifts, imploring him to
join the Matabele in resisting the white man. Arnot takes credit for persuading Lewanika
to rather seek the friendship of Khama of the Bamangwato who had already accepted
Christianity and was friendly towards English-speaking missionaries.55 Due to lack of
supporting evidence, whether due to Arnot is not clear, but Lewanika decided to decline
to join forces with Lobengula and instead asked for the friendship and advice of Khama,
the Christian chief of the Bamangwato who had already accepted Christianity, which was
freely given. This probably saved the Lozi from the same fate that befell Lobengula and
the Matabele at the hands of the British South Africa Company (BASC) in the 1890s.

53 Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 321.
55 Baker, op. cit., p. 97.
Within two years of arriving in Bulozi, it seems that Arnot was tiring of the effort as his personal mission was faith-related and all else was of secondary importance to him, completely the opposite of the way he was valued in Bulozi. In addition to this, his health had suffered badly during his stay there, so that when the Portuguese trader, Silva Porto, made one of his periodic trading visits from Benguela in early 1884, Arnot found himself unable to resist an invitation to accompany the Portuguese trader out of Barotseland to the west.\(^\text{56}\) Arnot had realised that, quite apart from his own frustrations, Lewanika’s position was gradually becoming less secure as more and more of his supporters were being killed after failing boiling water or ‘mwati’ tests following accusations of witchcraft clearly aimed at changing the balance of power in favour of replacing Lewanika.\(^\text{57}\) Before his departure, Lewanika came to Arnot and, in wishing his friend well, commented that he did not think he would still be in place when he returned to the valley,\(^\text{58}\) a prophecy which was soon fulfilled. Arnot’s commentary shows the fragility of the Lozi political order during this period and the weakness ensuing from a system of succession that pitched contending factions for power against one another and where the north-south, Lukwakwa Lozi vs. Makololo Lozi divide which had opened up in the late 1820s/1830s after the death of Mulambwa was as wide as ever. The ability of the socio-economic order of Barotseland to move forward during this period was, it appears, seriously constrained by political uncertainties and widespread fear.

Following Arnot’s departure and Lewanika’s temporary overthrow in 1884, the Sotho-speaking French missionary, François Coillard of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (PEMS) who had previously worked in Basutoland, finally arrived back at Kazungula with his wife and entourage. Much to his surprise, Coillard found, not Lewanika, but a young usurper named Tatila Akufuna in possession of the Lozi kingship,\(^\text{56}\) Baker, op. cit., p. 104.
\(^\text{57}\) The boiling water test was one method employed by the Lozi but learnt from the Mbunda, of dealing with accusations of witchcraft and other wrongdoing whereby the accused would be forced to plunge his or her hands into boiling water. If the skin then ruptured or fell off, the accused was deemed guilty and usually burnt to death. If, by some miracle, the skin appeared undamaged, the defendant would be released. Another method, also learnt from the Mbunda, was ‘Mwati’ whereby the defendant would be given poison and if vomiting occurred, a guilty verdict would be pronounced whereas, if the poison was kept down and no serious ill-effects observed the accused would be pronounced innocent.
\(^\text{58}\) Baker, op. cit., p. 104.
an unlikely Lukwakwa prince who had been foisted onto the nation by an ambitious warrior Induna named Mataa.

Lewanika had been overthrown in 1884 and forced to flee to his allies on the Mashi (Kwando) River in the west of the Kingdom and only returned to power the following year after the longest and hardest fought battle in the history of Barotseland. He had had to rely on the help of southern components of the kingdom such as the Mbukushu and Simataa Kabende Mamili from Caprivi and even external assistance such as that provided by Mambari mercenaries from the west. Moremi of the Tawana came north with a promised army to assist Lewanika, although arriving after the battle was ended.

Having then, with his eldest son Litia, survived his own overthrow and regaining the kingship with considerable support from southern interest groups, Lewanika set about consolidating his hold on the Kingship and confronting external power interests. Doubtless he had conversations with Westbeech as well as the odd Portuguese and many Mambari visitors. By late 1885 he would have been told about the arrival of the Germans in Namibia and Lewanika would also remember certain Arab influences from Zanzibar. During the innumerable conversations he would have had with Westbeech, it is not inconceivable that such subjects would have been discussed and advice received. Lewanika had dealt with Silva Porto who had initially been mostly interested in trading slaves and put up with the irascible Serpa Pinto, a Portuguese major who seems to have made a considerable nuisance of himself while staying in Bulozi and told many wild stories afterwards. Arriving at Seshake penniless in 1878, his survival depended much on the good graces of Coillard and his wife who were about to return south at this time after their first refusal from Lewanika.

Lewanika was also acutely aware of the continuing menace manifested by the Matabele presence in western Zimbabwe although he made less of it than his

59 Described by Jalla, op. cit., p. 54.
60 Ibid, p. 55.
61 Specifically, the erstwhile Said Ben Habib whose trading skills Sekeletu had taken advantage of in the 1850s as observed by Livingstone in his Missionary Travels..., p. 501 and as recounted by Smith and Dale in The Ila Speaking Peoples to Northern Rhodesia..., op. cit., p. 33.
predecessors. Of course there was also competition from those groups living at the periphery of Lozi influence such as the Lunda-Lovale and the Sesheke chiefs but these presented less of a threat to Lewanika than competing power factions from within Bulolo, particularly those associated with the old Lukwakwa faction, exiled during the Makololo interregnum. Thus the 1880s were largely consumed with putting these opposing factions out of action, largely by eliminating individuals and their families. Raids also took place to the north to subdue the Luvale and east to raid the Mashukulumbwe (Ba-Ila) people to supplement diminished numbers of cattle and slaves (the last of these raids took place in 1888). Much is made of Lewanika’s determination to restore various aspects of traditional pre-Makololo administration. However, it is difficult to know how much Lewanika would have remembered of the way the Luyi ordered their political economy, having been born around 1842 in the middle of the Makololo administration. He would have received stories from his father and uncles and advice from the likes of Induna Nalubutu, a loyal and highly respected elder who Coillard came to regard as a leading component of the aforementioned ‘pagan conservative party’. Yet the formative years of even these venerable gentlemen would have been spent under Sotho rule so it is more likely that Lewanika was seeking a newer hybridised version of Lozi political community which included aspects of Makololo administration such as the Makolo, a military structure to which all Lozis now belonged, the divisions of which did not correspond to residence in particular chiefdoms. This and other aspects of Lozi rule in the Second Kingdom, were more reminiscent of Sotho political organisation.

It was only after the defeat of the northern based rebels and a considerable amount of bloodletting to remove some of the elements that represented potential competition for power (a process that was to go on for some years), that Lewanika felt able to receive the missionary François Coillard, who initially had ‘backed the wrong horse’ by appealing to Akufuna for permission to ensconce himself and his followers in the Kingdom. Once again, it was Westbeech who oiled the wheels of Coillard’s insertion

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62 The position of Nalubutu continues today to be awarded only to a senior Lozi Induna of high regard and intellect. All positions of this nature continue to be reserved for those who are considered ‘true Lozi’. Even the two Mbunda chiefs Ciengele and Kandala, in spite of their residence and that of their forefathers in Bulolo since the time of Mulambwa in the late eighteenth century, are not eligible for senior office in the BRE although they do sit in the Saa-Sikalo Kuta or council and represent their people there. The last Nalubutu was also the Inete, the Chief responsible for Mongu district.
into Barotseland and Westbeech who soothed Lewanika’s tetchiness at Coillard’s approach to Akufuna which Westbeech had advised the impatient Frenchman against.

A full catalogue of Coillard’s life and his relationship with Lewanika will not be entered into here but is available in detail from Coillard himself, Favre, Jalla, Mackintosh and, on a more critical basis, more recently from Prins. A unique relationship of mutual dependency developed, whereby each leaned on the other for support and survival. Meanwhile both were to look to an outside power to provide security for their own interdependent futures. Coillard spends much of his memoirs denigrating the morals of the Lozi peoples and, whilst fretting and complaining about the ‘weakness’ of Lewanika in matters of conversion and consistency in decision-making, is clearly also highly dependent on the King and the Lozi elite as a heathen constituency to provide him with support from Europe for his missionary endeavours. Barotseland perhaps also represented Coillard’s personal nemesis. It was to be the defining life experience of a man denied of children who consigned his marriage, career and ambitions as well as the lives of most of his followers to the vagaries of missionary life in a region physically tough to live in and not noted for its enthusiastic reception of white strangers. Indeed, as Johnson discovered on his visit to Barotseland in 1891, Lewanika was highly suspicious and ‘however kindly the white traveller may be received and treated...by Lewanika, he is soon made to realise that his position as a guest is virtually that of a prisoner, for he cannot leave the country, nor dare a porter lift one of his loads, except by the King’s permission.’ Failure in Barotseland, after committing so much in the way of personal and donated resources would have meant the failure of a life project. But Coillard was as determined as Lewanika to hang on to his life’s dreams and ambitions.

Coillard was born the youngest of seven children in rural central France in 1834. His father died when he was two leaving behind heavy debts which caused the mother

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to sell off all property belonging to the family and go into domestic service.\textsuperscript{65} The Coillards were poor and the young François probably found religion to be an escape from austerity as much as a possible career move. He proved to be an ardent student, possibly, like Livingstone also to relieve the tedium and drudgery of his life. Significantly, once he had realised that not only was missionary work his calling but that it was also achievable, he became a driven man and recorded in 1854 at the age of twenty that his true longing was to go to a country where ‘...no missionary has ever been and where none wished to go.’\textsuperscript{66} Perhaps this helps to partly explain his later decision to try Barotseland and his determination to succeed there once he had a toehold. Much of the rest of the explanation lies in the twenty years plus that Coillard and his Scottish wife, Christina, an equally gritty and determined missionary, six years his elder, spent in Basutoland re-establishing the PEMS there and defending the station against the Boers in particular. Together with a small band of Basuto catechists, François and Christine Coillard resolved to offer the fruits of salvation in virgin lands that the bible had not yet accessed.

The essence of the relationship between Coillard and Lewanika is surely the nature of British colonialism that was to follow. Lewanika is clearly remembered by Lozis today as one of the greatest if not the greatest Lozi monarch of all time, perceived as responsible for re-instating much of the Lozi nation and Lozi tradition. In terms of contemporary Lozi identity, it is the Kingship that people identify with most and in terms of all occupants to date of this mystical role, it is Lewanika that Lozis would most choose to identify with. And while it is Lewanika that Lozis identify with, there exists in the memory of that noble King, a place for the diminutive Coillard, seen as a bringer of Christianity that is now so revered as a belief system in Barotseland and as an aide to Lewanika in his aim to defend the Lozi nation against external threats at the end of the nineteenth century.

Despite Coillard’s attempt to portray Lewanika as a weak leader always giving in to the ‘conservative heathen party’ within the Lozi elite, what emerges is a wise, practical and pragmatic Litunga, displaying control and leadership. From fairly early in

\textsuperscript{65} Mackintosh, op. cit., pp. 7-14.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid. p. 25
his reign, Lewanika sought to identify with modern ways, chosing to wear western clothes and reportedly always using European cutlery, something he could only have picked up from Livingstone, Porto and Westbeech. This contrasts with the elephant’s hair fly switch which each Litunga, Litunga la Mboela and Mboanjikana and four Resident Princes must carry with them at all times. The photograph in Figure 1 on page 129 also provides an indication of the camaraderie that clearly existed between Coillard and Lewanika. These were not adversaries nor were they simply teacher and pupil as Coillard would have his readers believe. Lewanika and Coillard respected each other for the very different values they represented. Both were intelligent articulate men and knew full well how they were using each other to achieve their own ends. In a way they were colleagues in the business of survival of their respective empires.

Prins claims that Lewanika had already been persuaded by Khama to accept Coillard as a suitable intermediary to use in obtaining the goodwill and ‘protection’ of the British, as well as deflecting the unwanted attention of the Boers, who Lewanika was learning from his southern colleagues, had designs only to deprive the African chief and his people of their land. In this last attribute Coillard would likely have been an enthusiast as he too, like Livingstone before him, had cause to castigate the Boers for they had ravaged the PEMS mission stations in Basutoland in the years leading up to Collard’s final move to Barotseland.

As previously mentioned, Westbeech was considered as a chief and Prins carefully portrays Coillard and his wife as chiefs, sub-chiefs of King Lewanika it is true, but chiefs all the same, and as chiefs they were therefore expected to be as magnanimous with their ‘tribute’ as all other chiefs. In this context the frustration of the mission party that local people only seemed to want gifts which they would eventually take if they were not made available is made comprehensible. Coillard was viewed by most, however, as a magician, a doctor, and most importantly, a descendent of Livingstone, the master magician who had become a Lozi legend in his own right. And, while claiming to be embarrassed and irritated by the constant references and

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67 Prins, op. cit., p.201.
68 Mackintosh, pp. 147-155.
69 Ibid. p. 198.
comparisons to Livingstone; Waddell, Coillard’s carpenter and general handyman recorded that Coillard was enthusiastic about the use of the ‘magic lantern’ and fireworks (sometimes referred to as the ‘Guns of God’ in local folklore) which would surely have enhanced his image as a purveyor of magic more than a saver of souls. In this he had surely learned from his copy of Livingstone’s Missionary Travels which he kept with him at all times.

Coillard acted as an intermediary then, between Lewanika and his elite at Lealui and emissaries sent out, not as Lewanika thought, by the ‘great white queen’ but by Cecil Rhodes’ British South Africa Company (BSAC), which had grand imperial and commercial designs for all land north of the Limpopo. In fact the first treaty, in 1889, between the Lozi Kingdom and the British had been with a trader, a certain Harry Ware, for mineral interests in Barotseland but this was sold to the BSAC and, in 1890, Rhodes sent out Elliot Lochner, who Coillard found to be abrasive and racist, to negotiate what became known as the ‘Lochner Concession’ with Lewanika. Contrary to the assumption of Johnson at the time, Coillard clearly must have known that the concept of negotiating with the crown was a hoax as he looked after Lochner during his stay at Lealui, but such was Coillard’s need for what he perceived as order and discipline among the Lozi so that he could better go about the business of obtaining Christian converts, that he felt able to justify this deception. This he was later to regret when the Lozi elite turned on him when one of his own people, Middleton, defected and became a trader himself, hoping to replace the now deceased Westbeech in the affections of the Lozi in the early 1890s.

It took a long time for the BSAC to send an envoy to Barotseland, being initially preoccupied with the military subjugation of Lobengula and the Matabele and it was only in 1897 that the first Resident, Robert Coryndon, a 27 year-old Major, arrived in Barotseland. Yet, it is argued here, the treaty reached in 1890, brokered by Khama and Coillard really marks the start of the Second Lozi Kingdom because it was really only from this time, apart from raids on the Mashkulumbwe that Lewanika could feel secure enough to engage in the renewed pacification of groups previously subordinate to the Luyi or Makololo and even to extend the borders of his influence. The years between the

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70 Waddell from his ‘Diary’ quoted by Prins, op. cit., pp. 197-198.
71 James Johnson, Realty versus Romance…, p. 136
overthrow of Sotho rule in 1864 and the late 1880s represent a period of transition and considerable uncertainty. Although Sipopa had ruled for some twelve years, the schism between north and south had resurfaced and this eventually sent him south to Sesheke. The experience of the Subia-sympathising Mwanawina and the early years of Lewanika’s reign together with his overthrow and re-installation simply emphasised the same schism that had emerged on the death of Mulambwa and that acted as a hiatus in political, economic and social development between the first and second kingdoms. The acceptance and input of the white trader Westbeech and Anglophile missionaries such as Arnot and Coillard really only served as mediation between the so-called ‘restoration’ and the outside world.

Despite all of this, Coillard is remembered for having ‘helped’ Lewanika and for having opened schools, the first at Sefula, where royal children such as Litia and other sons of the elite were taught, and also for bringing Christianity to Barotseland, even though the number of converts to the faith in Coillard’s own time, were minuscule. Meanwhile, for the PEMS, Coillard’s missionary society, having first set up stations in Kazungula, Sesheke, and Nalolo as well as the main stations at Sefula and Lealui, the fruits of their Christian endeavour were slow to come. Whilst universally respected by the British colonial authorities for advising the Lozi leadership in the interests of British colonialism and participating in civilising and Christianising the region, the same respect was not to endure beyond formal colonialism.

After independence, the church of the Paris Missionaries was absorbed by Kaunda into the United Church of Zambia (UCZ) after independence in 1964, a move which later led some Lozi followers to break off and form their own schismatic Church of Barotseland which combines some traditional beliefs with Protestantism and is active to the present day. Another relevant aspect of the missionary phase is that although the European missionaries were of a very mixed bag, including French, Italian and Dutch, they were also English-speaking and are remembered as part of the ‘English heritage’ of the kingdom, being associated with the British. Finally, Lozis remember Coillard and the acceptance of the PEMS as something to be shown off. Coillard and Co. were Lewanika’s missionaries, an asset to display to visiting dignitaries from other polities in the region:
They were our missionaries. Our Litunga did not allow white people into the country unless he thought they would serve the Lozi people well. Coillard was good for our needs and helped a lot with the British who we wanted. He also brought the Christianity of Nyaka (Livingstone) and that we also wanted. Therefore we love him now as one of our own. The grave of the Muruti and his lady are still at Sefula in the place that Lewanika gave to them to stay.

Many of our children learned to read and write with the missionaries. That (in the missionary schools) is where many of us learned to speak English and where we learned to love God. I myself learned to do many things the English way with the missionaries and that is one of the reasons I am here today as a Chief of my people. We are English from history. Our great Litunga Lewanika gave us this and Coillard was a gift from God, sent to help us.\textsuperscript{72}

All of these missionaries and traders, then, came from the south and accessed the Lozi kingdom via the same route, through Bechuanaland to Kazungula, then across the Zambezi and along to Sesheke from where they could apply for royal permission to continue onwards to Bulozi, such permission only rarely being granted. Yet the strategic importance of the south and Caprivi in the Lozi royal consciousness is central to the way that the Barotse Royal Establishment interpreted the loss of Caprivi, especially after the end of the First World War when Britain announced that it would not be re-incorporating Caprivi into Barotseland as Lewanika and Litia had expected. Caprivi, and Sesheke districts had been of enormous importance and significance to the Lozis. This was a border zone on the main transport artery of the region, controlling the route taken by enemies such as the Makololo and Matabele, traders such as Westbeech, missionaries such as Arnot, the Jesuits and Coillard and other Europeans to access the Kingdom, using the Zambezi to reach Bulozi, a situation that was to remain long into the twentieth century. From earliest times, Lozi kings had placed sentinels at Sesheke and in Caprivi itself not only to keep an eye on the political situation amongst subordinated groups and to ensure the payment of tribute and labour but also to guard the southern portals of

\textsuperscript{72} Interview 21-08-2001 with a senior Mbunda Induna, aged 85, in Mabumbu district (name withheld on request).
the Kingdom. In addition to this, Caprivi represented an economic component of the Lozi Empire providing tribute, labour and, in the time of Sipopa and Lewanika, was a substantial hunting ground from which ivory and skins were sourced. The Caprivi side of the Zambezi also had more fertile soils than the Sesheke side and so became a garden for food production, something that was to be realised at cost to the people of Sesheke in the twentieth century as colonialism reinforced an imaginary border along the thalweg of the Zambezi River.

A narrative of the Lozi encounter with the British Empire will not be attempted here and is, in any case, available elsewhere. However, Lewanika’s early encounters with the emissaries of British colonialism were very unsatisfactory to him. As pointed out earlier, having signed up to what he thought was the protection of the ‘Great White Queen’, Victoria, via various treaties and concessions in 1889, 1890 and 1898, Lewanika found himself and his kingdom actually in the clutches of a commercial company, which had considerably less interest in the welfare or good governance of the Lozis than it did in its own profit. An early lack of interest in Barotseland was articulated by the invisibility of any British official in the territory and the loss of Caprivi to Germany in 1890, something that was never properly understood by Lewanika or his son Litia, appointed to rule the south of the Kingdom including Caprivi from Sesheke, and the impression a year later that Britain was prepared to deliver Lewanika’s kingdom west of the Zambezi to Portugal. Lewanika’s worst fears started to be realised in 1891 when he was informed of the deception of Lochner who claimed that the BSAC was acting on behalf of the British Government and when the Matabele started raiding the Toka country in 1893. This unpromising start was, however, ameliorated by the defeat of the Matabele and death of Lobengula in 1896, the arrival in September 1897 of the 27 year-old first British Resident in Barotseland, Robert T. Coryndon, and in 1902 by a journey to England to witness the coronation of King Edward VII. This visit provided visible


75 As articulated in Coryndon to Milner, 16th January 1902, HC1/2/4, NAZ.
confirmation of the way in which Lewanika had perceived Britain and its industriousness.\textsuperscript{76}

\textit{Summary}

When Lozis today talk of the period following the end of Makololo rule (or at least that of the Sotho Makololo), they normally imply an era of power, continuity and stability, particularly during the reign of Lubosi-Lewanika. Indeed this era is the heartland of the historical construction of Loziness today. According to this theory, after the ‘overthrow’ of the Makololo, the Second Lozi Kingdom quickly re-established domination of the entire sub-region where the Lozi royal establishment exerted a stable and powerful yet beneficent influence over other groups. In fact, the half century to 1900 was a period of incredible social and political change for the people of the Upper Zambezi Valley and the pace of change quickened as the nineteenth century wore on. This period of change, from the death of Sekeletu until the first treaties with the British at least, was a time of chaos and instability. The ability of Barotseland and its people to utilise the productive capability of the region and its people and obtain tribute from others was severely constrained by internal political uncertainties. These uncertainties involved the problems inherited from the pre-Makololo period of competition between the north (Namuso) and the south (Lwambi). It was a problem that had been ‘put on hold’ while under the Sotho yoke.

Lozi historians describe this period as one in which Lozi independence became entrenched and the white European invasion of Africa engaged and taken advantage of by wise leadership. Yet it seems rather the case that, certainly until 1890, after which Lewanika chose to use British colonialism to stabilise the situation, life in Bulozi was characterised by political and civil strife and fear for personal safety, factors which severely constrained socio-economic development. Group identity and notions of

\textsuperscript{76} This visit and some of Lewanika’s reactions are described with genuine affection by Colin Harding, the British Officer appointed as his personal aide for the visit in C. Harding, \textit{In Remotest Barotseland: Being an Account of a Journey of over 8,000 Miles through the Widest and Remotest Parts of Lewanika’s Empire} (Hurst and Blackett, London, 1905), pp. 384-394.
citizenship were weak during this period. Notions of Loziness were certainly present but confused and infused by influences from the Makololo and the Mbunda. Even from as far south as Sesheke, Holub constantly referred to the ‘Marutse-Mambunda Kingdom (or Empire) ...ruled by Marutse Kings who acquired most of their land by occupation of Makololo territory’ and ‘...consisting of two separate kingdoms of which the first was ruled by Sepopo and the second by his queen sister.’ Of course, Holub was not privy to much of the pre-Makololo history or indeed to the workings of the kingdom in the north, to which he never travelled, but Holub’s observations do demonstrate the politically schismatic nature of Barotseland and the almost paranoid vulnerability felt by Sipopa in the post-Makololo era.

When Lewanika returned to power it is no small surprise that his immediate priorities were to secure his position in the Kingship by eliminating all opponents and potential sources of opposition and then looking round for assistance to prevent a recurrence of the political uncertainties that had brought about his removal from power in 1884-5. Lozi historians today, when asked why they feel so warm towards the British and the advice and assistance of Khama, Arnot and Coillard in securing British ‘protection’ point to the insecurity prevailing during Lewanika’s early reign:

*The British stopped the wars we were always having. Before they came we were always killing our leaders and there was never peace in Bulozi for long. The British brought peace and Bulozi became great again.*

Significantly, the same logic is employed by many older sages in Bulozi when rejecting ideas of a struggle for independence saying that in the event of an independent Barotseland:

*The same powerful people will want to fight one another for power again, nominating their own royal princes and expecting us to take sides. It would lead to our destruction.*

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77 Holub, *A Cultural Survey...*, p. 1
During this period, certain British and anglophile Europeans were indeed admired and taken in where it was thought they would be of advantage to the kingdom, or at least to the security of specific Kings and the Lozi elite in one way or another. Because these anglophiles also became Loziphiles, their influence and the way they are remembered is that much more poignant. Furthermore, the Lozi encounter with European capitalist expansion was pragmatic because it preserved much of the character and centrality of the Lozi state, although the powers and influence of this political entity were to be much curtailed in the twentieth century. Indeed the nature of the Lozi encounter with British colonialism was to be the cause of considerable decline and underdevelopment in the region. The period from the arrival of Livingstone and death of Sibituane in 1851 until the arrival of the first British Resident was hardly one of stability and consistent prosperity where Lozi rule was perceived as munificent and all-powerful. The productivity of Bulozi which had stood the Luyi in such good stead in the period prior to invasion by Sibitwane, the surplus from which could be used to enhance the power and wealth of the kingdom, was severely dented by the Makololo interregnum. This was because firstly, the Sotho influence took a long time to appreciate the value of agriculture and concomitantly the value of the labour required to work it, and secondly, the period following Sotho rule was marked by political turmoil and fear among the populace as interest groups vied for superiority.

During this period, which extended from 1864 through to around 1890, by when Lewanika had dealt with most contending sources of resistance to his rule and had embarked on the road which would serve to entrench his occupancy of the Kingship, the Lozi sense of self underwent considerable change. The cultures and traditions of the original Luyi who had themselves absorbed so many peoples in the era of grand expansion leading up to the rule of Mulambwa had not had time to absorb the very different blend of customs and beliefs when the Makololo invasion took place and this process was left on hold only to re-emerge as a component of the age-old north-south divide as the Sotho component of Makololo rule was overthrown in 1864. This era of flux was influenced by pressure from the European world economy advancing from the west and, more determinedly from the south. Ironically, although it was not clear at the time, by buying into this new irrepressible force as a resistance to domination and internal
unrest, Barotseland’s leaders were sowing the seeds of their country’s unequal impoverishment in the twentieth century although this was also due to the coincidental lack of developmental resources and infrastructure delivered by Europeans which in itself is another explanation as to why indirect rule through Lozi kings was supported by the British during the colonial period.

The arrival, then, of what is perceived by Lozis today as British help in stabilising the Lozi state is seen in very particular ways that help to explain the way that Lozis define their identity today. To understand this, two factors are of primary consideration. First, Lozi kings never wanted Europeans on Barotse soil and sought to preserve this condition in every treaty with the British, however injurious other conditions turned out to be. The second thing to remember is that Britain was requested to provide ‘protection’ from other external forces for Barotseland. In other words, the seeking of protection was a voluntary act carried out without a hint of duress. This nuance is vitally important as Lozis use it to compare themselves positively with other groups who were conquered or merely subsumed by Portuguese, Germans and British colonialists and defend themselves from accusations of being the puppets of colonialism. Lozis meanwhile say that their engagement of the British was a sign of their political maturity and a resistance that resulted in the preservation of their tradition in a way that no other group has matched. They accuse other groups of jealousy, and point to the futility of physical resistance to the European advance as pursued by their old enemies, the Matabele, which resulted in the permanent subjugation of those peoples in both colonial and post-colonial times.

The Lozi perception is basically quite justified, but it is also true that Lewanika saw in the British, as the strongest of the intruding forces into central southern Africa, a shrewd way of resisting conquest by others and, at the same time, securing his own position as well as that of his family and closest supporters. It certainly appeared to be a pragmatic choice that combined survival with a subtle form of resistance. Lozi historians speak of the development hoped for from the British and this is also true, particularly after Lewanika’s visit to Britain in 1902. Yet this priority was secondary to that of internal and external security and only really articulated later on when Lewanika had
secured the political status quo. Britain, in the eyes of the Lozi, was to be responsible for Barotseland’s peace and security as well as protecting its right to independence as a protectorate of the crown. It would also provide education and training. In return, Barotseland would supply loyalty and fealty. Lozis, from the King downwards, would commit loyalty to the crown. Regrettably for Barotseland and its people, Britain, in the form first of the British South Africa Company (BSAC) of Cecil Rhodes, second as the British colonial administration of North-Western then Northern Rhodesia and finally as the decolonising British Government of Harold Macmillan in the 1960s, reneged on its most basic commitment, that of protection under the crown, and was responsible for the bulk of the underdevelopment of the territory evident at the turn of the twenty-first century.
5 Lewanika, Barotseland and Britain: the ambiguous relationship between ‘Loziness’ and ‘Britishness’

How could our good friends, the British, do this to us? The treaties that Lewanika signed with your Queen, they are still binding. The colonial officers were men of honour. We may not have liked all their decisions but they respected our Barotse Royal Establishment, not like Kaunda who cheated us and not like these Bembas who think they rule us today. You British saw in us what we see in you, we have the same sort of parliament, House of Commons, House of Lords, we have that too. Your Lord Chancellor, he is the same as our Natamoyo. This is why we got on so well. We are like one another. The British came to us as friends, invited by our wise Litunga Lewanika. They came like Livingstone came, like Coillard came, they stopped our wars and delivered us into the hands of God. Even now, our friends should still come back and put the situation right, relieve us from our suffering and oppression. We invite them as our honoured guests. We forgive them. We are still waiting.¹

The British who came here were arrogant and racist. They treated us as if we were inferior beings. The white officers were carried in hammocks across Bulozi. Even princes like myself were expected to salute and we were treated little better than slaves. Those young colonial officers had little respect for Lozi chiefs and elders. The white traders were not much better except for those who took Lozi wives. Some of us were not displeased to see the white officers go. Yet it is true that Britain should not have left us the way they did. They were supposed to be our friends and certain ones, those who learned how to respect our customs, became so. Our great Litunga Lewanika told us to respect the whites. And even though we did not get the respect we should have from the colonial officers there were other better English who we wanted here but rarely got.²

¹ Senior member of the Barotse Royal Establishment in interview 29-07-2001, Limulunga, asked to remain anonymous.
² Interview with Prince Wamungungo, nephew of Litunga la Mboela Mulima, Muoyo, 12-10-2002.
These two contrasting statements, made by senior members of the Barotse Royal Establishment, both in their seventies, indicate a number of things. Clearly there is the ongoing dissatisfaction at being ruled by non-Lozis based in a distant location who are perceived to have marginalized Barotseland. Then, there is the reverence afforded to Lewanika, often held up as the greatest of Barotseland’s Litungas. The name Lewanika is equivalent to a brand name to day in modern Lozi culture. Lewanika equals virtue, strength, wisdom, cleverness, pragmatism and all things positive. To insult the name of Lewanika would be to insult the core of the Lozi nation. Lewanika is a cult and God-like figure in Lozi history, universally revered as the founding father of the present nation.

Also apparent from the above statements is the link between Lewanika and Britain and the reference to the British as friends. Here we see, on the surface at least, an apparently unalterable mindset, certainly among most of the older generation of Lozis, and particularly among members of the elite and ruling class. This writer made a considerable effort to identify and illustrate the neglect and underdevelopment of Barotseland carried out by Great Britain both in company and colonial office days together with the appalling and racist way that Africans were so often treated. Even the most die-hard Lozi fan of the pre-independence era knows full well that many British colonial officers treated Africans at arm’s length at best and with disdain at worst. There is also acceptance, sometimes grudging, that the British did nothing for the modernisation and development of Barotseland.

Some might suggest that respondents do not wish to offend the British interviewer by regaling him with negative images of his forebears. Yet those who do have stories of poor treatment also seem ready and willing to speak openly in a manner they would have been reluctant to in colonial days as the second example above shows. Hence, in laying the groundwork for this study, the writer realised that there had to be other explanations for the ‘warm glow’ of Britishness in the way that many older Indunas and Chiefs spoke. When it is pointed out that, quite apart from the xenophobic way that so many colonial officers behaved, Britain had truncated the kingdom twice in Lewanika’s time without seeking his permission and abdicated all responsibility for Barotseland in the Barotseland Agreement of 1964, bequeathing the protectorate to a President seemingly determined to teach the Lozis a lesson in subordination, there is a wry grin of acceptance. This is usually immediately followed by appeals for the British
researcher to go home to the UK and report this injustice in the vague hope that some redress can be effected. Notwithstanding this, the continuing attachment to a sense of Britishness still requires some explanation. By rights, all Lozis should surely feel loathing for the old colonial power that is so much responsible for the position that Barotseland and the Lozi peoples find themselves in today.

This chapter then, examines the Lewanika cult and the legacy of his rule. It also discusses the changing nature of British colonial rule in Barotseland and the changing relationship with Barotseland, its Kings, elites and people, particularly during the ‘end-game’. Finally, it attempts to understand the way that these components of relatively recent history have infused Lozi identity and, most particularly, notions of citizenship and subjectivity in the contemporary era.

The Lewanika cult - myths, realities and legacy

The extent to which Lewanika was and is a heroic icon in Lozi historiography and has impacted contemporary Lozi identity can perhaps be judged by the frequency that the name crops up in the names of his descendants, on buildings, streets and other public places. The explanations for this can be found in the uniqueness of his reign which crossed three important temporal zones in Lozi history, the aftermath of the Makololo interregnum, the transition period leading up to the Second Lozi Kingdom and the arrival of British colonialism. In terms of iconography, Lewanika is to Lozis what Mandela will become to future South Africans, a cult figure seen as the father of national renewal, seen as almost incapable of error.

As mentioned earlier, in 1884, six years after being hoisted onto the Royal Maoma drums, Lewanika or Lubosi as he was then known, was overthrown by ambitious warrior-indunas (led by Numwa and Mataa), escaping with his son, Litia, to Nyengo on the Mashi (Cuando) River, his birthplace in the southwest of the Kingdom. Yet, in a set of events without precedent, he was to regain the Litungaship in the latter part of the following year after some of the bloodiest battles in Lozi history. After this,

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3 This being one of the vital ceremonies to be undergone by any new Litunga.
the ferocity with which the young king put down his adversaries and their families became a legend in its own right, amplified by the accounts of European travellers whose memoirs tended to revel in the bloody deeds of African potentates.\textsuperscript{4} Lewanika also stood out as a survivor in a land where leadership usually resulted in early death, reigning for 32 years (not counting the 18 months or so he spent out of power in 1884-5). After the settling of old scores and the arrival of the British ‘protection’, Lewanika went on to become known among his people for his fairness and justice, not a soft option, but a fair one. Lewanika, it is held, engaged alien external forces (the Europeans) and tamed them to serve the nation’s purposes by protecting it from the Matabele, Portuguese and Mambari slavers.

Then, on another front, Lewanika managed to obtain the respect, albeit sometimes grudging, of virtually every European who came into contact with Barotseland in the latter part of the nineteenth century, becoming known among Europeans for his astuteness, serenity and politeness as well as his dignified regal bearing. European and Lozi alike found the King an attractive individual both from a metaphysical and objective viewpoint, a native it was possible to admit admiration for without fear of losing credibility or being accused of having ‘gone native’. For the British in particular, who did not find the Barotse homeland conducive to their health (Selous said ‘The Barotse Valley itself is a most miserable place to live in... very unhealthy, and is in fact a hotbed of malarial fever\textsuperscript{5}’), the aura of power and aloofness displayed in front of his Lozi subjects made Lewanika credible as a King to the British. Many developed close personal ties with this Litunga, something that did not happen either before or since. Lewanika, in turn gave and demanded of his subjects respect towards the British and other whites, with notable exceptions.\textsuperscript{6}

There are several examples of this relationship of mutual respect. His relationships with George Westbeech and Frederick Arnot have already been alluded to

\textsuperscript{4} For example, Coillard recalls the execution on Lewanika’s orders of a whole family of one of the chiefs who overthrew him in 1884, Coillard, \textit{On the Threshold}…p. 285.


\textsuperscript{6} These being Boers (Afrikaners) to whom Lewanika shared a dislike along with Livingstone and Coillard, and the Portuguese, due both to their propensity for slaving among tributary peoples and for their participation and/or support for raids and building of forts on land that the Lozi considered to be under their influence.
in the previous chapter. Much had to do with the demeanour and stature of the King. Lewanika’s interest in bettering his people was an additional factor. An example was Lewanika’s decision to extend his own abstinence of beer-drinking to the rest of the Lozi nation in 1911, something that colonial administrators as remote as the High Commissioner in Cape Town thought too extreme and likely to create a crime wave ‘which it would be impossible to suppress’. An additional factor was his apparent affection for the ‘English’, a term applied to all English-speaking whites, regardless of origin (with the exception of those he referred to as ‘Dutch’ (Boers).

Soane-Campbell claimed to be ‘privileged in knowing Lewanika very well’:

Lewanika had a number of outstanding characteristics:

- He appreciated Europeans and enjoyed talking with them and entertaining them
- He was an acute and wise man
- He had a remarkable sense of humour
- He had a sense of gratitude
- He looked a chief... his dignity and carriage impressed the observer.

When he died, I felt I had lost a friend, one whom I respected and admired.8

Knowles-Jordan remarked in 1908 that Lewanika was

’a finely-built native with a very intelligent face and most polite in all his ways...
Lewanika was the only native chief I ever met to whom the title ‘King’ appeared not inappropriate. He was an exceptionally intelligent, far-seeing man, and of a very dignified appearance.9

Selous said, ‘Lewanika made me a present of an ox and later on, a large tusk of ivory. He always dressed in European clothes, and seemed desirous of acquiring civilized

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7 Gladstone (High Comm) to Administrator, Northern Rhodesia, 05-01-1912 – File HC 1/3/1, NAZ, p. 74,
8 J. Soane-Cambell, ‘I knew Lewanika’ Northern Rhodesia Journal, 1 (1950), p. 21,
habits.\textsuperscript{10} Colonel Colin Harding, who accompanied Lewanika as consort to England in 1902, remarked in his memoirs:

\begin{quote}
I had constantly been with Lewanika for nine months, living practically under the same roof. You either grow very much attached to a man in that time or loathe the sight of him. I am bound to admit that with me it was the former\textsuperscript{11}

The King is a polished host, most polite and attentive, performing little acts of thoughtful courtesy with his own hand; free from ostentation, perfectly at ease and only anxious for the immediate wants of his guests.\textsuperscript{12}

He is now emphatically a statesman, and a far seeing one, and has at heart the welfare of his country and people to an extent surprising...\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

Captain A. St. Hill Gibbons who was sent to map Lewanika’s territory reveals the awe in which Lewanika was appraised by many Europeans:

\begin{quote}
...to govern such a country as this, native susceptibilities should be taken into account, it must not be forgotten that Africans look on their king with a respect and awe almost amounting to worship... he has real rights which cannot be ignored, his friendship means co-operation – his hostility obstruction at least. Liwanika (old spelling) is very favourably disposed towards Englishmen, and his reverence for the Great White Queen is the respect of a native potentate for a ruler whom he looks upon as the greatest and most powerful sovereign in the world.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

Stevenson-Hamilton remarked in 1899 that ‘Lewanika did me very well and was exceedingly friendly... The King was most attentive, passing one things and helping one

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{10} Selous, Travel and Adventure… op. cit., p. 252,
\textsuperscript{11} C. Harding, In Remotest Barotseland…, p. 393
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 29
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 31
\end{flushleft}
to everything in a manner which would put to shame many a white man.’ Johnson found Lewanika to be ‘...a real African King, compared with whom the many I had seen were but insignificant.

Lewanika was applauded for his longing ‘...for light and knowledge’, for being ‘by no means an idler’, and was even forgiven by the British officers who had dealings with him for any cruelty he may have inflicted on his competitors and their families after his restoration in 1885:

He was a tyrant, but circumstances compelled him to be one, and his cruelties were only those his early surroundings forced him to commit.

...as indeed might be expected – he vented his wrath on the sympathisers with the movement which had driven him into exile... I have known him for the past eight years, and the harshness of his earlier years are but hearsay to me; but of this I am convinced, that his cultured manner and exceptional character are natural and not imported.

Thus it can be seen that Lewanika was greatly admired by most of the British with whom he came into contact. This respect is also recounted today:

You see, the British, when they came to our country, learned very quickly to respect Lewanika because of his greatness and his power, the British saw that this was a true king and respected him as he respected the Great White Queen and later, their king. You see how alike we are.

16 J. Johnson, Reality versus Romance..., p. 137.
17 Ibid.
19 Excerpt from speech by Induna Imasiku Kamona, during History Workshop held in Cashandi of Litunga la Mboela Makwibi, Muoyo, July 2001.
Yet another vital relationship with Lewanika is worthy of mention here and that was the one he enjoyed with M Francois Coillard of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (PEMS). This relationship has previously been explored in the last chapter. While Coillard was not British, as mentioned earlier, he was married to a Scotswoman and was something of an anglophile notwithstanding the fact that much of his funding came from Britain. The relationship between Lewanika and Coillard was ambiguous and often conflictual but it should be remembered that Coillard arrived and was accepted by Lewanika immediately after the latter returned to the Litungaship in 1885 and remained there almost continuously until the turn of the century. In that time the two of them came to know one another, including their respective whims and weaknesses, very well indeed. From Coillard’s memoirs, despite his often pejorative accounts of the King, it is clear that the two utilised each other for their own ends. Arguably, Lewanika got the best deal, having used the Frenchman as an educator, mediator and translator with a variety of external parties, including the British, and as an advisor on external affairs.

From Coillard’s own accounts, it is clear that the relationship between the two fluctuated between animosity, co-operation and friendship as each used the other to exercise his own agenda and interests. Coillard’s interest was in building up a following of converted African souls that would impress his society in Paris and satisfy his own egotistical view of his life’s mission. For this mission to succeed, which it did not, it was clearly expedient to portray the King and his subjects in as primitive, backward and morally bankrupt manner in order to generate funds. Lewanika was portrayed by Coillard as pathetic and weak against the power exerted by the ‘conservative pagan party, but this seems unlikely to have reflected the truth of the reality of the relationship.

Coillard saw his relationship with and conversion of Lewanika as a vital if unrealised ambition and he was to remain mostly disappointed with the low level of conversion amongst ‘the heathen’. Lewanika’s interest was to obtain maximum benefit from the knowledge, skills and magic of Coillard and his little band of followers both for his own interests, for the Barotse elite on whose clientage he largely depended, as have

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20 Including the detailed narrative in F.C. Coillard, On the Threshold….
all Litungas right up to the present day. To Lewanika, Coillard was useful because he spoke Sesotho on which Sikololo was based and he was able to translate from and into European languages such as English. He had literary skills which were of considerable value in an illiterate community and he possessed valuable knowledge of what was happening in the outside world, particularly amongst Europeans. Prins demonstrates how Lewanika wrung knowledge out of Coillard and other European visitors in a way that made his visitors think the Litunga was weak and not concentrating when in fact he was eliciting information and comparing it with what he had heard elsewhere.21

In the photograph in Figure 1, which was probably taken around 1890, we see a very relaxed looking Lewanika with a jovial Coillard during a visit made by the Litunga to Sefula where Coillard was based in the early years of his stay in Barotseland. To see Lewanika sitting next to Coillard in this contented way shows how close the relationship between the two actually was. That Coillard acted for Lewanika in negotiating with the British and not any other European power indicates how Coillard himself perceived that an alliance between Barotseland and Britain would be best for the interests of the PEMS mission in Barotseland. In his own records, Coillard reckoned that the coming of British colonialism would assist in the task of concentrating Lozi minds on conversion by taming their ‘wild and wicked ways’.22 In this endeavour he was sadly mistaken and he later found his interventions had seriously compromised his position as missionary in Barotseland after Lewanika discovered that he had made treaties only with the British South Africa Company and not the Queen of England as he had been led to believe but which Coillard understood perfectly well.23

21 Prins, op. cit. p. 235.
22 Coillard, op. cit., p. 389.
In fact, Coillard and the PEMS’s presence in Barotseland was very much premised on the goodwill of Lewanika, without which the former parties would undoubtedly have been ejected due to the suspicions of much of the elite class, suspicions fuelled by rumours circulating about Coillard and his intentions. These rumours surrounded the rejection of Coillard by Lobengula while the former had prejudiced his early relationship in Lealui by having first treated with the usurper Tatila Akufuna much against the advice of sage heads such as Westbeech. There were some reactionary Indunas in Barotseland, particularly around Sesheke referred to by Coillard as the ‘Conservative Pagan party’ led by Induna Nalubutu who had been alive during Mulambwa’s time before the Makololo came. It was a vulnerability that Coillard was clearly aware of but loathe to admit to.

Yet Coillard’s stoicism and fanatical commitment to his faith which he often uses in his text to conceal his own impatience and driven nature in the teeth of disease and impoverishment also impressed local people who were reminded of Livingstone, not least by Coillard’s use of some of Livingstone’s magic, particularly medicine and the ‘magic lantern’. Coillard is credited, perhaps overly so, with having assisted the British

25 Referred to as Narubutu in Coillard, On the Threshold…, p. 408.
into Barotseland’s history, and as that portion of Lozi history is looked upon by Lozis today with affection, so Coillard’s memory also shares the same glow of affection.

Between 1890, when the Lochner Concession was signed and 1897 when the first British Resident, Robert Coryndon arrived, Lewanika agonised over his relationship with what turned out to be a commercial company and Coillard’s part in persuading him to sign up to British protection which in any case failed to materialise. After Coillard’s death in 1904, Lewanika’s suspicions about Britain’s commitment to the integrity of Barotseland increased. It certainly was not helped when a representative of the Crown, the Duke of Connaught, told settlers on a visit to Livingstone in 1910 that they had come to stay and that future generations would remember them as the first who ‘made Rhodesia into a white man’s country’. Nor were feelings improved in 1914, when the Caprivi Strip, which Britain took from Lewanika in 1890 without even checking to see who the land belonged to, and gave to Germany in a squalid deal involving Zanzibar, Heligoland, and tacit German approval for British ascendancy over the French in Egypt, was not returned on the expulsion of the Germans. Lewanika later tried to cover for the loss of Caprivi by telling the Lozi nobility that the southernmost component of Lozi influence was on loan to the British to help the latter in their dispute with Germany. This theft of Lozi territorial influence was to form a component of every Lozi protest about mistreatment by Britain up to the death of Mwanawina III in 1968.

Nevertheless, with the assistance of British ‘protection’, the Lewanika years saw the restoration of productive activity in Bulozi and the extension of wealth earning opportunities for Lewanika and the Lozi elite. This was achieved through the extension of lands and peoples that had not been under Lozi influence during the pre-colonial period over which the Lozi aristocracy was able to receive tribute and later tax. Milimo argues that, during the period 1900 to the death of Lewanika in 1916, apart from the

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26 Taken from speech given at Livingstone in November 1910 by Duke of Connaught, reported in Annual Report for year ended 31-03-1911 of the Administration of North-West Rhodesia (British South Africa Company, Livingstone), p. 18 – File A5/1/1, NAZ.

27 The Anglo-German Agreement (also referred to as the Heligoland Treaty) signed 1st July 1890, copy viewed in Namibian National Archives File PB/0016; commented on in The Times 1st July 1890, p. 5; 7th July 1890 p. 5; 11th July 1890, p. 6; and 29th July 1890, p. 5. These articles mainly dealt with the controversy over whether too much had been given away to Germany (Rhodes being particularly incensed) until it was pointed out that the Zambezi down which the Germans hoped to sail from Caprivi to link up with German East Africa was strewn with waterfalls and rapids, at which point, correspondence on the subject ceased.
lands lost due to international boundary agreements, Lozi jurisdiction and economic influence over subject peoples actually increased as did income derived: ‘the Lozi were relatively stronger by 1911 than they were in 1890 when the empire in the south was beginning to crumble’. 28 Milimo seems keen to construct this argument to support criticism of Lewanika’s successor, Yeta and the post-Lewanika elite in their protracted dispute with the BSAC and, after 1924, the British colonial authorities over land and income and gives an over-generous view of real gains by Barotseland. 29 In fact, the legacy of the treaties and agreements of the Lewanika years was the ability of the British to oversee a gradual but perceptible diminution of Lozi power and participation of the royal establishment in the civil affairs of the Kingdom. However, it is a commonly held belief in Lozi circles that the Lewanika period was the true golden era of Lozi history.

Barotseland and the British 1916-1964

It is argued here that in the history that is presented to the visitor to Barotseland today, the period between Lewanika’s death in 1916 and the negotiations leading toward the independence of Zambia in the early 1960s are rendered largely invisible in contemporary Lozi historiography as is the true relationship with Britain during this period. This does not, however, mean that the Litungas who reigned during this time are not remembered. Lewanika’s son Litia, who became Yeta III, is particularly remembered, especially by those who do not enthuse over the colonial period, because Yeta had the temerity to stand up to BSAC and colonial overlords and attempted on numerous occasions to have some of the treaties negotiated with his father reversed or amended. This culminated in Yeta’s petition of 31st March 1921, to the British High Commissioner in South Africa, described by Caplan and Ranger, 30 demanding renegotiation of all treaties previously negotiated with the BSAC, on the transfer of power to the Colonial Office. He felt, quite justifiably, that his father had been misled as to the nature of the protection he was buying into and even cheated, particularly over the excision of Caprivi.

29 Ibid. p. 113.
The relationship between Yeta and the British was rarely as harmonious as the latter had enjoyed with his father, part of colonial officialdom’s hostility being on account of the education that Yeta had received in South Africa at the insistence of Lewanika and the influence he was thought to be under from a group of young, similarly educated elite Lozis. Indeed, colonial records show that Yeta was often treated pejoratively and with contempt. But this period and the way that the British intervened in the succession competitions following the death of Lewanika, Yeta III, and his brother Imwiko, is largely overlooked as is the degeneration of Barotseland’s agricultural economy as a result of migrant labour to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia leading to frequent food shortages and degradation of land as canals remained uncleared and land untilled or cultivated with inappropriate crops by inexperienced labour.

Caplan is one of the only writers to have seriously treated this period, characterised by the underdevelopment of Barotseland by Britain from the time of the first treaty negotiated with Lewanika in 1890 (which superseded the mining concession agreed with Harry Ware in 1889), although some articles do touch on specific aspects. Scholars such as Gluckman who had written so enthusiastically in the 1940s of the ability of Bulozi to provide food sufficient for the needs of the local population, realised, by the 1960s, that he had done his research during a cycle of two to three years of ideal floods which served to mask the true state of decline in the productive capacity of Bulozi caused by a serious shortage of labour to work on the gardens and clear the canals that drained so much of the land close to the plain margins. When Gluckman came back in the 1960s to find drought and near famine conditions, he realised that he had been fooled by climatic variation.

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31 Many examples of which can be found in records of correspondence between Yeta and the colonial authorities between 1824 and 1938 in File no. 55/B/24, NAZ.
34 M. Gluckman, ‘Economy of the Central Barotse Plain’, Rhodes-Livingstone Papers, No. 7 (Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, Livingstone, 1941).
What had happened to the productive capacity of Barotseland was, in fact, a catastrophic reduction of available labour brought about by an out-migration of the male population of working age. Labour migration was first introduced by the BSAC and encouraged by the British colonial authorities as the only way of deriving value out of Barotseland in the perceived absence of mineral or other natural wealth. The only places where money could be earned to pay the new taxes imposed by the British were the mines and plantations of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia precisely as intended by the colonialists. Lewanika was utilised by the British as a front to obtain the co-operation of a people who would otherwise have been much less inclined to pay. This was achieved by offering a bribe to the Litunga, who had been the recipient of previous broken promises of payment by the BSAC regarding payments in relation to the Lochner Concession in particular. Lewanika would receive a measly 10% of the tax (which was never paid in full) in exchange for abandoning slavery and later, tribute labour, moves that weakened his position with the Lozi nobility and resulted on more than one occasion in his having to be propped up by the threat of the use of British military force.

However, despite the invisibility previously referred to of the colonial relationship with Barotseland in the early and middle parts of the twentieth century, much from this period can help to explain the legacy of warmth that continues to exist in the Lozi psyche towards the British. Firstly, it is important to identify the origin of the relationship and this lies with the Kingship and the Barotse elite because it was these institutions with the absolute powers they enjoyed that educated the Lozi masses as to how to behave towards the British and how they should feel about the otherwise alien presence of an elite group who both exercised and clearly enjoyed the trappings of power amongst the African people they were sent to dominate. Here, once again, it is important to remember that the European presence in Barotseland was not, as elsewhere in the Rhodesias, of the settler type, except for a few missionaries and traders.

Lozis were told to give respect to Europeans by their Litungas commencing with Lewanika. Perhaps if it had not been for Lewanika the relationship in later times would have been different, but Lewanika’s instructions to his people to show respect and salute colonial administrators and military officers echoed through the years of his successors,
certainly the first three of the four sons who followed him. District Commissioners (DCs), employed largely as tax collectors, the most unwelcome of visitors to Barotse villages were always accompanied by Indunas representing the royal establishment who acted as enforcers and persuaders of payment compliance, deflecting some of the criticism of the DCs that would have otherwise prevailed. In a way, such was the strength of the cult surrounding Lewanika that the reign of Yeta, Imwiko, and Mwanawina were almost extensions of their father’s reign, with the old man still exercising his influence and authority from his grave site at Namilako, as is the received Lozi tradition for departed Kings to do.

Meanwhile many British officials, both civil and military as well as later academics and their entourages clearly became entranced by the cult of Lozi Kingship and authority. In some cases one might even use the word subsumed. Examples abound of the admiration British officials had for Lozi organisation: Native Commissioner Hudson spoke of the ‘highly organized Lozi’ as opposed to the primitive semi-nomadic Mambukushu of the Mashiri; a colonial official’s wife in 1960 said ‘The Barotses are a talented and industrious tribe’. Schumaker describes the way that ‘Administrators frequently employed African symbols of authority to legitimate colonial rule’, and cites the example of a British District Commissioner who can be seen in a photograph from a colonial era Kuomboka being paddled in his own barge with Lozi-style canopy, stood prominently in colonial style safari suit, pipe thrust firmly into mouth and with the Union Jack flying proudly where the Barotse flag would have appeared. Certainly, one can interpret the use of many of these symbols to signify colonial authority but there is also a sense of enjoyment and of ‘buying in’ to the Lozi aura of power and the sheer magic of the Kuomboka festival celebrating Lozi identity, and in this case the relationship with Britain also (Kuomboka has always been an adaptive and inclusive festival as will be discussed in Chapter 7).

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36 R.S. Hudson, ‘Memories of Abandoned Bomas – No.4: Nalolo’ Northern Rhodesia Journal, 2, 2 (1953), p. 37; Mambukushu otherwise known as Mampukush or Mbukushu, earliest recorded Bantu inhabitants of Caprivi from whom the Subia are thought to have branched off, now confined to Okavango River Valley where it passes through Caprivi and Botswana north of the Okavango. It was the eMbukushu from whom Mwanambinje recovered the Maoma drums central to contemporary Lozi heritage.


39 Ibid. p. 51.
British military officers such as Goold-Adams, Gibbons, and the latter’s aides Quicke and Hamilton clearly enjoyed the status they were awarded by Lewanika. It appealed to their innate sense of superiority over ‘benighted savages’. Lewanika carefully used the privileging of the British to obtain their support and co-operation and the quotes earlier in this chapter are ample proof that he succeeded in this aim. Later on, even academics were not immune to seduction. Max Gluckman, in particular, fell under the spell of Lozi culture and the articulation of Lozi power and wrote copiously of his interpretation and understanding of Lozi society, economy and political organisation. But the boundaries between the academic researcher and the colonial administrator rapidly became blurred as Gluckman required the good offices of both the Lozi Kingship and elite, and the colonial administration to execute his work in Barotseland, which became somewhat irregular after his appointment as Director of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI) in 1941. Two contending interests for Gluckman’s attention were the arrogance of a colonial administration that was not convinced of the need for anthropological investigation into the ‘natives’, and external events, particularly the Second World War.

It is a little known fact that Gluckman collaborated with the colonial administration’s wartime propaganda by writing a piece in Silozi for the colonial journal Mutende in 1943 in which the Second World War and Hitler were likened to events and people in Lozi history. Specifically, Gluckman told Lozis that Hitler and the Nazis could be likened to an Induna called Numwa and his followers who led the revolution against Lewanika in 1884. Specifically Gluckman said;

 Numwa was a wild beast, a man without a human heart, who delighted in killing people, like Hitler. Like Hitler, he wished to live on the work of others whom he would make his slaves... In Barotseland he had the same plan as Hitler has, to

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41 A. Schmidt, ‘The Manchester School’, paper prepared for Dept of Anthropology University of Alabama, available online at <http://www.as.ua.edu/ant/Faculty/murphy/manchest.htm> last visited 18-06-2004
conquer all the people, so that he and his people can make them slaves...
Numwa, again like Hitler... attacked secretly in the darkness... \(^{42}\)

Lewanika, his family and followers, are represented in this scenario, like Britain and America, as the forces of goodness and light, and that if the forces of evil and darkness as represented by Numwa and Hitler are not overcome, then chaos and oppression will be the result and this will apply to the Lozi peoples as it did during their own period of subjection under Numwa in 1884-5. This reductionism and conflation of completely incomparable sets of historical events, as Gluckman must have known, was a serious distortion and misappropriation, certainly of Lozi history, myths and legends, and surely a dereliction of his duty as an academic, to suit colonial purposes.

Neither was Gluckman afraid of attempting to ‘modernise’ Lozi political institutions to suit colonial desires, getting heavily involved in colonial efforts to reduce administrative costs in running the Barotse Royal Establishment. Gluckman painstakingly reviewed the activities of all the Indunas in the three Kutas of Lealui/Limulunga, Nalolo/Muoyo and Libonda with a view to reducing outgoings. At the conclusion of this exercise and on publication of his results, Gluckman sent to the Litunga Yeta and the Lealui Kuta via the Provincial Commissioner, telling them:

*My friends, I have been studying Barotse customs and life for nearly two years... and I have spent two years thinking and writing about them... I have put forward a plan to re-organise your Kutas... You know I am a friend of the Malozi...With my understanding of your history* (Gluckman was not a historian and what he did write on Lozi history was often from dubious sources and incorrect) *and as a friend of the Malozi, I advise you that the Kutas must be brought into line with modern needs... I think that you must reform your Kutas.*

\(^{42}\) Taken from ‘Barotse civil wars and the World War, 1939-1943’ submitted to *Mutende* (for publication in June 1943), copies of Gluckman’s original typescript in writer’s possession.
...you will find... that some of you have to give up present rights and duties... But in every change someone suffers, and I am sure you are ready to do so if... it is in the interests of your people. In drafting this plan, I have taken account of all your history, all your taboos, and all your likings... I think that the kuta would be made more efficient if its numbers were reduced; but this... can only be discussed after the Kuta organisation has been made regular, instead of muddled.43

Here we see Gluckman donning the mantle of an imperious chief.44 This was not just a case of intervening with the colonial administration so that, as Gluckman would have it, 'my description of your history and kuta organisation will gain you some understanding from the Government'.45 Here he was making use of the office of the colonial administrators to communicate to his 'friends' in order to administer change to a weakened BRE (Yeta was nearing the end of his life at the time and his influence was waning). Did Gluckman use the Lozis out of a need to inflate his own self-view, to see in the Lozis an opportunity to create his own fiefdom, his own territorial sphere of influence, to act as a springboard from which to aspire to the command of other empires such as the Manchester School of social anthropology later in life? Certainly this is a possible explanation.

Later in the same year, 1943, Gluckman visited Lozi migrant labourers on the mines in the Transvaal. Despite the obvious opportunity to investigate and highlight the notoriously appalling conditions that Africans were being forced to work in on the South African mines, Gluckman was at pains to assure the Wenela recruitment agency managers that he was 'interested only incidentally in actual conditions on the Rand Mines'.46 At the same time he was anxious to know that people remembered him and recognised his status back home 'They all thanked me, but some did not kandelela',

44 Caplan says that Gluckman was treated as a Mulena (Chief) and formed close relationships to the ruling power bloc, in Caplan, The Elites of Barotseland..., p. 238.
46 Taken from 'Visit to Barotse at Rand Mines Feb-March 1943', report intended for Northern Rhodesia Colonial Administration, located in Box G at library of Institute of Social and Economic Research (INESOR), Lusaka.
they did not shoelela royal greetings’. In fact, most of Gluckman’s tour and interviews with Lozis at the mines seemed designed to produce a reassurance that, though conditions were worse than Lozis had anticipated, these were accepted as what was to be expected if one was to be able to earn reasonable money. Here once again, we see Gluckman in ambiguous roles as agent of colonial and company imposition while still wishing to retain his chiefly status among Africans.

Gluckman also became known as a witchfinder and this may have compromised his ability to carry out research as people feared the ramifications of working with a mukuwa (white) who apparently communicated with the spirits although Shumaker’s research found that this made people feel more positive toward Gluckman instead. Gluckman obtained the Lozi nickname of Makapekwa – which literally means ‘one who gives a lot’. He was known as a supplier of gifts and money in return for information while he set up a substantial base camp in Barotseland to which informants travelled. Caplan says that, unfortunately, much of the information that Gluckman received was false and that ‘the truth was never revealed to him’ although the former fails to explain what he means by truth. Gluckman had this name Makapekwa inserted onto the cover page of his ‘Ideas in Barotse Juriprudence’, although he claims that he only did so to reclaim the name from an unnamed usurping ‘British District Officer’ who now stood accused of stirring up witchcraft allegations, which probably added to Gluckman’s reputation as a witchfinder. Schumaker’s research on the RLI reveals the extent that Gluckman went to in order to obtain information and research. Indeed, as Schumaker points out, the ambiguity of Gluckman’s role was obvious in the way that he comported himself looking every inch the colonial officer, which may have been for the benefit of both Lozi and colonial administrations.

Gluckman epitomised, to the Lozi, every inch the type of larger than life important ‘Englishman’ who trod in the footsteps of Livingstone, Westbeech and Coillard. In his role as director of the RLI and later of the Manchester School, and anthropologist

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47 Ibid.
50 M. Gluckman, *The Judicial Process among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia…*, p. xxxiii.
51 Schumaker, op. cit., p. 49.
of Barotseland, an academic territory that he controlled like a gatekeeper, Gluckman clearly saw himself in a dual role. On the one hand, he was a researcher and excellent recorder of the information that he gleaned. Much of his early works on the Lozi are invaluable resources, even today. But, like Livingstone, Westbeech and Coillard before him, he also envisioned himself as a chief in the African context and felt a need to be right about the issues he dealt with. His 1943 proposals for the reorganisation of the Lozi administrative structure were presented to the Litunga and Lozi elite as something being handed down to erring children by a benign elder. Whilst it must have been difficult to deal with colonial administrators who usually had a very pejorative view of Africans and work aimed at understanding the socio-cultural life of Africans, Gluckman appeared to conspire with that very institution in order to further his career and reputation. Yet Gluckman, who came from a wealthy background in South Africa was renowned as a Marxist scholar who, as founder of the Manchester School of Social Anthropology, sought later to distance himself from precisely those influences that had assisted his rise to fame.

A Lozi scholar from the 1960s remembers Gluckman’s last visit to Zambia in 1969 when the latter had hoped to revisit Barotseland and found to his disbelief that some of the Lozi people he had made case-study examples of in *Judicial Process* were deeply offended by his exposure of them to the public gaze and wanted to attack him for doing so without asking their permission. Gluckman asked the Kaunda government for protection, which was promptly refused and Gluckman left Zambia in a fit of pique, never to return, completely ignoring two other scholars who were working on Lozi history at the time.\(^52\) The house in Mongu that Gluckman stayed in still stands to this day but the occupants and increasingly few of the present generation have any idea who *Makapekwa* was. Gluckman had overestimated the lengths he could go in appropriating and dissecting the history and culture of a people. He took too much Lozi goodwill for granted to be remembered for posterity in the way that some of his illustrious predecessors were. All this said, Gluckman provided some invaluable

\(^{52}\) The Lozi scholar who related this story prefers to remain anonymous. The other scholar was Caplan. Neither were grated audiences by Gluckman although both stated that they would have liked to interview him on his sources.
observations of Barotseland and its political organisation in the mid-twentieth century and is undeserving of the deconstruction of his work by Prins.\(^{53}\)

Much has been made of the warmth of the relationship between Loziness and Britain in the contemporary era while mention has also been made of the paradoxical underdevelopment and negligence of the country by its colonial masters. Hidden by the construction of warmth and fraternity that colours much of the current view of Britain are stories of frustration and alienation felt by ordinary Lozis towards the white man in general and this reflects the view of the second statement quoted at the start of this chapter. Lozi society in the twentieth century could be loosely divided into the Litungaship and royal establishment (the Lozi elite and nobility) and the Lozi masses. During the course of the twentieth century, many of the latter obtained education either via the Barotse National School, founded by the BSAC with some of the tax money that should have gone to Lewanika, or other educational institutions elsewhere. Those who obtained education also passed on their ideas to those who had not been so fortunate. In addition to this, due to labour migration many Lozi men would return home imbued with notions of resisting white rule and attempt to proselytise these ideas amongst local people.

This brought commoners into direct conflict with the BRE which had hung its fortunes on supporting British rule largely for the protection of its own dominance and its own pecuniary benefit. In the pre-Second World War era in particular, the BRE under Yeta, whilst having its own disputes with the colonial authorities, meanwhile brooked no criticism or disrespect towards whites in the territory. Hudson, who was present at the installation of Ngambela Mataa in 1924, recalls the emphasis placed in speeches to the new Ngambela by selected Indunas to ‘not run counter to the wishes of the White Man’.\(^{54}\) Hudson says that ‘one Induna became quite lyrical over the good works of the white man’.\(^{55}\) All this reflected Lewanika’s aforementioned command to respect the white man and all his works but the self-interest of the BRE became more and more apparent particularly as the Litunga and BRE increasingly used protests to the colonial

\(^{53}\) Prins, *Hidden Hippopotamus...*, pp. 98-99, 130, and 132,
\(^{55}\) Ibid.
administration to try to increase their own wealth. Caplan points out that during the 1920s and 1930s, successive protests by Yeta and his appointees were bought off by the colonial administration, which resulted in even more protests at the previous poor treatment of Lewanika and Barotseland and an increasingly cynical attitude on the part of successive administrators.56

As with many other African colonies, this state of affairs rapidly became less tenable after the Second World War during which the Copperbelt and other industrial activity in southern Africa worked at full capacity only to lay men off in the aftermath of the end of the war. The attitude towards whites hardened in most regions. In Barotseland, Caplan reports that missionaries ‘discovered during these years the depth of Lozi mistrust and even hatred for Europeans’.57 This came about as the exploitative nature of formal colonialism came to be appreciated by the new intelligentsia who, in the case of the Lozi, fell partly within the elite and partly among commoners who had just had the fortune to obtain education. Lozis on the Copperbelt were favoured by the British for administrative and clerical roles due to perceived higher levels of ‘civilisation’ and education. It was also due to the strength and goodwill of the BRE whose influence extended to the locations of Lozi labour migration. Meanwhile the ability of Lozi commoners to generate wealth outside of Barotseland also resulted in a lessening of respect for traditional authority on return to the homeland, a point ably illustrated by Philpot who studied labour migration from Barotseland in 1945.58 Also, the exploitative and disrespectful behaviour of many whites on the Copperbelt, and in the mines and plantations of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia produced a feeling of resistance to whites everywhere.

Thus, contrary to the popularly held view today, from 1945 through to independence in 1964, feelings towards the British in Barotseland actually deteriorated quite considerably. The difference between this period and the pre-war years was that dissatisfaction started to be showed by people outside of the ruling circles, as much to the irritation of the royal establishment as to the colonial administration.

57 Ibid, p. 159.
The story of the British in Barotseland then tends to be one of a relationship between a class of military and administrative officers, relatively few in number, drawn mostly from the British middle and aristocratic classes with a specialised code of behaviour, and the Lozi elite. Much of this was benign, patronising and paternal yet not too threatening. The veneer of ‘protection’ survived, cracked but still intact. There was none of the grasping malevolence and exploitation by determined and often hard-pressed settlers such as that witnessed in districts such as Livingstone town and in Southern Rhodesia. The difference, meanwhile, between the status quo in Barotseland and destinations of labour migrants such as Southern Rhodesia was only too obvious to Lozis as the following statement to the Bedisloe Commission in 1938 demonstrated:

_In Southern Rhodesia they do not look upon the black man as a person, they just treat them as dogs. The only time they look after them is when they want money from them…. I am a person, not a dog_\(^{59}\)

These increasing feelings of unease and resistance to the dictates of white rule and proximity to a very much more severe form of oppression in Southern Rhodesia were to recur in the approach to federation in 1953 which was resisted uniformly by a united front of the Lozi ruling classes led by Litunga Mwanawina. This opposition took the form of continual requests for independent Protectorate status under the administration of the Crown i.e. London as opposed to any white-dominated authority in central Africa.\(^{60}\) What people feared was that Britain was attempting to foist Barotseland onto the same white racists who so badly treated Lozis and black Africans generally in Southern Rhodesia as this extract from a District Commissioner’s report from Kalabo District confirms: ‘There were varied stories of fear that a reactionary policy towards the African of Barotseland would follow... any such Federation as proposed due to the different Native policy in Southern Rhodesia’.\(^{61}\) Another report said ‘...the fear has been

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60 For instance in March 1948 at the time of the Amalgamation and Falls Conference, the Barotse Native Government (BNG) put forward a petition for the creation of an independent protectorate i.e. outside of Northern Rhodesia and directly under the colonial office in London – document held in BSE1/2/20, NAZ.

61 Quoted from ‘Kalabo Tour Report’ No. 4/51 Minute 1 in File KE/1/51, NAZ.
freely expressed that the Government of Northern Rhodesia will fall into the hands of European settlers'.

A committee of Mongu ‘citizens’ wrote:

'It is obvious that the proposed government will be controlled by a minority – Europeans in (sic) the expense of the people who are the majority and because of fear the former will try to oppress the latter and... the poor African will never be given a chance to rise'. Letters from Mwanawina to the colonial authorities in 1951 and 1952 expressed the continual rejection of being tied to Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland or even to the rest of Northern Rhodesia due to perceived loss of autonomy.

Now while it is fair to say as many officials did, that this represented the views of the minority, the Lozi elites, and that most rural Lozi had no real opinion on the matter, it is also fair to say that colonial administrators made promises and exaggerated the potential benefits of joining the federation. For example, at a meeting held at Mongu on 10th August 1951, the British MP Julian Amery told the assembled audience ‘People in Barotseland... would notice no political change as a result of closer union. The treaties made between Queen Victoria and Lewanika would stand until the end of time... Britain would not now turn round and deceive the Barotse people’. In short, Barotseland was being told that if it went into the federation that became known as the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland that it would be a member state, that it would retain an indirect protectorate status under the crown and that the British Government had no intention of handing over its responsibilities with regard to the welfare of African peoples. In fact, Barotseland was never recognised as a partner country in the Federation but simply as a component of Northern Rhodesia albeit with certain autonomous powers not enjoyed by other peoples. This was never properly explained or understood at a local level.

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62 Quoted from ‘A note on the Barotse Province and some current questions’ Report sent by Sesheke DC to Provincial Commissioner A.F. Glennie September 1951, File BSE2/20/1 NAZ.
63 Letter to the parliamentary delegation from the UK from a committee of ‘Mongu-citizens’, no further details of authorship given, received in office of Provincial Commissioner, Mongu 11th August 1951, located in Box B, Document Centre of Institute of Economic and Social Research, UNZA.
64 From minutes of ‘Meeting held at Mongu African Recreation Hall on 10th August 1951 between Paramount Chief of the Barotse and the Barotse National Council, and the parliamentary delegation from the United Kingdom’, document located in File BSE1/2/20, NAZ.
65 Ibid.
Caplan says, and probably quite rightly, that the opposition of the Litunga and Lozi elites was essentially bought off by promises that their own fortunes would not be affected but his assumption is too generalistic and this does not excuse the deception and masquerade played out on the Lozi leadership both in the early 1950s and later in the lead-up to independence by when Mwanawina and the BRE had become quite unpopular. This unpopularity grew as more and more Lozis with experience of the outside world, who were not members of the elite, allied with those members of the elite who envied power in Barotseland to protest that the Litunga and BRE had become anachronistic and self-serving. This gave the chink of light to the nationalists led by Kaunda, in collaboration with the British Government of Harold Macmillan to force Mwanawina to accept the invitation to join the rest of Zambia on the false premise of the Barotseland Agreement that one party had no intention of upholding and the other had no interest in guaranteeing. In this final scenario however, Britain became viewed ambivalently by Lozis. Those in support of the Litunga and BRE felt that Britain had betrayed them while the nationalists led by dissident members of the elite saw Britain as caving into the inevitable pressure of African nationalism sweeping across the continent. In neither case could Britain be viewed with any respect.

Thus, what can be seen is that the affectionate image of friendship and benign protection with which Britain is largely viewed today is a contradiction of the way that Britain had come to be viewed less than half a century ago. Also, the image of the British people and Britishness imagined by Lozis throughout the colonial period and even up today is largely illusory although the stage is left open to new patrons of the Livingstone mantra. Part of the reason for the unrealistic view of Britain held by so many Lozis today is the remoteness and externalisation the region suffered under formal colonialism and since independence as a component of the postcolonial in which similar processes of marginalisation apply as during colonial times. Another part of the explanation lies in the abrogation of the agreement so painfully negotiated by Mwanawina during 1964 which became known as the Barotseland Agreement 1964.
Barotseland and the Barotseland Agreement 1964

Any attempt to understand the way that Lozis feel about the old ties with Britain and their location in Zambia today, both in a physical and a metaphysical sense, would be incomplete without a discussion of the use of the title Barotseland and the Barotseland Agreement, its creation and abandonment by President Kaunda in 1969.

Most Lozis interviewed for this work expressed their sense of outrage and hurt that their country is referred to as Western Province and not as Barotseland. When Zambia was first made independent in November 1964, for a short time, Barotseland did retain its pre-independence name and maybe for other groups this was synonymous with the Barotseland Agreement which set special conditions for the Lozi King and the traditional authorities who would enjoy more local powers than those in other provinces. This was resented by many nationalists as evidenced in this quotation from the Central African Mail at the time:

...thus did this controversial province cease to be a “protectorate” within a state. But this agreement has not... ended Barotseland’s special position in Zambia. It still remains the only province known by the tribe of its people. Personally, I don’t think it very proper for Barotseland to keep its “tribal” name. We do not have Bembaland, Ngoniland or Tongaland. Why Barotseland? My suggestion... is that this section of the country should be called South-Western Province.66

The use of the name ‘Barotseland’ seems to have come about during the time of Lewanika and is not, strictly speaking, a tribal name. Ba-rotse means the Rotse people which is how the Makololo referred to the Luyi certainly according to Livingstone when he first arrived in the region in 1851: ‘The black men referred to were the Barotse, or as they term themselves, Baloiána’.67 This view was later attested to by Mainga, Stirke and Gibbons.68 The consonant ‘r’ did not figure in Sikololo as Lozis could not pronounce it so

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66 Central African Mail Magazine 03-07-1964, p. 3. The piece was written under a pseudonym style of authorship known as ‘Kevin calling’.
67 Livingstone, Missionary Travels…, p.87
Rotse turned into Lotse and the `ts` was replaced with a `z`. Significantly, the Lozi chose to refer to themselves by the name that the Makololo called them instead of the original Luyana name, another confirmation of the affinity of the new ruling order after 1864 with the Makololo legacy previously referred to in Chapter 4. And, apart from the distant mostly mythological times of Mulambwa and before, it is the Lewanika years that Lozis use as a pivot when creating their national myths and history of a Lozi `golden age` hence the retention of the name Ba-rotse-land

The importance of the Barotseland Agreement and its place in the Lozi consciousness can be demonstrated by the fact that virtually every submission to the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) of the Republic of Zambia, which conducted hearings in Western Province between 8th and 28th April 2004, contained references to the Barotseland Agreement. All requested its re-insertion either in part or in whole as key to integrating Barotseland and the Lozi nation into the Zambian state, implying that to date, this integration had not taken place, leaving the relationship between Lozis and any concept of `Zambianess` in limbo. Spokespeople and journalists from other groups regularly try to play down the significance of the Barotseland Agreement. Their resentment is clear to see because to recognise the Agreement recognises that the Lozis somehow had more importance than other groups. An article published in the Times of Zambia in June 2004 ably demonstrates this resentment:

> Put in its proper historic perspective, the Barotseland Agreement... which piece of history is cherished by the Lozi and passionately detested by many from the rest of Zambia... is nothing more than a divisive trap that is best left in the vaults of history... To pretend that once Barotseland is given a greater degree of autonomy there will be paradise on earth is to live in a proverbial fool`s paradise.70

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quoting Lewanika and his son-in-law, Ishambai, though insisting that the correct term was Marotse instead of Barotse.

69 Copies of many of which are held by the writer.
70 “Barotseland accord: for whom and by who?” article written by Roda Phiri in the Times of Zambia 10th June 2004, p. 3.
Furthermore, the historicity of the sense of loss that Lozis feel for their independence and autonomy is intimately tied to the nature of British colonial rule that is perceived to have existed prior to independence.

The submission of the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) to the CRC throws some light on the confusion left behind by the departing colonialists and the way that both Britain and the postcolonial state are perceived in Western Province:

*Barotseland became a British Protectorate in 1897, long before Northern Rhodesia came into being... Northern Rhodesia also became a Protectorate, so that Barotseland was, in effect, a Protectorate within a Protectorate, giving it a special status not enjoyed by the rest of Northern Rhodesia. This was because the treaties signed by King Lewanika and the representatives of the British Government were done so exclusively between these two parties, specifically in the name of Barotseland.*

*The treaties signed by Lewanika and the British Government were maintained and respected by the colonial regime up to 24th October 1964... Barotseland was able to run its own affairs, particularly at local level, while central government maintained special responsibility for areas such as defence, justice, foreign affairs and public works. The Barotse native government, as it was then referred to, ran local government working closely with central government in all other aspects.*

*Hence, after coming under British control, Barotseland largely managed its own affairs as an independent state. The coming of independence, a process taking place throughout Africa as the era of formal colonialism drew to a close, was viewed with great concern and suspicion in Barotseland, because it was feared that, under an African nationalist government, Barotseland’s independence would be lost. Therefore it was felt necessary to enter into an agreement...*71

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Of course the truth of Barotseland’s relationship with Britain was far more complex and exploitative in Britain’s favour than is implied in the above extract from the BRE’s submission. But the true nature of Britain’s relationship with Barotseland is secondary to the fact of its existence prior to any relationship with other parts of what was to become Northern Rhodesia and to its perceived exclusivity. The essence of this exclusivity articulates the notion that here was a nation (the Lozi nation) that, through its astute and wise leadership, negotiated treaties with British colonial power in order to ‘protect’ its independence, its culture and a sense of sovereignty over its own people and homeland through exclusive rights awarded to the Litunga and royal establishment which were not enjoyed by other groups in the region that was later to become Northern Rhodesia. A core implication here is that Britain is portrayed, not as a colonial aggressor, responsible for the underdevelopment of the country, but as the invited protector of Barotseland and the Lozi nation’s integrity, sovereignty and independence.

This apparently mutually acceptable arrangement then, is purported to have been in existence, maintained and adhered to by the two signatory parties from the 1890s right up to independence in 1964 when the agreement enshrining the sanctity of Barotseland’s special status was supposed to come into effect as the Barotseland Agreement (copy contained in Appendix 3). This was signed in London by the incumbent Litunga of the day, Mwanawina III and Kenneth David Kaunda, later to become President of the new Republic, while the British Government jettisoned any sense of responsibility to its loyal following in Barotseland by signing only as a witness, ‘to signify ‘...the approval of Her Majesty’s Government...’’.72 The outgoing and somewhat outspoken ex-leader of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Roy Welensky, probably had just cause to tell Rab Butler, British Foreign Secretary, in front of the Litunga, to admit that the latter and Barotseland were being ‘sold down river’ by the British.73 As the Agreement states,

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72 Taken from the preamble to ‘The Barotseland Agreement 1964’, Cmnd 2366, Public Records Office (PRO), Kew, London (Copy contained in Appendix 3).
...all treaties and other agreements subsisting between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Litunga of Barotseland will terminate when Northern Rhodesia becomes an independent sovereign republic and Her Majesty’s Government... will thereupon cease to have any responsibility for the government of Northern Rhodesia, including Barotseland.

This, in a nutshell, is what the British were looking to achieve since before federation in the early 1950s, to cast off Barotseland, seen as of little value to the metropole, to hand over any responsibility and, most importantly, cost, for the country and its people to new, inexperienced political administrations. In this and in all the difficulties that have existed since, between Litungas, the BRE and Lozis outside the elite on the one hand, and the post-independence Government of the new Republic of Zambia on the other, can be mirrored the root of so many of postcolonial Africa’s political traumas and civil strife, particularly amongst Britain’s ex-colonies.

In Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Sudan, civil strife in the post-independence era has had much to do with the forced merging of communities that existed either independently or were separated and tribalised by colonialism. Denton illustrates how the British Government tried to persuade France and Senegal as well as the Gambian political elite to insert The Gambia into an alliance with Senegal in the early 1960s.74 This was because, as with Barotseland, Britain, having failed to make money out of the country and having offered nothing in terms of modern development throughout the formal colonial era, perceived unwanted future expense. Again, Britain tried to blackmail the political leadership of pre-independence Gambia into accepting this plan of integration by threatening to cut off all aid if it refused.75 Yet in the late nineteenth century, Britain had hung on to the sliver-like territory known by Senegalese politicians as the sword in Senegal’s stomach. France had tried hard to persuade Britain through offers of vast territories to allow The Gambia to become part of Senegal but Britain

75 Ibid. p. 263.
always refused, being convinced that trade would flow down the Gambia River from the interior, something that failed substantially to happen.

When Mwanawina arrived home and discussed the Agreement he had entered into with Kaunda with the Lozi elite, it was realised that there were many issues not properly covered affecting Barotseland’s autonomy and its ability to decide its own future. Thus, a letter signed by the Ngambela and all Indunas of the Saa-Sikalo Kuta was sent from the Litunga’s office to the other two signatories of the original agreement asking for a supplementary agreement that would clarify such issues as the option of ‘Mulozi’ citizenship, the use of the Barotse flag, land appeals and the right to possess firearms (to be retained by the Litunga and Kutas concerned). The request was rejected by Kaunda and ignored by London but Mwanawina and the BRE decided that it was not worth the risk of trying to force the issue as the Nationalists had unexpectedly won both Barotseland seats at the 1962 general election and were already intimidating members of the royal establishment, a mark of disrespect previously unheard of.

Following the abrogation of the Agreement by Kaunda in 1969, so the argument goes, Barotseland and Zambia should have reverted to being separate political entities, with Barotseland able to decide its own future. The analogy of a failed marriage with one party held in perpetual subjection and servitude by the other after the latter has failed to keep promises made is often used to describe the dynamics of Barotseland and Zambia’s relationship. However, not everyone shares the ideal of separation and a reversion to a pre-independence Barotseland. In fact, less than half of Lozis today would support an independence struggle, which would almost certainly be resisted by central government.

Even the position of pro-independence Lozi politicians has been known to waver according to the political dispensation in Lusaka. In 2001, an organisation was set up in

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76 Litunga’s Office to Kaunda and Sandys, 18th August 1964, received Resident Commissioners Office 31st August, copy located in Special Document Archive, UNZA.
78 In a survey carried out in July 2001, 58 % of Lozi respondents in Barotseland and Lusaka said they would not support an independence struggle (see Appendix 1).
Lusaka and Mongu known as the Forum for the Restoration of Barotseland (FOREBA). Indeed, this writer attended some of the early meetings at which the restoration of an independent Barotseland was to be a non-negotiable aspiration.\textsuperscript{79} Even the last meeting of the OAU in Lusaka was petitioned and a meeting held between one of the leading figures in FOREBA (a Lozi prince and former contender for the Litungaship himself) and the Director of the Secretariat of the OAU, now AU. After the election of Levy Mwanawasa who had a somewhat less confrontational approach to Barotse issues, to the Zambian Presidency in 2002, however, the same Lozi prince who had previously been one of the founding members of the governing MMD but later left to form his own party, renounced the idea of independence for Barotseland and FOREBA rapidly faded into obscurity.\textsuperscript{80}

That said, virtually every Lozi is ready to argue that the Zambian government should honour the agreement it signed in 1964 and Britain is wrongly portrayed in this dialectic as the party which kept its word in the past, the political entity with the ‘stiff upper lip’ that may have failed to bring development but at least kept its word, and there is still time for Britain to remember its old friend by coming to its aid in the struggle to regain autonomy. The Zambian state, meanwhile,  

\textquote{\ldots acted out of a position of power and strength, taking advantage of Barotseland’s vulnerability so that Barotseland lost its autonomy. There was no good reason for the Zambian Government to abrogate this agreement, which it did in 1969... The abrogation was and still is, totally unjustifiable to the people of Barotseland and took place without the consent of the people or their representatives... The abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement is a festering sore that weighs heavily on the shoulders of the Barotse nation... The BRE and Barotse people seek to have the feelings of oppression and discrimination}

\textsuperscript{79} Details on FOREBA from meetings attended in Lusaka in June 2001 and from interviews with Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika, son of Litunga Mbikusita, who sat on the Executive Committee of FOREBA; also from the petition presented to each African Head of State attending the OAU meeting in Lusaka on July 12th 2001, an original copy of which is in the writer’s possession, and the press release issued by FOREBA two days later.\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
removed from them so that they too can share in building a strong and united Zambia.\textsuperscript{81}

The last part of this quotation signifies the cognisance that the BRE has now long taken of the fact that the nation is likely to subordinate the idea of a freedom struggle to some semblance of real economic development. What has most irritated Lozis in Barotseland in the past is the epithet of poorest province in what is already one of the poorest countries in the world today. Meanwhile, proponents of a freedom struggle say instead that it signifies the subordination that the present and previous Litunga have undergone in order to appease the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) Government in Lusaka from where much of the Kingship’s day-to-day financial requirements emanate. Either way, it also signifies a lessening of the close bond to the warm glow of Britishness felt in the Kingship and BRE as it is increasingly clear that Britain is a disinterested party whose value lies more in the history constructed to support modern-day claims.

In terms of power relations, it must never be forgotten, and no self-respecting Lozi would allow it to be forgotten, that the British did not invade Barotseland or achieve dominance over the Lozi kingdom by any conception of military superiority or political pressure. Rather, Britain’s presence in the lands of the Lozi was due to an ‘invitation’ extended by King Lewanika. The British were invited because of the \textit{aura} of their power and as a survival mechanism. It is also true that they were recommended as strategic geopolitical partners by Khama of the Bamangwato who had achieved protection from the British and whom Lewanika had received good reports of from Arnot,\textsuperscript{82} and Coillard of the Paris missionaries,\textsuperscript{83} albeit for differing reasons.\textsuperscript{84} This logic has been used time and again in Barotse submissions to the Zambian Government, the OAU, in academic

\textsuperscript{81} Submission of BRE to CRC, p. 4 – see Footnote 70. Also reported in the Sunday Times of Zambia, Issue No. 11,462 dated April 25\textsuperscript{th} 2004, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{82} E. Baker, \textit{The Life and Explorations of Frederick Stanley Arnot} (Seeley, Service and Co., London, 1921), p. 97.
\textsuperscript{83} F Coillard, \textit{On the Threshold…}, p. 329.
\textsuperscript{84} Gluckman suggests that Khama’s own motivation had much to do with solidifying relationships on his northern borders and obtaining solidarity with others who shared the fear of most in the region of the Matabele to the west – M. Gluckman in F. Coillard \textit{On the Threshold…}, p. 11.
articles and to virtually anybody who will listen. The Lozi Kingdom then, or in reality at least, the Kingship, was placed under the protective care of the British imperial umbrella but, apparently, never had its sovereignty subordinated by it.

Important in this respect also, is that there is no history of militant anti-colonialism against Britain or indeed of militant nationalism within Barotseland until the arrival of Kaunda and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) in the early 1960s. In the 1962 election, UNIP won both Barotseland seats although the turnout was very low with poor voter registration confined mainly to white-collar workers based on the ‘Line of Rail’ where the nationalists had most influence. This class had begun to feel that the BRE was working for its own interests. The incumbent Litunga, Mwanawina, disagreed and treated the Lozi nationalists as traitors. By the time of the 1967 election, in which UNIP was to lose most of its gains in Barotseland after serious disaffection with the new government, the love affair with Zambian nationalism was starting to lose its gloss. Kaunda, like successive colonial administrators before him, had miscalculated the depth of feeling among Lozis for the Lozi Kingship which continues to inspire notions of citizenship and subjectivity. Thus, whilst an individual Litunga may become unpopular, this in no way diminishes the vitality and reverence vested in the institution of Kingship which is core to Lozi identity and, perhaps more germanely, is perceived as dominated primarily by the spirits of departed Litungas, particularly great ones such as Mboo, Mulambwa and Lewanika.

Hence, in the contemporary era, the notion of the ‘post-colonial’, the enduring condition manifested and articulated in many ex-colonies that continuing inequalities in the world in the contemporary era are as a result of colonialism, both formal and informal, does not generally apply in relation to Barotseland. Rather, those feelings of anti-colonialism are directed at the post-colonial state which is perceived to have deliberately put Barotseland on the back burner of development since Zambian

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independence in November 1964. In Barotseland today, most people feel, quite rightly, that standards of living are unreasonably poor as a result of interference from outside. This feeling is reinforced by the increasing, though still limited, ability to gaze out onto the world as communications infrastructure begins to become accessible to more people and as more and more Lozis migrate to places where wealth can be earned in places enjoying more of the economic and cultural trappings of modernity.

Criticism of Barotseland’s plight naturally falls on the post-colonial state because that is the tangible contemporary manifestation of an institution that behaves, to Lozis, as if it seeks to keep the region and its people underdeveloped. Few were alive during the colonial era, and even those that were, as in other ex-colonies, particularly where the British imposed indirect rule, tend to imagine that somehow things were better when ‘the whites were in charge’. Morale in the present is low, succour is therefore sought, almost by default, in the past, a past that is reconstructed to seem better than it really was, particularly by the older generation who are still listened to with considerable respect in Lozi culture. The irony of this situation is that Britain and Britishness, which enjoys some vague kind of enhanced value in the present, and which is tied so intimately to the Barotseland Agreement, was instrumental in inspiring a treaty, like the ones it foisted on Lewanika and Yeta, that would sow the seeds of Barotseland’s continuing underdevelopment.

Most Lozis in Barotseland still associate Britain with an aura of omnipotent power, not appreciating how this diminished in the twentieth century. Ironically, it is colonial underdevelopment, one of the legacies of British rule, which has assisted this lingering misperception on account of the long isolation experienced in many parts of the old Lozi kingdom from the rest of the world economy and globalised telecommunications, part of what Caplan describes as maintaining Barotseland as a ‘Living Museum’. Paradoxically, Zambian independence was to enforce and entrench Barotseland’s peripheralisation in the evolving global world economy and from the trappings of modernity for decades to come.

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87 Caplan, The Elites of Barotseland... pp.142-164.
Finally here, another aspect of the way that Lozis respect their historical relationship with the British is the notion of uniqueness or ‘specialness’. One is constantly told that it was a special relationship, implicitly between special peoples, both imperial powers with imperious self-perceptions. Of course, this relationship was actually between two sets of elites, the Kings and nobility of Lozi society and, initially, a certain disparate set of characters with access to a vague sense of modernity, involved in trade, missionary and colonial endeavours and using to their advantage, the aura of British power and a certain mix of omnipotence, fairness and justice. During field research for this work, the writer was often introduced in Kutas and in churches, not just as European and English-speaking, the latter in itself a valued asset, but most particularly as British, as if this would be likely to carry more weight in breaking down the habitual Lozi suspicion of strangers than virtually any other attribute of the individual. After the 2004 Kuomboka at which diplomatic representatives from the USA, Germany and Czechoslovakia attended, it was regretted that, for the third year running, the British High Commissioner was a conspicuous absentee because ‘we always invite the British High commissioner first, he would always have pride of place’. This aspect and the history attached to it are not well understood among the present generation of British diplomats to Zambia who see their presence in the country as part of representing a wider European community while down-playing any colonial inferences.

Britain was unique and special to the Lozi establishment then, due to its awesome and apparently unparalleled political power and control over the use of violence, its mystical kingship (even though occupied by a woman when it was making its greatest strides through the African continent), its inherent sense of propriety and respect, its collective industry and intellect (as reported by Lewanika and Yeta) and its apparently benign treatment of the Barotse political establishment. Barotseland was and is unique and special to Lozis due to its historical superiority in the region which Lozis sense other groups are jealous of; its powerful kingship and political organisation, so central to Lozi identity as well as other cultural factors which will be looked at in more detail in Chapter Seven. The historical view of its relationship with Britain tends to be

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88 This happened particularly when being introduced during church services, a particularly effective way of communicating the arrival of a stranger in the community and rationalising that stranger’s presence.
89 Induna Katema of the Ngambela’s Kuta, interviewed in Limulunga, 31-03-2004.
90 Responses obtained during a conversation with the British High Commissioner to Zambia, Mr T. Davids, in Lusaka, 02-07-2002.
viewed then, as a power relationship, a natural attraction of two strong political communities who came together almost one could say for expediency. This is seen as a much better and more pragmatic approach than was that employed on the arrival of the Makololo, although, arguably, the results have been much worse.

It is, then, through the lens of a constructed and idealised history that the affinity felt by the Lozi establishment with Britain and Britishness is today articulated. Meanwhile, official ties between Britain and Barotseland have not existed since 1964, thus the reality of the warm glow of affinity is starting to age, and with the ageing process comes distortion and the creation of myths. In addition to this, the image of Britain and Britishness that Lozis who have not travelled to the UK (which is most people) have is that of the pre-colonial and colonial era and most particularly, the colonial officers and very small European community that Lozis met up to the 1950s and 60s. The only other impressions are those carried forward from the official visits to the UK of Lewanika in 1902 and Yeta III in 1937. Mwanawina III also visited England in 1964 but that visit was and still is associated with the much maligned Barotseland Agreement. It is not generally appreciated that the view obtained by Lozis during the visits of Lewanika and Yeta was not typical of the UK as a whole and that post-colonial, postmodern British society in the twenty-first century has completely metamorphosed from the one that existed during the colonial era. Exposure to the outside world increasingly reveals Britain and the British as more remote and less important than previously imagined.

That said, Loziland’s engagement with Britain has left its indelible legacy. There is the English language, which Lozis, perhaps more than other groups in Zambia, seem to treasure as a second language, even though, in rural Barotseland, it is little used. Certainly in Lusaka and elsewhere outside of the homeland, Lozis prefer to use English rather than vernaculars such as Nyanje and Sibemba, a factor not lost on other groups in Zambia. There are other traits of culture and custom that Lozis, particularly amongst the elite classes that are imbued with a certain sense of Britishness. During the annual Kuomboka ceremony, which will be discussed at more length in Chapter Seven, the Litunga dons a uniform originally donated by King Edward VII of Britain at the time of his coronation, which Lewanika attended. Today, the Litunga, Ngambela and certainly all
Indunas attending Kutas are likely to be seen dressed in formal suit, shirt and tie or as close as it is possible to get to this given the austerity of most people’s domestic situation. The use of local traditional costume is certainly respected and brought into use at cultural festivals, particularly Kuomboka but the use of the European formal dress code is still a feature of everyday life in Barotseland and this extends into spheres such as religion as will be seen later.

Litungas have, since the time of Lewanika, sent their sons to a school in Kent, England, where there is reputed to be a statue of Lewanika, for their secondary education. It can thus be seen that the veneer of Britishness referred to throughout this chapter was largely articulated and directed by the Lozi ruling classes through whom British colonial rule was diffused. Thus it was very much a product of class consciousness in a society that was seriously structured along the lines of class and gender. The traditionally gendered nature of Lozi society was actually emphasised by the colonial experience as colonial officers and administrators were virtually all men. It is argued here also that aspects of the colonial heritage have been utilised by Lozis to differentiate and distinguish themselves from other groups in Zambia. That this should have been found necessary is partly due to the real poignancy of Lozi history but also due to the feeling of disillusionment with and alienation from what followed in the postcolonial era.
6 Kaunda and the Freedom Struggle Years

The period after the insertion of Barotseland into an independent Zambia in October 1964 as Barotse Province and then, from 1969, as the new ‘Western Province’, was one of increasing exigency for the peoples of the region. For Barotseland and the Lozi nation, the first and second Zambian Republics, presided over by Kenneth Kaunda, its first President, were characterised by mutual distrust, disillusion with the Zambian nation-building project and disappointment over the lack of development in Barotseland despite the heady promises made by nationalist politicians at independence. These included the improvement of roads and even the construction of a railway line to Mongu from Lusaka together with promises of improved access to symbols of modernity such as social welfare regardless of class.

To exacerbate the feeling of distrust, the whole western half of Zambia suffered the effects of imported turmoil in the context of ongoing freedom struggles in neighbouring countries with deep suspicions of Lozi loyalties and intentions held by other groups in Zambia and particularly by non-Lozis in UNIP. For Lozis the abrogation and abolition of the Barotseland Agreement in 1969 engendered a deep sense of suspicion that Kaunda wanted to humiliate the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE), which he saw as anachronistic and inimical to his ambitions for the new ‘One Nation, One Zambia’ project. The whole of western and southern Zambia suffered the effects of the freedom struggle and deep suspicions of Lozi loyalties and intentions harboured by other groups in Zambia, particularly by Kaunda and other non-Lozis in UNIP. This was exacerbated by economic duress as Kaunda sought to establish his Africanist credentials, centralise political control and nationalise economically productive activity in Zambia. Economic duress was endured due to the impact of the ending of migrant labour to South Africa, the removal of processing activities previously carried out in Barotseland and the failure to introduce meaningful development to the region. There were one or two exceptions to this such as the building of the Senanga hospital overseen by a Lozi Minister of Health, and the construction of the tarred road between Livingstone and Sesheke, named after the UNIP-supporting Princess Nakatindi which Van Binsbergen
says symbolised the effective penetration of the central state.¹ But these were the exceptions rather than the rule.

The saga of the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement is not covered in detail here but has been examined elsewhere.² Many respondents for this work wanted to talk very much about this aspect of their history and how it contributed to the way they feel today about being part of Zambia. Many amongst royal circles still find it confusing that Great Britain, their so-called friend, failed to intervene when it was clear that Kaunda intended to abrogate the treaty, little realising that what Britain, in the person of the Colonial secretary, Duncan Sandys, had actually done was to sign the Agreement purely as an observer, to signify ‘the approval if Her Majesty’s Government’. Therefore, as it was not actually party to the Agreement, Britain could claim that it could not get involved when the Agreement was broken. This sleight of hand is still not understood to this day as is explained in the preceding chapter.

The appointment of Godwin Mbikusita-Lewanika to the Litungaship in 1968 did nothing for the feelings of mutual distrust between disaffected Lozis and the UNIP government of Kenneth Kaunda. Mbikusita had been secretary to Yeta III, accompanying the latter on his visit to London in 1938, an appointment sanctioned by the colonial executive. He had been the founder of the African National Congress on the Copperbelt in 1948, an exponent of federation in the early 1950s and had been perceived to be working behind the scenes in Britain’s (and the Federation’s) interests in the run-up to independence in 1964 and might probably have been the last person that Kaunda would approve of as candidate for the Litungaship on the death of Mwanawina. Kaunda, however, was probably playing a mischievous game with the Lozi conservatives, knowing the divisive nature of the BRE, especially over the status of Mbikusita who added the name Lewanika later in life. In the early 1960s there had been controversy in Lozi royal circles over whether Mbikusita was actually a son of the famous

King Lewanika and therefore eligible for election to the Litungaship. It was to be an embarrassingly public controversy that was pounced on by sections of the press that had previously cast scorn on the idea of Barotseland and the Litunga having more autonomy than other pre-colonial kingdoms and chiefs in the new Zambia.

Mbikusita died in 1977 and this time the Litungaship went to a son of Yeta III, Ilute, who became known as Yeta IV. The reign of Ilute also became a cause of controversy amongst Lozi traditionalists due to the role that the new Litunga undertook in high public office. According to tradition, when ascending to the Litungaship, the incumbent adopts a persona that is wrapped in legend and mystical ambience. He should not speak directly to his subjects. Whenever he passes in the street, all his subjects should prostrate themselves and ‘Kandelela’ (clap hands and raise arms in obeisance). A Litunga does not take part in public life as a normal person would. But Ilute had had a distinguished career as a civil servant, diplomat and politician. He was Zambia’s first High Commissioner to Botswana thus it is perhaps not surprising that he accepted Kaunda’s invitation to become Member of the Central Committee with responsibility for Western Province. This was not, however, a role welcomed by all Lozis. Many felt that he was demeaning the office of Litunga by accepting this role and participating in national politics.³

_We were all brought up to show our Litunga our respect and humility. Previously it was always a big event for the Litunga to travel from the palace and people would be warned beforehand to prepare for his passing. But now, with this Litunga, he was passing every day twice a day going back and forth from his office in Mongu like an ordinary man. How could you respect a Litunga that behaved like that. Some of us lost the traditional respect for the position of the Litunga at that time and stopped kneeling to clap every time he went by. Some_

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people even started disobeying the rule of keeping silence in the night out of respect for the Litunga’s peace.\textsuperscript{4}

Later on, particularly in the Chiluba era, Ilute came to challenge the role of national government in thwarting the development of Barotseland. However, it could be argued that Kaunda did his best to sow the seeds of division and dissent amongst Lozi ruling circles. This chapter examines how specific dynamics were taken advantage of by Kaunda in developing this theme and discusses the impact on the Lozi consciousness and sense of being.

\textbf{Migrant labour}

One of Kaunda’s first imperatives with relation to Barotseland was to sever its links with the south, particularly South Africa and those countries controlled or influenced by South Africa including the then Rhodesia and South West Africa, later to become Zimbabwe and Namibia respectively. One of the most obvious manifestations of these links was the recruitment of migrant labour from Barotseland which had been taking place since the early days of the colonial era. From September 1936, the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (Wenela) commenced recruitment of 10,000 workers per year from Barotseland, a figure which was rapidly reduced to 1,500 in 1938, but increased again during the Second World War according to agreements reached between the Transvaal Chamber of Mines and the colonial authorities in Livingstone.\textsuperscript{5} Recruitment took place from Mongu and Livingstone and later from Katima Mulilo, just outside the border with Northern Rhodesia in Caprivi (then part of colonial South West Africa).

By the 1960s, Wenela was recruiting from Barotse, Caprivi and Angolan sources and even flying recruits to the mining regions of South Africa from Francistown in Botswana. From Barotseland alone, numbers recruited annually by 1960 averaged

\textsuperscript{4} Interview with a royal princess (Mokwae) on condition of anonymity, who spent her childhood in Limulunga and Mongu during the late 1970s and 1980s (there are a great number of people of royal descent living ordinary lives in the contemporary era; the designation ‘royal’ should not be taken as evidence of privilege or wealth).

\textsuperscript{5} R. Gray \textit{The Two Nations…}, p. 127.
5,000-6,000 men.\textsuperscript{6} To these were added large numbers of Mbunda who literally walked from Angola into Barotseland and either went directly to Mongu, or used Zambezi transport to get to other recruiting sites at Katima or Livingstone.\textsuperscript{7} Lozis were housed almost exclusively in their own ‘tribal’ accommodation or ‘barracks’ and were renowned for keeping to themselves more than other groups. Despite the appalling and degrading conditions of the mines, Lozis were reported to be largely uncomplaining and did not get involved in protests and strikes.\textsuperscript{8} That said, Coillard’s niece, Mackintosh, reported that in the early part of the twentieth century at least, they did feel somewhat isolated and became depressed and alarmed by the high mortality rate amongst their number, particularly in the period after the Second Anglo-Boer War when little money was immediately available for the improvement of working conditions.\textsuperscript{9}

Later, in 1943, the Lozi scholar and anthropologist, Max Gluckman, visited the Lozi in mine compounds on the Rand and found them billeted with ‘Angolas’, policed by ‘Lozi native policemen’ and ‘compound indunas’.\textsuperscript{10} Gluckman believed that the Lozi on the mines were able to make a separation between lifestyles in Barotseland and on the mines as two separate social systems although social hierarchies were clearly exported. Some of Gluckman’s comments are of relevance to the way that Lozis interpreted migrant labour in the mines of South Africa:

\textit{Generally...conversation turned toward Loziland...they wanted to know about their homeland, and they were not much interested in telling me about the work and life at the mines...However, this indicates that they were not very disappointed and had no major complaints...Moreover, the dichotomy of their...}

\textsuperscript{7} Cheke Cultural Writers Association The History and Cultural Life of the Mbunda Speaking Peoples by (Cheke Cultural Writers Association, Lusaka, 1994), pp. 157-159.
\textsuperscript{8} Interview with P. Oosthuisen ex-compound manager at the Government Areas mine and Imasiku Nankando of Sikwa Village, an ex-miner who worked in the Kimberley diamond mines in the late 1950s and 1960s.
\textsuperscript{9} Described by, amongst others, Christina Mackintosh, niece to the French missionary Coillard who travelled through southern Africa in 1903; see C.W. Mackintosh, The New Zambezi Trail (Marshall Bros, London, 1922), pp. 29 and 35-36.
\textsuperscript{10} Described in M. Gluckman, ‘Visit to Barotses at Rand Mines’, document written Feb-Mar 1943 but possibly not published, located in store at Institute of Economic and Social Research (INESOR), Lusaka,
living at home and at the Rand is obviously great – they accepted as inevitable the conditions of mining life, and although they complained to me of it in comparison to Bulozi life...they know they cannot expect to live the same kind of life, and must accept ...unsatisfactory conditions as part of earning money.

...they asked me about the recruiting of labour for the farms, and the stopping of recruiting for the Rand mines. They inveighed against it, there was no money to be earned on the farms and plenty at the mines...Wages...they said were very good, much better than they could earn in N.R. ...Prices...they said were very much lower than N.R. ¹¹

Of course there were complaints also, including the hard work and unfamiliar languages in use (except for Sotho) but most of the complaints of ill-treatment seemed to refer to miners from other ethnic groups such as Pondo, Xhosa and Zulu. The hardships, according to Gluckman, were interpreted in the context of what one could expect in return for the money earned. Indeed it is clear from Gluckman’s account, which admittedly suffered from some colonial-style bias, that most miners were concerned more about how to circumvent restrictions on returning to the mines after returning home than on the severity of working conditions or getting away.¹²

This was probably partly due to the influence of the BRE at home as the treasury of the Barotse Native Government (BNG) from which the BRE which derived much of its income received a percentage of the earnings of each Lozi recruit. Indeed Lozis were widely respected by the white managers on the mines some of whom wished that ‘more of our blacks could have been like the proud Lozis’.¹³ Whilst this remark reveals the racism that existed among the mainly Afrikaner junior rungs of white management on the mines, the correspondent concerned spoke of the genuine respect that he and his

¹¹ Ibid.
¹² Ibid.
colleagues held for the Lozis and their deep sense of identity, their loyalty to their King and their close-knit social organisation.

For most families of Lozi migrant workers, the residue income earned from this activity after deductions and pay for upkeep, dangerous and unpleasant though the conditions were, fed and clothed their families, who had virtually no other way of earning money. In remote rural areas such as Kalabo District, the benefit to the local economy was striking:

*If one adds up payments to the Barotse native Government in fees and rents, remittances and deferred pay to Kalabo repatriates, and payments made locally for labour, foods and materials at Wenela posts and stations in the district, the total for 1959 comes to some £50,000. Since all of this enters the local economy at the village level, it is unquestionably the largest single contribution to the prosperity of the district, seven times the amount of taxes collected for the year and 50% greater than the total budget for the Libonda Native authority.*

In the decades leading up to Zambian independence, labour migration to the south and reliance in Barotseland on remittances from that labour, increased dramatically. Gluckman says that on first visiting the region in 1940, ‘there was an abundance of grain, tubers, fish, meat, chickens and eggs, wildfowl, vegetables and fruit’. On later visits in 1942 and 1947, shortages had begun to appear although these could have been partly due to normal climatic variations, yet on visiting the region in 1965 after an absence of some eighteen years, he was astonished to report the plain region ‘to be notorious even beyond its borders as almost a permanent famine area, importing large quantities of meal from districts to the east.’ There were shortages of milk, eggs, vegetables and fruit with meat, milk and eggs now being imported by lorry from Lusaka, a service rapidly becoming uneconomic due to the poverty of people in

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16 Ibid.
Barotseland. Indeed, by 1964, the maize deficit in Barotseland had reached 80,000 bags per annum.\textsuperscript{17} Gluckman noted that ‘gardens were overgrown with weeds and neglected as they had not been in the 1940s’. The population of the Mongu district had risen from some 75,000 to maybe 110,000,\textsuperscript{18} partly due to migration out of the plain and partly as a result of migration from further afield such as Angola, putting even further pressure on decreasing food production. Yet the increase in population did not mean that more productive labour was available:

\textit{I saw (the) fall in production as probably being due to the effects of an increasing migration rate, for...the withdrawal of more and more workers would affect deleteriously a complex economy in which several scattered productive activities had to be performed simultaneously, much more than it would affect a simple economy where absentees could be compensated for by herder work on the part of those left behind...cattle owners near Mongu complained that as all the young men were away in employment at distant centres...they had to herd and milk the cows themselves and hence could not deliver the milk for sale in Mongu...many of the older men and women had become desperately dependent on sons and nephews working outside Barotseland for money to purchase their staple food.}\textsuperscript{19}

Hermitte argues that the drop in production in the late 1940s was rather due to a series of bad floods beginning in the late 1940s that had washed away crops and gardens. He further argues that the loss of men was not serious as women did most of the agriculture.\textsuperscript{20} This argument, however, whilst plausible for a short period after these years of excessive flood, does not account for the situation encountered by the 1960s. Women did work the less productive land in the central plain areas, while men worked extensively on farms around the plain edges and these were the most productive. Men were also responsible for clearing the drainage canals upon which cultivation largely

\textsuperscript{17} L. Van Horn, ‘The agricultural history of Barotseland...’ p. 164
\textsuperscript{18} Gluckman, ‘Economy of the Central Barotse Plain [2nd Impression]...’ p. xi.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, p. x-xii.
depended. Gluckman’s observations confirmed what Peters asserted in his 1958 survey on land usage in which it was noted that there were only twelve to sixteen able-bodied men for each hundred residents in an average-sized Lozi village. As he rather deprecatingly commented:

...like all other tribes, they have not proved capable of modifying their agriculture to take account of newly induced conditions such as the fall in rural male population, nor have they been able to provide for new wants while at the same time conserving the natural resources upon which agriculture is based.21

In the same report, Peters referred to the ‘decrease in the manpower available for agricultural pursuits due to labour migration...’.22 Figures released after a population census conducted in 1963, showed something of the way that Barotseland’s human resources had become skewed by migrant labour.23 Out of a total population for the Protectorate of 363,480, 54.1% were found to be female and of the 20-44 age group, arguably the most productive, 60.9% were female. By 1990, out of a total population of 606,813, 53.55 were female, showing little overall change but the proportion of females 20-44 had dropped to 55.6%.24 The latter figures show that males still migrated to find paid employment and opportunities, even if not to the same degree as previously. The number of males left behind was probably swelled by refugees from Angola who had melted into the local population.

The problem was further compounded by an influx of impoverished refugees from Portuguese Angola throughout the twentieth century. Some of these were following the labour trail south but others took up residence in Barotseland to work the land for Lozi families in return for food and lodgings. Unfortunately these immigrants, who had no knowledge of plain cultivation methods, often tried to grow the wrong crops

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22 Ibid. p. 49.
and failed to use cattle for fertilisation. Over-cultivation in the plain margins frequently led to the loss of the silt layer, particularly close to margin settlements, a factor compounded in the 1960s and 70s by reduced flood levels due to climate variation in the Upper Zambezi valley. In the early 1960s, new waves of Angolan refugees were arriving in Kalabo district, escaping the rapidly growing internal conflict connected with the struggle for independence in Angola, a struggle that occasionally spilled over into Barotseland as will be discussed later in this chapter.

Remittances from migrant labour also tied the labourers to their ancestral lands as elders used some of the money to retain holdings in land for their relatives to return to upon retirement, ‘hence the migrants had more then sentimental interest in sending this money home; but clearly once the land has deteriorated badly, only sentiment remains.’25 Here Gluckman was observing the final stages of a breakdown in the ability of Barotseland’s system of production to sustain its population. Originally, this system had been premised on substantial quantities of slave labour, which became anachronistic in terms of the evolving world economy to which Barotseland had become exposed with the arrival of British colonialism. What that colonialism demanded was a fiscal return and the only way that return could be obtained, it was perceived, was to force Barotseland’s abundant labour to migrate to work in the mines and plantations further south in order to find cash to pay hut taxes. Meanwhile Lewanika had been coerced into banning slave labour in 1906, partly by promises of a share of the tax. It had taken approximately sixty years for the production system to completely break down and it was to the tenuous link to financial security extended by the migrant labour trail to South Africa that Kaunda was to deal the decisive blow in terms of Barotseland’s economy.

Kaunda, meanwhile, had multiple agendas. On the one hand, he clearly wanted to demonstrate his Africanist credentials by cutting off the supply of labour to white apartheid South Africa and this was the way in which the banning of labour recruitment

25 M. Gluckman, ‘Economy of the Central Barotse Plain…,’ p. xii.
by Wenela in Barotseland in 1966 was presented.\textsuperscript{26} On the other, he probably also wanted to clip the wings of the Litunga Mwanawina III and the BRE by cutting the flow of money in attestation fees from Wenela and making the Litunga and BRE more reliant on the Zambian central government for its income. Kaunda may have been resentful of the help reportedly sought by Mwanawina from South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia to oppose the nationalists in Barotseland.\textsuperscript{27}

There were good grounds for Kaunda to be nervous about Barotseland’s links with Wenela and South Africa. These were articulated by a visit to Wenela’s headquarters in Johannesburg, South Africa in January 1964, made by Prince Ngombala Mubita, Mwanawina’s nephew, to obtain a much increased attestation fee to the Barotse National Government (from 11s 6d to £1 4s per head, an increase of about £5,000 per year) for labour recruited in Barotseland.\textsuperscript{28} Mubita was also alleged to have met with a representative of the Verwoerd Government in Katima Mulilo in March of the same year to request South African military and financial assistance for Barotseland. This ‘representative’ promised to station troops at Katima (a police post was indeed installed there at this time) in preparation for a military invasion to ‘free’ Barotseland from Zambia if needed, a scheme that the Litunga eventually refused to endorse.\textsuperscript{29}

In Western Province, the cessation of recruitment by Wenela was interpreted quite negatively as the comments below from individuals who were young adults in the Sesheke district at the time indicate. Many Lozis interviewed for this work think that the real motive was to deal a further blow to the power of the Litunga Mwanawina, who had only very reluctantly agreed to the incorporation of Barotseland in the new state of Zambia. More damaging, however, was the impact of the deprivation of income from migrant workers on households, particularly in the more remote southern and western parts of Barotseland where fewer alternatives for wealth creation existed. In the far south, this was compounded by the exhaustion of what little fertile cultivable land

\textsuperscript{27} Caplan 1970, op. cit., p. 206.
\textsuperscript{28} Caplan (1968) op. cit., p. 355.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
existed for communities deprived by the separation of the more fertile Caprivi from Barotseland in the colonial era. The result in Sesheke district was recurring famine. Many older men today, who were directly affected at the time the decision was taken, still feel bitterness and blame Kaunda for banning this source of income without making any effort at replacement, bringing extra poverty to their families. To rub salt into Lozi wounds, Kaunda used a Lozi Minister of Labour, Munu Sipalo, one of four Lozi members of the Cabinet at the time, to enact the decision,\(^{30}\) in order, many feel, so that Lozis would not complain too loudly.

When Wenela was stopped from recruiting in 1966, many Lozis, without other means of earning money, were left thinking that Kaunda wanted to punish them and to teach their traditional leader a lesson as these two comments testify:

*The problem with the cessation of Wenela was that nothing was put in its place and people started panicking saying 'how are we going to live? It was not a good time.'*\(^{31}\)

*KK (Kaunda) wanted to please other countries at the expense of the Lozi. When he finished off Wenela, he gave us nothing in exchange and used a Lozi minister so we could not complain too loudly. The President wanted to hurt our Litunga, instead, he kicked ordinary Lozis in the teeth. In Sesheke district we had nothing but sand to live on...*\(^{32}\)

Kaunda claimed that the decision was to strike a blow at the apartheid regime in Pretoria by depriving it of a major input to the economy that was propping up apartheid and denying emancipation and freedom to black Africans in South Africa.\(^{33}\) However,


\(^{31}\) Statement made in interview by Prince Mwimanenwa of Litoya village, son and ex-Private Secretary to Mulena Mokwae Mulima of Nalolo at Muoyo Kuta, 17-09-2002.

\(^{32}\) Interview with Mr E. Iluba, ex-Induna Nalubutu, Mabumbu village, 24-09-2002. Mr Iluba served as an official in the British colonial administration based in Sesheke district in the 1960s.

\(^{33}\) Molteno, op. cit., p.94.
arguments about apartheid both then and now are largely lost on these respondents. Some commentators have suggested that this move was one of the main contributors to UNIP’s heavy defeats in Barotseland in the 1968 general elections and this opinion was indeed borne out in interviews for this work.34

**Barotseland and the liberation struggle**

For Barotseland, the era of the liberation struggle was to last for two decades from the mid-1960s through to the late-1980s, by when, white South Africa’s grim determination to hang on to Namibia at all costs had been overtaken by a more pragmatic geopolitical approach that also took account of economic realities at home. Barotseland and its peoples had to endure hardships created by conflicts surrounding the independence struggles of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola. In the latter’s case this extended into a protracted civil war that impacted on Barotseland right up to the beginning of the twenty-first century when the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, was shot dead by Angolan MPLA government forces in 2001.

By the early 1960s, South Africa was waking up to the geopolitical significance of Caprivi. This awakening was soon reinforced by the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Southern Rhodesia in 1965 which, as Roberts points out, created new military threats for South Africa.35 The independence of Zambia in November 1964 and the multifarious wars of liberation in Angola, in which South Africa enmeshed itself in the 1970s and 1980s all served to polarise the location of Caprivi and its corridor-like shape in the minds of South African geopolitical planners and thinkers. Yet the South African agenda in the region in the 1970s was characterised by ambiguity, particularly as regards the Lozi population, as will be seen. As far as Zambia was concerned, South Africa’s aspirations required that camps of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO), which was fighting for the liberation of Namibia, be eliminated.

Part of the problem for both the SADF and local people in Barotseland was that these camps were victualled and provisioned from local resources and protected by Zambian National Defence Force (ZNDF) troops. From the late 1960s until after Angolan independence had been achieved in 1975, most SWAPO camps were located in Barotseland (after independence and until 1969 known officially as Zambia’s Barotse Province) and north-western Zambia acting both as training centres for raw recruits from Namibia and bases from which raids into Caprivi and the rest of Namibia were launched. The activities of white-ruled Rhodesia’s troops also had the potential to overlap into southern Zambia and Barotseland. This was due to the welcome extended, once again by Kaunda to ZANLA and ZIPRA and their operatives. The activities of these Rhodesian troops often dovetailed with those of the South Africans, in the Zambian sphere at least. In part this was because they were often short of equipment and relied on South African assistance in logistical ways. It was also due to the concentration, in Zambia, of potential threats to white dominance in southern Africa. From 1964, African nationalist political parties and their military wings from Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South West Africa (Namibia), some of whom had already embarked on a military struggle, had been allowed to set up offices in Lusaka and bases in rural Zambia, in itself a provocative and risky action, located so close to the white theatre of operations.

It was not to be long before soldiers, their headquarters and camps were set up on Zambian soil. One could say that this exposed the peoples of regions like Barotseland, sandwiched between liberations struggles in Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe and a new administration in Lusaka seeking to identify itself with the freedom struggle of black people across the continent, to an unreasonable risk. Yet it would have been hard for Barotseland to escape the ravages of separate struggles on three different fronts that, by their very nature and the geography of the terrain, had the potential to spill over borders regardless of the wishes of local people. By 1967, African freedom fighters were invading Rhodesia from the Zambian side of the Zambezi, prompting

36 For example, South African forces assisted Rhodesia’s Selous Scouts in the bombing of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) leader Joshua Nkomo’s house in Lusaka in 1979.
South Africa to send militarised police units to support white Rhodesian forces on the southern banks of the river. These were involved, in May of the same year, in the killing of the SWAPO military commander Tobias Hainyeko, who had been visiting Caprivi and Sesheke from his headquarters in Dar es Salaam to investigate how the region could be better used as a strategic tool in the newly emerging armed struggle against white South African power in Namibia.37

With the emplacement of an airbase at Mpache near Katima Mulilo, South Africa displayed its recognition of the potential threats and opportunities presented by dominance over the lands of the Lozi, a peoples who could be seen to be somewhat ‘out of sync’ with others in the region and who, traditionally, were closely linked with the south. The position of the Lozis also appeared somewhat ambiguous to the South Africans. Whilst those in Barotseland proper, the old British protectorate, could be observed to be mostly ambivalent to the militancy of the freedom struggle, many in Caprivi were clearly attracted by notions of independence although not necessarily along the lines of a united Namibia that included Caprivi as will later be seen. The fear of this new strain of militancy creeping across the border to southern Barotseland, later entrenched by the use of Barotseland for SWAPO bases, the outbreak of serious hostilities in Portuguese Angola, which overspilled Barotseland’s western borders in the Kalabo district, (particularly from 1966-1968) and the obvious inability of either the Portuguese or Rhodesian forces to contain guerrilla insurgency and impose control of the countryside, convinced Pretoria of the need to become more actively involved.

For South Africa, the situation was not improved when a United Nations seminar on apartheid held in Kitwe, Zambia, in July 1967, chaired by the Secretary-General, U Thant, condemned the situation in southern Africa as a crime against humanity and recommended that independent African states should provide necessary facilities for the organisation of national liberation movements.38 This was shortly after the assassination of Verwoerd when the Afrikaner nationalist political establishment was still in some

38 G-M Cockram, Vorster’s Foreign Policy (Academica, Pretoria, 1970), pp. 33-34.
turmoil and the new Prime Minister, John Vorster, voiced the collective sense of outrage in Pretoria that the UN appeared to be supporting the violent overthrow of another state contrary to its own doctrine.\textsuperscript{39} The decision was taken by Vorster to upgrade South Africa’s military presence in Caprivi and take a more proactive role in the social and political life of the Lozi peoples on both sides of the Zambezi. After the embedding of SWAPO bases in Barotseland, the SA military was also given the go-ahead to enter Barotseland in hot-pursuit raids and missions to cut communications links that could be used by SWAPO, which conducted its military raids into Caprivi and northern Namibia from Zambia until well after the independence of Angola in 1975.

Quite apart from setting up military camps and an airbase at Mpache, South Africa now vigorously set about its own brand of colonialism with the Caprivian population, designed to alienate dissident Caprivians and Zambian Lozis from each other and from other population groups in Namibia and Zambia respectively. Several strategies were employed to achieve South Africa’s aims. One was to vigorously pursue, prosecute and detain any Caprivian suspected of supporting nationalist aims. To this end, the detention in 1964 and later banishment to a remote hamlet in Kaokoland of the founder of the Caprivi African National Union (CANU), Brendon Simbwaye, a Caprivian Subia, was undoubtedly a warning to Lozis in Caprivi. Simbwaye was never to be seen again and was widely believed in SWAPO circles to have been killed by the South Africans.\textsuperscript{40} Another strategy the South Africans employed was the dissemination of propaganda.

\textbf{The South African propaganda campaign}

A powerful radio transmitter was erected at Katima Mulilo from where South Africa could disseminate selective information and propaganda to people living in Barotseland. These signals were received very clearly, more clearly in fact than transmissions from Lusaka, which, it was believed by some in the Zambian government at the time, were

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid. p.34.
\textsuperscript{40} Katjavivi, op. cit., p. 51.
also being blocked. Indeed, poor telecommunications in Zambia’s rural areas, particularly in Western Province, a legacy of the colonial era left unchanged during the Kaunda years, made life considerably easier for South African efforts at destabilising the population. Thus, radio broadcasts were transmitted in the 1970s from Katima in Silozi, which was sometimes very good and sometimes much poorer (probably using South African Sotho speakers), as well as in English to the people of Barotseland.

According to respondents interviewed for this work, the station, which was part of the Johannesburg-based South African Government ‘Radio RSA’, broadcast all day in English with Silozi programming in the early mornings and evenings. Broadcasting schedules incorporated Lozi cultural programmes including history and language, educative programmes, programmes about health, current affairs and a large dose of South African propaganda. Silozi speaking presenters had names like Kachana Kachana, Bonaventure Libonda, Muka Imanga Ikosa and Namamata Matakia. One regular current affairs programme was called ‘Amutwe’. Another programme intended for women that taught cooking and domestic hygiene was called ‘Lituto za ba Sali’. The historical content included Lozi and southern African history.

Current affairs would consist of world and local news relevant to Barotseland and Lozis in particular. An element of local reporting was clearly taking place as news items covered issues such as the level of flood waters each year with speculation as to when Kuomboka would take place. The news component was generally well-appreciated because Lozis in Barotseland had no other way of knowing what was going on in the rest of the world. This gave the South Africans a golden opportunity to affect the way that Lozis thought about them and about Zambia and its President, an effort that was later somewhat negated by the behaviour of their largely Afrikaans speaking troops on the ground. Nevertheless, items about South Africa would present that country in a

41 Testimony of ex-minister from Kaunda era (asked to remain anonymous).
42 The possibility that Sotho employees were used on the radio station is enhanced by the fact that ‘l’ was often pronounced as ‘r’, a Sotho pronunciation.
43 For information on South African broadcasts to Zambia via the Katima transmitter, I am indebted to the following respondents: Amos Simasiku, Chimbinde Mungamba Yolosi, Sam Mbumbi, Lifuna Akufuna, Mwiya Munkayumbana, Sheba Mulala, Ndate Mwenda, Kekelwa Morrison, J. Kakoma and Mukumbuta Namulume, all interviewed either in Lusaka or Mongu 16 to 30-7-2001.
positive light, well-off economically, scientifically advanced and self-sustaining with no mention of domestic troubles or of apartheid whilst Zambia was presented as chaotic and ruled in a despotic manner by a President who did not want Lozis to succeed. One respondent claims that, in the early 1980s, the Litunga Ilute (Yeta IV) was being encouraged to secede Barotseland from Zambia. The majority of respondents claim that unity between Zambian and Caprivan Lozis was definitely being encouraged as part of the propaganda emitted during the broadcasts in Silozi. The notion that South Africa would act as a friend in such an eventuality was encouraged by programmes such as ‘Litumeliso’ which featured requests, messages and greetings being exchanged between Lozis in Barotseland and South Africa and generally promoting the idea of synergy between the two countries.

The assertion was made in these broadcasts that South African soldiers were not the enemies of Zambian Lozis; that the SWAPO soldiers passing through their land were Owambo-speaking foreigners who were bringing their problems from ‘South West Africa’ to Lozis who were having to host and feed them; and that Zambian Lozis should realise that President Kaunda was not interested in their welfare but wanted only to keep them down. Kaunda was portrayed as a cruel leader who hated the Lozi people and this hatred could be observed in the form of the war inflicted on Barotseland, by declaring war against South Africa and by supporting SWAPO. Zambian Lozis should see how well their counterparts in Caprivi were being looked after and realise from this who really had the interests of Lozis at heart.

Propaganda was also disseminated by leaflets, which were dropped from helicopters and planes in zones where South African actions were likely to take place telling local people to stay in their homes to hold up pieces of white fabric to show that they were local people and not supporting SWAPO soldiers. They were also warned not attempt to assist SWAPO operatives; that way, they would not be shot. Another of these leaflets showed illustrations of a Lozi man, very thin and a SWAPO freedom fighter, very

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fat. The accompanying text, in Silozi, announced that the Lozi man was thin because of Kaunda’s neglect and the freedom fighter was fat because Kaunda was feeding him.46

Life for the people of Barotseland, particularly in the south was very difficult at this time with feelings being torn between loyalty to the freedom struggle (some SWAPO operatives were fellow Lozis, Caprivians who had joined CANU which merged its activities with SWAPO), anger at Kaunda for putting Lozis in danger and animosity at the depredations of both the SWAPO freedom fighters and South African forces. In general, people became confused and unsure about the intentions of all these external forces. Most Lozi families throughout Barotseland had relatives living in Caprivi and were aware of the higher living standards that started to prevail there from around the mid-1960s. Thus, the South African propaganda machine was able to tap into a vein of disillusion with the Zambian government amongst ordinary people who were not politically active.

**Home Guards**

Something that has not been previously reported in the literature was the creation, in Barotseland, of a kind of police reserve called the ‘Home Guard’. Most older-generation Lozis today remember the Home Guards but such was the climate of fear surrounding these shadowy figures that even now, some find it difficult to talk about them. Although the events surrounding the Home Guards are comparatively recent, obtaining information about a very sensitive issue amongst Lozis is difficult, firstly because of the high mortality rate that has already claimed so many of those who would have been able to provide first-hand evidence, secondly due to a sense of fear that still pervades when discussing this issue and thirdly, due to a notion of shame that some Lozis, even family members, acted as informants on their own people.

One respondent suggests the idea of the Home Guards came into being in response initially to the threats posed by the Rhodesia crisis but later extended to an initiative designed to provide a defensive response to the threat of incursion and

46 Interview with Mr E. Nawa of Muoyo village, 07-10-2002.
invasion by colonialist forces generally. Meanwhile, on February 2\textsuperscript{nd} 1966, a meeting took place at State House, Lusaka between Kaunda and his putative head of a new Zambian intelligence service, one John Poremba-Brumer (a Polishman who later turned out to have been a secret agent working for the Rhodesians) at which the formation of a new national militia group called the District Service Force was discussed.\textsuperscript{47} This may well have been where the idea of the Home Guard came from. Introduced by the UNIP Government of Kenneth Kaunda, the logic of the Home Guard initiative was to act as a response to Zambia's lack of defensive capacity in the face of attack. Whilst soldiers were busy patrolling borders with what little sophisticated fighting equipment was available, Home Guards were to receive basic military training in order to help rural people defend the countryside if need be. However, as one respondent wryly notes, whilst the concept of Home Guards was supposed to be a national response to a perceived crisis, it seemed only to be Barotseland in which these agents were deployed.\textsuperscript{48}

Others assert that while the Home Guards were ostensibly supposed to protect people in their homes, in actual fact they were the eyes and ears of Kaunda's UNIP government reporting on the activities of those suspected of sympathising with South Africa or showing hostility towards SWAPO. It is significant that some made the connection between the activities of the Home Guards and Kaunda's perceived mistrust of the Lozis resulting from the reluctance of the Litunga and many of his followers to give up their ties to Britain:

\textit{Home Guards were spies for KK. How? Since 1962, in Bulozi, Tungi and Siwito constituencies were supporting the Litunga, Sir Mwanawina, and the BRE who did not want the English man to leave Barotseland. The Barotse people wanted the English people to stay...When UNIP of Kaunda succeeded in taking power from the Litunga as President, a lot of tactics were induced...to infiltrate the Barotse administration...The Home Guards reported anyone talking about KK's

\textsuperscript{48} Interview with Mr. Mwangala Sililo of Nabulu village, Lealui district, 02-11-2002.
regime. Because of the two factions, those opposing the BRE’s wish to stay on
the English people remained vigilant in seeing no-one opposed what the
President said. Because of the former leader, KK, Home Guards were formed.
Now that he is no more, the Home Guard is dead.49

These were KK’s workers. As a result no Lozi benefited out of those so-called
Home Guards. The money KK used to employ these people was supposed to
have helped the people in the villages. It was very difficult to know who the
Home Guards were because in every organisation, even hospitals and schools,
people were working as Home Guards.50

Others saw the Home Guards in a more material context but still in terms of Kaunda’s
personal agendas:

This group…supported KK’s war against the South Africans and so they hated the
propaganda of the South Africans; as a result they registered as Home Guards to
fight…Those who justified…Namibia’s war of freedom felt that it was good to
fight for independence of that state as they were Zambia’s good neighbours.
What they foresaw were future economic benefits for Zambia51

Getting respondents to talk about the Home Guards requires considerable
patience due to the fear factor, in spite of the fact that Kaunda has been out of power
since 1990. At first people are very hesitant and diffident about discussing the issue but
once the subject is engaged, fear quickly turns to anger and bitterness in most cases.
There were exceptions but these usually turned out to be people who benefited from

49 Ibid.
50 Interview with Mr Iluba, ex-Induna Nalubutu, Mabumbu village, Mongu-Limulunga district 20-10-2002
51 Interview with Mr Siluwe Mukena of Liyala village, Lealui district 01-11-2002.
UNIP in some way. No-one interviewed was prepared to admit to having been a Home Guard.\textsuperscript{52}

In the context of the freedom struggle being waged by Namibian and Zimbabwean freedom fighters, many Lozis were more resentful of what they saw as foreigners’ wars and were understandably frightened of the conflict that was taking place in their country at the expense of the well-being of their people and lands.

\textit{At this time people had mixed feelings, others were scared of the war and so they showed resentment of the leadership of the time under KK. They couldn’t find justification for a leader who chose to sacrifice the lives of his innocent citizens just to satisfy the freedom of foreign nationals.}\textsuperscript{53}

The South African Defence Force (SADF) had been aware that SWAPO was building camps in Barotseland, training and infiltrating operatives for hit and run attacks in Caprivi and elsewhere in Namibia from late 1966 onwards after some failures operating from Ovamboland inside Namibia and across the border in Angola. In May 1967, as mentioned earlier, some SADF operatives shot and killed the SWAPO military commander, Tobias Hanyeiko, who was visiting Caprivi and Sesheke after he was given away by the local white operator of barges along the Zambezi.\textsuperscript{54} It is also known that from 1970, South African special forces known as Reconnaissance Commando (Recces for short) trained and set up camps in Caprivi. While the Portuguese were still in power in Angola, nominally at least, SWAPO would use the Caprivi and Cuando Cubango in Angola as a corridor to access Namibia. Stiff relates how, during this time, a group of disaffected Lozis, led by one Adamson Mushala, a North-Westerner who had previously

\textsuperscript{52} Nor was any suspicion as to identities asked for or followed up when volunteered due to the sensitivity of the subject.

\textsuperscript{53} Senior member of BRE, requested to remain anonymous, interviewed, Limulunga, 27-07-2001

\textsuperscript{54} Interview with Mishake Muyongo, Copenhagen, 04-12-2000, confirmed by P. Katjavivi, \textit{A History of Resistance in Namibia} (Africa World Press, Trenton, NJ, 1990), p. 60.
held office in UNIP, were flown into Caprivi from Angola by PIDE, the Portuguese secret police.\textsuperscript{55}

In Caprivi, the Lozi group were trained by the South Africans in order to be 'returned to Zambia...to destabilise Kaunda’s position and take his mind off the question of offering guerrilla bases in Zambia to Swapo and the ANC (of South Africa)'.\textsuperscript{56} The operation had its own codename, ‘Dingo’ and the training ground used, near to Omega II (a name that still exists locally) in West Caprivi, was given the name 'Fort Doppies', by the South Africans. Stiff describes how agents of the South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS) came to Caprivi (the date is not supplied) while both Mushala and the SADF colonel responsible for their training were absent and had the Lozi trainees transported to the Zambezi near Katima Mulilo to be shipped over to the Zambian side. Waiting for them on the other side was a well-prepared battalion of the 5\textsuperscript{th} Zambian Rifles who shot the Lozi group down mercilessly. Stiff reports that a brigadier from army headquarters in Pretoria later admitted to him that the Zambians had been tipped off and that the Lozis were sacrificed as a return favour for a concession that President Kaunda had made to Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa.\textsuperscript{57}

Patrick Wele describes the same dynamic from a completely different angle. He claims that 100 people went for training in Caprivi under the leadership of a Lozi politician, Timothy Kalimbwe Lupasa and that Mushala came later from Angola after disagreeing with PIDE about the use of Congolese ‘gendarmes’ to help overthrow Kaunda’s government. Lupasa was an associate of Nalumino Mundia who had formed the United Party in 1963 in opposition to Kaunda. The UP came to be associated with Lozi interests and joined with the African National Congress (Zambian) of Harry Nkumbula in 1968. Mundia suffered detention and restriction along with Mushala, another early member of the UP. All the above had originally been members of UNIP who became disenchanted with Kaunda’s shift away from democratic politics from the late 1960s, culminating with the announcement of a one-party state in 1973.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid. p.39.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid. p.41.
Wele interviewed Lupasa after he was released from prison in 1990 and heard that the latter had been sent to white Rhodesia by the Zambian African National Congress under Nalumino Mundia to seek help in overthrowing Kaunda. Rhodesia referred the matter to the South Africans who asked the Portuguese General Spinola, who was then governor of Mozambique for help. The South Africans flew Lupasa to Caprivi for military training with other Lozis where they were joined in February 1972 by Mushala. Lupasa describes going over to Zambia near Sesheke and being arrested together with about 14 others resulting in his imprisonment for the next 18 years. Could this be the same incident heard of by Stiff from SADF sources? Both accounts seem conspicuous by a certain vagueness about dates and individuals but local interviewees for this work confirm that they knew of Lozis and members of other groups being trained in Caprivi and of feverish activity by the Zambian military in the Sesheke area around this time. Great fear was engendered among local people because Zambian police in the area, who were almost exclusively non-Lozi, suspected virtually every Lozi male of being involved in a plot of some kind, a situation not helped when South African soldiers entered Barotseland in 1971 to blow up the Zambezi pontoon at Sitoti near Senanga which was suspected of being used by SWAPO fighters on their way to Namibia via south eastern Angola.

*The people were caught in the middle. Yes, we heard there were Lozis being trained in Caprivi and I remember how Kaunda’s police and soldiers were taking our people away and interrogating them with torture. They thought we were all terrorists. Many in Sesheke ran away into the countryside where they thought they would be safer, but there was no safety in those days...* 

This situation only worsened as the seventies wore on, with regular raids by the SADF into the Barotse countryside. Respondents from as far north as Mongu recall South African Air Force jets roaring over the Bulozi plain at very low levels to carry out bombing raids over SWAPO camps in Mankoya and Zambia’s north west. Stiff describes

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58 Ngenda Mushamuko, interviewed, 10-10-2002, Muoyo village.
specific raids by the SADF from 1976 to 1978 accounting for substantial SWAPO casualties.\(^59\) The result of these raids was to impoverish the SWAPO fighters who turned to the local population for support in terms of food and shelter. If refused, the latter were often taken by force with locals being told they had to support the freedom struggle or they would be reported to the Home Guards and the ZNDF. Meanwhile the behaviour of South African troops on the ground also caused considerable resentment. Most of these troops were white Afrikaans speakers; the use of black trackers does not seem to have occurred to the extent it did in Angola. Several respondents described the treatment they received at the hands of these young white soldiers, brought up with racist perceptions that tended to lump all black people together as potential enemies. One experience recounted by the Sambi (Prime Minister) of the southern Kingdom (Lwambi) at Muoyo is perhaps typical.

The Sambi had been visiting his home village and lands in the district close to Matabele Plain when his party was suddenly confronted by white South African soldiers who sprang out from the bush.

_I had guns pointed at me from all four sides, poking hard against my skin. They spoke very poor English and I found it hard to tell what they were saying through their heavy Afrikaans accents. At first they kept saying I was SWAPO and that they would kill me, but I told them I was not SWAPO. It was only when they allowed me to show them my ID document that they would finally believe I was a Lozi and not interested in their war. Their leader then asked me why my Litunga was supporting their enemies by allowing SWAPO soldiers to stay in the country and by feeding them. I tried to say that it was not our Litunga’s choice but they were not listening. They told me to go to the Litunga and tell him to stop supporting the SWAPO. Many of our people were threatened in this way._

\(^{59}\) Stiff, op. cit., pp. 222-233.
The South Africans behaved in a very racist way. They did not treat us as if we belonged in our land. It was very frightening.  

Soon, the only way that Lozis in southern Barotseland could convince SADF soldiers that were not SWAPO was to produce their identity documents which they had to carry with them at all times. With regard to the way the SWAPO FFs (freedom fighters) behaved, another respondent added this:

When the FFs first came they were friendly enough and some of us thought it would not be too bad though we did not like them making their bases in our lands. But after the Boers started blowing up their camps they became desperate for food and other supplies and that’s when they started behaving badly to us Lozis. Sometimes they asked for food and if we refused...well they took it anyway. Other times they would not even ask, saying we were apartheid sympathisers if we refused. Other bad things happened, women were mistreated. They seemed to have very poor discipline when things started going badly for them.

In the district of Senanga West, towards the Angolan border, the South Africans laid a minefield to try to prevent SWAPO insurgency via Angola. Many local people stood on these mines in error and the hospital at Senanga regularly found itself catering for those who had lost limbs or were seriously maimed and injured by these mines.

South Africa and Caprivi

Caprivi’s importance, or even notoriety, in the political economy of Barotseland, or Western Province as it was now re-named by UNIP, continued throughout the 1970s,

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60 Pastor Barrington Muhongo, Sambi to Litunga la Mboela Makwibi, interviews in August 2001 and September 2002.
61 Interview with Mr. Iluba, ex-Induna Nalubutu, Mabumba, September 2002.
62 Ibid.
63 Evidence from ex-Minister, asked to remain anonymous and Sambi Pastor Muhongo in interview September 2002.
thanks primarily to the physical location of Caprivi and Barotseland at the heart of black Africa’s liberation struggles as well as the emplacement of SWAPO camps in Barotseland, and due to the political suspicions surrounding the loyalties of Lozis. It has often been suggested that South Africa was interested in turning Caprivi and even Barotseland into another so-called ‘Bantustan’, but there was clearly more to South Africa’s interest in Caprivi than this. The South African effort at getting indigenous Caprivians ‘on board’ certainly made inroads into the way many Caprivians thought about themselves and differed from the way South Africa treated other indigenous Africans, both in Namibia and elsewhere. It is also argued here that these efforts were designed in five ways to reinforce the severing of ties of solidarity and oneness between Lozis on both sides of the Zambezi.

Firstly, in Caprivi, South Africa banned unauthorised white settlement, declaring the territory a ‘game reserve’. Also, no attempt was made to ‘repatriate’ Africans to Caprivi as in other homelands or reserves. Indeed the emphasis seemed to be on maintaining population levels and introducing facets of modernity and development not seen in other parts of Namibia. For instance, by independence in 1990, Caprivi enjoyed 23 secondary schools and school leavers were able to access further education in Zimbabwe or South Africa quite disproportionately to other parts of Namibia. A teacher’s training college was also inaugurated in Caprivi. Secondly, all administrators sent to Caprivi were instructed to maintain the use of the English language in their dealings with local people, particularly their leaders. This is significant because it went against the usual trend of the Afrikaner-dominated post-World War II Government of South Africa of insisting on the use of Afrikaans in all official dealings and particularly in education in subject areas. Thus, the productive capacity of Caprivi was left unaffected by being turned into a homeland or reserve unlike the Bantustans and reserves of South Africa and Namibia where the productive capacity of the regions concerned was crippled by the impact of so many people exiled to these places.

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64 Interviews with exiled leaders of the United Democratic Party, Gaborone, 1st May 2001.
Thirdly, in 1985, by when South African enthusiasm for holding onto the rest of Namibia had begun to wane, the South Africans took cognisance of the indigenous Silozi language spoken by Caprivians and, recognising this as a defining link binding Caprivian Lozis to their Zambian counterparts, produced an orthography of Lozi. What is clear from this orthography was that in the education of Caprivians, the administration had been actively changing phonetic descriptions of individual sounds, the meanings of individual words and phrases and different emphases. As Elderkin sums up:

_The orthography was produced after the Zambian orthography of 1977. The amount of disagreement between the two orthographies seems deliberately manoeuvred to produce the greatest number of obstacles to co-operation between the Silozi-using communities on both sides of the political border._

Fourthly, a Legislative Assembly of the Caprivians (here we see the use of the term ‘Caprivians’ officially introduced by South Africa) was inaugurated in 1972 in Katima Mulilo for Caprivian leaders to indulge in a measure of self-government, supported and funded by Pretoria and later the South African Government in Windhoek. In this Assembly, a surprising level of support for South Africa was expressed by a number of spokesmen suggesting an unusually high effort made by South African administrators at ingratiating the colonial Government with local leaders. Much sadness and a degree of trepidation even, at the likely activities of Zambian Lozis after Namibian independence, was expressed in the Assembly at its winding up in 1989 prior to the independence of Namibia. The following example is typical of statements indicating the subdued mood and fears expressed by members:

_We hear some unfounded rumours sometimes and we are becoming confused._

_To me there is cause for seriousness as far as the implementation of Resolution_

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435 is concerned. Some say the governments beyond the borders of Namibia will use Angola to bring along the Kwanyama-speaking people to vote for Swapo and some Zambian Lozi-speaking people to vote for Swapo. What does all this mean? To me it is not acceptable...  

Clearly the idea that Zambian Lozis would vote for SWAPO was a South African ploy to sow further seeds of doubt and confusion into the minds of Caprivians as it extremely unlikely that many Zambians in Barotseland would have volunteered to go to Caprivi to vote for SWAPO given the history of the organisation in Barotseland.

In the 1980s, some Caprivians formed the Caprivi Alliance Party (CAP), which took part in the Democratic Türnhalle Alliance (DTA), the South African Government’s attempt at installing a puppet regime in Namibia along with participants from several other indigenous groups in Namibia including the Herero and Nama.

Fifthly, the South African Defence Force (SADF) trained and used Caprivians as trackers and scouts and even incorporated these into their battalions. Most often they were Kxoe San but recruits were accepted from other groups, a measure that could not do other than heighten animosities between SWAPO fighters and Caprivians. This animosity was in any case evident after the split between SWAPO and its Vice-President, Mishake Muyongo, who would later go on to lead a fight for Caprivi independence. Muyongo, a direct descendent of Simataa Kabende, had been at the forefront of the liberation struggle against South Africa as a Caprivian and helped, as a young man, to form the Caprivi African National Union (CANU) in 1964, which, later the same year merged with SWAPO although there is considerable disagreement over the terms of this alliance. Muyongo claims that the agreement had always been that in the event of the overthrow of the apartheid regime in Namibia, Caprivi would have the option of going its own way or of joining with the rest of Namibia in a united state. This version is borne

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66 Statement by E. S. Likando contained in the minutes of the ‘Special Session of the Legislative Assembly of the Caprivians’, 14 to 15-03-1989 – held at Katima Mulilo (Government Printer, Windhoek).
67 Interview with Mishake Muyongo, ex-President of Caprivi African National Union (CANU) in exile in Copenhagen, 04-12-2000.
out by a statement to the press in Zambia by CANU’s Regional Secretary in Livingstone, F.M. Siomunyi in December 1964:

*The people of Caprivi are not struggling for their independence to join up with any of their neighbours...We are dedicated to the freedom of Caprivi alone. When we are free, it will be up to the people to decide whether or not to join any country.*

SWAPO, through its president, Sam Nujoma, who was the signatory for the organisation at the meeting, denies this version of events, saying that there was only ever an agreement for ‘One Namibia, One Nation. A press statement issued on 5th November 1964 appears to bear out that version of the discussion.

**The Angola effect**

Meanwhile in Barotseland’s western regions abutting the border with Angola, disruption to local people’s lives occurred from the mid-1960s up to the present day. There has been a flow of migrants crossing into Barotseland from Angola throughout recorded history. It certainly took place in the pre-colonial era when large sections of the Mbunda peoples moved to Bulozi, probably in the late eighteenth century, following strife caused by succession battles in the Mbunda homeland beyond the Kwando River. The Mbunda were received hospitably and became a part of Lozi society and politics. In the twentieth century, people migrated east due to increasing poverty in Angola, first under Portuguese colonial rule and later as a result of the wars of attrition engaged in by Angola’s putative liberation movements, aided and abetted by the CIA (via Mobutu of the then Zaire), South Africa, the Soviet Union and Cuba. In the first half of the century the flow of migrants consisted partly of men on their way to the Wenela recruiting posts at Mongu, Katima Mulilo and Livingstone. Apart from this, there were Mbunda,

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68 Central African Mail, 04-12-1964, p. 2.
69 Press statement made by Sam Nujoma, President, SouthWest Africa Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) and Albert Muyongo, Vice-President, Caprivi African National Union (CANU), Lusaka, 5th November 1964 (copy in author’s possession).
70 Interview with Chief Ciengele of the Mbunda, Limulunga, July 2001.
Baluchazi, Nyengo and other peoples who had fallen under the Lozi umbrella nation of peoples in the pre-colonial era and now simply sought a more secure and peaceful lifestyle in Barotseland where colonial rule was perceived as more benign. They became peasant labourers or just joined relatives already in Barotseland. Many were unable to obtain land or take up remunerative work, swelling the dependent sector of the population during a period when much of the productive workforce which would have been employed in food production or other specialised activities in the pre-colonial era, were spending most of their time labouring in a foreign land.

From the 1960s onwards, some of the flow of people out of Angola consisted of refugees fleeing political instability and fighting and amongst these were some agents provocateurs and what could loosely be termed freedom fighters. In the period 1966-1968, the Portuguese military was also not shy of crossing into Zambian territory in pursuit of supposed Angolan terrorists. In truth, the Portuguese colonial authority, like the MPLA Government in Luanda that was to follow, and like both the Kaunda and later Chiluba regimes in Lusaka, were highly suspicious of the perceived links between Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA movement, based amongst the Ovimbundu peoples of the Angolan central highlands, and the Lozi of Barotseland. Indeed there was deep suspicion both in Lusaka and Luanda that Savimbi, to whom ex-Lozi peoples in southeastern Angola largely gave their allegiance, received considerable quantities of strategic resources such as fuel and arms with the help and connivance or at least the tacit support of Lozis as Marcum suggests:

*Lusaka’s persisting distrust of Savimbi was based on UNITA co-operation with the secession prone Lozi of Zambia’s western border region of Barotseland.*

Nyengo people whose homeland was split into two by the 1905 border agreement adjudicated upon between Britain and Portugal by the King of Italy, found loyalties strained by the Portuguese. Up to the mid-1960s, Barotse Nyengo traded with

Angolan Nyengo, particularly cattle for salt. During the colonial era, British pounds were a much sought-after currency in Angola that bought clothes, finger millet and cassava. As the Portuguese were few on the ground, much toing and froing from one side of the border to the other took place, ‘while we all dressed like typical villagers, the Portuguese took no notice of us’. One respondent claimed that,’ people that were still illiterate thought the Portuguese were OK, the more educated ones hated them’. What becomes clear, talking to people of the border regions is that those they called Portuguese were very often not whites but Mbundus from the coastal hinterland surrounding Luanda, ‘and Mbundus just wanted to kill Zambian people regardless, especially well-dressed ones’.72 The Portuguese, themselves, did come in anger on occasion though, straying into Barotseland in helicopter gunships that fired into villages in Kalabo district causing deaths and injuries, many unrecorded.73 These events received very little publicity at the time outside of Zambia. After Angolan independence in 1975 it was to be MPLA troops, UNITA and white South Africans who strayed into Barotseland while prosecuting the civil war in Angola.

For Lozis, Savimbi became a cult figure inspiring a mixture of fear and respect, not least for his ability to stay alive. Every year, rumour has it that Savimbi would come to a certain witch in Kalabo district to renew his spiritual protection which made his body impervious to bullets. Savimbi was also known in some quarters to regularly visit the UNHCR camp at Nangweshi, some 80 km from the Angolan border.74 The traffic was not all one-way, however, trade did indeed take place from Barotse territory. A senior member of the BRE confirmed that shipments of fuel and food supplies often plied the route from Senanga via Shangombo, disappearing into the Angolan bush down little known tracks known only to local people. In the other direction came shipments of diamonds and other precious stones, both as payment for much needed supplies and to be traded for hard currency. When the Angolan government opened a consulate in Mongu, which still operates, it was not for the processing of visas or as a gesture of political goodwill, but rather to keep an eye on the comings and goings of people and goods across the border and at the various refugee reception camps around the region.

72 Interview with Maybin Monde Nasilele, age 48 of Sikongo village, Kalabo district 26-09-2002.
73 Ibid.
74 Information supplied by two members of the BRE who preferred to remain anonymous.
The same respondent told of Savimbi’s oft-expressed feelings of affinity and gratitude to the Lozi people.

The region west of the Bulozi floodplain bordering Angola and including Kalabo district has suffered from extreme remoteness and isolation, even compared to the rest of Barotseland. Due to poverty and lack of access to energy, even the media conduits of information about the outside world: radio, television and the print media, fail to obtain much coverage in these parts. This is partly due to the annual flood and very poor and expensive communications with Zambia and even other parts of Barotseland, not to mention Angola and the Atlantic coast. One might also mention the lack of interest taken in the region once the arguments between Britain and Portugal in the scramble for slices of Africa finally subsided after 1905 when Portugal realised it had neither the means nor the money to develop the region west of the border while Britain lacked the will having more lucrative areas to exploit in such as the mining regions of South Africa. Thus, deprivations imposed by the strife in Angola since the coming of the Portuguese at the start of the nineteenth century, which have continued in one way or another to the present day, have left this border region more traumatised and underdeveloped than most other regions in Sub-Saharan Africa. For local people, their perception of who they are and to whom they owe allegiance has become very fluid over time, resulting in somewhat mobile and flexible notions of citizenship and subjectivity. The essence of Loziness suffered from externally based threats to these remote western areas of Barotseland almost to the same degree as had been the case in Caprivi.

Today, the building of the first ever tarred road from Mongu to Kalabo, which is intended to provide access from eastern Angola and the Kalabo district to the rest of Zambia and to wider Africa (including the Atlantic coast port of Benguella), may bring to an end the feeling of remoteness felt by most living in this region.\(^\text{75}\) This in its turn may

\(^{75}\) This road, being built as a Kuwaiti development project in association with the Arab Development Bank and the Zambian Government, was due for completion in the winter (dry season) of 2004. However, all work had ceased by March 2004 due to design problems in the face of two heavy annual floods and complaints from the BRE regarding access for barges below its spans.
also transform the way that local people feel about themselves and their allegiances in the twenty-first century.

**Effect on Lozi self identification of the Kaunda years**

The Kaunda years 1965 to 1990 were very traumatic for Lozis in Barotseland. Firstly, the impact of losing a sense of independence (due to the low levels of intrusion by colonialism), of being a protectorate like a fondly favoured child (or so it seems in the contemporary era as older Lozis look back), and becoming part of the new state of Zambia was difficult and confusing enough. At the time, many Lozis, particularly outside of royal circles, became genuinely convinced that throwing in Barotseland’s lot with the rest of Zambia would be a good thing for the region and its people. After all, sixty years of British ‘protection’ had hardly resulted in any improvement in the standard of people’s living, quite the reverse in fact. The signs and symbols of modernity so longed for by Lewanika, were still largely missing from most people’s lives. An overbearing and stifling royal establishment had indeed been tamed by Kaunda and the nationalists, but to what advantage? Firstly Lozis discovered that they actually did not like the idea of their cherished symbols of identity being denigrated. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, this denigration had had no materially beneficial effects on people’s lives; once again, the opposite seemed to be nearer the truth. Other parts of Zambia, particularly the region bordering the ‘line of rail’, seemed to survive the catastrophic impacts on Zambia’s imploding economy during the first and second republics rather better.

The lure of the radical Kaunda and the leading Lozis who joined the UNIP bandwagon had proved irresistible to the majority of Barotseland’s voters at the 1963 general election. Furthermore, the BRE and its figurehead, Litunga Sir Mwanawina III, knighted by Britain, were largely perceived to have become obsessed with self-interest and the preservation of their own status and living standards at the expense of the rest of the population. Of course, this had been true throughout history but the effect of British colonialism had been to sever the link of interdependency between royalty and
commoner with the abolition of servitude and slavery and the imposition of taxes and the migrant labour regime.

The signing of the Barotseland Agreement at least meant that the national figurehead of the Lozis would not be swallowed up like all the other chiefs in Zambia. In other words, Barotseland would still retain its uniqueness and its traditional structure with which people identified, just as it had during the colonial era. By later abrogating the Agreement less than five years after its signing and casting scorn on the Litunga, now treating him like any other chief in Zambia, Kaunda made a serious error of judgement if he really wanted to keep ordinary Lozis on board. For Lozis, even those who had joined the nationalists, there was disquiet over the treatment of Mwanawina, representing as he did, that most revered of Lozi institutions, the kingship. What Kaunda had failed to appreciate was the importance of the Kingship to the Lozi consciousness. Thus to subordinate and chastise a Litunga, even an apparently unpopular one, was to subordinate the institution of kingship, an affront to Lozi dignity, something that struck at the very fibre of the Lozi consciousness, and was bound to be resented, particularly at a time when other exigencies were being imposed on Barotseland.

A catalogue of events and dynamics can be discerned from the Kaunda years that served to make Lozis revisit the nature of their identity and notions of citizenship and subjectivity. These were the cessation of migrant labour recruitment in 1966, the abolition of the Barotseland Agreement in 1969, the emplacement of SWAPO camps and the FFs who spoke predominantly Oshiwambo and Afrikaans, the creation of the Home Guards who acted as spies for the Kaunda administration, and the intimidation and humiliation suffered at the hands of foreign white soldiers, first Portuguese then white South African prosecuting war against other Africans on Barotse soil. Together with the lack of development and an overall increase in the grinding poverty encountered in rural Barotseland, particularly in the south, Lozis were left questioning the wisdom of losing their colonial connection after all. It had never been explained to them that Britain had been instrumental in forcing Mwanawina to accept incorporation into Zambia. Many were left wondering if Kaunda did not like Lozis or simply did not care for their welfare.
Either way, a feeling of betrayal started to become entrenched that grew as Kaunda detained Mundia and moved to a one-party state that brooked no criticism. The appointment of Godwin Mbikusita-Lewanika to the Litungaship in 1968 after Mwanawina had passed away did nothing to reduce the unease felt by those Lozis both inside and outside royal circles who no longer trusted Kuanda and UNIP. The elections of 1968, when UNIP lost most of its seats in Barotseland are testament to this.

Meanwhile, there were some notable Lozis who did well and seemed to be respected by Kaunda and these supported him throughout. These included the Wina brothers Arthur and Sikota, Mulena Mokwae Nakatindi Yeta Nganga of Sesheke, both royals, and Dr M.M. Bull, the first African woman graduate of the Rhodesias who went on to complete a doctorate and later undertook several ministerial appointments under Kaunda including Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. These however were generally in the minority and another problem for the Lozi consciousness during this era was the way in which they were thought of by other groups in Zambia. There had perhaps always been a latent jealousy brought on by the appointment of better educated Lozis in the colonial era to supervisory positions on the Copperbelt and in the colonial service. This was made worse by the obvious devotion of the Lozis to a traditional leader that clearly meant more to many Lozis than the government of Zambia. The same did not apply elsewhere because of differential treatment under the British who did more to undermine and dismantle traditional authority elsewhere. Lozis sometimes became thought of as selfish and interested only in their own welfare, wanting to speak only their own language and other such jibes. The BRE was talked about disparagingly as an anachronism and inimical to a modern state. In truth much of the rancour was borne out of jealousy but for Lozis, who were suffering underdevelopment and the imposition of external symbols of power in their homeland, the impact on identity was to reinforce a sense of Loziness.

76 Some of the story behind the success stories of Mukwae Nakatindi and Dr Bull are contained in Nalumango, M. and Sifuniso, M. (eds.) Woman Power in Politics (Zambia Womens Writer's Association, Lusaka, 1998), an essentially biographical work that also exposes some of the conflitual relations in Lozi politics during the era of the First Zambian Republic.
Perhaps the greatest impact on the Lozi psyche, particularly in the south, during this period, was the deprivations of the freedom struggle that saw southern Barotseland turned almost into a battlefield. During this period also, differences between Lozis of all hues (including particularly the Subias) in Caprivi and in Zambia became seriously entrenched. The propaganda campaign indulged in by the South Africans was partly to blame for this as was the development handed to Caprivi at a time when Barotseland proper was suffering serious underdevelopment. The Lozi consciousness was seriously traumatised during this period.

Not since the invasion of the Makololo had Lozis been made to feel belittled in their own homeland by foreigners. Fear engendered bitterness and re-ignited a new sense of unity and common bonding borne out of deprivation and adversity. Impoverishment and disillusion with outsiders actually seemed to enforce a new sense of Loziness. With few of the trappings of modernity that would engender associationist, horizontal modes of ethnicity, people turned to their history and to their perceived collective origins for succour. In history, there was valour, the articulation of power, wealth and pride. It was a kind of turning inwards, an introversion to vertical, communitarian values that was to continue after the Kaunda era came to its inglorious end and was replaced by the Movement for Multi-Party democracy led by a trade unionist, Frederick Chiluba, aided by notable Lozis in its formation, just as had UNIP, thirty years beforehand.
7 Lozi culture, the articulation of Loziness

Throughout this work, allusion has been made to the idea of specialness in the self-image of Lozi consciousness. Specialness here denotes distinctiveness as well as heightened value and inputs directly into the Lozi identification of self and otherness and thus into citizenship and subjectivity. The value that Lozis attach to what is to them a unique cultural heritage that expresses itself through a similarly unique set of behavioural and cultural modalities and grand displays of heritage, is core to the whole Lozi nation project. This chapter skates across the surface of Lozi culture in order to point the gaze of the onlooker at the way in which Lozis construct their self-view and to provide a fibrous glue with which to cement the temporal components of the nation’s history. Throughout there will be seen to be specific aspects of Lozi culture that have survived the tumults of history that serve to articulate the nation today. It should be noted that there is no attempt here to exclusivise Lozi society and culture from other African cultures or the passion with which these are also articulated. Many of the cultural practices and traits described here can be found in other African societies. What is sought here is to provide an analysis of the depth of feeling with which Lozi culture is expressed.

Respect, comportment and class

Chapter Six described and explained the affinity that Lozis feel for Britain and Britishness. Some of the answer to the link with Britishness lies in the comparisons Lozis make with their own systems of respect and comportment. Lozi comportment is founded on the giving and receiving of respect. By respect, what is meant is the accreditation of value, esteem and honour to the Lozi self, to other Lozis depending on their position in terms of age, gender and class and to non-Lozis considered to have relation or value to the Lozi self or nation. Of particular relevance here is the conceptualisation of the Lozi self. The world Bo in Silozi is a respectful form of address equivalent perhaps to the English use of the word ‘honourable’. When learning the Silozi language one is often encouraged to refer to oneself in introductions as Bo since it is considered good etiquette to ‘respect yourself’. Herein can be seen some of the explanation for the way that Lozis are perceived by others. When members of other groups in Zambia complain
about Lozis it usually has to do with the way that Lozis consider themselves to be special as this quote suggests:

These Lozis think they are so special, they do not want to speak anybody else’s language but their own; they just think they are better than the rest of us. They value themselves and their culture too highly. We cannot let any of them take positions of power in this country because they will just treat themselves...¹

Much of this perception, it is argued here, can be ascribed to a misunderstanding of the strong emphasis in Lozi culture on self-respect.

Particularly amongst those who come from the royal and chiefly classes, there is a very distinctive self-awareness and a bearing that people carry. Gendered subordination is also much diminished in the royal class. Walking the streets of any Barotseland town it is easily possible to spot the Mikwae (sing.-Mukwae - Royal princesses), of whom there are many. Frequently, a Mukwae will have few worldly possessions but will walk with a bearing and wear colourful smart clothes that mark her out from other women. She will speak to men with a confidence that would not be attempted by women of more lowly classes. Certainly, such individuals will expect and be accorded respect on a different level to other women. This is not seen as a humiliating form of self-subordination for commoners, rather an everyday expression of Lozi culture.

Lozis then, learn from birth a code of respect and comportment known as Likute. While to most outsiders, the Lozi system of respect, politeness and manners is, even today, too overt and overblown; to many older Lozis, today’s younger generation have lost much of this cultural glue which helped to bind the nation together. The following refrain was heard often in different forms during the course of field research for this work: Kale likuta la Malozi ne li zibiwa kai ni kai meaning ‘In the past the politeness of

¹ James S. Phiri, bank employee resident in Kabulonga district, Lusaka, interviewed 23-08-2001.
the Malozi was known everywhere’ implying that much of this has been lost over time.\(^2\)

In this system, emphasis is placed on class, age and gender in that order. Children are taught their place in society from an early age and the better their show of respect for elders, the easier their lives will be. As in other African societies, children are also given substantial domestic menial work to do regardless of sex, entrenching their minor status although education has also always been highly valued.

Education and industry remain staple components of Lozi cultural life. The notes of the early European visitors to Barotseland abound with reflections on how hard-working and industrious the Lozis were found to be and how this marked them out from other groups. Livingstone noted that ‘…these very industrious people are situated on both banks of the river; they are expert hunters... and very proficient in the manufacture of articles of wood and iron... Others... make neat and strong baskets...., whilst others excel in pottery....\(^3\) Livingstone was also told of a Lozi who had devised a way of leading water from the Zambezi at the Sioma Falls for irrigation purposes.\(^4\) Holub, meanwhile, was perhaps the most ecstatic:

Even before I crossed the Zambezi I had heard about the handicrafts of Sepopo’s peoples...Clay vessels: In no other south African native tribe did I find such perfection of this article as in the Marutse kingdom. I have to praise the variety of shapes, the thorough craftsmanship and the décor both in small objects and in huge vessels... Spoons and calabash ladles: the most beautiful of these I found again in the Marutse empire... Building structures: in the art of building the tribes of the Marutse-Mambunda empire surpass most of the native tribes south of the Zambezi and equal those who are the best...\(^5\)


\(^4\) Ibid., p. 213.

Even Coillard, who was loathe to attribute anything positive to the character of his Lozi flock, partly as a reaction to the lack of conversions to Christianity and partly in case it put off potential benefactors, had to admit:

*These Barotsi astonish me: they are certainly the most industrial of any blacks I have known. They do everything necessary with only a few implements... Lewanika likes work...he has had a workshop built... You will find him there in his leisure hours, working with his own hands, with about ten workmen under his orders. What does he do there? Or rather, what does he not do?*

Lewanika made the provision of useful knowledge for vocational skills such as construction and schooling pivotal roles expected of European missionaries and of the BASC. It was a constant source of irritation to him that missionaries put conversion to Christianity and teaching about God above educating his people in matters that he thought were useful for the development and modernisation of the nation such as vocational skills, science and the English language, particularly for the royal family and other Lozi elites. It was really a conflict over the purpose of education with Coillard seeming to imply that, as the mission was providing the service, so it should have first call on the output of that service. This eventually led to the ‘Ethiopian episode’ narrated by Coillard and analysed by Ranger in which Lewanika, anxious for the modernisation and development that he craved for the nation and frustrated at the obfuscation of the Paris missionaries, invited one Willie Mokalapa, previously a catechist under Coillard, to open a branch of the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AMEC) in Lealui in return for assistance in the modernisation and education of the Barotse Kingdom. Of particular interest to the anglophile Lewanika was the notion introduced by Mokalapa that local people could be taught to read, write and speak English in just two to three months.

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8 Ranger, ‘The ‘Ethiopian’ episode...’ op cit.
This project only fell apart after Mokalapa lost most of £700 entrusted to him by Lewanika to buy supplies in Cape Town and Lewanika was unable to pay the AMEC teachers resident in Barotseland. Nevertheless, the whole sorry episode did lead the BSAC to set up the Barotse National School (BNS) in 1906 which was to be the only non-mission school in Northern Rhodesia until after the Second World War. While mostly funded from the Lozi share of the Hut Tax, the school, staffed mostly by British teachers and ex-teachers from the Paris mission schools, was extremely popular and led to a preference on the Copperbelt for educated Lozis for clerical staff and foremen, something that was to lead to considerable jealousy on the part of other groups later on. An article about the BNS in the Livingstone Mail provides an idea of the enthusiasm for the school and the support given by Lewanika for the project:

*He (Lewanika) was highly delighted to see all the various departments in full swing... After 3 o'clock tea he called his chiefs together and instructed them to see that everything was done to make the school a success... Already more pupils are applying than can be accommodated and some have had to be turned away... Every credit is due to the Chief for the energy and enterprise he is displaying in opening up his country.*

*It is astonishing to note the marvellous progress that has been made since the arrival of the engine and saw-bench imported by Chief Lewanika...*

As already stated, Lozis respect themselves and each other. They also respect hierarchy and the exercise of power and authority, particularly where this is seen to be eminently just. Lozi society is a rigidly class-based society, even in towns like Mongu where modernistic politico-economic practices dominate. Today, there are senior royals (of the four branches of Lewanika’s family that followed him to the Litungaship, with prominence given to the family of the incumbent Litunga), there are other royals, and there are commoners divided into those who are of the chiefly classes, and others. Most often, people of subjugated groups from outside of the Bulozi plain subsist within the latter class with the notable exception of their chiefs who are awarded mats in the main Kuta. Generally only those who are considered to be ‘true Malozi’ i.e. descended from

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9 Ibid. p. 36.
10 Livingstone Mail No. 49, 02-03-1907, copy consulted at Livingstone Museum.
11 Livingstone Mail No. 52, 23-03-1907, copy consulted at Livingstone Museum.
the original Luyi may attain the most elevated positions in society. That said, since the earliest periods of Luyi history, all Lozi royals have had blood ties of one sort or another with peoples of other groups, particularly Subia from southern Barotseland and Caprivi. Not only that, as was proved in the colonial era, even respected outsiders can be awarded respect and status. From earliest remembered time, outsiders such as Livingstone, the Arab Said Ben-Habib, the trader Westbeech, the missionaries Arnot and Coillard and the scholar Gluckman, as well as numerous senior colonial administrators were given Lozi names and treated with varying degrees of respect according to their attitude towards the Lozi nation.12

In the nineteenth century, early European explorers found Lozi society, in the south at least, divided basically into Malozi, who were the owners of people and divided into their own class structure as described above, and slaves who comprised the majority and existed at the behest of the Malozi.13 But this was too arbitrary and betrayed the European tendency to try to conflate and categorise African peoples too narrowly. Class then, as in other African societies, is something Lozis grow up with, an expression of identity that is a cultural artefact, deeply etched on the Lozi psyche. It was explored previously in the case of the Makololo and will be explored later with the rise of the New Apostolic Church in Barotseland.

Apart from missionaries and traders who were few in number, the British that Lozis met during much of the colonial era were mostly of the military officer class who also had highly developed systems of discipline and respect and this induced many Lozis once again to draw parallels between the two cultures. To the Lozi, only peoples who sufficiently respect themselves and others can learn the true value of life and become great peoples. Respect breeds pragmatism, reason and wisdom. Both the Makololo and the British, to varying extents, fulfilled these qualities. As invasive forces from the outside, both were resented to varying degrees. Yet whilst accepting the very different

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12 An article containing various names attributed to whites in Barotseland over time was compiled by Y.K. Libakeni ‘The white tribesmen of the west’ published in The Lowdown (March 2003) and online at <http://www.lowdown.co.zm/2004/2004-03/whitetribesmen.htm> last visited 21-09-04.

13 For example, Emil Holub, A Cultural Survey of the Lozi-Mbunda Kingdom in South Central Africa (Royal Imperial Geographical Society, Vienna, 1879) p. 16.
nature of their intrusion on the Lozi consciousness, both forces carried with them some mystical qualities and modes of comportment that resonated with Likute.

Concomitant and related to the giving and accepting of respect, there exists the concept of courtesy or politeness. The courtesy expected by and awarded to British colonial officers and the practice of saluting, so conspicuous among the British military and police, was particularly resonant for the Lozi system of comportment. Lozis have an even more elaborate form of greeting and salutation that is an integral part of everyday behaviour and this is a type of clapping called *kukande lela* (to clap or pay respect to). When greeting someone in the street or even after an absence of just a few hours, Lozis treat one another with a ritual of clapping and bending of the knees reminiscent of a mini-curtsey (see Figure 1). This may be repeated a couple of times with enthusiastic enquiries after each other’s health and that of family and loved ones. In the home or court of a chief, a child, subject or other commoner will kneel then sit with both legs folded together around the body to indicate respect, fealty, subordination and subjectivity. In the case of close relatives or enthusiastic respect, kissing of the palm of hand by the submissive party known as *kutubeta* is also practised although not as much as in olden times (See Figure 2).
Figure 1. Lozi respectful greeting with correct stance and preliminary clapping.

Figure 2. Lozi respectful greeting showing the kiss to the palm of the hand. (Note the use of the left hand to respectfully proffer the right for the embrace.)
Several other aspects of formality in behaviour are common to Lozi culture. Some of these resonate with other African cultures. For example, it is not polite to sit with crossed legs when in the presence of an elder or chief. In the case of the most senior chiefs and chieftainesses and the Litunga, any but highly respected visiting dignitaries are expected to approach their chiefs in a subservient kneeling pose, shuffling forward with head bowed, clapping in short controlled bursts and then throwing both arms in the air uttering salutations reserved for the high office of the incumbent chief (a practise known by the verb *kushelela*).14

Visitors to Lewanika’s court were baffled by the way that a line of servants had to hand one another dishes while in a servile kneeling position. Lisimba describes the act of ‘ascending’ when approaching the Lozi King, ‘representing a movement from a lower to a higher ground... like climbing a mountain... suggesting the inaccessibility and unparalleled authority of the ruler’.15 No Lozi, or indeed any other person, may occupy a position that places him or her physically higher than the Litunga. Indeed, any person of perceived lower status, even if they are important in their own right e.g. politicians or foreign ambassadors, would be expected to obey the same behavioural caveats. When Yeta III finally managed to visit England for the coronation of George VI in May 1937 near to the end of his reign, it was, the Litunga claimed, one of the crowning moments of his life to be able to *shoalela* in front of the somewhat surprised and bemused looking English monarch.16 Quite simply then, the exercise of respect and courtesy is core to Lozi comportment and is a historical cultural artefact.

Outsiders and visitors, particularly Europeans, are often, but not always, forgiven observance of these ritualistic cabals but are warmed to instantly when making the attempt to observe the Lozi system of respect. The greetings described here are practised in all situations, domestic or otherwise throughout Barotseland and wherever

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14 In the Litunga’s case the cry of salutation is always ‘Yo sho! Yo sho!’.
16 As recorded in the narrative kept of the visit in 1937 of Yeta to England for the coronation of George VI by G.R.R. Stevens, District Officer – Northern Rhodesia (document dated 19th June 1937, NAZ File No. A/36)
Lozis live in the world. They mark the Lozi out from other peoples in the region, partly because they are different and partly due to the overt and unaltering way they are articulated. The Lozi system of respect is also a highly prized component of self-identification and a way of othering non-Lozis. Lozi myths about the British suggest that the latter also respect each other in a similarly formal way and it is invariably shocking for Lozis who, in rural Barotseland at least, are not privy to TV or newspaper access to discover the apparent lack of formality and respect for authority, particularly male authority, especially amongst white women and younger people of European descent in the contemporary era. Yet there is still a lingering perception that perhaps in Britain at least, behavioural patterns are still comparable.

**Belief: Kingship and royal power**

The vibrant indigenous belief system of the Lozis including the creation myths have already been alluded to in Chapter Two. It consists essentially of the cult of Nyambe, the Lozi God, Livingstone’s ‘Nyámpi’, creator and ruler over all things, who went to heaven in order to escape the pestilential attentions of Kamunu, the imperfect male human who killed animals and defiled the earth with his behaviour. In these myths, the Bulozi floodplain and the omnipresent Zambezi River (Lyambai) play their roles. Here also, we see the way in which the Kingship is brought into being and permanentised through a direct line of male descent from Nyambe and the first female monarchs of the Luyi – Mwambwa and Mbuywamwambwa. At the heart of the Lozi traditional belief system then, lies the institution of Kingship and the cult of Nyambe as does the arguably more important institution of ancestor cult whereby a King becomes more powerful and influential after his death.

The royal graves and ancestor cult is central to Lozi state formation and an understanding of the institution of Lozi Kingship. What needs to be understood is that the importance and role of the King as the visible figurehead of the Lozi nation during his human lifetime is not as significant as that which he takes on after his death. After death, a king becomes more powerful because, as stated earlier, it is from the spirit

world that kings dictate and endorse decisions and nominations. Thus a new king must visit all the burial sites of previous kings but, most importantly, those of Mbuywamwambwa and Mboo first, to pay homage, make offerings and seek approval. When a king dictates his burial place, people will go and build a village around that site and a guardian called Nomboti (plural Limbote) is appointed to look after and guard the site, act as an intermediary and make offerings which are left at a small opening into the grave (Limbwata) through which the spirit of a departed king may access what is left for him. At specific times, such as natural disaster or war, the reigning king presents a sacrifice in the form of an ox to the Nomboti who sees to the slaughter, and presents the suitable parts at the Limbwata. At other times a king or other notable may seek the advice of a royal spirit and this is conducted through the Nomboti who takes any reply received to the King or other consulting party.

The Nomboti thus plays a vital role in the purview of kingship which is why there is a dance dedicated to them during the Kuomboka festivities. During the course of research for this work, it was found to be difficult, as a white person, to approach any of the royal grave sites and there are specific aspects of privacy that are enshrined in the form of taboos maintained around the Kingdom at these cenotaphs. These are as follows:

- it is a taboo for a person to whistle close to a grave site;
- it is a taboo to cross ground close to a grave site while wearing shoes or anything else that covers the feet;
- it is forbidden to build a house whose roof is triangular in shape unless this is just on the side elevation;
- it is a taboo to rear or domesticate chickens close to a grave site;
- it is forbidden for any white ‘man’ or foreigner to enter the area of a royal grave site.

The last of these taboos served as an insurmountable barrier to Europeans in their search to breach the bonds of loyalty between Lozi royals and their subjects,

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19 Ibid
20 Interview with Inengu Muyunda Ananyatele, Limulunga 12 to 30-07-2001.
mainly due to ignorance which in itself would not have been helped by the Lozi custom of releasing only as much information about the Lozi nation and consciousness as absolutely necessary. Although exclusion of ‘foreigners’ was clearly a strategy designed to conserve the exclusivity of the symbols of Lozi power, it was also largely by their disrespect for Lozi culture and belief that Europeans found themselves debarred from the Royal gravesites.21

As with many other groups in central and southern Africa, fire plays an important role as a sign of life, provider of warmth and light and a resource for cooking. When a king dies, an event which is formally announced to the nation, all fires are put out and a new one lit ceremonially by the new king from which, by tradition, all other fires in the kingdom should be lit.22 This tradition, like so many others, is said to exist in Lozi culture and customs from the time of Mboo.

The origins of the kingship, which is seen as a divinely ordained event,23 are intimately tied to the origins of the Lozi people making one and the other inseparable. Although it is sacrilege to say so out loud, Nyambe is often suggested to have fathered Mbuywamwambwa, mother of the first Lozi King, Mboo (Muyunda Mwanasilandu), through an incestuous union with his daughter Mwambwa (see Chapter Two, page 9). Since then, all Litungas have been descended in a direct line from this first King. On elevation to the Kingship or Litungaship, the Lozi king partially leaves the world of ordinary mortals and enters into a mystical immortal realm whereby he becomes an intermediary between Nyambe and the Lozi people. In describing accession to the Buganda Kingship which bears so many similarities to that of the Lozi, Kiwanuka says that the king becomes ‘the vicar of God’.24 This mystical realm is reached after the prince elected for the Litungaship has gone through a series of ceremonies and rituals including attendance at the cenotaphs of the most influential of departed Kings such as Mboo, Mulambwa and Lewanika. During this time, a newly appointed Litunga learns all

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21 For example, the missionary Coillard, not for the first time, upset local sensibilities in the Senanga area when he refused to pay homage at the tomb of Mwanambinje at Imatongo in 1885, see Coillard, On the Threshold, pp. 170-171.
23 Mainga Bulozi under the Luyana Kings…, p. 23.
that is expected of him in terms of his duties and his expected behaviour. The person of the King is in another category, set above that of ordinary human beings. Once appointed, the persona of the King is elevated out of the sphere of other royals and enters into a parallel but higher realm of mystery and ritualism. A King does not ordinarily communicate with commoners, relying on the chief commoner, his Ngambela (Prime Minister), to represent both himself to the people and the people to him. A King should rarely, if ever, show emotion such as anger, sadness or great pleasure as this is not behaviour befitting one who is held to be on the level of a God. A King is normally referred to ‘through the use of figurative language when referring to his person and the objects of his household’.

The seemingly remote, aloof and mystical British monarchy, to whom British soldiers and officers asserted their apparently unswerving allegiance and loyalty and in whose name they claimed to be acting, represented the sort of royal power which Lozis, particularly those in the elite, related to and understood. When Lewanika and Yeta went to England it was for a coronation on both occasions. Thus what they perceived when they saw King Edward VII and George VI respectively was a king surrounded by adoring adulatory crowds while ostensibly remaining aloof and nonchalant of the adoration heaped upon them apart from regal waves. These monarchs were removed from the masses. Undoubtedly this would have reminded the Lozi Kings of the traditional behaviour of Lozi monarchs and their subjects. Johnson observed when invited to a court in Lewanika’s presence in 1892:

In front of him were his band of drummers and marimba players. Each company of men, as they assembled..., while at some distance began clapping their hands in unison; and taking their places raised their hands above their heads and shouted the royal salutation... After kneeling, they continue clapping, and bow their faces to the earth three times. To all this pomp and ceremony, with which the Marotsi have for ages surrounded their sovereign, Lewanika paid no attention but kept up a long conversation with me through an interpreter.

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26 James Johnson, op. cit., p. 138.
Belief: Christianity and the Church in Barotseland

Since the arrival of Europeans, Christianity has become integrated into the cultural life of the Lozi peoples. Lozis see their nation as an overtly Christian nation without losing any respect for traditional beliefs. As Gorer noted when observing the embeddedness of the Catholics in Ouagadougou, Christian missionaries throughout Africa were enabled in their crusade to convert African peoples by the many corollaries between Christianity and indigenous belief systems.27 In the Lozi case there is the great flood set back in history to the time of Mboo when the first Nalikwanda was built corresponding in a remote way to Noah’s Ark. Then there is the concept of the hereafter, heaven as the Lozis refer to it, Litooma, the village of God, a kind of mystical nirvana that man strives to reach.

The first permanent missionaries were, as previously described, Coillard and the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (PEMS). Their church was subsumed, together with the United Church of Central Africa in Rhodesia, the congregations of the Copperbelt Free Church Council and the Methodist Church into the United Church of Zambia (UCZ) by Zambia’s first republican government in 1965 as part of Kaunda’s nation-building efforts. However, the unity of this spiritual coalition of faiths was broken on 14th March 1997 when the Methodists and the Church of Barotseland reasserted their independence amid claims that the UCZ was not ‘following its responsibilities’ and for ‘lack of vision and seriousness over church matters by the UCZ leadership...’ (which at synods had become more dominated by the Copperbelt membership). Finally in a joint statement issued by the two dissenting churches it was declared that, ‘Thirty-two years ago, our individual churches were renowned for their services in education, medical care and agriculture. This was carried out in co-operation with other churches like the Roman Catholic, Anglican, Reformed Church, Salvation Army and the Seventh Day Adventist, all of whom have visibly and commendably shown the growth of their church work’.28

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28 Statement issued by the Rev. Isaac Mumpansha of the Methodist Church and the Rev. Gilbert Musialela of the Church of Barotseland 5th May 1997, quoted online at <http://ospiti.peacelink.it/anb-bia/nr329/e08.html>
Complaints from the Church of Barotseland included the stripping of assets in Barotseland, particularly from the old PEMS headquarters in Sefula and Mabumbu where there had been a teacher training college and sizeable secondary schools and transferring these to Livingstone and the Copperbelt, failing to support the mission hospital in Mwandi (royal village near Sesheke), allowing church buildings in Barotseland to deteriorate and failing to fund the construction of new premises. Together these were held to have been responsible for the running down of the church in Barotseland leaving the arena free for other Christian faiths such as the New Apostolics and SDA to gain dominance. This led to the re-formation of what was now officially named the Church of Barotseland, which was only allowed to register on 22\textsuperscript{nd} January 1999, perceiving itself as the torch-bearer of Christianity in the region as introduced by the Paris missionaries and remaining well-respected by most Lozis, including those who belong to other faiths. Meanwhile, it has been unable to recover any assets from the UCZ and has been accused of being a ‘tribal’ church due to its use of the name Barotseland, an accusation rebutted by the Secretary-General of the church who says that Barotseland is just the name of the country in which the church was first established, which is no different from the Church of England or the Roman Catholic Church.\textsuperscript{29}

The history of the formation of the UCZ and the splinter groups that broke off is one of the state under the guidance of Kaunda trying to modernise belief by centralising the church in Zambia. In so doing it was hoped to destroy all missionary influence and any perceived ‘tribal’ benefits in the field of social welfare such as education which were seen as the proper preserve of the state. After the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement and the ending of migrant labour to South Africa followed by the staging of part of the ‘Freedom War’ of other countries on Barotseland’s soil and the terrorising of the local population by government and foreign forces alike, it is not hard to see why local adherents of the old PEMS saw the treatment of the church in Barotseland as state colonialism. These processes simply mirrored the political dynamics of the region but are interesting here as a partial explanation at least for the rise of other churches.

\textsuperscript{29} All information contained here concerning the history of the Church of Barotseland supplied during interview with Mbuyawana Mbikusita, Secretary-General of the Church of Barotseland, Mongu on several occasions in July, 2001.
Other Christian churches then, embedded themselves in Barotseland in the twentieth century and these include the Roman Catholics, the Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) and, most notably, the New Apostolics whose church now enjoys the largest following in Barotseland in the contemporary era. In Zambia, whilst the New Apostolic faith is proselytised throughout the country, so closely is the faith associated with Loziness that some churches in Lusaka have even been known to conduct entire services in Silozi. The success of the New Apostolic Church and Seventh Day Adventists amongst Lozis and the emergence and survival of the Church of Barotseland are ascribed to their ability to allow the traditional belief system to exist alongside Christianity without one (particularly the latter) attempting to eliminate the other. The SDA and New Apostolics are also distinctive in that they are all staffed by African Zambians, in Barotseland, mostly Lozis, who not only understand local culture but also share it. This is extremely important in a social arena where witchcraft is considered a very real and important part of spiritual life as will be discussed. It is also the Achilles Heel of the Catholic Church which is led in Barotseland largely by white Europeans who have little time or mental energy for local beliefs. In the case of the New Apostolics also, this writer was told that the formal nature of the structure and services of this church was more to the taste of Lozis. This was explained by the use of a strict male-dominated hierarchy, where considerable power and influence is vested in highly-respected selected individuals (such as District Apostles and District Evangelists). Mention was also made of the separation of men and women in church and the aforementioned respect given to the Lozi traditional belief system and status of Nyambe so closely connected to the existence of the Kingship.30

Belief: magic, witchcraft and divination

Magic, witchcraft and divination, the first three words from the title of Reynolds’s 1963 book on his investigations into allegations of witchcraft in Barotseland for the colonial administration indicate a set of cultural beliefs and sensitivities that run like a thread through Lozi history.31 Once again, no claim of exclusivity is made here for what exists to varying degrees in most African societies and particularly those like the Lozi who have


been exposed least to the rationalising influences of capitalism. Holub remarked on the influence of the Mbunda diviners omnipresent in Sipopa’s court who turned the King into a murderous paranoid schizoid fearful of virtually all his own chiefs and Indunas. Any hint of witchcraft attached to a prospective offender would result in Mwati (a test of truth exercised by the administering of poison) and summary hauling off to be burnt alive or thrown to the crocodiles.

Coillard noted at one stage during his sojourn in Barotseland that nobody dies a natural death in Barotseland meaning that Lozis always attribute death to some spiritual intervention, normally malign in intent. Meanwhile, throughout his record of life with the Lozi, Coillard seems to have been fighting a running battle with the supernatural beliefs of the Lozi, a battle in which he spent most of the time on the losing side. The Lozi use of English provides another way of seeing how Lozi culture views everyday occurrences as being part of some kind of paranormal agenda. For example, if the sun does not shine one day then ‘the sun failed to shine today’. Similarly, if a fish trap is taken out of the water empty then the fish have ‘cheated’ the basket’ and its owner. Lewanika professed later in his reign not to believe in witchcraft and had the Mbunda diviners expelled from his court soon after the ‘restoration’ when responsibility for ills affecting the nation began to be attributed to him. Yet the impacts of witchcraft became a regular feature of life for local colonial officials who, whilst unbelievers, tried unsuccessfully to wipe out what, on the one hand, they could not take seriously, but on the other was a regular cause of crime and other serious disturbance.

The Witchcraft Ordinance of 1948 (amended 1952) attempted to provide a legal basis with which the colonial administration could outlaw what it could not seem to control. After an outbreak of killings due to the activities of Baloi (witches) in late 1956 and early 1957, considerable efforts were made to bring to justice those involved which, unsurprisingly, led to considerable obfuscation and misleading of investigative officers. But it also led to fear, suicides and considerable tension among local people who did not

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like their innermost beliefs and superstitions aired to foreigners. After a year of investigations, Reynolds concluded that 'Witchcraft beliefs are too strong to be driven out by legal methods...Witchcraft, for the African, is a living force and one which plays a very great part in his life'. Yet prejudice meant that few Europeans had understood the nature and power of the Lozi belief on the occult. As Herbert, who studied the records of a Kalabo District Commissioner of the time, attests, ‘...it (the outbreak of killings) was beyond the range of European understanding’. In turn, what the European colonial mind could not understand and what it could not control, it then feared, resented, condemned, and attempted unsuccessfully to eliminate. The colonial effort then, was primarily one of attempting to contain manifestations of witchcraft (or anti-witchcraft), their overriding concern according to Geschiere, ‘was to maintain law and order’. Furthermore, the colonial mind saw witchcraft as evidence of the primitive condition of Africans, equating it with something that white Europeans had endured during some far off time in the past before they became ‘modern’.

Today, belief in witchcraft and magic is still very strong in the countryside and is a fact of life even in the towns of Barotseland, as a recent interview with a youth group spokesman in Mongu shows:

*Buloi* (Witchcraft) *is real. It is going on all around us. There is nothing we can do about it. Black magic is everywhere; we know, most of us have seen it. I am a Christian as are my sisters and brothers like our parents before us. But there are people who are possessed of witchcraft. We call a witch *Muloi*. This is person who kills others thru evil things, visiting others at night, while they are sleeping or even during the day but then they are invisible. This is called juju*

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34 Reynolds records 27 suicides during the course of his investigations into the 1956-7 witchcraft deaths, see Reynolds, op. cit., p. 158.
35 Reynolds, op. cit., p. 165.
We have Mulauli (a witch-finder) a person who can identify people who practice witchcraft. These people use evil devices such as Mushengo which is a device that identifies Baloi (plural of Muloi) by pointing at them or directing the Mulauli. Mushengo can be a person, especially a girl, or a horn. Most witchfinders become powerful by killing someone using juju and become possessed by demons that enable them to recognise witches and wizards.

A Ñaka or witchdoctor is a person who heals and protects from evil. David Livingstone was a Ñaka.

What is striking about the above statement and many others about witchcraft in Lozi culture is not its originality; it has been a feature since earliest known Lozi times and has often been utilised as a modality of “othering” by Lozis and white Europeans. Rather it is the strength of belief in witchcraft in postcolonial Barotseland and this rings true with the findings of scholars who have specialised in the field. As Geschiere comments, ‘The occult forces are... a true obsession – and a highly conspicuous one – to people in postcolonial Africa, most notably in the modern sectors of society’.

Geschiere also quotes a Cameroonian notable who said, ‘Now we Africans are in charge, and we know witchcraft is real’. Evans-Pritchard, in his study of the Azande, contextualised the African belief in witchcraft accurately when he pointed out that witchcraft is nothing out of the ordinary, it is a part of a Zande’s everyday world: ‘There is nothing awe-inspring about witchcraft. They (the Azande) expect to be ill i.e. to be bewitched, and it is not a matter for surprise or wonderment’.

As the above quotation from a Mongu youth leader makes clear, there are three main characters in the Lozi occult: the Witch – Muloi, the witch-finder – Mulauli (literally “witch-smeller”) and the witchdoctor – Ñaka. As Reynolds points out, however, the cast is incomplete without a willing participative audience of clientele, in this case the Lozi.

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40 Ibid. p. 216.
people. The *Muloi* (pl. *Baloi*) is very often a woman and deals mainly in black magic although it is not unknown for witchcraft to be executed in order to protect. The practice of witchcraft in Barotseland occurs in different forms and acts depending on purpose and intent. The distinction between witchcraft and sorcery, the former being performed by those with psychic powers and no paraphernalia and the latter by use of charms and magic is somewhat blurred in Lozi culture. The following is a summary of the most common methodologies as narrated to the writer, the level of efficacy of which cannot normally be determined by the users.

**Night visitations** occur when the target victims are sleeping. Death is usually the desired result. Witches or wizards operate in spirit form or wear materials that make them invisible. The victim is often unconsciously fed pieces of meat from human flesh or blood from other witchcraft victims. It is also believed that this method is employed to recruit others into *buloi*, the targets remaining unaware until it is too late. These are then used by the *muloi* to go out and kill other people, whilst normally remaining unaware of their nocturnal prowls.

**Indirect/remote killings** take place when a *muloi* plants charms on a path used by the target person whose death is desired. The charms are often planted by evil spirits or those recruited during night visitations as described above. The planting of charms, a practice often referred to by the Lozi as *juju*, does not affect other people using the same route as the victim. Normally disease is expected to set in, followed after a period of time and in a manner instructed and directed by the owner of the *juju*, by death.

**Soul-stealing** is the taking of one’s spirit and soul using a footprint in the earth or sand. In this method, the *muloi* takes earth or sand from a person’s footprint and prepares a concoction with other items to make *juju*. This method is usually used to induce sickness and as the soul or spirit of the target person has been removed, the victim can be identified by loss of weight, loss of oil/moisture on the skin and incoherent speech.

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Soul-slavery (*mutukule*) is a practice where the target person is made to disappear from his or her close relatives by the *muloi* to work in the fields, herding cattle or for domestic work or even sexual slavery. This is achieved by the *muloi* by magic in the form a handshake, blowing at the target person when passing or talking or by speaking the target person’s name. There are several other ways of introducing this kind of buloi which are not mentioned here. In this practice, the victim often dies suddenly without apparently getting sick. When this happens the family of the apparently deceased must never mourn if they hope to see their departed loved one again. Others meanwhile, may be able to see the missing person in his or her living state. The writer is aware of just such a case recently involving a teenage girl although in this case the family of the victim did mourn and even held a funeral. After close to a year, a Mulauli predicted the girl had been taken by witchcraft and was now to be found in a village some 40 km from where she disappeared. Members of the family were dispatched to investigate and found the girl in the household of an old man.\(^\text{43}\)

The use of the *Kalilozi gun* to kill a target is a practice much reported on in the press and described by Reynolds. The gun concerned is usually made out of human bone and hair whilst *buhobe* (the local maize or cassava porridge) is used to form bullets. The gun does not shoot at the target directly but at the sun or moon when the name of the target person is spoken. Immediately, the gun goes off, the target person dies on the spot. Such a death can be recognised by the release of blood through the mouth and nose.

Meanwhile the witchfinder (*mulauli, pl. balauli*), whom the colonial administration treated as being as guilty as the *muloi*, uses devices such as *mushengo* described in the quotation above to identify a *muloi*. It is common knowledge that *balauli* are often possessed by demons that provide the investigative properties of the witchfinder. It is also believed that the *mulauli* becomes powerful by killing a person and using that person’s spirit as *juju*.

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\(^{43}\) Further details of this case, which were given to the writer, cannot be revealed here due to confidentiality.
In a throwback to previous tradition, when a muloi is identified, he or she is paraded in public and all paraphernalia belonging to the muloi connected with buloi is confiscated. Then, instead of killing the muloi, a Ŋaka makes a poisonous concoction (mucape) which the muloi is made to drink. If the suspect is a real muloi he or she will go into a trance and start revealing all the evil things committed. If the suspect is innocent, however, he or she will be able to go away unharmed. Another specially prepared concoction is then poured over the witchcraft devices used by the muloi which freezes or ‘kills’ them, rendering them inactive and unusable by other baloi.

Finally, mention should be made of karavinas who are people (usually young men) who are commissioned to kill baloi. Karavinas differ from Baloi, Balauli and Ŋaka because the guns they use to kill Baloi are real, in Barotseland often AK-47s fresh from use in the civil war in Angola when such firearms were regularly swapped by Angolan combatants for Barotse food. Zambian police spokespeople in the province say that this method of killing so-called witches is just a pretext for committing murder.

In general, people will not discuss witchcraft openly with a white European. Time and trust are required to get people to open up about their beliefs in this regard due to fear that they will be scorned or thought primitive. However, the problem is also compounded by previous white visitors and even academic researchers who have made the mistake of making clear their own disbelief and worse still, their disdain for belief in witchcraft. Their scepticism has had a profound effect on the European attitude to the beliefs and practices of African peoples. This scepticism, it is argued here, is why the white Oblate fathers and other white luminaries in the Catholic Church in Barotseland have been unable to draw large followings despite the provision of schools which attract vast numbers of pupils from around the region. Like the Paris missionaries before them, they mistake enthusiasm for the works that they do in the community for potential for conversion.

_White folks do not believe that witchcraft exists. They are blind. They think that because they cannot see it, it does not exist. They cannot understand us._

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44 Reynolds, op. cit., p. 51.
The British colonialists always made a fuss about magic and witchcraft. They made it a criminal offence to do witchcraft even though they did not believe in its existence. This is why they could not control it. They had no control over what they did not understand. And we could see that even though they were possessed of their own magic, it was insufficient. It was not enough to stop the missionaries dying of fever and disease just like our own people. That is why Christianity on its own was never enough. But if you ask most people here if they believe in witchcraft they will say no, partly because they know that is what you want to hear, partly because they are afraid you will condemn them, partly because we are very suspicious of the motives of strangers and partly because it is no business of the Mukuwa (white man). The truth is, most researchers and journalists are simply not told what goes on.  

The reach of belief in witchcraft and psychic capability is far-reaching, in fact into all corners of local society. In the Lozi consciousness, these components of daily life and living have been ever-present, a given which cannot be helped. In many ways it cripples openness and discussion and certainly engenders fear. It may be thought of as a strictly anachronistic vestige of communitarianism but research for this study shows that such a view would be misplaced. Whilst in Senegal in 2002, the writer came across several ‘readers’ whose regular clientele consisted largely of decidedly modernistic Europeans. It was also revelatory to discover in West Africa (specifically Senegal and The Gambia) the very similar ideas, notions and beliefs with regard to psychic phenomena and witchcraft as are found in central southern Africa. Another factor in the way that Lozis express their own belief in the occult is the striking resemblance this has to the results of the careful survey that Evans-Pritchard conducted among the Azande of central Africa in the late 1920s. This shows that the Bantu African tradition of occult belief has been broadcast largely unchanged over centuries of migration from west to east and then central and southern Africa.

That said, it is still the general view, in Zambia at least, that whites have no knowledge or understanding of witchcraft or the psychic world. This may be due to the

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fact that the immediate moral targets of African witchcraft idioms appear to be Africans themselves leaving, as Austen says, ‘European bases of power mystified where they can only be avoided, not effectively invaded’. In Barotseland, this assumption also extends to national government which is perceived to crudely disregard local belief systems. Failure to instigate proper research and to understand the cultural persuasions and beliefs of the target audience is a serious drawback for development programmes and projects devised in the developed world which often fail to take these into account. International NGOs, to date, have not demonstrated the ability to take phenomena such as witchcraft seriously in their surveys of cultural sensibilities in areas such as Barotseland where such beliefs are very strong. Concomitantly, southern NGOs and academic institutions, dependent on the umbilical flow of funds from the North for their existence, despite being composed of local people with local knowledge, also fail to inform donor agencies and programme managers of these cultural sensibilities, preferring instead to provide the sort of information they perceive that their funders wish to hear.

What is also remarkable about the strength of feeling surrounding the existence of witchcraft amongst younger generations in the contemporary era is the way that an old belief in the supernatural is being brought into play with very contemporary issues. For example, the belief in much of rural Africa that few if any die a natural death, is very prevalent in Barotseland, and has several constraining implications in the contemporary era. For example, Western Zambia suffers grievously from the affliction of HIV/AIDS and, as is so often the case, local people are loath to admit that a mysterious young death has been caused by the scourge of AIDS. Thus the recourse to witchcraft as an explanation for such premature and unexpected deaths removes the slur attached to this disease and at the same time negates much of the work of doctors and those in NGOs trying to raise awareness of the risks attached to unprotected sexual intercourse. As a doctor of 25 years standing in the profession who has been part of Government campaigns to provide knowledge, raise awareness levels of the dangers of HIV/AIDS and introduce ideas aimed at prevention in Bulozi remarked:

Our single biggest problem in the villages and even sometimes in the towns is disbelief, not in the fact that people get diseases and die but in the causes of those diseases. With regard to AIDS, we can take as many condoms as we like into the field but might as well keep them for repairs to our ageing Land-Rover engines. The young men simply will not use them, partly because they do not want to but also because they do not take our warnings seriously. They tell us that when a person gets a disease and dies, particularly if that person is young and the death unexpected, then it is the result of buloi.

Their elders simply confirm this view. Of course it provides an easy escape for young people to behave in an immoral manner and for those who do not want to admit that members of their family have this disease if it means owning up to immoral ways but they say that it is us from the city who have closed our eyes to the dark forces at work. Sometimes it can be dangerous for medical officers to work in the rural areas. Some of our officers have been attacked in the past for suggesting the true causes of death from HIV-AIDS.47

Thus Lozi cultural citizenship is crosscut by a deep sense of traditional spirituality and magic that at once defines the nation and also acts in positive and negative manner in social and economic arenas. In the social, political and economic arenas, witchcraft represents a perennial home for the unexpected and otherwise unexplainable. This can include drought or flood, death, disease, economic downturn, impoverishment or any of a plethora of misfortunes to hit a person or community. As with other forms of belief then it is a safe haven for fear, sorrow and disappointment. Like Christianity, witchcraft provides culprits for misfortune with one difference in that the former is perpetrated by an all-seeing immortal God, whose power lies in another world, whereas the latter is propagated by mortal members of the living community seeking mostly to do harm to one another. The supernatural world also ties Lozis to their history, much of which is constructed around magic and superhuman deeds. Meanwhile, although magic and witchcraft are an accepted fact of life in Barotseland, it is also not discussed as a matter

47 Dr. Imasiku Sipalo interviewed October 10th 2002, Namushakende District.
of course. Fear of its execution and impacts causes silence, irrational behaviour or failure to act for fear of accusations or of becoming a victim. In postcolonial political circles, witchcraft, in particular, is an untameable and unpredictable force. In Zambia as in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, governments try, just as in colonial times, to have witchcraft eliminated from communities but are unable to target perpetrators of what is an accepted belief system.

**Kuomboka: articulation of Loziness, representation of nation**

One of the concerns of the Litunga and Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) as expressed to the writer in 2001 was the paucity of history concerning Barotseland on offer in the school curriculum around the region. ‘We need historians to write about our history and make it widely available because our young people are not learning the history of their nation. It is not available to them in their schools’. Meanwhile *Kuomboka* and the five day festival surrounding it offers education in the form of socially constructed meanings and representations of a past that bypasses formal educative processes.

*Kuomboka* (which means ‘to get out of the water’) is the annual celebration of an event that marks a temporal stress point reached as the seasonal inundation of the Bulozi floodplain by the River Zambezi reaches its zenith. It is a stress point because this was the time when, throughout history, the Lozi people and their cattle had to migrate to the plain margins to avoid the inundation of their homes and villages, mostly built on man-made mounds. This inundation lasts for between two and four months of each year according to the height of the flood, gradually advancing and receding from December through to June. The procession was traditionally led by the Litunga or King of the Lozis in his specially constructed state barge called *Nalikwanda* who would lead his people to higher ground and then lead the return (*kufuluhela*) as soon as it was feasible to do so after the waters subsided. In other words, it was a time of crisis.

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48 Litunga Imwiko-Lubosi II in interview August 22nd 2001, Limulunga palace.

49 Originally most of these mounds were termite mounds that had been excavated and built up.
The origins of *Kuomboka* and its inseparable link with the Kingship are discussed in Chapter Two, where it can be seen that *Kuomboka*, Kingship and belief articulate themselves in the physical arena of the River Zambezi, the floodplain - Bulozi and the annual flood – *Meyi-a-Lungwangwa* – ‘the waters that swallowed everything’. These stories, which are founding and central components of the Lozi national history are rooted at the beginning of Lozi time and stand central to the Lozi cosmos. In the beginning there was nothing, then there was the Lozi God, Nyambe, who lived by the river before going to heaven – Litooma. Later as his sons started to rule in Bulozi they were faced with an overwhelming flood. In response, the early Lozi turned to a man, Mboo (Muyunda Mwanasuliundu), as first King to save the nation from the annual inundation by thinking of and building the Nalikwanda.

Nevertheless, Lozi peoples hated to be away from their homes in the plain, it is said, because this was a healthy land that provided food including agricultural produce and fish in abundance and where cattle could graze freely without fear of the dreaded tsetse fly found in the surrounding wooded areas. In addition, enemies could be ascertained approaching across the flat plain long in advance of their arrival. After the turn of the twentieth century and with the coming of colonialism, the social balance of community and environment quickly changed. The cessation of slave and tribute labour and male out-migration to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia in search of money to pay new colonial taxes led to catastrophic diminution of work on the fertile lands of Bulozi. Living in the plain could now be a disadvantage and so thousands of families moved permanently to the eastern margins of the plain where more permanence could be obtained and where access to routes out of Barotseland were more readily available all year round.

Nonetheless, the power and symbolism of *Kuomboka* was retained and re-invented by the very astute Litunga Lewanika and put to use to celebrate what others in Zambia wrongly interpret as an anachronistic link to colonialism. In the modern-day *Kuomboka*, the Litunga enters the state barge – *Nalikwanda* at Lealui, Lewanika’s old capital, in the heart of the floodplain, in traditional costume, accompanied by a specially invited guest such as the State President. In the barge, which is paddled by up to sixty
trusted, specially chosen and trained oarsmen in loincloths adorned with leopard skins and red headdresses (see Figure 3), the Litunga is secluded under a white canopy later to emerge at Limulunga, the higher ground destination at the plain margin, in the glittering gold-braided uniform of a British admiral originally donated to Lewanika at the coronation of King Edward VII in London in 1902. The latter ceremony has been repeated at Kuomboka since the time of Lewanika and was reinforced after the visit to London of his son and heir Yeta III in 1937 for the coronation of George VI.

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50 These used to be lions’ manes (the lion used to be a symbol of the Lozi and Makololo before the elephant took on greater significance when ivory trading became invaluable to the Lozi economy in the late nineteenth century; both animals were identified with due to their courage, size and strength).
To some extent it is possible to see the nature of today’s ceremony as an imported European usage of pomp and ceremony to celebrate a sense of identity and membership but that in no way detracts from the Loziness of Kuomboka or the Lozi interpretation of the relationship with Britain. What is being celebrated here is not the subordination of the Lozi peoples by British colonialism; but rather a perceived relationship between equals, often referred to by current Lozi historians as a ‘friendship’. Ranger underlined this logic when describing Yeta’s visit to the 1937 coronation as ‘his homage to King George as one king to another’.¹ What Kuomboka now represents then is: firstly, the Lozi engagement with the physical environment of the homeland; secondly, the centrality of the Kingship in Lozi life; and thirdly, the engagement of the British colonial machine moving inexorably northwards, to serve domestic purposes and also to avoid annihilation by external forces. What it also represents is Lewanika’s use of history and heritage to speak to the Lozi people, to create a rallying point for all Lozis to

come and celebrate their Loziness, the poignancy and usefulness of which was not lost on most colonial administrators.

The irony is thus that, while history and heritage are defining marketing tools for Kuomboka, today’s celebration of Kuomboka serves an entirely different purpose. This does not mean, as Milbourne suggests, that it is an invented tradition. The procession of boats from the capital of the Litunga to higher ground at the height of the flood season has been taking place since the earliest known times of the Aluyi (the name given to the original Malozi) and stopped only during the Makololo interregnum, as far as is known. An example of this historicity is the note Livingstone made in a letter to his family during his first short sojourn to Barotseland in 1851 of a conversation in which he was told that:

...boats of considerable size might sail on it [the Zambezi], for Seunturu [now remembered as Mulambwa] (the chief whom Sebitoane expelled) built a boat of planks sewn together and roofed in with white cloth, which required 20 men to paddle it. It was roofed in with cloth, & Sebitoane’s people destroyed it.

Here, Livingstone was clearly being told about the Lozi state barge, traditionally constructed under the direction of succeeding Litungsas since the earliest recorded Lozi king, Mboo, the symbolism of which would have been an obvious target for the invading Makololo.

Rather then, Kuomboka has been adapted, modified, moulded and re-invented even, to serve new purposes. Thus Milbourne is right to point to the inclusive nature of Kuomboka over time reflecting as it does, not only the colonial influence but also the absorption of the Mbunda peoples in Litunga Mulambwa’s time (by the appearance and

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5 See Chapter Two, p. 19.
performance of Mbunda Makishi dancers). Kuomboka is about the re-invention of the Lozi nation. For Lozis, to attend Kuomboka is a pilgrimage to the Lozi ‘Holy Land’ to bathe in and re-embrace the essence of Loziness involving Kingship, floodplain and Lozi history, in so doing also embracing a curious relic of the colonial relationship with Britain that also helps to define Loziness in the contemporary era. Thus, Kuomboka is a heritage festival that is at once participative and experiential.

To watch the Kuomboka flotilla making its way across the floodplain is to watch the progress of a family. In the lead, the Nalikwanda carries the Litunga, the semi-immortal father of the nation, paddled by a retinue of only the most trusted warriors. Atop his barge and visible for miles around, stands a giant elephant, the tou, symbol of the wealth of the nation. On board the barge is a canopy covered with white canvas. Concealed under this, the Litunga sits while, immediately outside, the fire of the nation is kept burning and the Mikubele Procession Drums are played continuously to encourage the paddlers of all the barges and attract the attention of others. Close behind follows the Notila carrying the Litunga’s first wife, mother of the nation, and behind that a barge carrying the household baggage, the treasure of the nation. Other barges carry the Litunga’s concubines, demonstrating the fertility of the nation and the Ngambela - Prime Minister of the nation, leading the common people. Alongside and in the train of the parents of the nation, follow the children of the nation – mortal people, in a variety of boats and canoes.

Kuomboka, in all its symbolism and pageantry, the black and white of the state barges with animals atop and the scramble of the flotilla that follows, set against the backdrop of the blue floodwaters of the Lyambai (Zambezi) that is at once the greatest threat and the bringer of life to the nation, takes place under a sky that changes from sparkling blue to leaden grey, with hot sun interspersed by lashing rain (the rainy season normally has not ended). Turner said that the Lozi had created a ‘symbiotic relationship between the people living in the flood plain and the ecosystem around these

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6 Ibid.
7 Notes of Godwin Mbikusita, later to become Litunga Mbikusita-Lewanika in a pamphlet entitled ‘The Barotse Tribal History’, NAZ.
groups, which has influenced their religious beliefs and performative rituals.8 Meanwhile, due to the intertwining of Loziness and Kuomboka and the strong Lozi relationship with traditional belief and the occult referred to earlier means that unusual occurrences at the time of Kuomboka may present problems for traditional authority. For example, the failure of the annual flood can be interpreted as a sign of the disapproval of departed Litungas while a very heavy rainstorm that affected the progress of the 2004 Kuomboka was questioned by many as a possible sign of spiritual anger or the result of witchcraft aimed at the current Litunga and his Ngambela, particularly by those with a grudge to bear.

Kuomboka has, to some extent, become an indicative barometer of the state of the Lozi nation; and in terms of the logic for attending Kuomboka, immersion in Loziness is not seen as a tourist or leisure opportunity as described by Walsh.9 In fact, Kuomboka as a heritage festival is akin to Walsh’s idea of articulating the nation at a time when other nations and states consider themselves to be under threat, although not from the same sources as Walsh, who concentrates on the UK, suggests, namely international capital and supranational organisations such as the EU.10 Rather the threat to the people of the Lozi and other African nations is perceived to exist more from the post-colonial state. Seeing the relationship between the perceived oppression of the colonial state, and colonialism and neo- or post-colonialism originating in the North is hard for peoples whose access to the world gaze has been denied (by institutions of oppression based in the North).

To this great historical event then, today attracting more crowds than any other in Zambia and the sub-region, come thousands of mainly African visitors. White Europeans and Asians mostly do not come to this part of the world partly because it is perceived to be too remote and takes too long to get to and away from, partly because the Zambezi Valley is thought to be environmentally and socially inhospitable, and partly because western Zambia is not yet considered as a regular tourist destination, therefore

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10 Ibid., p. 177.
lacks the sort of facilities expected by international tourists. Quite literally, there would be nowhere to accommodate outsiders or probably the food to feed them if they did come, certainly not of the sort that they would be used to.

Many of the attendees of Kuomboka are Lozis from the Zambian ‘Line of Rail’ and elsewhere. Attending Kuomboka for this group is in the sense of the aforementioned pilgrimage to celebrate Lozi culture and to pay homage to the Kingship. But countless more are from other groups who come to view the spectacle with awe and some respect. Many find accommodation exorbitant or unavailable. Even more get to see little of Nalikwanda, the state barge carrying the Litunga, or its voyage. What is more surprising is that the culmination of Kuomboka, the arrival of the Nalikwanda in Limulunga harbour followed by the appearance of the Litunga, dressed in the uniform of a British military officer is, as already pointed out, essentially a time of homage to the Lozi King. Yet visitors from other groups also find the event exciting and join in the acclamation to what some would see as an anachronistic vestige of a past that strays into the present, threatening the associationist libertarian values of modernity with the constraining bonds of an authoritarian traditionalism stained by the footprint of colonialism.

That most attendees are African is relevant for other reasons. This is not a cheap event for most to attend as the location of the ceremony is indeed remote from the rest of Zambia and certainly from regions further afield. The only way into the heart of Barotseland is the tarmac road (much-improved of recent years though still dangerous) that runs 615 km west from Lusaka, where it is not signposted, through the Kafue National Park, terminating at Mongu, the principal and only town of any size in the region while the bus journey can take all day. Accommodation in Mongu and Limulunga where Kuomboka arrives and the Litunga alights to the acclamation and adoration of the crowds of onlookers, is sparse and expensive (prices skyrocket in the area around the time of Kuomboka). Yet African people continue to come in ever increasing numbers by all kinds of transport including the back of trucks to take part in the atmosphere of Kuomboka.
In order to explain this seeming anomaly, a brief description of another broadcaster of Lozi heritage is required. Opposite the Litunga’s palace in Limulunga is the Nayuma Museum, construction of which commenced in 1984 with funds from Norad, the Norwegian development agency which also selected its first white European curator although Norad pulled out some years ago and the European curator was replaced by a Lozi Director. The Nayuma Museum, whilst serving the purpose of a storehouse of artefacts and a display case of Lozi history was not originally intended to be a museum in the strict sense but rather a cultural centre,\(^{11}\) reflecting the dynamic culture and heritage of the Lozi nation and peoples. It is affiliated to the National Museums Board of Zambia which funded the employment of a Lozi director although it no longer receives funds from this body.\(^{12}\) Receipts at Nayuma (named after one of the Litunga’s yards where precious things used to be stored) are small and have even been diminishing over the last decade. Outside of \textit{Kuomboka}, visitor numbers are low throughout the rest of the year.

Surprisingly, even during \textit{Kuomboka}, many visitors pass by Nayuma and proportionately little money or time is spent there. Exposed to market realities, this has meant that the service offered and the quality of visitor experience has declined, the staff complement has been rationalised and is poorly paid, and an ever-deteriorating spiral entered into whereby, in time, the museum would go out of existence without fresh sources of funding. Here it is suggested that the workings of the free market do not work for a museum unless that museum already has substantial local participation and support i.e. is seen as part of the local. To rely on outside patronage is insufficient. As Walsh attests, ‘It is the locality which must come to terms with the always historic processes which affect it’.\(^{13}\) Nayuma has yet to achieve this and so lies in a no-man’s land between visitors to the area who do not really appreciate what Nayuma has to offer and a local community who have yet to understand how the museum is a part of local life and a benefit to the people at large.

\(^{12}\) That Lozi Director is today the Ngambela of Barotseland and combines both tasks although a new Director is, at the time of writing, being sought.
\(^{13}\) Walsh, op. cit., p. 183.
There are four possible explanations for Nayuma’s lack of patronage. Firstly it could reflect the remote location of Nayuma at Limulunga, 15 km north of Mongu at the end of the metalled road, in a sense, on the way to nowhere, therefore not attracting any passing tourist traffic. Secondly, one must consider the paucity of funds suffered by most Zambians. Thirdly, it could also reflect declining standards of exhibits and visitor facilities at the museum and the fact that a flourishing crafts business now exists on the Lusaka road out of Mongu. In addition to this, some years ago, Nayuma lost a contract to supply the Livingstone Museum with crafts for sale at the Museum shop there which has a much higher turnover of visitors. Fourthly, African people come to ‘celebrate’ and experience Kuomboka as a festival that is something quintessentially Lozi and African. As the word festival suggests, Kuomboka is not a static museum display; it is something dynamic, innovative, and most important, participative. Unlike the Nayuma museum, it is not a static display. It lives and breathes and offers membership and inclusion. This is how it comes to be so adaptable and also so African. But finally, Kuomboka also reflects the logic of visitation for its clientele.

Non-Lozi Africans come to Kuomboka to immerse themselves in an event that, while quintessentially Lozi, is also seen as wholly Zambian and, more importantly, African; this despite its evident colonial connotations. It is primarily a celebration of African tradition and culture executed by Africans for Africans. Thus, many visitors are immersing themselves in layers of ‘Africaness’ as opposed to Loziness. And the fact that this is an African event largely unattended and unstained by global tourism (associated with whites and exploitation) is often cited as one of its biggest attractions. How different this is to a city like Lusaka, comprised of a little over one million inhabitants where living costs are very high and where modern facilities such as shopping malls, restaurants and leisure facilities are virtually all owned by South African companies or members of Zambia’s Asian population, all of whom are seen as exploitative of Africans and where the clientele is largely either ex-patriot or of the narrow African elites. The following two statements are indicative of the sort of motivation felt by typical visitors to Kuomboka (for which no estimates exist of actual attendances). The first is from a

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14 Called Mumwa Crafts, run by an ex-employee of Nayuma Museum assisted by a potter who also worked previously at the museum, selling Lozi craftwork and artefacts produced by local artisans in Mongu as well as currently exporting by the container to Europe in conjunction with some Dutch business people.
Bemba visitor from Lusaka, the second by a Lozi from Kabwe. Both were male and were talking at the time of the 2004 Kuomboka festival.

_**Being here makes me feel like an African. I try to come every few years with my brothers. We don’t think that it matters that it is a Lozi King being celebrated or that he wears that British uniform. This is an African event. Just look at who is here. I feel like an African here surrounded by my people celebrating the African land and culture. I don’t feel that way in Lusaka. There is nothing like Kuomboka anywhere else in Zambia I come here because this is mine, Kuomboka belongs to us as Lozi men and women. One day it will no longer be ours for other richer visitors will come and the BRE will welcome them because they have money. I mean the government like the whites and the Asians, they have robbed us of everything else, they must never be allowed to rob us of Kuomboka. If they come local people will favour them because they have money and will not want to know us, their African brothers and sisters._

These comments sum up the contradictions and dilemmas faced by the Lozi nation in defining itself culturally in the contemporary era. Kuomboka, as already explained, is a festival that represents different things to different audiences, even amongst the Lozi diaspora. Lozis use different aspects of cultural heritage to explain themselves and to position the nation in juxtaposition to other communities that are seen to constrain development or empathy for the plight that Lozis find themselves in. For most of the twentieth century, this produced an introversion of national identity. Lozis, particularly in Barotseland itself, seem to have built a metaphorical wall to shield themselves from forces that are perceived to have acted negatively upon the nation. The question arises though, how would this change in the event of a more favourable attitude towards Barotseland and its people from central government? Currently, culture plays a centrally important role in the way that Lozis define their identity and citizenship. Isolation has also played a role, but current trends suggest that factors constraining economic development are changing. Roads are being improved, bridges constructed and decentralisation of decision-making over development appears to be taking place at the time of writing. As with Kuomboka, in the event of large numbers of extra visitors and, concomitantly, money arriving in the region, it is entirely probable that the emphasis on
history and culture will start to adapt and become more inclusive to new imported cultures, in particular from South Africa with which Barotseland has long-standing ties.
8 Construction of citizenship

When the late Litunga, Ilute (Yeta IV), was visiting offices in a Lusaka suburb in 1998 and Lozis around the offices and outside on the street were throwing themselves to the ground, clapping and showing traditional obeisance to their leader, a considerable stir was caused. People of other groups were shocked. Even today, Bemba and Nyanje friends speak of the occasion. Many are dismissive and say it shows how out of date Lozis are. Some say it shows that the Lozi only respect their own anachronistic tradition and culture and demonstrates why a Lozi must never be allowed or trusted to become President of Zambia because this would result in a transfer of power and wealth to Limulunga. One said, ‘Who do they think they are to do that in my street in my town, why do they think they are so special?’ Others are more cautious and are honest enough to talk of the admiration that they had at the time and the realisation that Lozis retain some undefined ‘African’ citizenship that goes back in time and that others had lost. Another said, ‘At least these Lozis know their place. If we still had that kind of respect in our society, we wouldn’t have to put up with crime and useless politicians who do everything for themselves and nothing for us.’

Citizenship and subjectivity are much-debated topics in academic as well as political circles in the contemporary era. Defining and understanding these critical concepts, however, has proved as difficult as with other such famously vague and all-encompassing terms as ‘development’ and ‘identity’. Citizenship and subjectivity often appear like two sides of the same coin but both terms are highly contested in their meaning and significance. In the developed and developing world alike, although for different reasons, these ideas have tended to become blurred and conflated with other issues of identity as well as with nationalism, transnationalism, cosmopolitanism, ethnicity and tribalism. In the era of globalisation when boundaries and borders are becoming increasingly flexible, mutable and uncertain, there seems to be an ever more urgent need to know exactly who we are and what we perceive we belong to or are members of.

If one is to understand citizenship according to the dictionary definition in the developed world, it is directly related to the state. To this keyword might be added
membership, belonging, protection, rights and obligations. A state must have citizens in order to confer rights and duties, entitlements and responsibilities because, in order to be able to carry out its functions, a state requires a citizenry to govern and take part in government, not least in order to provide the resources a state requires to operate. Key here is the idea that a citizen of a state expects the responsible government of that state to provide something, a set of services perhaps, or a sufficient say in who runs that state. A citizen might also expect a set of laws to protect him or her from unjust treatment by other parties, whether citizens or others, organisations or the state itself. Other expectations might involve the provision of education and healthcare facilities, communication links such as roads, railways and telecommunications, a financial system including a central bank, institutions of law and order such as a police force and a judiciary, and a military that protects the borders of the state and its citizens/subjects from violence at the hands of each other or external forces.¹

Another important aspect might be the ability to elect, re-elect or change the government of the state in order for that government to represent the hopes and aspirations of a majority of the citizenry. And although in the developed world only an increasingly small percentage of the electorate actually vote at elections due to so-called ‘voter-apathy’, in most of the developing world and particularly in Africa, freely-held elections usually attract as many voters as can obtain voter registration. This is a right as is the conceptual expectation of human rights, the idea that a citizen is entitled to be treated fairly and justly by the state, regardless of class or position in society, and that the state will actively seek to protect the citizen from bad treatment at home or abroad. Concomitant to the above then, a state must also have a constituency (a population of citizen-subjects) and a clearly defined territory to govern with clearly demarcated borders to defend. Thus the expectations of a citizenry can be roughly divided into provision of services and rights.

Meanwhile, a citizen must expect to behave as a subject, to owe allegiance and to give something in return for these expected entitlements. This might include taxes on earnings, military or community service of some kind, jury duty and subjection to the

rule of law if laws set by the state as moral agency are broken. A citizen is also expected to make some show of allegiance to the state. This may be at an oath-swearing ceremony or by being expected to be able to read, write and speak the national language or proving knowledge of the culture of the country concerned. Meanwhile, some states do not allow citizenship of other states simultaneously. In order to be a citizen, one must also be a subject although the same is not necessarily true in reverse as citizens expect to be full members of the political community whereas subjects may well not be as in the case of asylum seekers who obtain residence rights as refugees but little else. Clarke illustrates the distinction by describing the citizen as a ‘free subject’.2 Thus citizenship, the entitlement to rights and obligations, and subjectivity, involving just the obligations in return for the right to remain in the state’s territory, run hand in hand in terms of the state. This is not necessarily the case in non-state citizenship as will be discussed.

These state concepts of citizenship and subjectivity, as described above, may seem somewhat simplistic and applicable more to the advanced states of the core of the world economy where liberal democracy is the ruling and accepted political ideology. State citizenship, as an essentially Western concept,3 therefore, can only really be expected to flourish to any great extent where a European political institution has become deeply embedded and maintained and where capitalist economic processes are operating in the arena of the global market sufficiently for a majority of the citizenry to feel that the state is providing some sort of stage worth acting on. Isin says that there are two fundamental perspectives to the traditional western view of citizenship, one that sees the world split into two civilisational blocs, one rationalised, secularised and therefore, modernised and the other, ‘irrational’, religious and therefore traditional. The other perspective sees citizenship as all-embracing, harmonious and fraternal espousing ideas of equality and liberty and of the citizen as secular and universal, lacking tribal loyalties.4

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But there are other aspects to the western or northern notion of citizenship that distinguish it from the way that people in the ex-colonies of the developing world or south are likely to view the concept. The word citizen derives from cité and sein and literally means ‘to be of the city’ and refers intimately to expectations and rights accorded to city dwellers who considered themselves to be more acculturated and civilized than their rural counterparts. Thus, city dwellers in Ancient Greece and Rome and later in Western Europe, distinguished themselves from feudal overlords and rural dwellers who were considered as pagan, uncivilized and unworthy of rights. In this way, culture, or lack of it, becomes an arbiter of citizenship. Citizenship therefore, becomes at once an exclusionary as well as an inclusive category, contrary to Dahrendorf’s assertion that, ‘Exclusion is the enemy of citizenship’. By implication, it is synonymous with urban living and modernity and indeed, most people living in Western Europe and the United States today, live an urban lifestyle even those living technically in the countryside.

Conventional European and American-style citizenship, so closely associated with the authority of the state, meanwhile, has been undergoing some modification since the 1980s. This corresponds to the dynamics of globalisation where the physical and subjective boundaries of the nation-state are perceived to have become less clearly defined and politicised, and citizenship more personal and commoditised. The basic premise of citizenship has become a seriously contested issue as different mediating social and cultural influences dispute the basis upon which citizenship is articulated. People are no longer considered to be the rational beings that Weber thought of as acting according to the Protestant capitalist ethic or indeed as individuals as maximisers of self-interest according to neo-liberal theory. Nor are they considered to be social in the manner of post-World War II social government in Europe or indeed to be psychologically mobilised by unconscious forces. In this broader arena, in which citizenship is defined more as a social process where the emphasis is more on norms,

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8 Ibid.
practices, meanings and identities instead of legal rules;\textsuperscript{9} religion, race, gender, sexual orientation, economic status, ecology, diaspora and cosmopolitanism can affect the citizenship status of an individual.

It is also now quite possible for two or more modes of citizenship to be considered simultaneously applicable. Thus an individual might consider him or herself to be a ‘citizen’ of the ‘Nation of Islam’ as well as a Nigerian or a Rastafarian as well as a citizen of Barbados or to be a Green Activist or Friend of the Earth as well as British or to be a Freemason as well as a Basque or Catalan. Each category creates its own physical or metaphysical spaces where members can act. Each provides some sense of warmth of membership whether it is spiritual protection or unity of purpose. However, one may also divide all of these more flexible modes of citizenship into two camps, ones that can be changed and ones that are unchangeable or primordial. The latter are becoming less in number but for example, being white, male and born in the UK are categories that are barely mutable. Being British or holding to a certain faith, a certain sexuality or any sort of philosophical, political or economic persuasion are all becoming increasingly flexible and the speed with which we can change our identity is increasing also.

Personal identity in developed countries thus becomes increasingly ephemeral and chameleon-like in nature and as citizenship is a tool of identity, so the conception of citizenship must also become more malleable. It is shaped by Lash and Urry’s ‘signs and symbols’ where personal branding allows individuals to mark themselves out from one another,\textsuperscript{10} where transnationalism and cosmopolitanism become the norm. One 38 year-old Muslim male colleague interviewed during the course of this work explained that he was born and brought up in The Gambia, then spent 3 years in Senegal, eight years in France in education and since then, 14 years based in the UK where he now holds citizenship status being married to a British woman but has worked on and off in several different countries as a development analyst. This colleague explained that in terms of citizenship it was hard for him to define any particular prominent modality except in terms of faith which has remained a cultural constant throughout. Much has to do with

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\textsuperscript{9} Isin and Turner, ‘Citizenship studies…’, op. cit., p. 4
\textsuperscript{10} S. Lash and J. Urry Economies of Time and Space (Sage, London, 1996)
personal circumstance while the boundaries of any fixed sense of identity become more blurred and mutable.

A further factor in play here is that layers of citizenship can be overlapping and fluctuate in prominence depending on self-image in juxtaposition with the various social, cultural, political and economic dynamics exerted on or being exerted by the person or group at any one time. As already implied, most are also peelable and replaceable. Each must bestow rights and obligations agreeable to the holder. This flexible conception of citizenship then, is a postmodern or post-Fordist version applicable surely to those places where postmodern, post-Fordist modes of societal dynamics and economic regulation are seen to operate i.e. in the advanced economies of Europe, North America and Japan. As will be argued, however, flexible citizenship is a concept that is not confined purely to the core countries of the world economy where the most advanced economies cohabit. In the developing world also, citizenship is articulated flexibly though for reasons not associated with any sense of having transcended the modern. Ong suggests that the observable flexibility of citizenship seen today is a product and condition of late capitalism. However, arbiters of citizenship have been metamorphosing since societies first started centralising. The pivot of change, it is argued here, is economic development or underdevelopment and processes of physical or cultural change that relate to factors such as environmental change and migration which can be due to a variety of factors.

Moommen claims that it is not possible to articulate citizenship without a state or nation-state as the arbiter of context and content and claims that any attempt to define citizenship without the state as foundation is meaningless and empty. But this idea is colonialist as it insists on the Western style state as the prime arbiter of citizenship and effectively rules out other types of political community as illegitimate in this respect. It denies the concept of citizenship to a large proportion of people in the developing world who do not live in a country controlled by an effectively working state in the western sense. If citizenship is to be judged from a western perspective, then non-western

societies would appear to perform poorly in relation to citizenship indicators such as western-style human rights and universal suffrage but this would not diminish their ability to distribute rights and obligations and the ability of their populations to articulate feelings of membership commensurate with citizenship.

To follow Moommen’s logic then is to give citizenship too narrow and inflexible a set of parameters and indulge in colonial style thinking. Citizenship, like all modes of identity, is located largely in the imaginary. Stevenson says that this imaginary is a ‘social and historical creation and serves to remind us that society must always create symbolic forms beyond the purely functional’.13 The power to construct oneself as a citizen or subject is a metaphysical force; as Castells puts it, ‘The sites of this power are people’s minds’.14 In all of the communities suggested as likely candidates for flexible citizenship above, it is surely the case that most are imagined because, as Anderson puts it when talking about nations, ‘members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’.15

Clearly, people living in sub-Saharan Africa, where nations with a clear idea of territorial homeland that pre-existed the arrival of colonialism and the European concept of the state, do experience feelings of citizenship and these feelings may or may not be attributed to a state. However, the European experience is not a good guide to citizenship modalities in sub-Saharan Africa.16 People become citizens of a state by default, that is to say by being born in a certain territory nominally controlled by a state. Yet the state may be a failed state, unable to offer basic social services and entitlements such as a passport or collect taxes such as Somalia or only able to enforce its sovereignty very weakly from the centre as is the case in the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Thus to consider the use only of the state to

construct modalities of citizenship is too arbitrary and ignores the fact that such constructions are still within the realm of the imaginary.

Another way of explaining the very different ways that people in the developed and developing worlds regard the state is through history or rather dissimilar roles in the same history. European states were mostly formed after the overthrow of monarchical or colonial regimes. Revolutionaries espoused a mix of liberal, republican, and, later, Marxist (proletarian) values in defining ideological underpinnings of new states. Key to these revolutionary processes was the concept of mass action. However, such ideologues also had to be pragmatic and careful not to threaten the new regimes that had come into place. Thus, revolutionaries had to adapt their ideas to prevalent ethnic, racial, religious, gender and class sensibilities. These new European states were then, in part, the result of a certain set of historical processes that formed an evolutionary path. They were also imbued with what R.M. Smith refers to as ‘constitutive stories’ of ethnie, race, religion, gender, culture and class in order to define national identity upon which citizenship status could be defined.17 Even the United States shares this type of political history although the resulting post-revolutionary state became polyethnic (not dominated by one ethnic group) and lacking the same historical emphasis on class.

In Sub-Saharan Africa by contrast, new states were formed in the twentieth century at the behest and timing of European colonial regimes, nationalist agendas and the will of dominant neo-colonial regimes such as the USA and USSR. These new states took the place of the colonial regimes whose histories were based in Europe, not Africa. Meanwhile, colonial regimes had themselves only partially deconstructed the political communities they found on arrival in Africa. In rural Africa, which constituted most of the continent and its people, pre-existing political communities including thousands of nations, primitive states and mere ethnies, were simply overlain, either within the same colony or divided by new colonial boundaries. Thus, when colonial regimes made way for new nationalist states that attempted to form states based on the artificial land borders of departing colonialists, the governments of these new states were faced with multifarious political communities such as the Lozi nation whose ethnic, racial, religious

and cultural underpinnings had not been modified since the pre-colonial era. Separately, these pre-colonial political communities all had history and ‘constitutive stories’ that were firmly entrenched.

Meanwhile, the ability of new African states to produce ‘constitutive stories’ was severely constrained by lack of revolutionary process that had led to their coming into being. There was little evidence of mass action, except in the case of wars of liberation such as those in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia but even in these cases, after independence, ethnic and class divisions rapidly split any overwhelming sense of unity in the new state. New nationalist leaderships were usually formed from an educated elite minority base that gained its ideological values from urban, industrialised Europe and America and found it hard to value the largely communitarian and non-urban ‘constitutive stories’ of the many political communities inherited in the post-colonial African state. Thus, these new states have suffered from a paucity of history or at least of evolutionary historical process and have often tried to construct ‘constitutive stories’ such as that associated with a ‘freedom struggle’ that are often inappropriate to large sections of the population who did not participate or understand such dynamics although they were all impacted by them. In such situations, people, particularly in the rurality, receive or are ‘subjected’ to citizenship that they have not chosen and are not convinced of the value of, simply because they or their community happen to live where a new state was born. As R.M. Smith asserts, ‘Even today... most people acquire their political citizenship thru unchosen often unexamined hereditary descent, not because they explicitly embrace any political principles...’.

Another major factor in the inability of the state, in Africa at least, to manifest itself as an attractive citizenship option is not hard to locate. It lies in economic poverty, the inability to offer services, economic development and the trappings of modernity to more than a sliver of the population, just enough to keep a government in power. If the maxim that social development follows in the trail of economic development is correct then it also follows that state-related citizenship rights as part of political development will be elusive in the absence of economic development.

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18 R.M. Smith., op. cit., p. 110.
Thus, while African states are held in dependence and economic subordination to
the developed core of the world economy and remain bereft of institutional capacity,
and while the decision-making capacity to make changes to this status quo are located
largely outside of the borders of the African state, it is difficult to see how that same
state can manifest itself as an attractive citizenship option to the marginalised masses
be they in the rural or urban arena. Meanwhile, it would not be true to posit
disillusionment with the state as normative and universal across Africa. As Miles and
Rochefort discovered, Hausa villagers on the Niger/Nigeria border ‘do not place their
ethnic identity as Hausas above their national one as citizens of Nigeria or Niger and
express greater affinity for non-Hausa cocitizens than foreign Hausas’,19 and this in spite
of an underdeveloped economy. Colonialism imbued this sense of difference, however,
as Hausas differentiate themselves according to European language.

The apparent inability or unwillingness of many Africans to take on European
style citizenship is also because the state in sub-Saharan Africa, sometimes
deprecatingly referred to as the ‘Fourth World’ (comprising the world’s poorest
countries), is, with few exceptions, a poor parody of its ‘First World’ counterpart on
which it is modelled. The African state network is, like most African economies, still
essentially held in subordination by Europe, the United States and the International
Financial Institutions (IFIs). The ability to act decisively in the interests of the majority
of the citizenry is severely constrained by this subordination which, in turn, is borne out
of politico-economic dependence, a legacy of colonial and neo-colonial domination. This
makes African states, existing as they do in some kind of post-colonial torpor, vulnerable
and unattractive citizenship options.

The use then, of the state or nation-state as the only arbiter of citizenship fits
the developing world, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa (with the possible exception of
South Africa), even less than it does the developed.20 This is in spite of the fact that
Europe is, historically at least, responsible for the creation and maintenance of what is

19 W.F.S. Miles and D.A. Rochefort, ‘Nationalism versus Ethnic Identity in Sub-Saharan Africa’ American
20 F. de Boeck, ‘Postcolonialism, power and identity: local and global perspectives from Zaire’ in R. Werbner
euphemistically referred to as ‘Africa’ and the state network therein. The rationale for this is that the history of the contemporary state in Africa is, in fact, a by-product of the history of the political economy of Europe and America and not based on pre-existing political communities and societal structures.

In addition, the political ideology of liberal democracy, so crucial to the operation of political economy in Europe and the rest of the core of the world economy, where nation-state based citizenship is strongest, is only recently arrived and weakly entrenched in Africa. Indeed, colonialism, experienced by all African peoples in one form or another, in its formal mode, was an alien, authoritarian patriarchy controlled from a remote power base where rights applied to the selected few on completely illiberal, undemocratic principals and obligations were applied to everybody else, specifically the indigenous population. Such an experience was hardly good preparation coming, as it did, immediately ahead of the independence era when new African states were suddenly expected to don the mantra of liberal democracy. This does not, in any case, imply that citizenship and democracy are natural bedfellows, indeed, this study would argue this is rarely the case. Nor does democratisation necessarily lead to a fairer and more effective working of the capitalist free market, economic development and the realisation of the modernist dream including liberal or republican citizenship rights. As Kelsall says, where liberal norms are only weakly institutionalised and where people find it easier to work in vertical rather than horizontal networks, democratisation ‘may lead to increased competition of a most illiberal kind’. Meanwhile, the modalities of African self-identification continue to be largely communitarian, as opposed to being individualist or associationist, which is unsurprising as Africa has been constrained from undergoing agricultural and industrial revolutions Europe-style, together with the concomitant social revolutions one would expect from these economic dynamics.

In many African countries, the idea that governments and their institutions are in existence to serve the people is treated with suspicion and cynicism at best, and

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21 Including, it would be argued here, Liberia, which experienced unofficial or indirect colonialism through the delivery of Americanised freed slaves who rapidly formed an elite layer of society based at the coast around Monrovia.

contempt at worst. Individuals tend to consider themselves to be citizens and subjects of more than one socio-political community and these communities are more communitarian and less associationist in nature, although they can be just as peelable. Thus people often consider themselves to be of their ethnic group or tribe (which may cross national boundaries) first and of the postcolonial state second. Religion, which also knows no national boundaries, becomes a major identifier as well. Physical boundaries have also been poorly identified with in Africa because, as Herbst points out, before formal European colonialism, power was exercised more through the control of people than land as land was in abundance but people over whom to have influence, were not.\textsuperscript{23} Notwithstanding, Herbst is too absolutist and categorical when saying that African boundaries in the past were not designed to regulate the movement of people.\textsuperscript{24} In the case of the Lozi, before, during and after the Makololo interregnum, use was made of the Zambezi and Chobe/Linyanti/Kwando and their swampy environs and the various sentinels placed at strategic locations along these rivers, precisely to monitor and regulate the flow of people into and out of southern Barotseland.

Due to paucity of resources, the state, often dominated by one ethnic group, is perceived to reward only its clients, leading to what is locally referred to as the tribalisation of politics. To do so, however, the capital city, where the modernistic seat of power lies, must also be taken possession of in differential respects associated with the ruling group. In Namibia for example, the Ovambo group have successfully taken charge of state politics based in Windhoek despite the fact that the Ovambo homeland is located in the far north of the country and in Angola. Strength of numbers was a factor here, as was language. In Namibia, Oshiwambo soon started to be heard on the streets of the townships of Windhoek while, at independence, the national language was made English, a language that the other large ethnic groups of Namibia, such as the Herero and Nama, had never spoken (being largely educated in Afrikaans by edict of the South African colonial regime). Thus when Lozis in the Caprivi region of Namibia consider the organs of government, they tend to think of Oshiwambo speaking Ovambos and peoples from other regions speaking Afrikaans bent on holding key positions of power and subjecting Caprivians to their will. Meanwhile, os pointed out in Chapter 6, Silozi-

\textsuperscript{23} Herbst, \textit{States and power in Africa}…, pp. 40 and 232.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 232
speak the Caprivs, even by South Africa, largely to English as the European colonial medium.

Zambia is another example of this phenomenon where the Bemba are perceived by other groups to have created dominance over high government office and the civil service. It has been difficult, therefore, particularly for large groups such as the Lozi, with their own national history, to feel and display feelings of allegiance to the Zambian/Bemba state. State nationalism in most of Sub-Saharan Africa has failed, despite nationalist political awakening during the colonial era, to permeate communitarian group identity or sub-nationalisms. Put simply, the nation-state has failed to materialize. The difficulty in postcolonial Africa has been in identifying whether citizenship or subjectivity are uppermost in the minds of local people when they think of the state. This is because the state is perceived to make many demands upon its population but fails to provide or guarantee adequate public services, human security and rights to more than a select few of its population. It also largely fails to provide an economic stage where the individual can expect to find opportunities to make personal gains. The fault for this state of affairs is invariably set at the door of the national government which is seen as inept, corrupt, predatory and indulging in patron-clientage. For groups like the Lozi, who perceive that the state has been deliberately withholding development, the state is even seen as colonialist in behaviour, which is an irony given that the state in Africa, struggling to break free from the colonial legacy of lack of institutional capacity and training, also feels itself locked into postcolonial dependence on a global politico-economic system from which it cannot break free.

All this still does not mean that citizenship is not evident in Africa. On the contrary, the basic tenets of citizenship: membership, belonging, exclusionary identification, the potential for inclusivity, personal branding, rights and obligations are all enthusiastically subscribed to but in ways other than allegiance to a state. People in the developing world have an equal if not more urgent need of membership of social entities that will provide and protect, but the premise upon which notions of citizenship are based is so different, for example, in the behaviour of political communities, modes of production, and of distribution of power and wealth. As already stated, this is due to
different histories prior to the arrival of the world economy and different histories within it. A closer look at the trajectory of African political development is perhaps appropriate here.

Certainly before the coming of Europeans, Africa consisted of thousands of polities, political communities which, for convenience here, may be referred to as tribes. Many of these polities were nations in the sense that several groups had coalesced or been subsumed by one dominant group but all of whose constituent parts now recognised a shared sense of identity and solidarity in a shared homeland. Some nations, such as the Lozi, had even transcended into early forms of state in that the national identity had become collective, spanning a number of ethnicies, united within one political community governed from a centralised institutional apparatus. In the case of the Lozi, King and state existed in tense co-habitation with one another. The properties of citizenship, as described above, existed in many of these nations even though the state may have been primitive in form and lacking in democratic practice with an economy that was dominated by the centralised polity and not by the market. Society was, by nature then, communitarian and stratified according to class.

With the arrival of colonialism, authority over Africans consisted to varying degrees of direct or indirect rule. Direct rule usually involved the breakdown of traditional structures of power and authority which were replaced with rule by white European administrations whose officers were sent out from the metropole. Direct rule did not spread widely to the countryside unless there existed valuable mineral resources such as on the Copperbelts of Zambia and Katanga or concentrations of white European settler-farmers such as in the highlands of Kenya, Natal, the central highlands of Namibia and Southern Rhodesia. However, it was in urban areas, particularly the colonial capital cities, such as Dakar, Lusaka and Nairobi that direct rule was mostly exercised.

Indirect rule was most often found in the countryside that Europeans did not consider suitable for farming and settlement, where no substantial resources such as minerals were located, and where the colonial administrative machine found it hardest
to permeate due to paucity of resources. It was also where there were traditional or customary rulers and authorities who could be authorised and relied upon to maintain order and allegiance to the metropole in return for leaving these indigenous and localised structures of power in place. As Mamdani makes clear in his ‘Citizen and Subject’, in non-settler colonies, colonialism reinforced and promoted a form of power that Mamdani refers to as the ‘customary’, this referring to traditional authority, although this was always subordinated to colonial state rule, in order to effect ‘indirect rule’.\(^{25}\) Indirect rule had definite advantages for colonial regimes, it was cheaper to administer, and had the effect of boxing African people into discreet ethnic or tribal units maintained by African leaders whose interests were also served by emphasising and maintaining tribal mentalities in their peoples. Ranger describes ethnicity as a great colonial ‘invention’ which involved ascribing monolithic identities.\(^{26}\) These were key, according to Vail in preventing the appearance of de-tribalised natives of whom white colonialists were deeply suspicious.\(^{27}\) Meanwhile, in Zambia, as in most of Africa during the colonial era, a mix of direct and indirect rule prevailed.

Where Lugardian indirect rule was most prominent such as in northern Nigeria, Uganda and Barotseland, a local oligarchy was often subsumed and made reliant upon the metropole. It was through these autocratic but mostly respected organs of power that the will of the colonial administration was to be imposed. In some cases, such as the Lozi of Barotseland and the Baganda of Uganda, the internal political structure of the nation was left virtually untouched except that traditional rulers were now answerable to a narrow, white, elite layer of authority. This authority was invariably located in a remote European style new urban place such as Lusaka, or an adapted African urban place created for colonialist economic expediency. So long as value, usually in the form of taxes combined with migrant labour, was seen to be exacted from these rural regions, this exempted the colonial administration of the need, impetus or expense of extending formal colonialism to peoples and regions not deemed economically viable.

\(^{25}\) M. Mamdani *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, (Fountain Publishers, Kampala, 1996), pp. 21-23.


Thus through the co-operation of traditional leaderships, colonial regimes were able to withhold modernising influences applied to other areas of the colony, sowing the seeds for future mistrust and inter-group rivalry. This can be seen at the root of inter-ethnic rivalry in Nigeria, where first Yorubaland in the south-west and then Iboland in the south-east benefited from educational, professional and commercial opportunities while in the north, which received none of these, Britain found willing allies for their system of indirect rule in the Fulani emirs. That traditional rulers and colonial overlords seemed able to co-exist and co-operate so well can be ascribed to the fact that both existed as the most powerful echelons of their societies, which were highly stratified by class. Both were used to occupying and articulating power and status.

When colonial rule gave way in the second half of the twentieth century to rule by African nationalists from the urban centres inherited from the departing colonial regimes, often using whatever institutional capacity was left behind, independence leaders were presented with the same dichotomous power relations between urban and rural populations. The towns, cities and what industrial belts existed were much easier to imbue with republican and African nationalist sentiment. Urban populations could be deracialised and democratised. Here we can equate democratising with the taking on of citizenship along the lines of the Greek city-states where those in the countryside were considered as backward and less developed. Urban bias quickly set in, encouraged by the modernisation development thinkers and strategists of the day and as new governments also realised that their constituencies effectively lay in the towns and cities. In the rural areas, meanwhile, that the colonialists had not bothered to penetrate or had kept under control using the sway of traditional leaderships, contestation over political allegiances soon started to emerge.

As in the case of the Lozi, sharp differences soon emerged between the all-encompassing ideals of nationalism and the threat that this posed to traditional leaderships and authority. Nationalist politicians encountered difficulties in mobilising rural people and their leaders through dynamics such as deracialisation which was rarely an issue in the countryside and democratisation which was perceived as threatening the

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28 Bartkus, op. cit., p. 98.
status quo of traditional authorities. This sometimes resulted in outright conflict as in the case of Biafra, otherwise it simmered under the surface amid an atmosphere of suspicion and innuendo. Traditional leaders were portrayed by the nationalists as backward and reactionary, holding up the spread of modernity to the rural masses. Former colonial powers, however, mostly supported the new nationalist governments and left former polities that they had used to their advantage in indirect colonial rule to their fates at the hands of nationalist regimes that felt little empathy towards traditional rulers.

When disillusionment set in after the dreams of modernisation had failed largely to materialise and as political power rapidly became more authoritarian and less accountable in the 1970s, leadership became more autocratic and idiosyncratic. This opened up the possibility of co-operation between holders of power in the cities and countryside in alliances of convenience. As many of the new rulers came from the military, this type of alliance was acceptable as no particular political ideology was being employed other than the struggle to hold on to power. Thus new patron-clientage relationships grew up that replicated in many respects, the indirect rule style of relationships that existed in colonial days. In Zambia, after the death of Mwanawina, the Lozi kingship was co-opted by Kaunda who hung onto power through one-party rule from 1973 until this became untenable in 1990.

As economically bankrupt African states apparently ‘redemocratised’ in the 1980s in accordance with the conditionalities of the World Bank, IMF and other lending authorities through such programmes as Structural Adjustment, the ability of these states to impose sovereignty and order in the rural areas became ever more difficult. This was due to the enforced cutting back of the state and reductions of spending on social upliftment programmes such as health and education that would have given the state legitimacy in rural areas. For regions such as Barotseland which had suffered underdevelopment during both the colonial and lost-colonial eras, this led to even more dissatisfaction with the state and, even though traditional authority could not fill the modernising gap left by the moribund state, it could at least provide a cultural and communitarian hearth in which people could bask in the glow of history, heritage and
familiarity. In the communitarian version of citizenship, it is participation and group identity which is recognised and emphasised. Delanty claims that these take precedence over rights and duties,\(^{29}\) although in the case of the Lozi, rights and duties are part of citizenship but not in the western state sense. Thus in the contemporary era, the state capitals and other main urban areas continue to enjoy the lion’s share of available development. Meanwhile, many rural societies, which have hardly been penetrated by the state and by processes associated with modernisation such as democratisation which distributes citizenship rights and provides new means of inclusion and exclusion, languish.

Citizenship entitlements such as voting rights become seriously contested as governments, whose clutch on power has become precarious, seek to withhold voting rights from those suspected of harbouring alternative political allegiances. This is the situation prevailing in Zimbabwe today. Citizenship thus becomes a seriously contested issue as different mediating social influences dispute the bases upon which citizenship is adjudged. As with the citizens of the advanced economies of the ‘North’, who are currently experiencing the flexible processes of postmodernity, people in sub-Saharan Africa are also articulating their citizenship in a broader arena in which multiple layers of citizenship are bought into but in which nation-state citizenship achieves a much lower ranking. Thus citizenship discourse surrounds issues such as ethnicity or tribe, religion, and community. Citizenship is defined more as a social process where the emphasis is on norms, practices and meanings. In the case of tribe, in many cases this can be interpreted as nation. For the Lozi nation, the citizenship arena is easier to define as there is a clearly defined homeland territory and Lozis have long able to transcend Oommen’s conception of ethnie into nationhood.\(^{30}\)

In the developed economies of the North alternative articulations of citizenship are sought out as the nation-state evolves and adapts to new technological and regulatory developments in the ever-dynamic global world economy. In Africa, they are


\(^{30}\) Oommen states that the ethnie becomes a nation when it can relate to a defined territory and reverts from nationhood into an ethnie when this conditionality is lost, for instance after displacement – T.K. Oommen, *Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity: Reconciling Competing Identities* (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1997), pp. 16-17.
sought out rather because of the failure of the state to deliver the trappings of modernity and nation-statehood promised at independence. It is also due to a feeling of impotence as people, particularly away from the cities, feel they are unable to change the status quo that they know is responsible for their unequal impoverishment in the world. This leads to low morale and feelings of loss and exclusion, felt even more keenly on account of the ability of global media and telecommunications to permeate the remotest corners of less-developed countries to demonstrate to people just how badly off they are in comparison to other parts of the world. Whereas citizenship might be expected to offer opportunities for improvements in levels of life in the North, in many African states, citizenship and subjectivity are often absorbed by people as part of a survival strategy. Thus a person might primarily subscribe to citizenship of a tribe or group offering protection, food or some form of power and/or wealth regardless of ethnicity or place of birth.

Equally, religions such as Islam or, in the case of Barotseland, the New Apostolic faith, may offer spiritual protection and even opportunities that a state government that is too often seen as a predatory interest group, fails to offer. Belief systems also offer rationalisation and explanations to poor people for the plight in which they find themselves (the will of God), and may even offer themselves as vehicles for protest at the unequal treatment of the marginalised (for example, as catholic priests in Latin America have often been prepared to stand up to autocratic and praetorian regimes on behalf of local protest groups).

By implication here then, cultural citizenship in this flexible sense is something to be aspired to. The sorts of conditionalities concomitant to citizenship in the north are not replicated here. Instead the right is to be able to call oneself and be recognised as Lozi may be an honour that is either endowed at birth or awarded or bought into during life.

For the state in Zambia, what seems to be occurring are feelings of postcoloniality and helplessness on the part of the state and its supporters. It is undoubtedly true that the Zambian state has demonstrated nepotism in the past in terms of appointments and apportionment of services and development. But this is
surely an inevitability in a political economy that finds itself unable to deliver or enable what the World Bank calls 'basic capabilities' for the majority of the population. It is very difficult for a political party in government to project itself and the state as an attractive option for citizenship when it finds itself having to reduce and ration out the provision of services and human security and where decision-making power is constantly being eroded by the dictates of the IFIs and international NGOs. Certainly, the locus of power in African countries, once located in the capitals of European colonial powers, now seems to have shifted, to differing extents, to locations such as Washington D.C. where the World Bank and IMF have their headquarters, instead of the capitals of African countries themselves. Empathy amongst the marginalised and impoverished populations of Africa for their hapless governments is, however, very limited as it is difficult, from below, to see the constraints they work under. As in the case of the Lozi and the Barotseland Agreement, there are often individual experiences that have led marginalised groups to mistrust the state.

Meanwhile, for groups such as the Lozi, remote from any of these centres of power, there is a feeling of peripheralisation and exclusion, a kind of ‘fourth worldism’ that, in turn, generates an introversion to culture and community. Implicit here is the attraction of the past, to a history constructed to provide a warm and attractive cushion against the frigidity and impotence of the state. For the Lozi, there is no sense that the state offers anything other than burdensome and enforced subjectivity. There are few perceived benefits deriving from this subjectivity. Lozis feel instead that they are not trusted and today face a ‘glass ceiling’ when attempting to climb the ladder in the public sector due to a perception that they received favour in the past from the colonial regime. This is not to say that some Lozis are not recruited, but there are other ways in which the state shows its distrust and ambivalence to a people. For example, it would be almost impossible to find a Lozi policeman appointed to work in the Office of the President (the Zambian state intelligence agency) in western Zambia or as an immigration officer on the borders of western and south-western Zambia, adding to the negative perceptions held by local people.
In addition to this, the state’s control of violence has been insufficient in the past to prevent incursions of armed and lawless people from Angola and elsewhere, causing havoc for local people. In these cases it has seemed to local people that the Zambian government is more interested in its relationship with the Angolan Government than with protecting local people from abduction, rape, killing and plunder by foreigners. Furthermore, it is still within the living memory of many of the current older generation of Lozis that the Zambian state under the tenureship of President Kaunda licensed a war between foreigners (the freedom struggle between SWAPO and the South African Defence Force) to take place on Barotse soil in the 1970s leading to the terrorising, death and displacement of thousands of local people. Meanwhile, in his discussion on public education and nationalism, A.D. Smith asks whether people of a non-dominant ethnic community would be prepared to die en-masse for the patrie en danger just because they have been taught that they are citizens of the state. In the case of the Lozis, the answer here would at once be ambivalent and paradoxical. On the one hand, many Lozis would not feel patriotic fervour for the Zambian state, while on the other, in the context of prevalent poverty and underdevelopment and the fact that soldiers are likely to be paid a reasonable wage and receive other perceived perks, many Lozis would probably enlist.

\[\text{I would willingly join the army or air force and wear the Zambian uniform, just as I would be a prison officer or a policeman or special agent. This is because I am poor and my family spends most of the year hungry. But I would not do anything to endanger my people, my Chief or the Litunga. That is for Lozis. I am a Lozi first and foremost even if I am wearing a Zambian uniform.}\]

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31 An example being the reaction of the government of President Chiluba in November 2001 following incursions first by rebel UNITA soldiers and then Angolan government soldiers into the Shangombo district of Western Province leading to the deaths of 7, the rape of 14 women and abduction of 103. Chiluba spoke only of regret and hoped for closer collaboration between the two governments of Zambia and Angola ‘to avoid further misunderstandings’ and to ‘improve their relations’. Info taken from the Times of Zambia November 23rd 2001 <http://www.times.co.zm/news/viewnews.cgi?category=2&id=1005939860> and Zamnet News Service November 26th 2001 <http://www.zamnet.zm/newsys/news/viewnews.cgi?category=2&id=1006407947>


33 Muyunda Nasilele, 30 year-old water company worker of Mongu, interviewed 21-10-2002.
Here, economic realities can overlay feelings of disenchantment and exclusion although few feelings of nationalist fervour or pride would result which helps to explain the often apparently lacklustre and unenthusiastic performance of many African armies.

Meanwhile, Lozis still feel the need of some sort of citizenship to buy into, and this takes the form of group membership of a socially constructed warm and inviting past, a feeling of solidarity with those who share affiliation to myths of past power and wealth. It is then, as already intimated, a cultural and communitarian style of citizenship that Lozis are expressing in the contemporary era whereby the gaze turns inwards to gain sufficient protection to endure the alienation and misunderstanding of the outside world. Most do accept they are also Zambian, if only by default. It does not help that so few, particularly in Western Zambia, are able to get onto the voters’ register and indulge some kind of participation in electing representation to the state’s decision-making bodies. However, low morale and disillusionment of marginalised peoples in African states does not rule out the potential for the state to generate feelings of patriotism if only because of the location of the state in the world system. Thus when the Zambian football team is playing televised matches against other countries Lozis in Western Province enthusiastically cheer the Zambian team. This could be interpreted as a default expression as there is no Barotseland team and no feelings of loyalty exist to other African states. However, human insecurity and economic hardship breed strange bedfellows and loyalties can be very flexible in such situations as the example of military enlistment demonstrates.

**Locating Lozi citizenship in the contemporary era**

In the preceding chapters, various components of Lozi history have been explored in an attempt to identify factors helpful in explaining contemporary Lozi identity and notions of citizenship and subjectivity. In Chapter 2 it is demonstrated how the earliest myths and legends served to root the Lozi nation in its original homeland, the flat floodplain

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34 The writer witnessed the endless queues of people lining up outside a small building in Mongu in September/October 2002 in the hope of registering on the electoral role ahead of Zambian elections held in the following December. Many had travelled long distances to get to these registration points yet were jostled by police and security, often only to return home disappointed. There are clearly large numbers of rural people classed as Zambians who are unable to participate in the basic processes associated with state citizenship.
known as Bulozi. And, although the original Aluyi spread out, subdued and subsumed other peoples in other landscapes, it is the physical environment of Bulozi that rests firmly in the national consciousness as the sacred, untouchable Lozi territorial homeland. Bulozi is as quintessentially Lozi as Utah is to the Mormon nation, as the vast expanses of the Gobi Desert are to the Mongol nation, and as the arid Karoo region is to the Afrikaners of South Africa. In each of these the homeland landscape can be seen as a previously empty, harsh and wild place, apparently tamed by the brave, early pioneers of the nation that came to dominate its physical spaces.

This early period in Lozi historiography also situates the Kingship, the central pillar of Lozi identity today in the earliest temporal zone, associated with the birth of the nation, in the creation myths deifying the Lozi God Nyambe, his daughter Mbuywamwambwa and one of their sons, the first Lozi King or Litunga, Mboo. Celebration of Lozi culture today, seen so vividly through the Kuomboka ceremony, is rooted back to this early period, to demonstrate the immemorial and timeless nature of Lozi dominance in Bulozi. These early myths and legends, surrounded by magic and superhuman deeds may seem anachronistic, unreal and possibly inappropriate as a tool of identity in today’s context of Barotseland as the Western Province of Zambia and while people suffer deprivation and need. In fact, however, these early myths and legends provide a very real basis for identification in the sense of specialness and rootedness in time, of territorial homeland, nation and citizenship. Such primordial components of identity secure the Lozi nation and Loziness in time and space and provide security of tenure in life against the every real feelings of physical and economic vulnerability, insecurity and deprivation faced by a majority of people living in the region of the Upper Zambezi Valley today.

Finally from this period, many of the character traits of early Lozi rulers celebrated in Siluyana praise sayings and verse celebrate the sort of virtues that Lozis hold dear today such as bravery and valour, fairness and justice, and care for the physical environment including the flora and fauna. Stories of bad behaviour exist but are carefully censored so as to provide just a warning of what is not good Lozi behaviour or comportment. The basis of the class society that exists today is also situated in this
period with the royal clan related by blood exposed as the dominant force in early society. Of course, many of the myths and legends surrounding this early period have been re-interpreted, embellished and distorted to suit the agendas of leaders over time, particularly in the period of early contact with Europeans, but the import of these stories cannot be underestimated when assessing contemporary Lozi identity.

The Makololo interregnum, covered in Chapter Three, is important in that this intervening period between the first and second Lozi Kingdoms is portrayed as a time when the nation is perceived to have lost direction after the death of the much-revered Mulambwa and fallen prey to usurpers from the ‘south’, the first recorded invasion of Barotseland. This caused the nation to be split into three different allegiances before awakening from its torpor having realised its weaknesses, absorbed the strengths and rejected the weaknesses of the Makololo as pointed out by David Livingstone, and emerged a stronger nation. To Lozis, the charisma, magnanimity and apparent invincibility of the Makololo Chief, Sibitwane, carried with it a sense of magic. Whilst this charismatic Chief lived, the lands of the Lozis thrived even though segments remained in exile, and it should always be remembered that the Lozi Kings Sepopa and Lewanika had both been groomed in the Makololo court. It has been demonstrated how the Makololo, in truth a very mixed band of Sothos and the various peoples that came under the sway of Sibitwane were never truly eliminated because they had intermarried and become intertwined in Lozi society. Today most Lozis would like to consider themselves to have just a little Makololo blood running trough their veins to represent the historical valour and strength that faced down the threat from the dreaded Matabele.

It is the Makololo era too, that confirmed the extent of the old Lozi empire with its close links with Caprivi, originally subdued by the early Lozi princes and Litungas; plus it was the coming of the Makololo that anchored the gaze of the Lozi nation southwards both in terms of potential threat and of value. Previously, as demonstrated in Chapter Two, the south had been a region for exploration and expansion while the west was the region of imminent threat from the ‘Andonyi’ and ‘Wiko’ and value once traders from the Atlantic coast and their Ovimbundu intermediaries had reached the Zambezi Valley. But this changed irrevocably with the coming of the Makololo and their
erstwhile enemies, the Matabele, and later, with the arrival of Livingstone. Some say that the legendary suspicion of Lozis towards strangers and foreigners stems from the time of the Makololo invasion.

The relationship between Livingstone and the Makololo and Lozi, even though he spent relatively short periods in the Zambezi Valley created long-lasting myths and stories of magic. Livingstone is credited with being the pioneer of Christianity which is now the main basis of faith in the region. Livingstone also introduced long-distance trade, and made known to other Anglophone traders from the south, the reserves of previously undervalued ivory. On the one hand, Livingstone was responsible for the disappearance of the elephant in Barotseland but on the other he was also the pioneer of Anglophone influence among the Lozi which was to remain a lasting feature. Traders such as Westbeech and Missionary expeditions such as those of Helmore and Price, Arnot and Coillard all set out for Barotseland thanks to Livingstone, his journals and books.

Chapter Four reveals how the period of the restoration leading up to the arrival of British rule introduced the influence of Europeans in the form of traders and missionaries, some of whom were taken in by Lozi kings and used for the protection and benefit of the King and his elite while Lewanika, in particular, also sought development for the Lozi nation, not least, to add credence and protection to his own position in power. The chaos and uncertainty surrounding the post-Makololo years is partly responsible for Lewanika’s search for an external partner to help him secure the Litungaship which otherwise looked somewhat unstable in the post-Makololo political climate in Barotseland. Had it not been for Lewanika’s decision to engage the British and seek ‘protection’ the Lozi would have either fallen under the influence of Portugal which was very interested in securing Barotseland for its colonial collection or else, under a less thoughtful ruler, could have gone the way of the Matabele by attempting to oppose the European colonial onslaught.

The impact that the activities of Coillard and his PEMS followers had on contemporary Lozi identity cannot be underestimated. Like missionaries elsewhere in
Africa, Coillard and later Adolf Jalla set about committing the Silozi language to print, first and foremost in the form of the Bible and later in the form of ‘authentic’ Lozi histories as dictated by Lewanika and other designated Lozi historians. Jalla’s *Litaba za Sicaba sa Malozi* is still used by many Lozis as a base reading of Lozi history. Thus, as well as creating written languages, missionaries were instrumental in creating cultural identities through their specification of custom and tradition and by writing ‘tribal’ histories. When missionaries first arrived in Barotseland, the language in use was a hybrid mix of Siluyana and Sesotho known as Sikololo. But Coillard and his Sotho evangelists did not know Siluyana so concentrated on teaching and writing mostly in Sesotho with a smattering of Siluyana words, more of which crept back into what is now Silozi as more Lozis came to be literate. The impact of this missionary activity was to produce and entrench cultural borders and differentiation between Lozis and other groups in the region. It also underlined the southward gaze of the nation to where others spoke and used the same vernacular.

The period of rule by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) and the Colonial Office was marked by a gradual erosion of power, first from Lewanika, then later from three of the four sons who succeeded him to the Maoma Drums. Yet what is significant about this period, examined in Chapter Five, is what Lozis choose to remember and what many, though not all, selectively overlook about the period of British rule. British colonialism oversaw the destruction of the productive capacity that had made Barotseland into the centralised state that it became. In addition, indirect rule, while apparently leaving traditional authority in place, actually also undertook the emasculation of power located at the Kingship. This was the period that witnessed the emasculation of the Litungaship and effective Lozi rule over its people. It was also the period in which Lozi men, freed up from compulsion to work on the canals and farmlands of the Litunga started migrating in earnest to earn money elsewhere in the British Empire in order to pay colonial taxes and, concomitantly, were exposed to modernistic practices. The main direction of this migrant labour was south and the Lozi connection with the south became firmly entrenched during this time. Agriculture,

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35 Originally produced in typescript form and referred to severally by colonial officers conducting research into Barotseland and first published in 1909 by Oxford University Press, then republished several times, most recently as A. Jalla, *Litaba za Sicaba sa Malozi* (Bookworld Publishers, Lusaka, 1996).
meanwhile, stagnated while cattle farming was hit by disease and a lack of urgency on the part of the colonialists to take action led to a decimation of the export trade in cattle from Barotseland which was in competition from white farmers in Southern Rhodesia.

Indirect rule in Barotseland had the effect of slow asphyxiation on the ability of the Barotse organs of government to effectively administer the Lozi people as authority was withdrawn with every new edict which successive Litungas found themselves forced to sign up to so as not to bring about the end of their own dynasty. This led to a loss of respect for the royal establishment which became seen as anachronistic and self-serving and this manifested itself in the events surrounding Barotseland’s insertion into the new Republic of Zambia when respect for the Litungaship of Mwanawina III was at an all-time low.

Yet the colonial period also imbued a sense of Britishness that has never left the Lozi nation. There has been an enduring notion of shared specialness, the idea of two strong and unique forces coming together in friendship and co-operation to go forward into the twentieth century. Of course, this is a fallacy created by two elites who relied on each other to maintain a status quo which was mutually beneficial. The nostalgia for the British connection is also powered by the enduring memories of Lewanika’s visit to Britain and the written and photographic records of that visit. And whilst both Yeta III and Mwanawina III also made visits to Britain, it is Lewanika’s visit that is remembered because he remains the hero of the nation, the founding father of the Second Lozi Kingdom whose cult continues to infuse the nation right up to the present day.

In the period since independence, as detailed in Chapter Six, promises of participation in a nation-state (‘One Zambia-One Nation’) as promised by Kaunda at independence whereby citizenship would result in a return to the path to modernity, so sought after by Lewanika but stunted during the colonial era, resulted in disillusionment and disappointment. With the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement in October 1969, it seemed to some as if the ability of the Litunga and BRE to exercise authority over the Lozi nation was crippled forever and that Barotseland - the Lozi Empire and
Barotseland - the British protectorate, were to be consigned to become merely one of the eight provinces of Zambia. As Caplan opined in 1970:

'Given the realities of African nationalism, it was predictable that the work of the British South Africa Company was completed by a black government. The formal destruction of the old kingdom of Barotseland was now total: it became merely one of eight provinces of independent Zambia... It was exactly eighty years since Lewanika had signed the Ware Agreement. His successors were left with nothing but their status, an unshakeable belief in the superiority and special destiny of the Lozi, the loyalty of many of their people, and their good white friends in southern Africa.'

But Caplan himself recognised in these and the closing words of his book that the very fact of abrogation and the humiliation thus inflicted on the institution of the kingship had drawn the majority of Lozi away from the nationalist fold. And, by the end of 1969, with Kaunda clearing the decks for a one-party state of which he would be supreme commander and with Zambia arming itself for insertion into the freedom struggle of neighbouring states, Caplan saw that Barotseland would be vulnerable as a strategic territory wedged between competing interests and the loyalties of the Lozi people sorely tested in the decade to come.

The freedom war waged during the 1970s between the fighters of SWAPO and troops of the South African apartheid regime on the soil of the Lozi heartland without the consent of local people at the behest of the Zambian President and which terrorised and frightened so many Lozis was another grave humiliation to be suffered by so proud a people. This combined with the ending of migrant labour to South Africa in 1966 without putting in place any equivalent opportunities for earnings, the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement in 1969, increasing poverty and the broken promises of development such as a railway line to Mongu from Lusaka, the damage inflicted on the

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36 Caplan, The Elites of Barotseland..., p. 221.
Lozi Kingship by Kaunda and the move to an intolerant, authoritarian one-party state all combined to leave Lozis cynical and disillusioned about the citizenship benefits of a state called Zambia.

The period from 1990 is not covered in detail in this work. However, following the removal of Kaunda and the return to multi-party rule in 1991, Lozis could have been forgiven for expecting an improvement in their relative situation. Yet it turned out that the new regime of Frederick Chiluba seemed as determined as ever to constrain any form of meaningful development reaching the old kingdom of Barotseland. Chiluba was a trade unionist having worked on the railways and his Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD), which was formed with the help of certain high ranking Lozis was expected to remove the anti-Lozi bias from government. But Chiluba proved to be as resistant to the idea that traditional authority could be a useful adjunct to the government of Zambia as his predecessor and, lacking the capacity or will to extend the reach of state government into the territory, withheld development from Barotseland even more virulently. Thus, heightened notions of Loziness and a mental return to the glories of the past were an inevitable result. Ideas of secession have rumbled under the surface ever since the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement although, as previously explained, these have consistently failed to gain sufficient support among the Lozi masses. Meanwhile, the activities of the Caprivi Liberation Army in 1999 which were so misunderstood in Windhoek and Lusaka only served to disappoint adherents of Lozi nationhood when it was discovered that these Lozis of the old southernmost portion of the kingdom actually militated for their own independence, rejecting a return to the homogenous Lozi nation. In summary, the period since independence has served only to entrench and reinforce ideas of subjection and subordination, the foundations for which were laid during the colonial era.

The discussion on culture in the preceding chapter focuses on the production and expression of Lozi comportment and behaviour, language and its import to other expressions of Loziness, the nature of belief systems in Barotseland and the use of heritage events such as the three annual Kuomboka ceremonies to articulate and re-invent the Lozi nation over time and space. Lozi comportment and language demarcate
the Lozi nation in Zambia and create a sense of ‘otherness’ and ‘specialness’. On the one hand, the very practice of Lozi comportment such as kunkandelela and Kushoelela creates difference which is noticed and remarked upon by other groups while on the other, is also utilised and appreciated by Lozis who search for identifying markers to recognise themselves in a sea of deprivation and underdevelopment, particularly when outside the borders of the homeland. This was observed in the exclusive use of Silozi in some New Apostolic churches in Lusaka where the lingua franca is Nyanje. The attempt by Kaunda to homogenise Christian belief in Zambia with the creation of the United Church of Zambia created something of a backlash in Barotseland culminating in the appearance of the Church of Barotseland which concentrated on the original teachings of the Paris missionaries with a smattering of Lozi traditional belief which still infuses custom and culture in contemporary Lozi society. Meanwhile the creation of othering practices is ameliorated by the concept of ‘joking relationships’ between Lozis and other groups especially those who have spent some part of their history under Lozi and/or Makololo domination such as the Lovale, Tonga, Toka, Leya, and Ila who now enjoy a resurgence of independent identity as a result of colonial and postcolonial regime machinations.

Lozi society today remains largely introverted and suspicious of outsiders, a condition partly due to its geographical remoteness which was enforced during both the colonial and postcolonial eras. It is also a highly superstitious society where witchcraft is an accepted component of the Lozi cosmos thus the request for more competent ‘witchfinders’ in the submission of one traditional leader to the Constitutional Review Commission in 2004 referred to previously. People are still dying as a result of Karavinas and the use of the Kalalozi gun, and fear abounds, particularly in the countryside, over such issues as the kidnap and killing of babies and strangers, particularly whites, for use in witchcraft ceremonies.

Kuomboka, meanwhile, remains the most distinctive expression of Loziness and a vivid statement of identity and citizenship by all Lozis who attend the event as if on a pilgrimage. Kuomboka, with its inclusive connotations including Mbunda Makishi dancing

and the appearance of the Litunga in the British admiral’s uniform, is a flexible and adaptable festival combining re-immersion in and re-invention of Loziness.

So what does the label Lozi provide in terms of citizenship and subjectivity that is more attractive than other labels, particularly the Zambian state? Firstly, it is important to remember that ‘Lozi’ is a generic label encompassing a large number of peoples who also exist under other tribal or ethnic headings. Secondly, that Barotseland is poor goes without question, certainly poorer than other parts of Zambia and Caprivi though not as badly off as war-torn eastern Angola, which abuts the region. Thus, apart from allocations of land, which is of little value without the finance to develop it, no material benefits result from being Lozi, even for those in the royal family and those chosen to serve in the BRE. Even for the elite, the material benefits conferred are extremely modest compared to what they were under colonialism which placed a usage value on traditional rulers that post-independence governments did not. The status and value attached to serving or representing the Lozi nation through the BRE is entirely symbolic but this still matters in an arena where people feel their citizenship in communitarian ways. Lozis gladly admit to being Lozis first and foremost, are prepared to pledge allegiance and loyalty to the Kingship, and are prepared to accept the suspicion, ridicule and criticism of their counterparts in Zambia.

The explanation for this, it is argued here, lies in Lozi culture and history. What ‘Loziness’ confers on its subjects is status and self-value, the signs and symbols of the past, something fixed that cannot be bought or taken away, the trappings of cultural citizenship. Lozis then, to use A.D. Smith’s phrase, are ‘subjects of history’, which Gellner implies is a necessary component of ‘high culture’, necessary to enter and not to be submerged by modernity and the industrial age. Thus it might be argued that Lewanika attempted to ready the Lozi nation for modernity and dreamed of Barotseland as an industrial state à la Britain. It is certainly true that Lewanika found it hard to see beyond wealth and power gravitating upwards to the kingship and being re-distributed out to those of the elite deemed deserving in what was a rigidly class-based societal

39 Most Indunas attached to the five royal centres receive a fee of less than US$1 per month.
40 A.D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism..., p. 38.
structure. Yet Lewanika clearly saw that there was something beyond to be aimed at for the nation and that was industry, for through industrialisation Lewanika saw the dream of Barotseland as a great power like the Britain that he so much admired.

And herein lies part of the key to Lozi identity and apparent inwardness today. The dream of Lewanika, which was shared at the time by the Lozi elite and only realised later by the rest of the population, is a broken dream, one that was never realised. There is a perceptible sense of frustration in the Lozi consciousness of having been held back. This frustration articulates the perception that the Lozi nation, already paramount in its region at the turn of the century,\(^\text{42}\) was now ready to take the next step, into modernity, and that this was thwarted, in fact by the BSAC and colonialism, but more perceptibly in the Lozi consciousness, by the post-colonial state. Lozis know in their hearts that they have always been special and unique people in their region and that it is only constraints imposed by a system, which is not properly understood, that has allowed others who were not as special as themselves to obtain control and thus, out of jealousy and resentment, to withhold the dream of modernity from the Lozi nation. The irony is that the force most responsible for the broken dream is one that Lozis like most to be associated with in terms of identity from their history in the pre-independence era – Great Britain. Yet it is also undoubtedly true that little could have reversed the fate of Barotseland as European colonialism swept across Africa. And with regard to the negative impact of inclusion in the postcolonial state, as Caplan points out, even more economically viable African kingdoms such as Buganda and Asante fell victim to the wrath of the nationalist creed.\(^\text{43}\)

Today, grinding poverty and underdevelopment have taken their toll on Barotseland, while urban Lozis and those in the wider diaspora feel a deep sense of frustration that their homeland is so poor. Whilst doing fieldwork for this work, the writer came across several Lozis working in South Africa under Arabic names, amongst groups of Somali workers, afraid to reveal their Zambian identity for fear of being thrown out of the country as illegal immigrants. Thus, yet again, to be Zambian was

\(^\text{42}\) By which time it had actually fallen firmly under the yoke of indirect rule colonialism through which it was garnering wealth in the form of a share of tax from peoples it had never dominated.

\(^\text{43}\) Caplan, *The Elites of Barotseland…*, p. 221.
valueless. Yet what these economic migrants wanted most to say was that they have not lost their Loziness; like their forebears who worked in the mines of the Transvaal in the Wenela years, Lozis share an indefatigable spirit of community. This is manifested in self-respect and a passionate sense of belonging that exists in spite of the material poverty of the Lozi homeland and the humiliation and subordination that Lozis have to undergo in order to earn money in foreign lands.

The bonds of community are so strong that other groups, especially in Zambia accuse Lozis of being aloof, of only wanting to speak their own language and of being arrogant and conservative, and worse still, of being the ex-lackeys of British colonialism. Lozis say this is just jealousy born out of envy that Barotseland’s traditional institutions, especially the Kingship, were left in place when others were suffering the dismantlement of traditional societal structures and values, typical of formal colonialism elsewhere. This has been observed to be true yet Lozis do often manifest an apparent veneer of superiority and this was discussed in terms of the creation of the Lozi self-image described in the preceding chapter. It is born, as previously argued, out of the mist of historical perceptions and cultural beliefs and practices. These are reconstituted as sureness that, at one time, the Lozi nation was the most powerful and wealthy in the region, that colonialism did not overpower Barotseland but was engaged and lived with as an equal partner. This was thanks to the foresightedness and surefootedness of the great King Lewanika without whom the Lozi nation would not exist in its present form today. Some of this is clearly true but Lozi knowledge and use of history is selective as has been pointed out earlier. There has been careful censorship, sanitisation and control over historical knowledge in the past, knowledge which was handed down mostly by oral stories, there being no written or photographic records before Livingstone’s first visit in 1851 and little access to anything other than oral records even today in the rural areas. Not that the arrival of the written and printed word put an end to censorship of the past. Quite the opposite in fact, it gave license to the appropriation of aspects of the past to deliver to the farthest corners of the earth.

Furthermore, it may not be important whether the notion of a golden past is particularly accurate. It may even be that many Lozis, particularly among the rural
peasantry, who imagine a golden past know that for all but a select few, it was not true. What these myths do is to provide a warm and powerful communitarian citizenship to both buy into and to posit against the alternative, a cold, uninviting and seemingly predatory ‘Zambianess’ that offers subjectivity but few of the rights or privileges of the citizenship of modernity which has failed to materialise for all but the bourgeois urban elites. There is no particular material value and few rights to be taken advantage of in this communitarian or cultural citizenship. Instead, cultural citizenship provides meaning and aesthetic value. It is what Stevenson refers to the ‘dialogic production of meaning and aesthetics through a variety of practices’. It is used as an oppositional discourse, a resistance to the empty republicanism of the state. It is worn like a badge or uniform, articulating the otherness that the state, through its failure to offer social progress and economic development appears to articulate, and reifying this into something with which to claim specialness.

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9 Conclusion

One of the fundamental issues that this work sets out to explain is the difficulty experienced by so many peoples of Sub-Saharan Africa in feeling some sense of citizenship and subjectivity of the post colonial state. The task set here has been to examine and explain the extent and nature of these aspects of identity across ‘rememberable’ time amongst a distinct group of peoples in central southern Africa. This group, the Lozi of the Upper Zambezi Valley, have historically experienced a very strong sense of nationhood both in the pre-colonial and colonial eras and this has continued undiminished in the post-colonial period despite the incorporation of the homeland territory of the Lozi known as Barotseland in the Republic of Zambia.

The first finding of this study is that Western notions of citizenship differ widely from those prevailing in Africa because societal formation and association in Africa is expressed differently to that in the West. This may be attributed to completely different though interconnected modes of political, economic and social development. Due to different locations in the now global world economy, these dynamics have left social relations in Sub-Saharan Africa weighted towards communitarianism even within the large urban arenas where people still mostly identify primarily with their rural roots. African societal relations remain very much at the vertical, communitarian stage rather than the horizontal, associationist stage related to capitalism that requires people to adapt their communitarian values towards individualism.

Thus the basis upon which notions of citizenship and subjectivity are constructed in Africa are fundamentally different to that prevailing in the West. The foundations of modernistic, associational social identity derived from economic processes such as industrialisation, wage labour and sustainable economic development, and political processes such as universal suffrage and pluralism are largely unrealised resulting in the aforementioned communitarian mode of identity and social relations.

A second but closely related finding relates to the attractiveness of the postcolonial state in Africa as a citizenship option. Due to the impoverished state of the economies of most African and other developing countries, there are few state resources
to be allocated to the populace in the form of public services, employment, the creation and protection of civil and human rights and defence against criminals and intruders from outside of the supposedly sovereign borders of the state. In this situation it is virtually impossible for the postcolonial state to form the basis of a respected political institution as those resources that exist are all too often corruptly sequestered or tend to be allocated by state leaders and their governments to those interest groups who will assist them to stay in power. These interest groups can be a particular ethnic group or coalition of groups, the military and/or police or a cultural or religious entity such as the Mourides in Senegal. The need to stay in power is premised on the fact that the rewards of government office can so far exceed what is available outside of government i.e. in the private commercial sector, that the effort to avoid removal from office may involve corruption, vote-rigging, the abandonment of elections, and, as in the case of Zimbabwe under Mugabe, Equatorial Guinea under Obiang Nguema and Mauritania under Ould Taya the use of intimidation and outright attacks on political opposition. Here then, the attractiveness of the postcolonial state as an institution in which to invest for identity, particularly for the rural masses, far removed from what are weak centres of power, is much diminished.

A third finding, also related to the previous two, relates to history. Before European colonialism, the socio-political scene in Africa was characterised by a collection of societal groupings at differing levels of development from one another. Sometimes these groupings had developed into nations or primitive nation-states. This was partly due to the ability to take over benign physical environments such as the Bulozi floodplain. But it was also due to competition over increasingly scarce resources and the ability to compete for these resources as a result of the arrival of external influences such as the gun and the demand for gold, ivory and most particularly, in terms of the evolving world economy, slaves. The Lozi nation-state grew and became strong both before and as a result of the arrival of Europeans. With the arrival of formal imperialism in the shape of colonialism, African ethnic groups, nations and states were divided or artificially welded together into new colonial states, often held in place by force. However, the British left the homeland of the Lozi state and its institutions mostly in place, despite the excision of Caprivi, the lands to the west of the Kwando and Balovale.
And whilst, colonial rule appeared to leave the traditional political structure in place, in fact it emasculated it and made it impotent. In reality, British colonialism ‘imprisoned’ the Lozi state in the form of the Barotseland Protectorate, trapped within the Northern Rhodesian Protectorate, later only releasing it to the postcolonial state of Zambia which attempted more openly to dismember it.

This work has examined specific eras of Lozi historiography in order to ascertain defining aspects that have contributed to the way in which Lozis today identify themselves as citizens and subjects. From this historiography and the socially constructed histories spawned, discernable strands of identity can be detected that connect the Lozi consciousness over the years. One of these is a deep sense of pride in the nation and its corporeal symbols such as the Kingship, Kuomboka and the Lozi past. However outsiders may perceive Lozi nationhood, most Lozis believe in the idea of their nation, that they are members of some imagined homogenous political entity and this engenders a deep sense of belonging, of membership of something psychologically tangible. History, however constructed, is worn like a cloak by Lozis as protection from the intangible alienation experienced through contact with the outside world that seems, to the Lozi consciousness, through jealousy, resentment and exploitation, to want only to constrain the nation.

Citizenship to most Lozis interviewed then, is a protective layer, worn like a uniform. In the conventional sense, the obligations of Lozi citizenship are to speak the language, offer loyalty to the institutions of Lozi nationhood and conform to a certain set of cultural and behavioural modalities. The rights and privileges of Lozi citizenship are bound up in a sense of pride and self-belief provided by membership of a community that feels different to others, particularly in Zambia. Another major factor here is economic distress. To not know where tomorrow’s food is coming from and to suffer exposure to bad health due to economic impoverishment is one thing. To be poor yet a member of a nation with a proud past enduring the exigencies of the present imposed by an indomitable outside world is entirely another. In this case, Lozi citizenship is a morale booster.
All this is not intended to diminish in any way the very real historical basis upon which Lozi nationhood has been forged. Nevertheless, history is a product of the moment. The Lozi past is constructed, adapted and viewed from the context of the Lozi present and possible Lozi future. There can be no doubt that contemporary Lozi identity and notions of citizenship and subjectivity are polarised around the idea of a Lozi nation imagined and dreamt of in terms of a glorious past. Meanwhile, the constructed past is utilised as a tool to deal with the present and as an attempt to mobilise for the future. Of course all nations of the world require to have national histories in order to buttress their raison d’être. But the need for this in the Lozi case appears to be heightened by a sense of rejection and alienation reinforced by desperate levels of impoverishment not remembered from previous eras. According to present thinking in Lozi circles, the development of the Lozi nation has been thwarted by an omnipresent postcolonial regime that was unfairly awarded domination over the birthrights of every Lozi, the Kingship and the homeland. This belief is supported by the collective submissions of hundreds of Lozis who contributed to the findings of this study.

Lozis also know that the colonial past did not benefit their nation’s development and that their special relationship with Britain was worth very little when Britain was offloading its colonies in the mid-1960s. Yet, once again, due to the exigencies of the present, the relationship with colonial Britain, because it was different and more personal than that experienced by other groups in Zambia, is used as an identifying marker, an oppositional tool in the face of the perceived alienation endured under postcolonial Zambian regimes. This differentiation has been reinforced by the fact, underlined by successive Litungas, their administrations and local historians, that the relationship with British colonialism was entered into willfully and not under duress. There is also a perception among many older Lozis who remember the British presence and think of the relationship as stretching all the way from David Livingstone’s arrival in 1851 that, in some way, Britain will one day come along to help undo the terrible wrong imposed on Barotseland at independence, a wrong, it has to be said, that was not perceived as such by very many Lozis at the time of independence in 1964.
Given the above findings, it would not be surprising to find political murmurings for secession and independence, and indeed, there is longstanding evidence of this. However, unlike in the case of the Igbo and Nigeria in the 1960s or the Casamançais and their ongoing secessionist struggle with the Senegalese state or the Eritrean struggle for independence from Ethiopia, poverty has bred a sense of resignation and fear among the Lozi rural masses. Meanwhile, those Lozis who have become urbanised outside of Barotseland fear the implications of an independence that would appear to offer no serious economic benefits. Thus, support for the idea of independence for Barotseland in the first decade of the twenty-first century is somewhat muted and is often, though not always, seen as the preserve of hotheads and those seeking personal gain.

This has not always been the case, however. In spite of the seemingly obvious explanation for Lozis’ ability to look back with pride and longing while regarding the present with distaste and a sense of peripheralisation and humiliation, it has been argued here that there are other strands that have led to calls for the independence of Barotseland, first from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and later from Zambia. The Federation was seen as a tool for the enrichment of whites, particularly Southern Rhodesian whites who were easily identified as exploiters of blacks by a nation forced into labour migration. The Zambian republic, meanwhile, was judged after only a few years of its existence as oppositional and hostile to the development and well-being of the Lozi nation and predatory towards its peoples. Once conflicting feelings regarding the Lozi nationalists had evaporated and the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement had taken place, Kaunda played into the hands of Lozi nationalism by imposing perceived hardships. These included the cancellation of the Wenela Agreement without offering any alternative employment to the many thousands affected and the imposition of SWAPO camps and the resultant intrusion of freedom fighters and South African forces into Barotseland’s rural expanses. To these were added a perceived deliberate policy of underdevelopment and broken promises of development by a central government that appeared to view Barotseland as a backwater. The enforced change of name from Barotse Province to Western province has never been forgiven by Lozis who are still militating for the return of the old appellation. It was as if a nation collectively
realised the awful mistake it had made when Mwanawina III felt forced to accept Barotseland’s incorporation into Zambia.

Meanwhile, incumbent Litungas from the death of Mwanawina onwards have not openly espoused secessionist calls, possibly due partly to the fact that the Litungaship is financed by the Lusaka Government. Amongst much of the rest of the Lozi nation, which has seen increasing impoverishment over the last century, whilst unable to express empathy with the Zambian state, there exists considerable scepticism over the wisdom of secessionist calls. So often during field research for this work, opinions were voiced which cast doubt on the intentions and abilities of those calling for secession to bring improvements to the lives of the rural poor in Barotseland proper. Many of the older generation feared the bloodshed that might ensue, and looking to Lozi history, also feared a return to debilitating internecine competition within the Lozi elite that would involve the recruitment of factions within the Lozi masses and resultant divisions and disharmony. Whether such fears are grounded is open to debate, but such fears were expressed widely and reinforced by the tendency of some Lozi politicians to dilute secessionist calls as soon as they became recruited by Zambian governments that supplied them with the trappings of high office and influence on a wider level. Thus, it appears that secessionist calls tend to be class oriented, made by men from within the group elite who seek power, influence and wealth on a personal level, who can be bought off once these personal needs have been assuaged.

This is not, however to deny the potency of group identity where such a strong history exists. Any threat to the Lozi nation, in particular the kingship and its centrality in the life of the Lozi homeland, the Bulozi floodplain, is opposed by all Lozis, of whatever class. It has even proved largely impossible for Zambian police to supervise the Kuomboka ceremony with near riots when this has been attempted in the past. Unsurprisingly, therefore, there have been very few attempts to interfere with those aspects of Lozi ‘citizenship’ and ‘subjectivity’ that are interpreted as central institutions of Lozi identity. Only the Makololo ever succeeded in doing this and even Sibituane recognised the need to embody substantial elements of the Lozi elite in his administration. This may also help to explain why calls for secession in Barotseland
have so far not met with much grassroots support. It may also assist in understanding why Lozis have such a weak sense of ‘Zambia-ness’, the fact that successive Northern Rhodesian and Zambian administrations have not attempted to assert a larger state authority over Barotseland. And indeed, there was no particular incentive to do so. Not only was it expedient to leave the Lozi Kingship and state institution in place, albeit in emasculated form, there were no perceived important economic gains to be made from what would be expensive and resisted attempts to subvert Lozi paramountcy in what has always been viewed as a region remote and isolated from other theatres of power and wealth accumulation.

Finally, having explored the nature of Lozi citizenship and subjectivity with its emphasis on history, culture and community, it is perhaps appropriate to address the future and ask how the nature of identity among Lozis may change in the decades ahead. Changes are taking place at the start of the twenty-first century that will have an impact on the way Lozis negotiate their identity and place in what has been the ‘outside world’ to date. First among the changes that are relevant here is the construction and/or replacement of roads into and out of the region that has been going on apace since 2001. Core to these changes is the improvement of main roads in the region after decades of neglect that saw road transport descend into the realms of farce and chaos with relatively short journeys taking days and exposing users to great danger. This factor alone was a serious disincentive to development.

Now all that is changing. The road from Livingstone to Sesheke and Katima Mulilo in Caprivi has recently been completely refurbished and a bridge built over the Zambezi at Katima (Zambian side of the border), all completed in June 2004. This has brought about revolutionary changes in speed and time of transit for locals and is likely to introduce travellers to the southern part of Barotseland from the rest of Zambia, Zimbabwe and the Victoria Falls, Botswana and Namibia with all the commercial possibilities that come with such contact. For local people in the old royal centres of Mwandi-Sesheke and the many villages on the left bank of the Zambezi, these are revolutionary changes in terms of mobility and access. Other routes are also undergoing improvement including the track from Mongu across the Bulozi plain to Kalabo and on to
the Angolan border where no road has existed before. This is intended to link up with another new road planned by the Angolan Government to link up with the Atlantic port of Benguela. Finally another new road is to be built to replace the track that leads from Mongu south across the Zambezi to the Namibian border at Katima. This would link with a road system leading to the Namibian port of Walvis Bay and, ultimately, Cape Town and Johannesburg. The impacts of the likely inflow of cheap goods and the introduction of South African style consumerism are likely to have significant impacts on local identity.

Such developments will make it easier for those living in Barotseland to look south and west in the search for economic opportunities, as their ancestors did before them, instead of being forcibly locked into dependence for mobility and access on a poor quality road from Lusaka. This has real implications for social and economic change for people who have been forced to look east by successive post-independence governments resentful of potential development for Barotseland and jealous of Barotseland’s obvious strategic position for taking advantage of development opportunities and suspicious of Lozi loyalties should meaningful economic development arrive in the territory. These changes are taking place at a very fast pace and local people are still largely unaware of how they may be affected.

For these developments to take place, a considerable change of thinking must have come about in political circles in Lusaka and this has indeed been the case with the coming to power of President Levy Mwanawasa who replaced Frederick Chiluba in the Zambian general election of 2001. Mwanawasa has not continued with the suspicious attitude towards Barotseland and fears of Lozi separatism adopted by his predecessors Kaunda and Chiluba. Decisions regarding development projects and programmes have undergone a degree of decentralization.

Another recently announced project is for a South African company to lease two national parks in Barotseland in order to turn them into expensive eco-tourist attractions. The company intends to restock the parks with depleted species of animals and build lodges to accommodate wealthy foreign tourists. A percentage of the proceeds
would pass to the BRE via the Litunga while it is assumed that the project would be
good for local people who might gain employment and spin-off tourist spending in the
region.

Future research must look at the background, experience and impacts of these
projects on the way that local people feel about themselves, their localities and their
place in the world. This work argues strongly that the intrusion of the outside world and
development projects of this nature will have very noticeable impacts on notions of
citizenship. The traditional Lozi introversion is likely to retreat as strangers, especially
those bringing money, development and employment opportunities start to flood into
the territory. Hostility to the Zambian government is also, contrary to the government’s
previous expectations, likely to recede as people perceive that there is less opposition to
development from the Zambian capital and with the newly increased interaction with
Angola, Namibia and indirectly, South Africa it is even likely that local people will start to
feel more Zambian. As an example of this, there is ongoing local antipathy towards the
many thousands of refugees in camps run by the UNHCR in Barotseland, mainly but not
exclusively from the now defunct civil war in Angola, who are reluctant to leave their
adopted home.

Meanwhile the traditional culture and history of the Lozi nation will never lose its
poignancy or potency even if the edges become blurred by the flurry of new activity.
However, it is likely that the heritage of the nation will be put to much more commercial
advantage than has recently been the case and this will have knock-on effects for the
way that Lozi heritage is celebrated. Doubtless, an event as engrained in local life as
Kuomboka will simply adapt and become even more inclusive than it is now.
Nevertheless, there is uncertainty in a future that contains the prospect of sudden
intrusion of the capitalist world economy into a region from which it has been largely
absent to date. The likelihood, however, is that Lozis will seize the opportunities
presented to them while continuing to respect their culture. Some aspects of behaviour
and comportment may become diluted and there is always the ever-present threat of
degradation to the environment of the Lozi homeland, which is already an ecologically
fragile zone.
Whatever the future course of social, political and economic development in the Upper Zambezi Valley region, it is likely that the past, particularly the recent past will be reconstructed to meet the agendas of the day and to help once again look to a better future for this unique and compelling people and the region they inhabit. Citizenship and subjectivity will continue to be flexible although the idea of Lozi nationhood is unlikely to be dispelled for a long time to come.
Appendix 1 –

Maps showing location and extent of Kingdom of Barotseland before the British excisions
Map of Barotseland from colonial times showing approximate extent of floodplain (Bulozi) and some of the place names mentioned in the text.
Appendix 2

*LITUNGAS LA BULOZI (in chronological order starting with the first)*

MWAMBWA (princess of the Luba Empire, migrated south during a succession dispute)

MBUYUWAMWAMBWA (daughter to Mwambwa)

MUYUNDA (later called Mboo, first-born son to Mbuyuwamwambwa)

INYAMBO (brother to Mboo)

YETA (Yeta I)

[Numwa (son of Inyambo)]

NGALAMA (son of Iñalamwa, another of Mbuyu’s sons who did not accede to the throne, also cousin to Numwa)

YETA (Yeta II, Yeta Nalute, son to Ngalama)

NGOMBALA (son to Ngalama)

YUBYA (grandson to Ngombala)

MWANAWINA (Mwanawina I -brother to Yubya, grandson to Ngombala)

MWANANYANDA (son to Mwanawina)

MULAMBWA (son to Mwanawina, brother to Mwananyanda) ?-1830?

SILUMELUME (son to Mulambwa)

MUBUKWANU (son to Mulambwa, brother to Silumelume)

[Imasiku] in exile during Makololo interregnum

[Imbuwa] in exile during Makololo interregnum

LUTANGU (later Sipopa, son to Mulambwa) 1864-1876

MWANAWINA (Mwanawina II, nephew to Sipopa) 1876-1878

LUBOSI (Lubosi I, son to Litia, grandson to Mulambwa) 1878-1884

TATILA AKUFUNA (son to Imbuwa) 1884-1885

LUBOSI (Liwanika-la-Mafuci, a Luvale/Luyana phrase for ‘gatherer/conqueror/uniter of lands [nations] later corrupted to Lewanika by the British) 1885-1916
LITIA (YETA III, son to Liwanika) 1916-1945

IMWIKO (Imwiko I, son to Liwanika, brother to Litia) 1945-1948

MWANAWINA (Mwanawina III, Sir Mwanawina Lewanika the Third K.B.E., son to Liwanika, brother to Imwiko) 1948 to 1968

MBIKUSITA (Lewanika II, son to Liwanika) 1968-1977

ILUTE (son to Yeta III) 1977-July 2000

LUBOSI (Lubosi II, also referred as Imwiko II, son of Imwiko I) – 2000 to date

LITUNGAS LA MBOELA [Malena a Nalolo] (in chronological order starting with the first)

Notulu
Mbanga
Yubya
Nakambe
Mwanaamatia
Kusiyio
Mubukwanu
Kandundu
Kaiko
Mwangala
Matauka
Maibiba (Kaunda)
Atangambuyu
Mulima
Makwibi (current)
Appendix 3 – Barotseland Agreement 1964
Appendix 4 – List of interviewees

Lifuna Akufuna, Mongu, Barotseland, 23-07-2001

Inengu Muyunda Ananyatele, Limulunga Royal Village, Barotseland, 12-08-2001 to 30-07-2001 and 20-09-2002 to 19-10-2002 (also acted as research assistant)

Chief Cieniege of the Mbunda, at his palace near to Limulunga Royal Village, throughout 13-08-2001 and 20-08-2001

T. Davids, British High Commissioner to Zambia, Lusaka, 02-07-2002

E. Iluba, ex-Induna Nalubutu, Mabumbu village, Barotseland, 24-09-2002.

Her Royal Highness the Mboanjikana Kandundu, Libonda Royal Palace, Barotseland, 17-08-2001

J. Kakoma, Mongu, Barotseland, 17-07-2001

Induna Katema (now promoted to Kalonga) of the Ngambela’s Kuta, interviewed in Limulunga Royal Village, Barotseland, 31-03-2004

Maliwa Liyaali, Nayaka, Barotseland, 19-08-2001

Mbuyawana Mbikusita, Secretary-General of the Church of Barotseland, Mongu on several occasions in July, 2001

Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika, son of Litunga Mbikusita, Lusaka, 20 to 27-06-2001

Maybin Monde Nasilele, Sikongo village, Kalabo district, Barotseland, 26-09-2002

Maliwa Liyaali, Nayaka, Barotseland, 19-08-2001

Her Royal Highness, the Litunga la Mboela Makwibi and all the indunas of Muoyo/Nalolo Kuta at a history indaba, Muoyo, Barotseland, 12-08-2001

Nawa Matakala, Limulunga, Barotseland, 13-07-2001

Ex-Chief B.B. Mamili of the Fwe people of Caprivi, Namibia, in exile, Copenhagen, Denmark, 07-02-2001

Sam Mbumbi, Mongu, Barotseland, 20-07-2001

Kekelwa Morrison, Mongu, Barotseland, 21-07-2001

Pastor Barrington Muhongo, Sambi (Prime Minister) to Litunga la Mboela Makwibi, interviews at Muoyo, Senanga and Mongu throughout July and August 2001 and September 2002,

Siluwe Mukena of Liyala village, Lealui, Barotseland, 01-11-2002
Sheba Mulala, Lusaka, Zambia, 29-08-2001

Mwiya Munkayumbana, Sefula, Barotseland, 23-08-2001

Ngenda Mushamuko, Muoyo royal village, Barotseland, 10-10-2002

Mishake Muyongo, self-styled leader of the Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA), ex-President of Caprivi African National Union (CANU), ex-Vice-president of SWAPO, and ex-President of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) of Namibia, in exile, Copenhagen, Denmark, 04-12-2000 and 05-02-2001

Ndate Mwenda, Mongu, Barotseland, 22-07-2001

Prince Mwimanenwa of Litoya village, Barotseland, nephew to Litunga la Mboela Milimu, Muoyo, 17-09-2002

Mukumbuta Namulume, Muoyo, Barotseland, 23-07-2001

Muyunda Nasiilele, 30 year-old water company worker of Mongu, interviewed 21-10-2002

E. Nawa of Muoyo village, Barotseland, 07-10-2002

Chief Sikwa and his people, Nambinje, Barotseland, 21-07-2001

Mwangala Sililo of Nabulu village, Lealui district, Mongu, Barotseland, 02-11-2002

Dr. Imasiku Sipalo interviewed October 10th 2002, Namushakende District.

Amos Simasiku, Mongu, Barotseland, 22-07-2001

Buxton Simasiku (Induna Amulimukwa), Mwandi, Barotseland, 01-09-2001

Nawa Tahalima, retired schoolteacher, interviewed in Sesheke town, October 12th 2002

Wakuňuma Wakuňuma, Libonda, Barotseland, 16 to 18-08-2001

Prince Wamungungo, nephew of Litunga la Mboela Mulima, Muoyo, Barotseland, 12-10-2002

Chimbinde Mungamba Yolosi, Limulunga, Barotseland, 28-07-2001
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A2/1/13
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A2/1/45
(May 1924) Correspondence between Yeta III and Governor of N. Rhodesia BarFY1.05
A3/16/1
(1909) Correspondence and documentation referring to the Masubia cattle cases CapFS1.02

A36
BSE1/2/20
BSE 1/6/4
BSE2/20/1
HC 1/2/1
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sub-districts, Lewanika’s living children, Yeta III’s living children, Mbangweta Munalula: Ngambela of Barotse, Interesting indabas and ceremonies.

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